The Anatomy of Frank Bainimarama’s Defeat at the Fiji December 2022 Election

ABSTRACT Fiji’s 14 December 2022 election saw the defeat of 2006 coup leader turned civilian prime minister Frank Bainimarama’s FijiFirst Party, and victory for an opposition coalition led by Sitiveni Rabuka, the 1987 coup leader and 1992–9 prime minister. This article examines the polling venue-level data to investigate whether regional, class, ethnic, or urban–rural differences determined that outcome, as well as exploring the influence of variations in the personal vote over the three open list proportional representation elections of 2014, 2018, and 2022.


INTRODUCTION
The Fiji general election of 14 December 2022 saw defeat for Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama's FijiFirst Party and victory for an opposition coalition led by People's Alliance Party (PAP) leader Sitiveni Rabuka, the 1987 coup leader turned 1992-9 civilian prime minister.This was no landslide electoral outcome.Turnout fell to 67.8 per cent, down from 71.9 per cent in 2018 and from a high point of 83.7 per cent in 2014.The incumbent FijiFirst Party and the opposition PAP/National Federation Party (NFP) coalition were left neck and neck with 26 seats in the 55-member parliament.The ultimate outcome was determined by a fourth party, SODELPA, narrowly crossing the 5 per cent threshold and then deciding to coalesce with the opposition parties rather than with FijiFirst.Nonetheless, this was a momentous change for Fiji.Bainimarama's government was the product of a December 2006 military coup.It had ruled for 16 years, first in an 'interim' capacity and then, through the FijiFirst Party after 2014, as an elected government.It had introduced a new 2013 Constitution of the Republic of Fiji (hereinafter the 2013 Constitution) and extensive electoral legislation designed to disadvantage the opposition parties.On that basis, FijiFirst won the initial 2014 post-coup election by a 59 per cent landslide and a second election, in 2018, more narrowly, with 50.02 per cent of the national vote.Until December 2022, it was far from clear whether either Bainimarama or the Republic of Fiji military forces would tolerate an electoral defeat for FijiFirst or whether the country would experience yet another post-election coup, as had occurred in 1987,  2000, and 2006.This article examines the outcomes of the 2022 general election in comparison with those of 2018 and 2014. 1 It uses the micro-level polling venue data to investigate why FijiFirst support waned over the three elections of 2014, 2018, and 2022 and the extent to which this was driven by regional or provincial changes, urbanrural differences, loyalties based on social class or ethnicity, or variations in the personal or party votes. 2 The article finds that ethnic and regional differences trumped other lines of affiliation in 2022, as they had done in many of Fiji's earlier elections, and that over the course of the three elections FijiFirst proved unable to transform itself into a fully fledged civilian political party that could survive outside the state.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Fiji's open list electoral system enables eligible citizens of 18 years or over to cast ballots by indicating support for a specific individual candidate, but it initially tallies these ballots by reference to political party (except for independents).The system is simultaneously highly candidate-and party-centric, being party-centric in the sense that all open list proportional representation systems primarily allocate seats based on the aggregate party tally and because there exists a 5 per cent threshold, greatly discouraging independents or smaller parties when used in large districts. 3he arrangements are highly candidate-centric because the ballot paper features only randomized numbers representing individuals and because party leaders have little control over the order of election of their candidates.Symbols showing party affiliations are not listed on the ballot paper, but for the first time in 2022 were shown on a National Candidates List available in the polling venues.
The electoral laws are partly detailed in the 2013 Constitution and partly set out in the Electoral Decree 2014, the Electoral (Registration of Voters) Decree 2012, the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct Funding, and Disclosures) Decree 2013, and numerous subsequent amendments of each. 4The 2013 Constitution provides that the 'election of 1 For an article that focuses on the 2022 campaign, the parties, and the personalities, see Jon Fraenkel, 'Fiji's 2022 Election: The Defeat of the Politics of Fear', Pacific Affairs 96, no. 3 (2023): 531-52. 2 The term 'polling venue' is used by the Fijian Elections Office to refer to what are more usually called 'polling stations'.Under Fiji's post-2014 electoral arrangements, 'polling stations' in fact refer to ballot boxes, of which there may be many at any single polling venue. 3A 5 per cent threshold is not unusual internationally, but when used in a single nationwide constituency it imposes a relatively high barrier for smaller parties or independents. 4Republic of Fiji, Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding, and Disclosures) Act 2013, https://www.laws.gov.fj/Acts/DisplayAct/2495;Electoral (Registration of Voters) Decree 2012, https://www.laws.gov.fj/Acts/DisplayAct/66;Republic of Fiji, Electoral Decree 2014, in Government of Fiji Gazette, 28 members of Parliament is by a multi-member open list system of proportional representation, under which each voter has one vote, with each vote being of equal value, in a single national electoral roll comprising all the registered voters'. 5The reference to a 'single national electoral roll' has often been misconstrued to mean the adoption of the single nationwide constituency. 6In fact, this refers to the discontinuation of the pre-2006 coup practice of having separate, racially based electoral rolls for 'Fijians', 'Indians', 'Rotumans', and 'general voters' (which responded to one of Bainimarama's vaguer March 2012 'non-negotiable' requirements for the new constitution: the 'elimination of ethnic voting'). 7These are two quite distinct issues: it is quite possible to run elections using a single national electoral roll, but with several multi-member constituencies.The distinction is important because constitutional provisions regarding the electoral law are virtually impossible to change since any amendments require a 75 per cent majority in parliament followed by a 75 per cent majority of all registered voters in a referendum.Insofar as use of a single national constituency is specified anywhere in law, it is in the Electoral Act, 2014, where provisions for a 'National Candidates List' and a 'National Results Tally' and regarding the allocation of seats and the ballot paper design all implyeven though this is not stated explicitlyuse of a single national constituency. 8se of open list systems in single national districts is fairly rare internationally, but such systems are used in Slovakia, San Marino, Kosovo, and the Netherlands.
Open list proportional representation (PR) systems are often credited with stimulating highly personalized elections, greater corruption, and weak parties, but such perspectives are of limited value in interpreting the impact of that system in Fiji and indeed elsewhere. 9On the contrary, Fiji's political parties are stronger Mar.2014.All of these decrees were reconfigured as 'acts' of parliament after the passage of the 2013 Constitution.than those found in other Pacific Island states, and electoral corruption is no greater under the 2014 electoral law than it was under the previous single-member district based systems.10Fiji's elections have become highly personalized, in the sense that the larger parties' fortunes have become dependent on having a prominent leader who can accumulate sizable votes, butas detailed later in this articlethe December 2022 outcome in Fiji shows the limitations of that strategy and the importance of securing broader localized pockets of support.
The choice of electoral law was not independent of its consequences.The Fiji government opted for a single nationwide constituency because, in 2014, it was clear that the likely major electoral advantage for the freshly launched FijiFirst Party was personal support for 2006 coup leader turned interim prime minister, Frank Bainimarama.By contrast, the then major Indigenous opposition party, SODELPA, was strongly rooted at the local level in the provincial councils, villages, and local circuits and divisions of the Methodist Church and other Christian churches, while the largely Fiji Indian-backed parties had originally emerged with strong ties to the sugar cane farmers unions in western Viti Levu and northern Vanua Levu (see Figure 1).A multiple constituency model would have confined Bainimarama's personal vote to one district whereas the single district model capitalized on his nationwide appeal.Adoption of the new electoral laws occurred in tandem with the undermining of other institutions of local elected representation: no municipal council or Sugar Cane Growers Council elections were held after the 2006 coup.The position of the urban trades unions was also weakened, although these moves were constrained by interventions on the part of the International Labour Organization. 11iji's 2014-22 electoral arrangements did not offer a level playing field.Nor were justice or policing handled in an impartial fashion.At the instigation of Attorney-General and de facto Prime Minister Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, the government put in place onerous restrictions on the opposition parties, which were not managed in an even-handed manner by the supervisor of elections, a close ally of the attorney-general.One electoral amendment diminished the powers of the 2014 Electoral Commission (hereinafter the Commission), and the reappointments to that body after the 2014 polls also weakened its authority.The powers of the supervisor of elections, both over the Commission and to vet opposition parties' campaign pledges, were greatly enhanced. 12Both SODELPA and the NFP were, at different points, de-registered by the supervisor of elections, a fate never endured by FijiFirst.Decrees requiring English party names and changes in acronym were aimed at undermining the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL), the party of the deposed 2006 government, which had to change its name to Social Democratic and Liberal Party and then its acronym to SODELPA.
The Fiji Independent Commission against Corruption (FICAC) was used to hound the opposition leaders, with only tokenistic measures taken against FijiFirst.Two former prime ministers were forbidden from contesting the 2014 elections due to corruption convictions.Three SODELPA members of parliament (MPs) were imprisoned ahead of the December 2022 election and prospective NFP candidate, lawyer Richard Naidu, was found guilty of 'scandalizing the judiciary' for pointing out that one Sri Lankan judge had confused the words 'injection' and 'injunction'.Opposition MPs were routinely brought to police stations for 'questioning', even during the 2022 campaign.In 2016, all of the opposition party leaders were arrested for organizing a meeting to discuss the 2013 Constitution. 13In 2021, nine opposition party leaders were arrested during controversies about a new land leasing law. 14In the run up to the December election, Bainimarama's party defied efforts to constrain its campaign tactics: a huge FijiFirst banner was erected on the Suva City Council car park in the centre of the capital city in October 2022, butafter opposition proteststhe supervisor of elections required that it be taken down for being in breach of election regulations.In brazen defiance, the banner was back up in late November after that building was redesignated by the government-controlled council as an 'approved public area' for display of campaign materials. 15n one prominent case, an influential but discriminatory electoral amendment was driven by a fit of pique rather than careful campaign strategy.In 2020, it was discovered that an opposition MP was registered in the name on his birth certificate 'Nikolau Tuiqamea', but had contested elections using instead his better-known name, Niko Nawaikula (a fairly common use of a variety of names in Fiji).In July 2021, the speaker declared his seat vacant on these grounds, acting on the advice of the supervisor of elections.The matter was brought before the courts, which struck down the speaker's decision.Solicitor General Sharvada Sharma was summarily sacked for failing to win the government's case.Subsequently, a 2021 amendment to the Electoral Act was passed, requiring that the name 'specified on the applicant's birth certificate' be used for electoral registration. 16As a result, women registered in their married names were required to file documentation amending the names on their birth certificates. 17A consequence was that many women were disenfranchised in December 2022 and some of those who contested as candidates were required to use names other than those they were publicly known bya severe disadvantage in an electoral system strongly based on personal name recognition.
only in the run up to the December polls, secured 21 seats and its closely coalesced partner, the NFP, obtained five seats.In the provisional count data released on election night, only three parties crossed the 5 per cent threshold and FijiFirst had an absolute majority, but when the final results were published, a third party, SODELPA, had narrowly crossed that threshold with 5.1 per cent of the vote and three seats.All other parties fell below that 5 per cent barrier.Former Reserve Bank Governor Savenaca Narube and the 1999-2000 prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, secured respectively the sixth and seventh highest nationwide personal vote tallies, but their Unity Fiji and Fiji Labour parties had no other candidates with substantial support, and so both of these parties failed to secure a single elected MP.
As at the 2014 and 2018 elections, the critical variations in party vote shares are most clearly identifiable at the regional (or divisional) level (see Figure 3).In 2014, FijiFirst had a majority in the Central, Northern, and above all Western Division while the opposition was ahead only in the sparsely populated Eastern Division, which covers the outer islands (Kadavu, Rotuma, and the Lau and Lomaiviti groups) (see Figure 1).FijiFirst was able to capture the bulk of the vote in areas that had, prior to the 2006 coup, largely backed the Fiji Labour Party, which saw its vote collapse from 39.2 per cent at the pre-coup election of 2006 to only 2.4 per cent at the 2014 polls.From a position as an incumbent semi-authoritarian government, FijiFirst was able to transform a pro-developmental reform voter base that had hitherto only narrowly been able to win pre-coup elections in 1987 and 1999,  into a substantial majority. 18In 2018, the opposition erased FijiFirst's lead in the Northern Division, which covers Fiji's second largest island, Vanua Levu, and Taveuni.It also did so in the Central Division, which covers the densely populated southeastern part of the main island of Viti Levu, including the capital, Suva, and the heavily urbanized Suva-Nausori Corridor.Only in the Western Divisionwhere the bulk of the country's tourism is located, including the country's major international airport at Nadiwas FijiFirst able to retain a sizable lead, but that too declined over the course of the three elections.If examined on a provincial basis too, FijiFirst's vote share was down in 2022 in every province except Lau and Lomaiviti, which have in any case been opposition strongholds and which are tiny compared with the big provinces of Ba, Tailevu, Naitasiri, Rewa, and Macuata.Comparisons of regional vote shares in 2022 with those in 2018 or 2014 need to take into account the reconfiguration of the major opposition party in the wake of its 2018 election defeat.In 2020, SODELPA embarked on a troubled leadership election, which culminated in 2018 party leader and 1987 coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka being replaced by Viliame Gavoka, a former chief executive officer at the Fiji Visitors Bureau.Rabuka resigned, and commenced preparations for his new party.Ahead of the 2022 polls, half of SODELPA's MPs defected to Rabuka's PAP, including Cakaudrove Paramount Chief Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, Ro Filipe Tuisawau, and trade union rights activist Lynda Tabuya.The PAP forged a close coalition with the NFP, led by former University of the South Pacific economics professor, Biman Prasad.The NFP had historically been a predominantly Fiji Indian-backed party, but over the course of the three elections of 2014, 2018, and 2022, it reconfigured itself as a multi-ethnic party.Its president, Pio Tikoduadua, a former FijiFirst minister, and its third 2018-22 MP, Lenora Qereqeretabua, are both Indigenous Fijian.With those three seats in the 2018-22 parliament, equal to the number it held in 2014-18, the NFP was able to cement a position as an alternative both to Fiji-First and to the largely Indigenous-backed opposition parties.
FijiFirst had initially emerged in the run up to the 2014 election as the party of Bainimarama and his incumbent interim cabinet.Under the guiding influence of General Secretary and Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, it positioned itself as the champion of the December 2006 coup and 2013 Constitution, as well as of meritocracy, equal opportunities, and reform oriented towards economic development. 19uition fees were abolished for Form 7 secondary school students, continuing moves in this direction under the pre-2006 coup governments, and children were allowed to travel free on subsidized school buses. 20Bastions of elite privilege were assaulted: in the aftermath of the 2006 coup, Bainimarama famously told the chiefs to go and 'meet under the mango tree and enjoy home brew'. 21The Great Council of Chiefs, which played an important role under the 1970, 1990, and 1997 constitutions in selecting the president and in protecting Indigenous communal land tenure, was abolished in 2012 after the chiefs refused to endorse Bainimarama's preferred president.Land lease incomes accruing to the chiefs were redirected to the bank accounts of ordinary members of the mataqali (clan). 22The opposition-associated Methodist Church, too, found itself caught in the cross-hairs of the Bainimarama government owing to its oppositional stance, with its annual conferences cancelled.Despite the 2014 return to elected government, tight media controls, extensive use of police repression against prominent opposition figures, and passage of most legislation using emergency provisions characterized the governments of 2014-18 and 2018-22.

THE URBAN-RURAL DIVIDE
Supporters of the Bainimarama government have often deemed FijiFirst's policies necessary to 'break down the traditional institutions that have supported the chiefly elite (such as the Great Council of Chiefs and the Methodist Church)' and thereby remove 'binding constraints' on economic growth. 23Many have viewed that party as a largely urban-based organization, with the opposition being predominantly rurally oriented. 24As Table 1 indicates, FijiFirst did draw more on urban than rural backing in December 2022, both in terms of its share of the overall urban vote and the share of that party's vote, but so did the NFP.The PAP and SODELPA offered a mirror image: a larger share of the rural than urban vote and a bigger share of the party's vote coming from rural areas.But, as in 2014 and 2018, the differences were not large. 25All parties secured sizable vote shares both within and outside the towns and cities.Despite successive Household Income and Expenditure Surveys showing wide income variations between town and country, political affiliations in rural Fiji have become less sharply differentiated from those in the urban areas than they were in the earlier post-colonial years.

SOCIAL CLASS
Particularly in the early post-2006 coup years, the Bainimarama government was regularly depicted as drawing support primarily from poorer Fiji citizens.Government policies on the minimum wage, school fees, and squatter resettlement have often been identified as aimed at improving the wellbeing of those less well-off. 26Such perspectives formed an important aspect of FijiFirst's 2022 election campaign, which included claims that 100,000 Fiji citizens had been lifted out of poverty. 27FijiFirst candidates routinely attacked the opposition parties as representing a prosperous elite, detached from the concerns of ordinary Fijians, or as an Indigenous front for Gujarati business interests: 'you put the iTaukei up front, you turn the key from the back', party General Secretary Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum claimed of the opposition parties at a rally at Laqere in the Suva-Nausori corridor on 10 December. 28Particularly poorer Indigenous Fijians were thought willing to tolerate police repression and semi-authoritarian rule if the FijiFirst government could deliver increases in living standards for the country's less prosperous citizens.As Subhash Appana and Malcolm Abbott expressed this in 2015, 'despite the fact that there are numerous complaints about the manner in which voices of dissent are "managed", there is little arguing that Fiji is on the long missed path to economic development'. 29he available electoral data do not permit any differentiation of voters by social class.Nor have detailed opinion surveys been conducted in Fiji that explore party allegiances of those at different income levels.Nevertheless, polling venues close to poorer settlements might be expected to depart from the regional mean in ways that convey information about the voting allegiances of less well-off citizens. 30n the Central Division, urban polling venues used by poorer voters around Tamavua village, FijiFirst (47.8 per cent) was ahead of the major opposition party (33.9 per cent), but in most other Central Division polling venues catering to areas including large squatter settlements the PAP was well ahead of FijiFirst: as in Raiwaqa (50.5 per cent to 27.9 per cent respectively), Nadonumai in Lami (66.7 per cent as against 15 per cent), Suvavou (67.9 per cent compared with 19.5 per cent), and Kinoya (50.2 per cent as against 31.5 per cent). 31On Vanua Levu, the polling venue closest to the Namara Tiri squatter settlement (Labasa College) returned a FijiFirst vote share (53.3 per cent) that was almost identical to that for Labasa as a whole (53.9 per cent).Polling venues adjacent to squatter settlements in Lautoka in western Viti Levu, such as Field 40 (63.8 per cent FijiFirst) and Lovu (72.8 per cent FijiFirst), did show stronger support for the ruling party than Lautoka as a whole (50.9 per cent), but Natabua (42.3 per cent FijiFirst) was below the average for the west.As in 2014 and 2018, polling venue data covering poorer areas suggest that region proved a stronger indicator of political affinities than social class.

ETHNICITY
Ethnicity has notoriously been a strong driver of electoral affiliations in Fiji.The pre-2006 coup arrangements permitted a close identification of this association because voters cast ballots both in ethnically separated communal constituencies and in common roll districts and because the Fiji Bureau of Statistics published data on ethnicity.The Bainimarama government halted publication of such data and abolished the earlier ethnically reserved constituencies.In 2014, FijiFirst was able to secure the overwhelming majority of Fiji Indian votes and around 40 per cent of Indigenous votes while SODELPA remained confined to support within the ethnic Fijian community, attracting only very few Fiji Indian votes. 32Yet, as we show in Table 2, FijiFirst's vote share became increasingly strongly correlated with the Fiji Indian share in the provincial population over the course of the three elections of 2014, 2018, and 2022. 33he PAP remained an overwhelmingly Indigenous party at the December 2022 polls, but it campaigned on a multi-ethnic platform and fared better than its predecessor SODELPA at attracting credible candidates of Fiji Indian descent.The party's final pre-election rally at Syria Park in Nausori on 10 December, for example, focused almost entirely on contrition for the sins of the 1987 coup and on conveying a message of inter-ethnic conciliation. 34One Fiji Indian candidate was elected on a PAP ticket, Charan Jeath Singh, becoming his party's third highest vote recipient, drawing on support in the Labasa area and Macuata province.Former permanent secretary in the Prime Minister's office Parmesh Chand, a late campaign entrant, was not elected but was the 29th-placed PAP candidate relying mainly on votes from Ba province, a FijiFirst stronghold.The party's other three candidates of Fiji Indian descent fared less well (being the 40th, 44th, and 53rd-placed PAP candidates).The new government's claim to represent Fiji Indian voters stems principally from its inclusion of the NFP, which in addition to securing re-election of its three incumbents obtained an additional two seats, both of which were won by Fiji Indian candidates.FijiFirst remained more multi-ethnic in character than the PAP or SODELPA, with 11 of its 26 elected MPs being Indigenous Fijian and 15 Fiji Indian.the control of former military officers who were close allies of the prime minister: Police Commander Sitiveni Qiliho and Bainimarama's brother-in-law Frances Kean as commissioner of correctional services.In 2018, turnout at the barracks had been exceptionally low (49.3 per cent), likely because many soldiers cast ballots in their home districts.Only 109 prison officers voted at correctional facilities in 2014, as compared with 556 in 2018 and 807 in 2022.Before the 2022 election, a government directive was issued requiring all members of the security services to vote at their workplace rather than at home.In 2014 and 2018, most police officers had voted in their home areas, but 24 new polling venues were introduced at police stations for the 2022 polls.As Table 3 shows, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces and prison officer vote for FijiFirst was 87.5 per cent and 91.4 per cent respectively in December 2022, but 48.2 per cent of police officers voted in favour of the People's Alliance and only 32.9 per cent supported FijiFirst. 35Prisons accounted for seven of the eight largest polling venue percentage increases in FijiFirst's vote share compared with 2018.Those outcomes suggest that the regimentation of the vote was particularly acute at the barracks and in the prisons.

THE PERSONAL VOTE
Under all list proportional representation systems, seats are primarily allocated to parties, which gain MPs in close connection to their shares of the vote.Under closed list systems, the parties themselves control the order of election attributes are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the numbers of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases'. 37Under such electoral systems, parties regularly campaign by seeking to accumulate personal votes for a prominent party leader (sometimes called a 'rock star' candidate), knowing that this will build the overall party vote and thereby enable many other candidates to be elected on the coat-tails of that well-known personality.
In Fiji, use of open list PR in a single nationwide district (50 MPs in 2014, 51 in 2018, and 55 in 2022) initially gave advantages to larger parties with a wellknown leader.In 2014, FijiFirst was able to win by a landslide with 59 per cent of ballots cast, drawing largely on interim Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama's personal vote, which on its own amounted to 40.2 per cent of the overall national vote and close to 70 per cent of the total FijiFirst vote. 38As Figure 4 shows, Bainimarama's personal vote share declined over the course of the three elections, while Sayed-Khaiyum's share increased, but not by enough to compensate.As Figure 5 indicates, this decline was not counteracted by an increase in the personal votes of other FijiFirst candidates.On the contrary, over the course of the three elections, FijiFirst's candidates became increasingly skewed towards the lower end of the vote-acquisition spectrum, with 24 of its 55 candidates obtaining less than 500 votes in 2022.By contrast, only eight of the PAP's candidates gained such low vote tallies.
In part, this imbalance was a product of campaign tactics.At rallies ahead of the 2022 election, FijiFirst promoted above all the '234' number of Bainimarama.Other candidates were discouraged from campaigning on the basis of their personal numbers.This had also been an issue for SODELPA in the run up to the 2018 election, when a belated shift in campaign tactics saw a 'turf war' over then party leader Sitiveni Rabuka's number being promoted at the expense of those of local candidates, as detailed in the protests of one prominent SODELPA MP. 39 Recriminations arising from that 2018 campaign still dogged the opposition during the post-2022 elections negotiations on a coalition.In general under open list PR systems, there exists some risk that party candidates will compete against each other as well as against the candidates of rival parties, but as José Cheibub and Gisela Sin demonstrate in the case of Brazil, this risk can be diminished if parties compose their lists strategically. 40That risk was navigated by the tightly centralized FijiFirst party by promoting Bainimarama's number, but the success of that strategy diminished over time.By campaigning both for a personal vote for the party leader and for more broadly-based support for candidates able to pick up pockets of votes in FijiFirst strongholds, the PAP and the NFP opted for a more balanced strategy.
In total, FijiFirst's vote share dropped by 8.8 per cent in absolute terms comparing 2018 with 2014, and by a further 7.5 per cent comparing 2022 with 2018, in the latter case almost matching the decline in Bainimarama's personal vote.Most other FijiFirst ministers fared slightly better than in 2018, although former Ba mayor Parveen Bala saw his personal vote shrink from 6,358 in 2014 to 6,063 in 2018 to 3,604 in 2022.Mosese Bulitavu, a FijiFirst candidate who switched sides after being de-selected by SODELPA, saw his personal vote collapse from 5,342 in 2018 to only 631 in 2022.Yet the combined PAP and SODELPA vote share was only 1.1 per cent up on SODELPA's 2018 tally and the NFP increased its share by only 1.5 per cent.The residual loss in FijiFirst's 2018 vote share was absorbed by an increase in the vote shares of Chaudhry's Fiji Labour Party (+2.1 per cent) and Narube's Unity Fiji (+1.3 per cent) and a slightly increased net vote share for minor parties and independents (+1.5 per cent) despite none of these small parties or independents crossing the 5 per cent threshold.It was the larger parties that benefited from these minor party and independent vote shares.Even if SOPELPA had failed to cross the 5 per cent threshold, the PAP and the NFP would still have been able to form a government, by 28 to 27 seats, that is, exactly the result of the parliamentary vote for the prime minister held on Christmas Eve 2022.41

FIGURE 1 .
FIGURE 1. Map of Fiji.Source: CartoGIS Services, Scholarly Information Services, The Australian National University.

FIGURE 2 .
FIGURE 2. Outcomes at the December 2022 general election.Source: Fijian Elections Office.

18
Jon Fraenkel and Apolosi Bose, 'Whatever Happened to Western Separatism?', in From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign & Its Aftermath, ed.Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies; Canberra: Asia-Pacific Press, 2007), 225-42. 19Brij V. Lal, 'In Frank Bainimarama's Shadow: Fiji, Elections and the Future', Journal of Pacific History (hereinafter JPH) 49, no. 4 (2014): 457-68. 20I am indebted to Professor Vijay Naidu for pointing out that shifts towards 'free education' had been initiated under the governments of the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.What FijiFirst did was extend these to Form 7, but also proscribe 'fund raising' by schools.

FIGURE 5 .
FIGURE 5. Histogramsnumber of personal vote recipients by share of the vote, FijiFirst and largest opposition party, 2014, 2018, and 2022.Source: Fijian Elections Office.

TABLE 1 .
Party shares of the urban and rural vote, 2022.

TABLE 3 .
of their candidates.With open list systems, voters determine that order, creating what John Carey and Matthew Shugart describe as 'incentives to cultivate a personal vote'. 36Those incentives may become particularly strong as the size of the district (meaning the number of MPs elected from any specific constituency) increases.As Shugart et al. put this, 'when lists are open, legislators' personal vote-earning Ballots cast at barracks, prisons, and police stations, 2022.
36John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas', Electoral Studies 14, no. 4 (1995): 417-39.In some 'flexible' or 'semi-open' systems, voters have only a limited right to determine the order of election of candidates.Often, personal votes need to reach a specific threshold before they trump the party-determined list.