Gigantic struggles: the battle to build the United Automobile Workers after the sit-down strikes, 1937–1945

ABSTRACT This article examines the struggle to build the United Automobile Workers in the years after the sit-down strike of 1936–37 in Flint, Michigan. The strike, which historian Sidney Fine has called ‘the most significant American labor conflict in the twentieth century,’ has secured the lion’s share of scholarly attention. While it was very important, much remained to be done to make the UAW an institution that represented almost all American autoworkers. At the time of the strike, only 10 percent of GM’s 47,000 Flint workers belonged to the UAW, while much of the industry was unorganized. This article changes the focus, examining the struggle to build the union after the strike. In this period, the union faced bitter internal divisions, ongoing corporate opposition, patchy membership levels, and economic instability. It struggled to establish itself, and internal records – especially overlooked executive board minutes that are mined here – reveal considerable vulnerability and instability. While the UAW made progress between 1937 and 1941, it was in World War II that it solidified itself nationally, helped by favorable bargaining conditions. Even then, it faced ongoing leadership divisions and rank and file disaffection. Building the union took time and deserves closer interrogation.

new technique, and one that anticipated the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Babson, 1999;Barnard, 2004, pp. 1-4;Bernstein, 1960;Fine, 1969, p. 341; for the influence on later civil right, see Chafe, 1980).In the strikes, workers demanded to be treated as more than cogs on giant assembly lines.As long-serving UAW leader Walter Reuther later reflected, the 'most novel and significant fact' about the strikes was that 'workers were asserting that a man who labors at a lathe for five, ten or twenty years is not an economic pariah but has a property right in his job' (Reuther, 1946).
On 11 February 1937, the beaming sit-downers emerged from the plant, having won recognition from GM, the world's most powerful corporation.The 'jubilant' strikers, reported The Washington Post, emerged 'with all the fanfare of a war-time armistice' ('Autoworkers,' 1937, p. 1).It was a huge victory, a seismic moment in U.S. labor history.'Rarely,' wrote Jay Lovestone afterwards, 'does a single event of and by itself mean so much' (quoted in Fine, 1969, p. vii).Scholars have recognized it as such.Within a decade, the strike had been the subject of a vivid account by Henry Kraus (1947).Other works soon followed.In his classic Sit-Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936Strike of -1937, Sidney Fine termed the strike 'the most significant American labor conflict in the twentieth century ' (1969, p. 341).A generation later, UAW historian John Barnard called it 'the decisive event in auto organizing ' (2004, p. 73).
More recently, others have gone even further.'The victory of Flint autoworkers,' argued Edward McClelland in Midnight in Vehicle City, 'ushered in the golden age of the American middle class and created an economy in which all workers had a right to the wealth their labor produced.'According to McClelland, the Flint sit-down was 'the natal event of the modern labor movement.'The BBC called it 'the strike heard 'round the world' (McClelland, 2021, quotations on cover, p. 183).
To be sure, the strike facilitated important gains for millions of American workers.Winning recognition from GM was huge.The UAW breakthrough was followed by the surrender of the U.S. Steel Corporation -another fierce opponent of unionism -to the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee, beginning what the Financial Observer termed 'a new era' of labor-management relations (Fine, 1969, p. 341).Between 1936 and1937, the number of sit-down strikes rose from 48 to 477.Participants included laundry workers, millhands, tobacco workers, and hotel and restaurant employees, along with opticians, pencil makers, and dog catchers.As Fine observed, 'every conceivable type of worker ' got involved (1969, p. 331).In many ways, the sit-down strike encapsulated the new found militancy of American workers in the 1930s, a decade that saw the organization of industrial unions and a big upsurge in union membership.Between 1932 and1939, membership jumped from under three million to almost nine million workers (Zieger & Gall, 2002, p. 66; see also Bernstein, 1970;Zieger, 1995).
The Flint sit-down deserves its place in labor -and U.S. history -textbooks (see, for example, Boyer et al., 1998, pp. 570-571;Brinkley, 2003, pp. 711-712;Norton et al., 1996, p. 491;Zieger & Gall, 2002, pp. 87-88).In some ways, however, a wider focus would be beneficial, especially as the fulsome praise lavished on the strike can obscure the task that autoworkers still faced.While the strike achieved a lot, much also remained to be done, especially in building the UAW into an institutional force that represented the vast majority of America's autoworkers (Porter, 1937, p. 66).
Militancy alone could not achieve this.At the time of the strike, only about 10 percent of GM's 47,000 Flint workers belonged to the UAW.A much smaller group -about 900 workers -were true veterans of the sit-down strike.Across GM's empire, union membership was patchy, and there were many states outside Michigan -even in the industrial Midwest -where the UAW had few members.The contract that the sit-down strikers secured, moreover, was limited and preliminary.Crucially, GM retained the open shop, only recognizing the UAW's bargaining rights over its members, not all GM workers.The UAW was also only recognized for six months.As The New York Times summarized, this was a 'truce' rather than a long-term 'peace,' especially as GM's leaders continued to believe that the UAW was 'bound to fail' (Porter, 1937, p. 66).Apart from GM, the huge Ford Motor Company -with over 125,000 workers in the U.S. -was unorganized, and the company was bitterly resisting the union.In addition, most parts makers and the large aircraft sector were non-union, and the UAW had yet to establish much of the administrative apparatus it needed for long-term viability.A lot more organizational work was needed ('autoworkers,' 1937, p. 1;'U.A.W Votes,' 1937, p. 1;p. 1;Zieger & Gall, 2002, pp. 87-88).
As such, the years immediately after the strike warrant closer interrogation.Compared to the strike, much less is known about the union's history in these crucial years, particularly the key period between 1937 and 1941.There are some studies that cover these years, particularly from a grassroots perspective of particular locales or groups, but the national viewpoint -especially as seen by the international executive board -has been under-represented (see, for example, Babson, 1991;Friedlander, 1975;Keeran, 1980). 1 These years were less glamorous, yet they were crucial in cementing the UAW's place in American life.Working hard, the union gained members and made considerable progress, especially in bringing the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) under contract.At the same time, it faced many problems, including bitter internal divisions, ongoing corporate opposition, patchy membership levels, and economic instability.It struggled to establish itself, and internal records reveal considerable vulnerability and instability.The picture that emerges from these sources is of a union that had a lot of work to do, even after the sit-down strike had made an important breakthrough ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 33).
In particular, this article mines UAW international executive board minutes, an overlooked source that provides particularly candid insights into the union's struggles in the years after the Flint sitdown.While broader works -particularly by Barnard (2004) and Lichtenstein (1995) -have ably covered the UAW's history in a wider context, these minutes have been largely overlooked.In American Vanguard: The United autoworkers During the Reuther Years, 1935-1970, John Barnard (2004) covers this growth but relies more on convention proceedings and other public records, rather than executive board minutes, which offered particularly candid insights into the challenges of growth and the struggle to make the UAW a national force.As the American Vanguard title indicates, Barnard's work is also more of a sympathetic insider account of the UAW's history -with a strong eye on future progress in the postwar decades -yet the minutes mined here reveal considerable vulnerability and struggle.This important first decade needs to be understood and explored in its own right, not just viewed through the lens of subsequent progress.This is especially the case in the crucial early years (see Boyle, 1995;Lichtenstein, 1995;Silvia, 2023).
Rather than trying to provide a complete history of the UAW in these years, this analysis seeks to complement existing scholarship -particularly the accounts of Barnard and Lichtenstein -using a detailed reading of the minutes to explore how the union's highest body experienced the tumultuous events of this early era.The board's perspective was important, as it set and enforced policy and decided on key national issues.According to a resolution passed in 1938, the board had the 'highest authority' to establish policy between the union's conventions.The body brought together representation from all parts of the U.S. and Canada, and local unions had to 'comply' with the board's decisions or face suspension ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 20).
The minutes provide a fresh way to read the UAW's history in its crucial foundational decade.Of course, minutes themselves can be subject to political pressures, even used by those in power to undermine their opponents.By the time of World War II, IEB minutes were often summarized accounts of long meetings, and were not a complete record -though they were still detailed and valuable (e.g.'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941).During the late 1930s, however, executive board meetings were transcribed verbatim, making them an extraordinarily detailed and candid record of the union's history.Divisions and problems were laid bare, in the clearest terms.The Silberblatt Organization transcribed the minutes, with three key staffers -A.Ornelas, H. P. Sanders, and A. W. Biegal -often involved (e.g.'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b).The UAW was proud of its openness, with Walter Reuther later declaring that, 'our Union is without doubt the most democratic union in the American labor movement.'The minutes certainly provide remarkable insights into the UAW's history, and show that the process of building the union into the force that it became by the immediate postwar period was long, with many bumps along the way ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1949, p. 548).
These findings also provide a link to important later scholarship.A lot of work has focused on the problems that the UAW experienced much later, particularly from the 1970s on (a period not covered by Barnard or Lichtenstein) when deindustrialization and layoffs hit the union hard (see Bluestone & Harrison, 1982;Dandaneau, 1996;Dudley, 1994;Feldman & Betzold, 1988;Milkman, 1997;Shotwell, 2011).In the twenty-first century, problems intensified, with GM and Chrysler rescued from bankruptcy in 2008 by a $80 billion federal bailout, dramatic moves that led to further job losses -and membership decline for the UAW (see Dewar, 2009;Ingrassia, 2010;Vlasic, 2011). 2 As other work has shown, the UAW was not helped greatly by the growth of foreign-owned automakers -who established many plants from the 1980s on -largely because most located in the South and the union was unable to organize them.As in its first decade, major problems for the UAW returned (see Minchin, 2021;Silvia, 2023).
Using these records -along with other archival sources and newspapers -I argue that the strike was more of a beginning than an end, and the UAW experienced significant growing pains.As the board summarized in January 1938, after the strike it faced 'gigantic struggles' with employers, as well as significant 'internal problems' to unify the membership.'We faced all our problems at once,' it admitted ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 33).
While the UAW made progress between 1937 and 1941, it was in World War II that it really solidified itself as a national presence.The breakthrough came with wartime employment growth in a key industry, combined with maintenance of membership provisions in wartime contracts, which provided an unprecedented level of union security. 3By 1945, UAW membership had grown to over one million, almost twice the prewar high.Another 250,000-300,000 autoworkers were in the military, retaining their seniority and membership.At the end of the war, the UAW was the largest free union in the world.It has also established itself as the biggest industrial union in the U.S., a position it would hold right through to the end of the twentieth century.This development was not just due to the sit-downs, however, but to hard work after it and the unique support that wartime conditions gave to labor organization (Barnard, 2004, p. 166).By the end of the war, summarized The New York Times, the UAW had 'vast resources' with which to do battle against a wealthy industry (Ruch, 1945, p. 1).
The results were very important for American workers.For over one million autoworkers -and many others who received similar benefits due to the pattern-making nature of UAW contractsunionization brought higher wages, the establishment of grievance machinery, and the introduction of seniority.It also allowed workers to get involved in community welfare and political action.No longer 'just a number on the time-clock rack' -as Reuther put it -autoworkers had 'status in all phases of American life' (Reuther, 1946).With further consolidation in the postwar decades, UAW members became a blue-collar elite, synonymous with high pay and good benefits.In 1998, for example, The New York Times described them as 'blue-collar Brahmins' who earned over $60,000 a year with overtime (Greenhouse, 1998, p. A1).The economic and symbolic importance of America's 'premier industry,' as Paul Ingrassia and Joseph White (1994) have put it, further increased the profile of UAW members, who were frequently courted by political leaders (see Herszenhorn, 2008, p. C1;Hitt & Stoll, 2008, p. A3).
Still, there were caveats that the minutes -a unique forum for private discussion -graphically exposed.Behind the scenes, there was plenty of struggle within the union, especially in its early years.Despite the membership gains, internal divisions plagued the UAW right through to the end of the war.There was ongoing corporate resistance, along with considerable rank and file disaffection.The war years witnessed many unauthorized strikes -in violation of a national no-strike pledge -and mounting grassroots frustration.There was more vulnerability than the UAW's public image as America's largest industrial union allowed.Clearly, the job of building the union took time, and deserves closer interrogation ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 7).
Progress was also not linear.In the immediate wake of the sit-down strikes, the UAW experienced rapid growth.In less than a year, membership surged from 30,000 to nearly 400,000, driven by the example of the strike, active organizing efforts, grassroots frustration with low wages and lack of shopfloor autonomy, and the path-breaking protections provided by the National Labor Relations Act (1935).'This organization during the past year expanded its membership and its functions at a pace unheard of before in the history of the entire labor movement,' the IEB reported in January 1938.In 1938, however, the U.S. economy nosedived, and many of these new members were laid off, robbing the union of stability.Membership rolls fluctuated wildly, as did the union's finances, causing regular deficits.Leaders -most of them relatively young men who had been in the plants themselves until recently -learnt on the job.They also vied for influence within the new organization (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1938, p. 33).
Rapid growth brought other problems, especially for a union that had only been founded in conventions of 1935and 1936(Barnard, 2004, pp. 3-4, 69), pp. 3-4, 69). 4 In particular, the board faced the difficult task of establishing the buildings and infrastructure needed to maintain its nascent membership.Growth necessitated the move to bigger offices in the Griswold Building -a landmark skyscraper in downtown Detroit -along with many other changes.They included the establishment of regional offices, the introduction of new purchasing and accounting methods, and the appointment of a staffer dedicated to publicity work ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, pp. 34-35).With the 'emergency character' of many situations behind it, in early 1938 the UAW also established a legal department ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 37).At the same time, board members established many of the essential services the UAW would need going forward, including a telegram machine, an inter-office communication system, and a staffed reception area.These were all central to the functioning of the international union, which -as the board summarized -was 'formed primarily to facilitate unity of purpose and tie together all sections into a powerful unit' (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1938, p. 20, quotation, pp. 38-39).
In addition to these top-down changes, a lot remained to be done, especially in terms of building the union on the ground.In 1938, another wave of strikes broke out at GM plants, including a walkout at the Fisher Body Plant in Flint that was related to the UAW's efforts to increase its duespaying membership.According to GM, the union barred 400 workers who had not paid dues or signed union cards from going to work ('7 More Strikes Flare,' 1938, p. X2).Board minutes were candid about the union's struggles to establish itself in workers' day-to-day life.In April 1939, President R. J. Thomas -a former autoworker from Detroit -termed the situation at GM 'extremely pitiful, to say the least,' adding that although the union claimed to represent the overwhelming majority of GM workers, most of them were not paying dues.Beyond the militant cadres that led the sit-downs, reaching the bulk of workers across GM's vast empire was a daunting task, and the union was still unsure of its support.'Nobody could tell how an election would come out in General Motors,' admitted Thomas ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939e, pp. 4-5).
Other reports confirmed this picture.As GM director Walter Reuther reported to the board in April 1939, 'the question of rebuilding General Motors is probably one of the most important jobs we have got.' Membership levels were patchy.'This job is primarily one of organization,' admitted Reuther, 'and in the meantime we have got to carry on negotiations in those plants where we still have a bargaining procedure' ('UAW International Executive Board Minutes,' 1939g, p. 110).Overall, a lot remained to be done, including extensive research and publicity work.As Reuther admitted, more research work was needed 'because we have got to know where the hell we are in General Motors and where we are going and how we can get there.'It was a huge task; in 1939 the union's records showed that GM employed over 169,000 workers in the U.S. In order to bargain effectively, leaders needed to know a lot more about job structures, wage levels, and members' grievances, as well as the company's economic structure (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1939g, p. 111).
In the wake of the sit-down strike, the company's resistance did not dissipate.After the settlement, Flint organizer Robert C. Travis told a Senate inquiry that company officials had become 'more vicious' in their attitude toward unions, and were targeting grassroots activists ('G.M. Officials,' 1937, p. 2).In the summer of 1937, the UAW was also still fighting to establish grievance machinery at GM, with Homer Martin complaining about the 'inadequacy and impracticability' of the current procedure, especially as the company did not recognize shop stewards.As a result, unauthorized wildcat strikes remained a major problem ('Union "Grievances,' 1937, p. 5).
Building support -and member engagement -at GM took time.More than two years after the ending of the Flint strike, membership levels at GM were so patchy that Reuther reported them off the record.In April 1939, he related that out of GM's 69 U.S. plants, there were 29 where the UAW did 'not have organization,' meaning that there were a small number of members but no bargaining relationship with management.'There is a great amount of work to be done before you can consider the elections in General Motors Corporation,' he concluded (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1939g, pp. 114-115).Reuther also reiterated that 'extensive research work' was needed before the UAW could do 'an effective job in General Motors' (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1939g, p. 117).He called for more information about GM's 'financial position and progress,' especially if the company asked for concessions.There also needed to be better communication with members -particularly regular bulletins -about the 'whole organizational set-up' (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1939g, p. 119).
There were also problems at Chrysler and Ford.Although Chrysler was organized through a successful sit-down strike in March 1937 -which the company did not actively oppose -union members were again in a minority.After the strike, further union building was needed.While Chrysler's managers were relatively tolerant, the task of reaching a huge body of workers was huge.At Ford, which remained unorganized until April 1941, the challenge was much greater.Used to unilateral control, CEO Henry Ford authorized violent resistance to organizing efforts, including surveillance of union activities and the hiring of strike-breakers.It took years of painstaking organizing to break down Ford's resistance.When the CEO was finally pushed to sign a contract in 1941, he reacted with a temper tantrum.'I don't want any more of this business,' he shouted.'Close the plant down if necessary.Let the union take over if it wishes' (Barnard, 2004, pp. 95-97, 161-164, quotation on p. 163;Reuther, ca 1945, p. 8).
The fight to organize Ford was long and bitter.The company's notorious attack on union representatives at the giant Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, on 26 May 1937 -which saw Reuther and fellow board member Richard Frankensteen beaten by company operatives -led to a lengthy legal challenge by the UAW that went all the way to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.In December 1940, board minutes show that the case was still going on (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1940, p. 58; see also Lichtenstein, 1995).For several years after the Flint strike, the UAW undertook a large-scale organizing campaign at Ford.Resistance was severe; in January 1939, the board acknowledged that the organization of Ford 'hasn't made much progress' (UAW International Executive Board minutes, 1938, p. 10 1939a, p. 83, quotation).Opposition came from the very top, with founder Henry Ford proclaiming that, 'Labor unions are the worst things that ever struck the earth, because they take away a man's independence.'In late 1937, Ford swore that, 'We'll never recognize the United Automobile Workers or any other union' ('Ford Held,' 1937, p. 9).
The company threw everything it had at the UAW, which knew that the sit-down strategywhich reflected particular circumstances and conditions -was unlikely to work at Ford.Union supporters were harassed and attacked, and the UAW was frequently on the defensive.As the NLRB found, Ford fought the union with 'utter ruthlessness' ('Ford Held,' 1937, p. 9).Resistance lasted a long time.As late as 1940, Ford secured a handbill ordinance from the pliable city of Dearborn that prevented the distribution of union literature near its plants.In May, three top UAW leaders -Thomas, secretary-treasurer George Addes, and regional director Richard Leonard -were arrested outside the Rouge plant after they tried to pass out union handbills.Using this arrest as a test case, the UAW's new legal department succeeded in having the law declared unconstitutional, paving the way for more organizing gains ('Arrest Union Men,' 1940, p. 27;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1940, p. 58).In April 1941, after Ford had precipitated a strike by firing many union activists at the Rouge, the company also used black workers as strike-breakers in what Reuther termed a 'desperate attempt to stem the tide of unionism.'The union hit back, mobilizing local and national black leaders to its side.Helped by the militancy of African-American workers and the intervention of new Michigan governor Murray D. Van Wagoner, the UAW was reluctantly 'recognized' at Ford (Barnard, 2004, pp. 159-162;Reuther, ca 1945, p. 8, quotations).
It took a lot to secure this.Agreement was won partly because the fledgling UAW allowed the national CIO to assume control of much of the organizing drive, contributing staff and resources.In September 1940, the CIO contributed $50,000 to the Ford drive -an amount matched by the UAWwith workers organized under the 'C.I.O.banner' ('C.I.O Puts Up,' 1940, p. 24).As the board added later, the giant automaker had only been organized 'by setting aside differences and inviting National CIO to take over direction of the Ford drive' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1947, p. 32).Even after this, the job of building the UAW at Ford plants remained painstaking, and corporate resistance was a constant.'The Ford Motor Car Company does not appreciate they have signed a contract with the International Union,' Reuther admitted to the board in December 1942 ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, p. 8).
In the years after the sit-down strike, the union faced other challenges.The economic climate, in particular, was problematic for several years.In 1937-38, there was a sharp economic downturn, disrupting the UAW's efforts to consolidate its position and keep new members.From May 1937 to June 1938, real GDP dropped 10 percent and unemployment hit 20 percent, remaining high for months afterwards.According to the Federal Reserve, this was America's third-worst downturn of the twentieth century.As late as December 1940, the IEB noted that 9-10 million Americans remained unemployed, with many of them destitute.Minutes highlighted that thousands of skilled autoworkers were 'constantly seeking jobs.'Overall, corporate claims of a labor shortage -along with calls for longer hours -were 'faked.'Highlighting the union's defensive position, the UAW insisted that it had to fight to prevent workers being placed back in a condition of 'economic slavery' (Federal Reserve History, 2013;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1940, p. 61, quotations).
Throughout the late 1930s, the economic situation meant that stability eluded the fledgling UAW.The January 1938 IEB meeting referred to 'the unemployment situation in our Union and the decline in collection of dues' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1938, p. 12).President Homer Martin warned that the auto industry 'was among the last to be affected by the decline, and will be among the last to recover.'In Detroit, the union had 'direct connection' with the Relief Department, finding work for thousands of displaced members and assisting those without jobs.It was a similar situation elsewhere; in Cleveland alone, 25000 UAW members were on welfare ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 24).'Layoffs and shutdowns have brought lengthening lines of workers back to relief stations,' summarized the board in 1938.'Automobile workers have suffered seriously.'According to the union, big business was also attempting to use the downturn to 'weaken the power of the organized labor movement.'The UAW suffered (According to the union, big business was also 1938, p. 25).
The downturn continued in 1939, hurting the UAW's efforts to gain members at Ford and in the large aircraft sector, both of which remained unorganized.'We are facing an abnormal condition,' William McAulay told the board in April 1939, 'work is tapering off, and yet we have a hell of a fight on our hands' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 32).Even unionized companies sought cuts.At the Murray Corporation, a major maker of car bodies, the UAW faced a 'most serious problem,' as managers claimed that they needed a big wage cut in order to stay in business and compete with non-union builders.One car body builder, Budd Manufacturing Company in Philadelphia, paid an average wage of 74 cents an hour, much less than the UAW rate of 94.85 cents.Another competitor, City Stamping, paid 85 cents an hour, taking away work from union members ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, pp.12-13, quotations p. 9).Across other sectors, cheaper non-union rates remained a problem, especially in a constrained economic climate.'We have got to meet our competition there on the question of rates and that is what is hurting us,' summarized one board member ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 21).
As the downturn bit, the fledgling UAW faced constant pressure to reduce wage rates, hurting its efforts to establish itself as a national bargaining force ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, pp. 31-34).These problems led to disaffected members.As President Thomas admitted to the board in September 1939, referring to the Murray Company, 'from what I have talked to various officers of this local union I would like to say this, that the reaction I got from speaking to them that their morale is low at this particular time.'The climate of economic insecurity, he added, had made many workers 'afraid they are going to lose their jobs' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 53).' Across the industry, members also opposed the union's push to abolish piece work because they worried that their pay would go down.This undermined efforts to establish an hourly union wage, a core goal.'I think that is hurting us in establishing a complete breakdown on piece work throughout the industry which should be another objective of this International,' admitted Richard Frankensteen in 1939.Above all, the UAW had yet to secure pattern bargaining or a national wage -these would only be achieved in the more prosperous postwar era, particularly in the landmark GM contracts of 1948 and 1950 ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 54). 5 The early UAW fought constantly to maintain rates.As Frankensteen acknowledged, it needed 'a concentrated effort to develop a higher standard in competitive shops' (UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 52).
Many UAW locals were also inexperienced, fledgling organizations and sought guidance from the executive board.In April 1939, 'Brother McWilliams' from the Murray local asked for bargaining assistance: 'we are very young in the labor movement and although we have got hellish good intentions they probably can fool us a hell of a lot easier than they can you fellows' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 13).There were similar problems in many other sectors, especially as parts companies were often unorganized.In the springs-making sector, where non-union companies undercut union rates, Reuther pressed for an industry wide agreement in order to 'take labor out of competition.''If they work as an organized group with the support of the union working in a concerted program they could lick these God damn sweat shops up-state,' he explained ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, pp. 14, 28-29).
Until World War II, the big aircraft sector -an important prize for a union whose charter authorized it to organize aircraft workers -also remained largely non-union.In the late 1930s, the situation became urgent, especially as the sector grew in the build up to war.At the 1939 convention, plans to organize aircraft workers were approved but the task was huge; the industry employed over 150,000 workers, and they were paid as little as 50 cents an hour, much less than autoworkers ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, pp.9-10).In December 1939, The New York Times reported that the UAW had made 'several starts in organizing the aircraft industry but without much success,' chiefly because of lack of resources and the need to organize car plants (Stark, 1939b, p. 18).As a result, the CIO promised greater assistance in unionizing the booming sector.Board members knew that they might need to strike to bring the aircraft companies to heel, yet this was problematic.In April 1939, President Thomas told the board that the UAW did not yet have a strike fund.He worried that if it needed to initiate a walkout, particularly at GM, it would find that 'we haven't got the dough and will probably hesitate on calling a strike' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 13).
By the time of the board meeting in December 1940, held at the Hollenden Hotel in Cleveland, the UAW was gaining strength but still experiencing growing pains.Thomas began the meeting by relating that the situation in the aircraft sector was 'not satisfactory.'This was important, especially as the sector was growing fast ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1940, p. 3).'The big job ahead would be to organize the aircraft industry, because of all other industries this particular one will be affected the most by the National Defense Program,' the board noted.Organizing the aircraft companies also required greater coordination with the CIO, but some board members were wary of this, apparently because of territorial issues ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1940, p. 4).
There were other growing pains, and private discussions belied the impression of strength and unity the union often had publicly.As late as April 1939, the UAW lacked a dedicated legal department, giving it increased costs because lawyers had to be hired on daily rates.Secretary-treasurer George Addes, in particular, pressed for the establishment of in-house attorneys so as to eliminate the 'premium' the board paid for legal representation ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, pp. 23-25, quotation p. 24).Board discussions also revealed that membership was patchy, especially in auto centers far from Detroit, including many parts of Illinois and the Wisconsin cities of LaCrosse, Racine, Oshkosh, and Janesville.All contained many autoworkers ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 21).Organizing was sporadic; in April 1939 board discussions revealed that the union did not have any organizers in Kentucky or Illinois, yet these states contained 'a lot of potential membership' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 27).Pennsylvania was another weak area, with Reading, Allentown, Pottstown and Philadelphia all being described as 'serious spots for competitive plants in this country' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 52, quotation by Paul Miley).A lot of work was being carried out in the Keystone State, where the UAW lacked members.Overall, the union had a lot of 'virgin territory' it needed to cover ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 28, quotation by 'Brother Roberts').
Even during the defense boom that started in 1940, challenges continued.At the July 1941 meeting, the board discussed the need for greater financing, with Addes suggesting either a dues increase or a per capita tax.The union's second-in-command wanted to use 'this period of prosperity' to build a $5 million treasury.It was important, agreed Reuther, to 'build a reserve in order to combat the hard years ahead.'The board unanimously agreed that increased member contributions were needed in the months -and years -ahead ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1940, p. 10).At this meeting, Addes explained that the union had 'heavy expenses' and was 'definitely in the "red."'Dues payments still lagged, and the UAW had to pay back a loan from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.In conclusion, Addes 'again urged all board members to make an effort to reduce the expenses in their respective regions' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, p. 17).
Financial weakness was a constant problem.The board minutes offered candid insights, highlighting that it proved easier to sign up members than to build a stable organization.In comments that he asked members to keep private, in April 1939 Thomas worried about the union's 'financial situation.''We have been just running along about even,' he related.'It is going to be very necessary to economize as much as possible.'The need to cut, he admitted, threatened to undermine organizing ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939e, pp.6-7).Addes was even bleaker, telling the board on April 25 that, 'If we are to continue at the rate we have been going it will be but a short time before we will be bankrupt.'The UAW, he added, had an operating deficit of $26,962 ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 2).The problem was exacerbated by 'exorbitant' printing costs for the United Automobile Worker, which was mailed to all members.The union was spending $22,000 a month to print the paper, more than it was committing to organizers' salaries.The periodical also lacked national advertising, as the union's publicity efforts were still in their infancy.Many members also complained that they did not receive the publication ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, pp. 5, quotation, 27, 30-31).
Staffing was another issue.Repeatedly calling for cuts, Addes complained about 'dead wood,' particularly among the organizing staff ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 7).He wanted to dismiss many organizers, but other members opposed this.'There is a lot of work to be done in the field,' related one, 'and I don't see how we can reduce the number of organizers and expect to get income in.'Organizers were the 'life blood of this organization' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, pp. 14-15).Chrysler department head Leo Lamotte was outspoken, arguing that in organizing the union had 'a job to do.' Organizers, he insisted, 'can certainly more than pay for their salaries and expenses in this International Union.' Addes, however, stuck to his guns.'I'll bet you nine-tenths of our organizers don't do a damn thing to bring in revenue from the standpoint of calling on local unions, and I say now, on per capita tax, to get that into the International office,' he asserted ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, pp.16-17).
Perhaps the biggest problem, however, was internal division.While this has been acknowledged in other accounts, board minutes show just how crippling and lasting the issue was.The problems lasted well beyond 1939, when president Homer Martin -a flawed and erratic character who had alienated much of the board -was charged with impeachment and removed.John Barnard's observation that by 1941 the UAW had 'resolved the crises that accompanied its birth' did not quite capture the full picture exposed by board discussions (2004, pp. 130-164, quotation p. 164).Factional fighting hurt the UAW right through to the end of World War II, when Walter Reuther took over as president and finally produced more unity ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, p. 11; see also Lichtenstein, 1995, pp. 78-79).
On the eve of World War II, the fight to expel Martin consumed the union.A former Baptist preacher and auto worker from Kansas City, 37-year-old Martin was charged with trying to make a sweetheart deal with Ford in order to bring about organization.In return for Ford signing a contract, Martin allegedly agreed that the UAW would drop all NLRB charges against the company.The union also committed to abandoning the personal injury cases of strikers beaten up by Ford (Barnard, 2004, p. 59;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, pp. 17-18).According to Reuther, Martin had also undermined the union by placing his friends on the payroll 'just to take up every damn bit of slack that we had gained.'Since the UAW's birth, Martin had also sought to consolidate power in the presidency, rather than in the membership, arguing that it would reduce radical influence.His conduct divided the board (U.A.W. Growth, 1937;p. 53;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939f, p. 20, quotation).There were huge ramifications for the UAW as a whole, which was -as The New York Times noted -'split wide open' by the fight (Martin Ousts Foes, 1939, p. 2).After Martin's suspension, added The Washington Post, the UAW was split into 'two angry camps' ('Martin Ousts 5,' 1938, p. 1).
Consuming the UAW for the early months of 1939 -with a lengthy internal trial in March -the Martin case involved extensive testimony from local and national union leaders.Much of it was damning and divisive.According to Paul Ste Marie, the recording secretary of Ford Local 600, Martin had been 'fishing around for approval' at Ford.In order to get union recognition from the last of the Big Three, the UAW leader had signed up for a 'so-called agreement' that was 'lousy' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, pp.19, first quotation, 20, other quotations).Proceedings even revealed that Martin had privately contacted Harry Bennett, the notorious head of the Ford Service Department, to make a deal that involved taking the UAW out of the CIO and into the rival AFL.Minutes showed that Bennett offered Martin a 'closed shop contract' if he led the UAW into the AFL, which was known to be less militant than the CIO (Barnard, 2004, p. 136;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, pp. 21-23, quotations).
Martin vigorously fought the charges.According to proceedings, Martin felt the CIO was too 'radical' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, p. 24).The president had severe differences with the executive board, reputedly calling them 'a bunch of incompetents, a bunch of dumb sons-of-bitches' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, p. 27).Although he did not appear before the board to answer the charges against him, Martin claimed support among the membership and sought a rank-and-file vote in his position, asserting that this was the only way to end the 'factional war' in the union (Martin Calls, 1939, p. 6).He also asserted that some of his opponents were communists who wanted to bring the U.S. into a war with Japan in defense of Russia (Martin Calls, 1939, p. 6;'Martin Seeks,' 1938, p. X30).
At the March 1939 board meeting, other revealing details surfaced.Testimony showed that Martin believed that if he secured a contract at Ford and withdrew from the CIO, the company would pressure parts suppliers to recognize the union.Much of the giant parts sector remained unorganized, and the UAW worried about the scale of the task ahead.There were, however, more sinister motives.Thomas, who took over as president, testified that Martin met with populist priest Father Coughlin, who was anti-labor and anti-Semitic.The controversial radio personality encouraged Martin to take the UAW out of the CIO and into the AFL.Exacerbating divisions, Coughlin expressed hatred for board member Richard Frankensteen, who was Jewish, and Martin apparently acceded to this.A subsequent NLRB investigation also revealed that Martin had taken money from Ford, although the company denied this (Oakes, 1940, p. 1;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939c, pp. 3-5, 8, 18; see also Lepore, 2018, pp. 461, 476;Tull, 1965).
The fight spilled over into local unions, with many dividing themselves along pro or 'anti-Martin' lines ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939d, p. 13).A strong speaker, Martin had considerable support on the ground.Factional fighting consumed many locals, with Thomas' supporters attacking their opponents -in the words of board member Ed Hall -as 'stooges' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939d, p. 113).In early 1939, there were even fist fights between the two sides at union gatherings, including a mass brawl at a meeting of Plymouth Local 51 that had to be broken up by Detroit police.According to The New York Times, a February 1939 mass meeting of both factions in Flint also saw 'about 100 fist fights' ('U.A.W Factions,' 1939, p. 12).After this melee, Richard Frankensteen was charged with assault after he pulled a gun on a Martin supporter (Stark, 1939a, p. 1).Some local union members even gave anonymous testimony to the board about efforts by Martin's supporters to get locals to leave the UAW (see, for example, 'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939b, pp. 140-144).Although Martin suspended 15 board members -even locking them out of their offices -the CIO recognized the furloughed group as legitimate officeholders.After this, Martin resigned from the CIO executive board and the fight was apparently resolved (Barnard, 2004, pp. 136-137;Martin Ousts Foes, 1939, p. 2).
The split, however, had lasting repercussions.Martin ended up taking some locals into the AFL, where he set up a rival union that also called itself the UAW.This generated confusion, and ongoing fighting at the local and national levels.At the July 1941 board meeting, attorney Maurice Sugar reported that a number of lawsuits were still in progress because of the split.Finances were affected, with the treasuries of a number of locals being impounded.Property in the UAW's headquarters in Detroit's Griswold building also had to be divided between the two organizations ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 11).The UAW's 'lengthy' Cleveland convention, where Martin was ousted after a drawn-out process, also produced a 'tremendous amount of expenses.'In its wake, the number of central committees had to be reduced ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 30).
The split also hurt the UAW's efforts to consolidate its grip on the industry and sign up members.Board members worried about the ongoing influence of 'Martin's stooges' in grassroots locals, a problem across the industry ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, p. 27).The split hurt efforts to organize GM, where Martin retained considerable strength on the ground.In July 1939, GM dug in as the UAW sought a new contract, with a company spokesperson telling the union that it 'wouldn't negotiate a new contract or changes in the old one until somebody tells us who the U.A.W. is' ('Strike Move Near,' 1939, p. 9).The company even petitioned the NLRB to determine whether the UAW-CIO or UAW-AFL was the legal heir to the contract signed after the Flint strike.Martin also had many supporters at the large Motor Products plant in Detroit.At both companies, many workers were migrants from the South or lower Midwest and were drawn by Martin's Baptist-inspired rhetoric ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, pp. 55-56).At the Briggs Manufacturing Company, a maker of car bodies, the UAW had to battle competition from the UAW-AFL.Only in November 1939 did it win bargaining rights at Briggs' seven plants, following contested elections and 'protests' from the UAW-AFL ('NLRB Names C.I. O,' 1939, p. 2, quotation;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939g, pp. 55-56).At the local level, workers across the country staged numerous strikes and sit-downs in the chaos.The executive board recognized the seriousness of the situation, with one member worrying before the expulsion that 'drastic action' against Martin would 'tear this International union up' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, p. 192, quotations by 'Brother Carey').What Addes called 'factionalism' remained a major problem in the early UAW ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, p. 198, quotation;Zieger & Gall, 2002, p. 98).
At the executive board, members decried the state of affairs, yet continued to fight.'I never in all of my life seen such disruption that has been carried on in this International union as it has in the past two months,' fumed Ed Hall at the 10 January 1939, meeting, referring to the 'God damn factional activities of the President' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, p. -202, second quotation by 'Brother Parker').Proceedings were emotive and profane, with terms such as 'horse shit' and 'Bullshit' permeating the air.According to Hall, Martin should 'go out and jump in the God damn river' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, pp. 202, 204).There were also lots of 'God damn' and 'hell' references (see, for example, 'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, pp. 216-217).Observing it all, new president R. J. Thomas tried to steady the ship.'If this God damn fighting doesn't stop this union is going to be smashed all to hell, make no mistake about it,' he warned the board in January 1939, 'but God damn it I have tried to stop it and hell, I couldn't do it' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a, p. 219).
Sure enough, the fighting continued.It took a long time for stability to be achieved, and Thomas' position was always tenuous.In 1943, a new wave of factional in-fighting erupted, prompted partly by John L. Lewis' defection from the CIO, whose support of administration policies he had criticized for a number of years.Lewis took the United Mine Workers back into the AFL, claiming that he could deliver a 'good portion' of UAW locals too ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 4; see also Lichtenstein, 2003pp. 31-32, 76-78;Zieger & Gall, 2002, pp. 112-113).Thus, in June 1943 Thomas referred in his report to the board of a 'factional fight' within the Board, adding that it was 'most unhealthy for the organization' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 3).Lewis' return to the AFL generated divisions, re-opening the wounds of the Martin era.Clearly worried, Thomas called for 'all out support for the CIO,' adding that, 'as big as the autoworkers were, they could not stand alone' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 4).
The little-known split of 1943 was serious.'President Thomas proclaimed the situation existing today in the Union to be as bad as that which existed in the days of Homer Martin,' the June 1943 minutes recorded.'If continued, it could only lead to the disintegration of the Union, the losing of contracts, and collective bargaining.' Thomas ended his address to the meeting 'with a plea to the Board that all work together' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 5).Despite this, the board was unable to agree on a nomination to serve on the National War Labor Board, Thomas admitting that the names he recommended 'never did quite meet the complete agreement of both sides.'In addition, Reuther turned down an offer from CIO president Philip Murray to serve on the War Production Board, telling the executive board he had been willing to assist but did not 'deem it advisable' due to 'recent developments' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, p. 25).At the meeting, Reuther clashed bitterly with Chrysler department director Leo Lamotte, the latter accusing his counterpart of encouraging the wartime strike wave for political gain ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 69).
These clashes provided the backdrop for the UAW's 1943 convention, held late in the year in Chicago.Reporting to the board, Thomas referred to the gathering as 'chaos.'Part of the problem was considerable 'unrest' among the membership, many of whom disliked the national no-strike pledge that labor made for the duration of the war.Pressure from below undermined the UAW's leaders, whose grip on their positions was tenuous.The convention also featured a fight between caucuses led by Reuther and Addes, with the Reuther group running Richard Leonard for secretary-treasurer against Addes.A young Socialist, Addes won re-election by a narrow margin, while Reuther edged out Addes' ally Frankensteen to become first vice president.The results represented a defeat for the Left, as Addes and Frankensteen had proposed an incentive pay plan at the board, a move that was popular with the Communist Party, which wanted to increase military production.The convention featured an open fight over incentive pay that again laid bare top-level divisions.While Thomas sidestepped the factionalism, his own support was insecure (Barnard, 2004, pp. 182-184;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, pp. 4, quotations, 5).
Even late in the war, factional fighting continued.In the summer of 1944, Thomas warned the board that 'it would be criminal to go to the coming convention with our people split -it would hurt the political action program, wage program and in the final analysis weaken our organization' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 7).Despite this, divisions on the executive board remained palpable, causing what the minutes termed 'internal trouble in the Union' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 8).
In the fall of 1944, the Ninth constitutional convention, held in Grand Rapids, Michigan, featured continued division -or what the executive board minutes termed 'unrest.'The problem, however, was not just leadership differences but mounting frustration from below.As Thomas told the executive board in October, 'When considering the present status of our country, and the provocations of managements all over the country, it was easy to comprehend the reason for the worker's almost open animosity towards all officers, Board members and general staff at the Convention.' Highlighting the atmosphere of mistrust that still plagued the board, Thomas warned his colleagues 'against playing "politics" with such situations.'Later in the October 1944 meeting, Thomas made a 'plea' to all board members to 'cease to act as individuals and to think and work for the general welfare of the Union.'He added that, 'All animosity must be put aside in order to face the job ahead of the Union and the reconversion period' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944b, p. 5).There were acute divisions in the Western region, where the rival UAW-AFL was, Reuther admitted, 'organizing on the West Coast far more aircraft workers than UAW-CIO now, as a result of this bad situation in our own ranks.'The UAW had even been unable to elect a regional director on the West Coast.It was, the board concluded, a 'mess' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944b, p. 9).
Even at the end of the war, divisions were obvious on the executive board, where motions were disputed and discussions referred to 'only the majority's view' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1945c, p. 30).At the January 1945 meeting, Thomas 'again called for complete cooperation on the part of all Board Members, that the problems affecting the life of our organization might be properly resolved' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1945a, p. 7).The holding of annual conventions exacerbated the problem, yet members pressed for regular gatherings, partly so that they could air grievances regularly.After the war, the UAW would move to triennial conventions ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1945c, p. 9).At the March 1945 meeting, differences were also visible between much of the board, which called for the CIO to withdraw its representatives from the National War Labor Board because of its unsatisfactory record in processing labor grievances, and President Thomas, who told the press that this was 'unwise.'The dispute sowed the seeds of Thomas' demise; in March 1946 he lost the presidency to Reuther in another close contest (Barnard, 2004, pp. 223-224;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1945b, p. 50, quotation).
During World War II, financial problems also continued.In August 1942, the UAW's financial position remained weak, heavily dependent on more dues being received.'Our Union today is confronted with a great number of problems,' Addes told colleagues ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942b, pp. 4, 13, quotation).Addes termed the financial structure of the union 'very unstable,' with an operating deficit of $60,446 a month.As a result, he recommended again that the staff be cut, with around 120 organizers to be removed.The number of international representatives -and their expenses -was also a perennial problem.In August 1942, the UAW had some 302 international representatives, and payroll costs accounted for 64 percent of average monthly income.Addes wanted a 'very drastic shake-up in the personnel,' but other board membersdefending territory and stressing the importance of organizing -disagreed ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942b, pp. 13, 14, quotations).As the war continued, so did the growing pains.In December 1942, Thomas told the board that the UAW faced 'many serious problems.'Although membership was increasing, expenditures continued to exceed income.'We must not risk having the International go bankrupt,' he warned ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, p. 4).
It was wartime conditions that ultimately addressed these problems.The no-strike pledge made it difficult for managers to provoke strikes to break unions, while a tight labor market increased workers' leverage.There was also support from the Roosevelt administration, which needed labor's backing -politically and for the war effort.At the March 1942 board meeting alone, the UAW issued 38 new charters.Gains included Ford, Dodge, and Pontiac plants, along with aircraft companies, numerous parts makers, and broader manufacturing concerns.Although a swath of new locals was based in the industrial Midwest, gains occurred from Massachusetts right across to California ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942a, pp. 26-27).At the June 1943 meeting, another 39 new local unions were chartered.They included new Ford Motor Company locals in Michigan and Pennsylvania, as well as unions at major wartime facilities such as Bendix Aviation and Southern Aviation.There were also gains at key auto-related facilities, including Mack Manufacturing Corporation and Higgins-Tucker Motor Company.The union's reach spread from Louisiana and Texas in the South to California in the West, along with strongholds in the industrial Midwest and Northeast.It was a genuine national force ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, pp. 12-14).
As the war continued, membership shot up.In 1939, the UAW only had 165,000 membershighlighting the scale of the job to do -but this jumped to 461,000 in 1941 and 1.06 million in 1944.Board minutes showed that for the first six months of 1942 alone, UAW membership rose 7 percent, and averaged 521,395.Membership had increased in all areas, with Canada -classified as a regionshowing the biggest rise (Lichtenstein, 2003, p. 80;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942a, pp. 22-23).There were organizing gains in multiple industries, including the aircraft sector, where over 78,000 new members had been added.The cost of organizing these workers -many of them described as 'young boys' -was considerable, yet the membership gains were considerable, as these were giant facilities ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942a, p. 24).
Other wartime conditions were crucial in producing this growth.In particular, for the first time the UAW was able to secure a reliable dues-paying base, crucial for long-term viability.In this regard, the maintenance of membership clauses of wartime contracts addressed the issue of securing dues that plagued the union before the war.In late 1942, a strict maintenance of membership clause was inserted into the GM-UAW contract, with workers required to stay in the union once an initial 15-day 'escape' period had passed (Gilbert, 1944, p. 9).Across the industry, the constrained labor market also provided economic stability, preventing the dips in membership that had occurred in the late 1930s.In December 1942, Addes told the board that growth was pleasing.'The figures show a steady increase in membership and we have not as yet benefited from the maintenance of membership clauses in some of our new contracts,' he reported.'It is difficult to estimate but certainly the gain should be substantial.'As a result, the secretary-treasurer finally anticipated a balanced budget ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, pp. 51, quotations, 52).
The UAW emerged from the war with unprecedented strength, but its journey in its first decade was rough and uneven.There was plenty of adversity, and unresolved tensions in its ranks.Even the war years brought abundant challenges.Throughout the global conflict, it proved hard to address workers' grievances, especially as federal wage controls, rather than collective bargaining, set workers' pay.Again, board minutes provided candid insights into how acute the pressure on UAW leaders was.In December 1942, President Thomas admitted to his colleagues that 'collective bargaining, as such, has somewhat broken down.Most of our problems now must be settled in Washington through proper governmental channels.'The UAW, however, lacked representation in Washington; it did not even have an office there.The union's regional structure proved problematic during the war, when authority was centralized.A Washington office, Thomas admitted, 'would also stop much of the complaining of the membership' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, p. 7).
Gradually, the union moved to address this.The December 1942 meeting authorized the establishment of the UAW's Washington office, another important step in the union's growth.Frankensteen and Reuther staffed the office, with Reuther responsible for liaising with the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission, while Frankensteen dealt with the War Labor Board and the Conciliation Service.The appointment placed Reuther at the heart of important policy-making decisions, another step on his rise up the ranks.This was especially the case given that the international union, not regional offices, was given final authority to decide matters coming to the Washington office.The war left Reuther in prime position to challenge for the presidencyhelped by his 1943 defeat of Frankensteen for the first vice president's position ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1942c, p. 56).
Like the rest of organized labor, shortly after Pearl Harbor UAW leaders had signed up to a national no-strike pledge for the course of the war.Workers, however, faced heavy workloads, long hours, a rising cost of living, as well as managers who exploited the situation to gain the upper hand.In the auto plants -which were converted to make tanks, trucks, and jeeps during the war -these problems were particularly acute.Pressures of production were enormous; during the war, $25 of every $100 worth of war materials was produced by autoworkers.As a result, many launched unauthorized strikes.Often, these walkouts were short-lived and unreported.Board discussions revealed how acute the situation was, and how leaders struggled to control events on the ground, which were also inflamed by ongoing political divisions ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 7;'UAW vs GM,' 1945, p. 69;Zieger & Gall, 2002, p. 128).
The minutes highlighted the pressure that grassroots autoworkers were under, especially in the second half of the war, when conditions took their toll.On the morning of 20 May 1943, for example, workers at Chrysler's large Jefferson plant in Detroit struck, chiefly over unresolved grievances.Board investigations revealed that grievances included local issues such as leaking roofs, lack of wage adjustments, and 'indifferent and vindictive' attitudes from supervisors.In addition, workers were angry because the company took away coveralls from welders.The strike was one of the many wartime walkouts that were unauthorized, with workers persisting despite efforts by the War Production Board and UAW executive board to dissuade them ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, pp. 60, quotation, 65).
A few hours after the Chrysler workers struck, about 5,000 workers at the Dodge Main plant walked out, despite efforts by the international union and company to dissuade them.Earl Reynolds, the president of Dodge Local 3, even angrily asserted about Chrysler manager Joseph M. Rubin, 'that ____ ______ doesn't know what the _____ it is all about' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 61).The Dodge strike was precipitated by new workers being hired in violation of seniority rules, another common problem due to the wartime labor shortage ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, p. 62).On 21 May 1943, workers at the DeSoto Warren plant also struck, local union leader Maynard Eysaman relating rank and file 'dissatisfaction with the Company's answers to grievances which have been taken through the regular bargaining procedure.'Again, DeSoto workers voted to 'close the plant down' despite pressure from the company and international union not to do so ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 62).Frustration built up because workers who struck found it hard to get any redress.Overall, as Chrysler UAW representative Leo Lamotte related, the WLB's 'only interest was in getting the men back to work' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 63).
The strikes only led to piecemeal gains, with workers told to put their main demands on hold until after the war.As Frankensteen acknowledged, the membership was restless.'For the past several years,' he told the executive board in 1943, referring particularly to Chrysler, 'the grievance procedure has been proven inadequate with the result that unsettled disputes have developed into work stoppages.'The board fought unsuccessfully to establish an impartial umpire at Chrysler, where unsettled grievances produced 'unrest and turmoil' at the grassroots ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 74).The strikes were part of a broader pattern; in 1943, there were over 3,700 strikes across the U.S., involving almost 2 million workers (Zieger & Gall, 2002, p. 129).
Reflecting mounting worker frustration, the summer of 1944 was even worse.Strike numbers increased further, Thomas reporting that a 'wave of strikes' had made the need to retain the no-strike policy 'urgent' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 7, quotations;Zieger & Gall, 2002, p. 129).The fall of 1944 saw walkouts at Briggs and Packard, chiefly over grievances of maintenance workers ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944b, p. 6).In February 1945, there was another unauthorized strike, this time at Dodge plant 3 in Detroit.The walkout occurred after eight workers were fired due to a 'dispute over production standards' ('UAW-CIO press release,' 1945).The executive board intervened to try and settle the strike, noting that it had occurred at a 'crucial stage of the war against our enemies' ('Statement by the International Executive Board, UAW-CIO,' 1945).Affecting some 13,000 workers, this was a particularly serious dispute ('Re: Dodge Strike, ' 1945, p. 35).
In a special hearing of the board held on February 28, however, the leaders of Dodge local 3 were unrepentant.'Conditions in our entire Dodge plant is rotten and so rotten, they stink,' asserted worker Mike Novak, detailing overbearing supervisors and managers who refused to settle grievances ('Re: Dodge Strike,' 1945, pp. 7, 8, quotation).Reflecting similar division, the UAW's 1944 convention in Grand Rapids featured a referendum on whether to uphold the no-strike pledge; the faction to revoke the pledge received 37 percent of the vote, and the union emerged without a clear consensus.The outcome helped explain the board's concerns about member unrest (Lichtenstein, 2003, pp. 195-196).
The strength that the UAW gained during the war was also a double-edged sword.As board members were aware, the defense boom was temporary -and tenuous.Well before the end of the war, leaders were concerned about layoffs, fearing that membership could dip and vulnerability be resumed.'Employment in war industries has now passed its peak and is on the decline,' summarized the executive board in August 1944.As military contracts were terminated, the UAW feared that as many as five million workers could be displaced.In August 1944, an executive board resolution summarized the union's reconversion policy, which sought to minimize job losses as the shift occurred.'Until victory is won on all fronts the principal object of the UAW must be to further the production of military equipment,' it explained.'The continuance of an all-out effort upon the part of the membership depends in no small measure upon the assurance of uninterrupted employment, or at the least upon the guarantee of adequate assistance during the reconversion process' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1944a, p. 82).
Still, many UAW members were victims of the reconversion layoffs.As scholars have detailed, African-Americans and women -both hired in large numbers during the war but often seen as temporary replacements for male workers in the military -were hit particularly hard (see Barnard, 2004, pp. 191-198, 204-205;Gabin, 1990, pp. 111-142).During the war, almost 350,000 women joined the UAW, a number bettered only by the United Electrical Workers.After the war, however, the number plummeted.The influx of women and African-Americans also caused significant tensions in the plants, as board minutes documented (Barnard, 2004, p. 166;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, p. 80).
One of the most disturbing wartime developments was the occurrence of hate strikes by white workers when blacks were hired into new areas (Barnard, 2004, pp. 194-196).It fell to the board to resolve these disputes -and their leadership often made a difference.Minutes of a hate strike at Packard, a giant car plant in Detroit, were especially illustrative.In June 1943, the board related that when three black workers at Packard were upgraded and placed on the assembly line, whites -many of them southern migrants -walked out.'Fundamentally the problem concerned the up-grading of three negro workers,' related the board.'Upon being transferred the white workers in that particular department refused to work and walked out and returned to work only after the three negroes had been taken out' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 23).The strike encapsulated the broader tensions that would trigger the Detroit race riot that same month, when police killed 17 African-Americans following inter-racial fighting over access to housing, jobs, and recreational spaces in the crowded wartime city (Detroit Historical Society, n.d.).The minutes revealed that a company official, 'Mr.Wise,' exacerbated the situation, initially telling workers that they would not have to work with blacks.In response, the UAW's executive board called for Wise to be fired and condemned the strike.As a result, the company official changed his position.The board also issued a 'very strong' resolution that stressed the importance of non-discrimination in wartime work.Further, the board called for an investigation into Klan activity at the factory and recommended greater education for grassroots workers ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, pp. 23, quotations, 80).
The minutes also revealed, however, how the board's endorsement of non-discrimination -for both women and African-American workers -had strict limits.In 1943, the IEB backed the policy of the War Manpower Commission that women with young children should be discouraged from working, only hired as an 'absolute last resort in meeting manpower requirements' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1941, p. 29).In addition, women workers often did not have as strong seniority rights as men, the board deeming seniority for part-timers a 'complicated matter' that was best handled 'on a local union or plant basis.'Furthermore, it endorsed War Policy Division recommendations that women workers have less seniority, worried that full rights for full and part-time workers was a 'considerable danger in that it may make top heavy a seniority roster which will prove a real problem during the post-war period.'The union also discouraged mothers from working at night.When the war wound down and veterans returned, the board also largely favoured plans to protect the seniority status of men.As such, board policies helped underpin the widespread displacement of women autoworkers at the end of World War II.In the decades after World War II, women would not comprise more than 15 percent of the UAW's membership (Gabin, 1990, p. 1;'UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1941, pp. 30, quotations, 61).
Board minutes provide insights into the broader reasons for such policies being adopted.They demonstrate that the UAW's image as what one scholar has termed 'an advocate of women's rights' needs some tempering (Gabin, 1990, p. 2).This image rested more on postwar developments -such as the UAW's foundational role in setting up the National Organization of Women in 1966 and endorsing the Equal Rights Amendment in 1970 -rather than events in this important first decade, which again need consideration in their own right (Gabin, 1990, pp. 1-2).Early minutes described UAW members as 'men' and 'the men.'While these were standard terms at the time, the terminology was still revealing.More importantly, the board was all-male, with women employed as secretaries.These secretaries were also forbidden to have visitors during working hours ('UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, pp. 5, quotations, 9).On other occasions, UAW leaders -including Thomas -termed grassroots members 'the boys' ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939e, p. 6).In 1944, the UAW took a significant step when it established the UAW's Women's Department, the first of its kind, providing a forum for women to bring their complaints.Overall, however, the UAW's record in regard to women workers during World War II was, as historian Nancy Gabin has put it, 'decidedly mixed ' (1990, pp. 1, quotation, p. 4).
By the end of World War II, the UAW had achieved considerable strength.It is this power -and unity -that existing accounts have emphasized.'The auto workforce had recreated itself in the image of the union's name . . .they were truly united,' concluded UAW historian John Barnard in his history of the union, discussing the end of the war (2004, p. 207).Wages and membership numbers had increased significantly, and organizing the Big Three was a huge achievement.
There was, however, another side to the story.As a private, internal source, the executive board minutes suggest a more complex picture -one of increasing strength, but also simultaneous vulnerability and division.Building the union was a gradual process, and the fledgling UAW faltered until the favourable conditions of World War II provided a much-needed boost.The Flint sit-down was an important beginning, but a lot remained to be done.Even at the end of World War II, internal divisions remained, and the membership was hungry for wage gains and shopfloor autonomy (Reuther, ca 1945, p. 8).
By VJ Day, however, the UAW had an organized workforce, a growing economy, and substantial resources.As a result, it was well-placed to address these problems, building on the steady groundwork it had laid in its first decade.To some extent, workers' demands at the end of the war were assuaged by the UAW's big strike against GM in 1945-46, a 113-day struggle that delivered substantial wage and benefit gains (see Barnard, 2004, pp. 212-219;;Clark, 2018, pp. 20-22;Lichtenstein, 1995, pp. 229-246;2003, pp. 224-228;Zieger, 1995, pp. 219-221, 223-227).The strike set the tone for the UAW's postwar program of economic security, which dominated bargaining for decades.'Is America going back to the brand of "normalcy" that paid off in the bitter dividends of the Hoover Depression?' Reuther asked during the strike, 'Or are we determined to find a peacetime equivalent for the full employment we achieved in war?' (Reuther, ca 1945, p. 12).
As GM director, Reuther eloquently led the strike, becoming UAW president shortly afterwards.Under Reuther's dedicated leadership, the UAW gained the internal unity that eluded it from 1937 to 1945.Reuther held the UAW presidency until his death in a plane crash in May 1970, becoming a towering figure in postwar liberal politics.Helped by continuing economic growth, UAW wages and benefits became some of the best in the economy and were pattern-setting for millions of American workers.The auto industry, summarized a New York Times editorial in 2015, 'served as the 20th-century trailblazer in spreading prosperity to millions of workers and their families and fostering middle-class security through higher wages and company-sponsored benefits.'The 'gigantic struggles' of this crucial first decade paid off, bequeathing a union that would play a central role in postwar U.S. history ('UAW and the Auto Industry,' 2015, first quotation; 'UAW International Executive Board minutes, ' 1938, p. 33, other quotations).
As the minutes show in fresh detail, however, the union's prominence reflected not just the foundational strike that gave birth to it, but multiple struggles and hard work over its vital first decade ('UAW International Executive Board minutes,' 1939a).It is important to explore this history in its own right, not just through the lens of subsequent advances.Few, after all, anticipated this progress at the time.