An Assessment of Germany’s Remaining CO2 Budget: Can Germany Still Afford to Destroy Villages to Burn More Coal?

Abstract The global climate budget for 1.5°C necessitates distributing future CO2 emissions to individual countries. In Germany, this translates to 3.1 billion tons (January 2022). All sectors must engage to meet this target, particularly the lignite (i.e. low-grade brown coal) sector. This entails leaving significant reserves untapped. Also, economic factors are already driving a decline in coal consumption, aided by Germany’s renewable expansion and rising CO2 prices. Forecasts suggest lignite phase-out by 2030, prompting reevaluation of mining plans without devastation of villages. The paper proposes new mining plans for the main lignite regions Rhineland and Lusatia.

by Pao-Yu Oei and Philipp J. Herpich Police operation to evacuate the village of Lützerath, which was occupied by climate activists in order to prevent the mining of the lignite underneath.
This latter declaration was signed by several countries, including gas and oil producer Colombia, some island states, and members from the European Union (EU).
Germany, though also supporting a faster global fossil phase out, did not sign the declaration, and has until now also refused to join BOGA.One reason for this is Germany's struggle to manage its own coal phase-out, without increasing the demand for fossil gas imports-especially within the context of the war in Ukraine. 4 In 2022, Germany extended the lifetime of its oldest lignite power plant units and, consequently, increased its temporary domestic lignite usage and CO 2 emissions.The government, however, in exchange arranged a deal with Germany's largest coal power plant operator, RWE, to fully phase out its lignite coal power stations by 2030 instead of 2038.This is done to comply with the country's national CO 2 reduction target of at least 65% by 2030 (compared to 1990) and carbon neutrality by 2045, but is still not enough to contribute a sufficient share to comply with the global 1.5 °C budget.
This article examines whether, from an energy-economic perspective, it is necessary to exploit additional villages for lignite mining or whether it must be avoided due to the limited remaining CO 2 budget in Germany.This article therefore examines a fair greenhouse gas budget calculated for Germany in line with the Paris climate target and the resulting consequences for the German lignite industry.A specific focus is hereby put on the two lignite mines Garzweiler II in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and Nochten in Lusatia.The two mines are considered in this article since they have been subject to public debate in the last years.They are the only ones in Germany requiring destruction of villages for further mining operations.The article therefore covers the planned mining under the village Lützerath in Garzweiler II and its destruction in January 2023, as well as the upcoming plans to destroy the village Mühlrose in 2024 in the open pit Nochten.The opening of these new lignite mining areas caused major protests by affected villagers and climate protesters in Germany and globally, and stands in contradiction to Germany's self-proclaimed role as a progressive climate leader.

Germany's (Role in) Climate Policy
German policymakers positioned Germany as a front runner in climate protection, leveraging this stance to assert a leading role in global climate negotiations.Germany's climate policy has been widely regarded as among the most ambitious and effective worldwide.The country's energy and climate policy initiative, known as the "energiewende, " aims to transition from coal and nuclear power to renewable energies and gained substantial international attention. 5The term "energiewende" has become internationally recognized as the shift from a fossil fuel and nuclear-based energy system to one characterized by decentralization and reliance on renewables.Over the years, Germany's domestic climate policies have undergone significant transformations.The Green Party has played a pivotal role in shaping the nation's climate policy, while events such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster and protests against the coal industry have influenced policy decisions. 6Germany has complemented the European emissions trading system (EU ETS) with its own national climate policies to address shortcomings in the EU ETS. 7 Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in the energy sector, include the phased closure of coal-fired power plants by 2030-2038 and the promotion of renewable energy. 8These measures underscore Germany's commitment to climate protection and its pursuit to reach climate neutrality by 2045.
However, Germany's international reputation as a climate policy leader is fading due to perceived shortcomings in meeting its climate targets.Its expansion of renewable energy generation capacities is not progressing at a pace aligned with achieving climate neutrality. 9One factor contributing to the slow growth in renewable energy capacity is Germany's cooperative federalism model, which depends on coordination among various levels of government.This has resulted in divergent climate policies at the subnational level, shaped by political and socioeconomic factors and resistance, particularly against wind energy deployment and grid expansion. 10,11Additionally, the Renewable Energy Act ("Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz"), which is central to the energiewende, was changed several times, destabilizing the secure investment conditions for renewable energies. 12erman climate policy often reacts to disruptive events and public sentiment.In 2023, this was evident in discussions surrounding the implementation of stricter regulations on new heating systems in Germany, resulting in weakened provisions in the final legislation.Consequently, the country faces challenges in achieving climate neutrality, especially with the pace of coal-fired power plant closures falling short of achieving 1.5 °C. 8en Germany's highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, engaged in the climate policy debate.In March 2021, it declared the Climate Protection Act ("Klimaschutzgesetz") unconstitutional, citing its postponement of the majority of climate protection measures until after 2030, a postponement that curtails the freedom and rights of future generations.Additionally, the court mandated that the federal government specify measures beyond 2030, highlighting the vague character of existing policies aimed at achieving net emissions neutrality. 13The Federal Constitutional Court has also underscored the importance of international cooperation in climate protection, linking constitutional law to the Paris Agreement and calling for political collaboration at the international level.
Calculating a "Fair" Remaining 1.5 °C CO 2 Budget for Germany Germany's climate protection can be aligned with the Paris Agreement by applying the CO 2 -budget approach.There exist different approaches to break down the global CO 2 budget to national levels. 14he per-capita approach to CO 2 budgeting is easy to communicate and adheres to a fairer distribution principle, instead Photo by Tim Wagner, www.ti-wag.de.
of granting countries with higher historical emissions higher future emissions due to path dependencies ("grandfathering").However, Germany favors the grandfathering solution and uses its influence in climate political debates to grant Germany higher CO 2 budgets than it would receive by simply applying the per-capita approach.If the share in the world population is taken into account and historical emissions are neglected, the following figures result for Germany, according to assumptions proposed by the German Advisory Council on the Environment. 14The CO 2 budget available for Germany distributed per capita, which would limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C with a compliance probability of 50%, corresponds to an amount of 3.1 gigatonnes (Gt, billion metric tonnes) CO 2 as of 1 January 2022. 14To limit global warming to 1.5 °C with a probability of 67%, the German CO 2 budget corresponds to 2.0 Gt CO 2 .To limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C with a higher probability, remaining CO 2 budgets would be correspondingly lower.
Different approaches would result in higher remaining CO 2 budgets for Germany, under the condition that they support transitions in the Global South.

CO 2 Budget for Germany's Lignite Mining Areas
In the following sections, based on the remaining 1.5 °C CO 2 residual budget of 3.1 Gt CO 2 available for Germany (as of January 2022 14 ), we calculate how much of this budget is attributable to the lignite sector and individual mines in a proportional distribution.
The use of lignite was responsible for 16% of Germany's total CO 2 emissions in 2021. 26Assuming a proportional allocation of the German residual budget of 3,100 million tonnes, this comprises a maximum of 496 million tonnes of CO 2 .Our calculation assigns a proportional share of the German residual budget to lignite use.However, since a reduction in the energy sector and especially in coalfired power generation is cheaper than in other sectors (agriculture, transport, industry, etc.), a disproportionate share would actually have to be met by this sector.
Any CO 2 -budget overruns would only be compatible with the corresponding climate protection targets if other power plants or other sectors compensate for this with correspondingly stronger climate protection measures.However, this is not foreseeable in the case of other gas or hard coal-fired power plants, nor in other sectors such as transport or heating.
Just under half of all remaining lignite-fired power plant capacity is located in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). 27In the east, a slower phase-out path is planned.This results in the allocation of 40% of the residual emissions for lignite power plants

How Much Lignite Does Germany Still Need to Burn in North Rhine-Westphalia?
At the end of 2022, the lignite operator RWE and the state government of NRW bargained a deal to end lignite production by 2030, instead of previously 2035 or 2038, respectively.Lignite demand for electricity generation until 2030 was calculated independently by both the Office of Energy Economics and Technical Planning (BET) on behalf of the state government, 15 and in studies by Aurora Energy Research 16 and FossilExit. 17BET analyzes three demand scenarios, while Aurora analyzes two, resulting in different ranges of future demand: BET estimates demand from the Garzweiler open pit at 132-183, Aurora at 116-124, and FossilExit at 120 Mt (million tonnes) of lignite.A detailed discussion of BET's and FossilExit's assumptions are available in the endnotes. 18Excluding outdated assumptions that were still used in the BET report, we believe that Aurora's calculation for power generation and Fossil Exit's calculation for refining are the most accurate, resulting in a total lignite demand of approximately 160 Mt until 2030.Thus, the lignite supply and demand from the Garzweiler open pit mine is about 160 Mt of coal with an uncertainty margin of about plus 10 Mt.Such an uncertainty margin is reasonable because we cannot say with certainty (i) exactly how much coal is in a seam and (ii) how energy demand will change over the next few years.
It is therefore possible to adjust the open pit mine planning and preserve the coal under the Lützerath site within an operation until 2030.In the course of the next few years, we will then be able to better assess whether even more coal volumes will remain in the open pit, or whether RWE could burn even more coal.
However, the deal between RWE and NRW leaves an option to mine and burn additional lignite after 2030.The deal with RWE includes a reserve option from 2030 to 2033 19 that might use up to 50 additional million tonnes of coal.This results in a potential 280 million tonnes of lignite that RWE would be allowed to extract in Garzweiler II due to the deal made with the state government of NRW.However, coal demand can be reduced even further in the long term.This could be achieved by, among other things, energy efficiency measures, energy savings, reduction of coal refining, relocation of lignite-fired power generation to the neighboring Inden/Weisweiler opencast mine complex, and replacement of lignite-fired power with lower-CO 2 energy sources such as renewables, gas, hard coal, or power imports.Argumentation lines of otherwise insufficient coal quantities already existed in recent years in the discussions on Hambach Forest and the other Garzweiler villages, and were all refuted over time.
in NRW to a maximum of 199 million tonnes CO 2 , and for Lusatia 205 and for the smallest coal region near Leipzig (Central Germany) 93 million tonnes CO 2 .

Does Germany Need the Lignite Beneath the Villages in Rhineland and Lusatia?
In 2023, Germany added 14.1 gigawatts of photovoltaic and 3.2 gigawatts of wind energy (of which 2.9 gigawatts were onshore). 33This led to a record share of 59% renewable energy in net electricity generation, while the combined share of brown and hard coal shrank to 25%. 34ue to tightened European and German climate protection goals, as well as rising costs for CO 2 certificates, the profitability of lignite coal-fired power generation is expected to further decrease in the coming years.This is likely to result in continued low capacity utilization of power plants, which in turn will necessitate further reductions in open-pit mining.

Does Germany Need the Lignite Beneath the Depopulated Village of Lützerath in North Rhine-Westphalia?
The Hambach and Garzweiler II opencast mines are connected with the power plants Neurath and Niederaussem and the lignite refining facilities in the Rhenish mining area via a coal railway link.They can use lignite from both opencast mines.In its 2020 mining concept, RWE has already reduced the size of the Hambach open pit mine so that the remnants of the Hambach Forest and the district of Morschenich will be preserved. 20The reserves amounted to ∼110 million tonnes at the beginning of 2022.
As can be seen from satellite images, the edge of the open pit mine Garzweiler II was immediately in front of Lützerath in 2022.With the help of satellite images, data from the lignite operator in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) RWE, and other sources, it is possible to determine the available reserves that would be available if Lützerath had been preserved. 35 possible movement of the extraction slope is indicated by the green arrow in Figure 7.The technical mining route was to be designed as follows, whereby the single belt collection point at Jackerath

How Much Lignite Does Germany Still Need to Burn in Lusatia?
Additional regulations are urgently needed to ensure sufficient compliance with national and international climate protection targets.However, even without additional climate protection policies, lignite demand in the Lusatian mining region will be significantly reduced, driven by the market economy.After the short-term increased utilization due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the utilization of the power plants will again decrease significantly in the coming years. 20,21,22en with the end of nuclear power production in Germany in April 2023, power production via lignite decreased in 2023.In addition to the decline in electricity production by lignite-fired power plants, we also assume a decline in demand in the lignite refining sector.This is because consumers switch to other energy sources as additional sectors fall under the emissions trading regulations.Analogous to the internal business planning scenario 1A from the then-operator Vattenfall AG, an end date for refining is assumed in 2030 (see Appendix 1 in Matthes 23 ).The BET study also assumes an end date of refining in 2030, as well as a reduction until then. 24In scenarios 1 and 2, the lignite for upgrading comes from the Nochten and Welzow-Süd opencast mines, respectively, since the highest coal qualities are found here.
Analogous to the planned lignite reserve in NRW for the years 2030-2033, a similar situation is conceivable for Lusatia.If the same considerations are applied to Lusatia, the possible coal reserve could amount to approx.45 million tonnes 25 (see also Figure 11, shown later).Note.Authors' calculations based on SRU 14 und IPCC. 1 would be maintained and the open pit would continue to rotate up around this point.Initially, the extraction levels would be progressively shortened until they enter the area before Immerath.In the process, the (pre-cut) excavators would be successively moved to the southern area of the levels.The northern open pit area would be driven to its final stage during mining operations and shut down, which according to a BET expert opinion is to be considered economically viable. 36Such a shortening of the levels can be seen on the aerial photos at the level of the village of Keyenberg and was practiced by the open pit operator for years.At the end of the open pit mining period, the extraction slope in the outlined mining area would run parallel to the already created replacement road for the L19/L277 before Jackerath up to the belt collection point in an east-west orientation.A northern bay between Keyenberg and Lützerath would not be developed and consequently would not need to be served by belt facilities.
In addition to our analyses, the company Mining Technology Consulting (MTC), commissioned by RWE, examined different mining variants in which the village of Lützerath would remain on a spit of land in the middle of the Garzweiler II open pit. 37The scenario with the highest extraction rate if

Rhenish Lignite Mining Region CO 2 Budget
Based on the distribution of power plant capacities, this budget for lignite-fired power generation can be divided among the various locations in the Rhenish lignite mining region.For electricity generation from the Garzweiler II and Hambach opencast mines with the large-scale power plants Niederaussem and Neurath, which is primarily considered here, this results in a share of around 80%, that is, a maximum of around 159 million tonnes CO 2 from 2022.Provided that the remaining supply of 110 million tonnes from the Hambach open pit mine is fully exploited if the remaining area of the Hambach Forest is retained as planned, a remaining budget of a maximum of 49 million tonnes of lignite remains for the Garzweiler II open pit mine from January 2022.The reserves of the Garzweiler II mine added up to over 160 million tonnes, which makes it the largest mine in the Rhenish mining region.
All budget figures presented refer for better comparability to the reference date of 1 January 2022.To enable better comparability of the figures, we have assumed priority utilization of the remaining 110 million tonnes from the Hambach opencast mine.This is done because the lignite in Hambach has a higher energy content than in Garzweiler. 28lternatively, the stockpile quantities could be distributed between Garzweiler and Hambach as desired, provided that the CO 2 budget is adhered to.The production volume at Garzweiler is estimated at 23-25 million tonnes of lignite in 2022.This reduces the 1.5 °C budget still available (at 50% probability) as of January 2023 from 49 to about 25 million tonnes.Note.Authors' depiction based on DIW Berlin et al., 29 Statistik für Kohlenwirtschaft, 30 BNetzA, 31 and RWE. 32Adjustments due to the deal between RWE and NRW are not

Lusatia Lignite Mining Region CO 2 Budget
In Lusatia, all the lignite-fired power plants are connected with the four open pit mines Jänschwalde, Welzow-Süd, Nochten, and Reichwalde (see Figure 5).Hence, the stockpile quantities could be distributed between those open pits as desired, provided that the CO 2 budget is adhered to.Lignite production will likely end in Jänschwalde by the end of 2023, as there is no main operation plan for the pit after 2023 and the reserves are coming to an end.Note.Authors' depiction based on DIW Berlin et al., 29 Statistik für Kohlenwirtschaft, 30 BNetzA, 31 and LEAG. 41ützerath were retained calculates a stockpile of 170 million tonnes (Mt) of coal.In all the scenarios considered, however, Lützerath was finally left out in a semi-island location, which is why MTC concluded that stability might not be assured in the future.A mining option that was stable for Lützerath was not investigated.
If the so-called northern bay were abandoned, which would then leave Lützerath in a stable position, the coal volume would be reduced by 10 Mt to a total of 160 Mt.MTC estimates that in the central open pit area before Lützerath there was a reserve of 100 Mt that could be mined without any mining adjustments.A further 60 Mt could be mined in the southern bay south of Lützerath. 37s a conservative estimate, at least 160 Mt of lignite could thus have been extracted without resorting to the coal under the area of Lützerath, which was already largely devastated at the time of this writing.
In March 2024, research was conducted to assess the discrepancy between projected and actual electrical output from coal-fired power stations linked to Garzweiler II.The analysis revealed that the actual electricity production was 35% to 40% lower than the predictions made in the BET study, which had previously justified the destruction of Lützerath. 38rthermore, the study indicated that the BET projections significantly overestimated the lignite processing activities when compared to contemporary empirical data and prevailing economic conditions.As of the current date, no lignite extraction has occurred beneath the area formerly known as the village of Lützerath.

Does Germany Need the Lignite Beneath the Village of Mühlrose in Lusatia?
Jänschwalde open pit mine contains only limited lignite reserves in 2023.In addition, the open pit mine's main operating plan is only valid until end of 2023.We therefore expect the open pit mine to be closed by the end of 2023.After that, lignite will only be available from the Reichwalde, Nochten, and Welzow-Süd opencast mines.
For the Nochten open pit mine there is currently only an operating plan until 2026.We are therefore reviewing whether it would be possible to supply the power plants and refining operations from the Welzow-Süd and Reichwalde open pits from 2027 onward, in the event that the Nochten open pit mine were to be closed  39 and Planet Labs, Inc. 40 Photo by Frank Kehren, licensed under Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 2.0 Deed by the end of 2026.In this case, it would not be necessary to use the Mühlrose subfield, where also the village of Mühlrose is located (see Figure 5, shown earlier).Lignite from Reichwalde is blended with other coals due to its slightly poorer quality (lower energy value and greater slagging when burned). 37This optimizes energy output and reduces maintenance requirements.Different proportions can be used in the power plant units without any problems.

Note. Authors' depiction based on GeoBasis-NRW
In Lusatia, 700 million tonnes of lignite are currently still available as reserves in the Jänschwalde, Reichwalde, Nochten, and Welzow-Süd opencast mines. 41urning this coal is equivalent to about 700 million tonnes of CO 2 .However, a CO 2 budget compatible with the 1.5 °C limit for Lusatia comprises only about 205 million tonnes of CO 2 (see Figure 3, shown earlier).This means that in order to comply with international climate protection targets, the opencast mines in Lusatia must be reduced by about 70%, corresponding to almost 500 million tonnes.With a curtailed annual lignite combustion of -25%, the CO 2 reduction can be ensured until 2030.
Even without further policy intervention, downsizing of lignite operation is necessary.Projected coal consumption without additional climate protection measures is approximately 350 million tonnes.This consumption includes operations until 2030, as well as a possible coal reserve of 45 million tonnes until 2033-similar to the lignite reserve planned in NRW by RWE.The demand of the power plants is calculated according to the planned installed power plant capacity as stipulated by the Coal-fired Power Generation Termination Act (KVBG) and the expected utilization of the power plants.Thus, even without additional climate protection measures, a reduction of the Lusatian opencast mines by 50% and a level of 350 million tonnes of lignite is necessary.Political adherence to late coal phase-out years of 2035 or 2038 denies the energy industry depiction.At the same time, it leaves directly affected people in unnecessary uncertainty.This jeopardizes acceptance for the necessary and unavoidable transformation and risks further dividing society.
There are sufficient reserves in the remaining opencast mines so that the Nochten opencast mine can be shut down at the end of 2026 after the end of its currently valid operating plan.The upper limit for the admixture of lignite from Reichwalde will not be exceeded at any time, as high proportions can be admixed, especially toward the end of the power plant's service life. 42Thus, there is neither an energy-economical nor an energy-political necessity for the use of the opencast mining subfield within which the village of Mühlrose is located.
Villagers should be compensated even though the lignite beneath might not be used since necessary investments for the preservation of the village have been forgone in recent years and many people now want to settle to a new place.The people lived in uncertainty for many years and fear that with the lignite beneath their old homes not needed, the compensation and the chance to start a new life in a different location might no longer be possible.Residents of the village should therefore be free to decide whether they wish to relocate voluntarily and receive compensation or remain in the village.The coal under the village must not be burned if the climate protection targets are to be met.

Inclusion of Socioecological Aspects
The operator RWE argued about the necessity to use the overburden in the area of Lützerath in Garzweiler II for the backfilling of old pits at the Garzweiler I open pit mine.RWE claims that without the overburden in the area of Lützerath it would be impossible to create new agricultural land in the old Garzweiler I pit.However, this argument neglects several aspects: On the one hand, the quality of the agricultural soils beneath the former village of Lützerath will be reduced by the mining operations, as the high-quality top part of the soil will be mixed with other layers of the overburden.Further, it is not even necessary as more ecological solutions work without backfilling the remaining hole at the Garzweiler I open pit mine. 43In addition, the current renaturation plans, including the plans for residual lakes, do not sufficiently consider the existing water shortage in the region, which is caused by the worsening climate crisis.Flooding the open pit mines will lead to severe water stress in the region and lead to high evaporation due to the resulting large water surfaces of the lakes.Hence, making alternative renaturation plans in NRW is necessary to meet the challenges of increasing water stress in the future.
In 2022, fewer than 18,000 people remained directly employed in the German coal sector-of which threequarters will retire within the next 10 years.This is only a minor share of previous coal employment of up to 700,000, which has undergone its biggest Photo from Wikimedia by SPBer, licensed under Creative Commons BY-SA-3.0 transition in the 1960s-1980s in the west 44 and in the 1990s in the east of Germany. 45Still, research shows that the lignite coal regions will exhibit losses in output, income, and population within the next years.A faster coordinated phase-out would, however, also lead to a quicker recovery and replacement of jobs.Migration to other areas in Germany and demographic changes will in addition partially compensate for increasing unemployment.To enable a just transition, however, support from federal policy is necessary to assist these regions. 46ermany has allocated 40 billion euros to support its coal regions, emphasizing the need to adapt promised structural aid to the current situation and expedite its availability to ensure a just transition.Research underscores the importance of involving local actors and civil society in this process. 47Specifically, measures aimed at strengthening public infrastructure and social cohesion are

Reference Scenario and Climate Protection Scenario (1. 5 °C Goal)
Even with the lignite quantities for a security stand-by after 2030, the available reserves in Lusatia (excluding the subfield Mühlrose) exceed the lignite demand in the reference scenario.The reference scenario is a likely scenario from an economic perspective of energy production.If we take climate considerations into account for a climate protection scenario, taking the 1.5 °C limit seriously, the reserves exceed the lignite demand significantly and a 70% reduction of the lignite production would be necessary (see Figure 11).

Note. Authors' depiction.
Photo from Wikimedia by Dr. Steinhuber, licensed under Creative Commons BY-SA-4.0 crucial considerations.Simultaneously, there is a notable trend of more young women than men leaving the region, with young women reporting a diminished sense of connection to the area. 48ddressing this, efforts should be made to enhance the region's attractiveness for all people, considering factors such as caring labor and ecosystems as fundamental to life and the economy.Recognition of the "care crisis" in climate change, species extinction, and social disruption underscores the importance of incorporating gender dimensions into the energy transition to avoid perpetuating existing exploitative practices and inequalities in power, distribution, and recognition. 49n response to the pressing issues of unemployment, poverty, and the erosion of trust in politics, there is a need for comprehensive solutions for Germany's coal regions, especially in the east.The current situation has led to a palpable sense of being left behind, fostering social disintegration and fueling support for movements like the rightwing political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).The emigration of young, highly qualified women further exacerbates the challenges, contributing to a concerning downward spiral.Proposed remedies involve not only increased financial and social support for women-dominated sectors but also the expansion of vital services like health care, public transportation, and the creation of inclusive social spaces.Highquality care facilities play a crucial role in this vision.Additionally, ecological considerations and enhanced female participation in political decision-making processes are advocated to ensure a more equitable and sustainable future for these regions. 50kimedia Commons/Bodoklecksel Protest against the devastation of Lützerath, January, 2021.

International Dimension, or How to Keep Global 1.5 °C Possible
Analyses show that many countries in the Global North (especially Europe and the United States) have difficulties in meeting a proportional 1.5 °C CO 2 budget without a very rapid adjustment of their fossil fuel economies, which could be accompanied by social disruptions.However, any overshoot of the German budget would only be compatible with the climate protection targets if other countries compensate for this with correspondingly stronger climate protection measures.This does not mean, however, that the global 1.5 °C limit will be decided in one country.
Countries in the Global South still have significantly lower per-capita CO 2 emissions due to their lower dependence on fossil fuels.If Germany and other countries from the Global North succeed in accelerating the transformation in the Global South through appropriate financial and technical support, it may still be possible to meet the global climate protection targets.
A first small step in this direction is the agreement reached by Germany and the United Arab Emirates at the climate conference in 2023 to kickstart the new climate loss and damage fund with 100 million USD each.However, the overall pledged volume of the fund, which reached around 660 million USD in 2023, is still not sufficient to cover all needed costs for climate adaptation and mitigation measures. 51,52Costs to cope with immediate impacts and for subsequent reconstruction by 2030 alone are estimated to be in the range of 150-730 billion USD. 53,54ithin this context, it is important that international development, climate, economic, and energy policy should turn away from the marketing of Global North's industrial interests, and instead, Photo by pat uriku, licenced under Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 2.0 Deed based on the historical responsibility of the industrialized countries' emissions to date, commit selflessly to supporting the Global South.The urgency of the climate crisis does not allow for either/or: Only if we succeed in bringing about the fastest possible transformation in the Global North and Germany, as well as providing additional support to the Global South, will we have a chance to at least somewhat cushion the damage of the climate crisis.

Conclusion
The discussion surrounding the phase-out of lignite coal is complex, involving various interest groups with different motivations, arguments, and methods.Key themes of the debate revolve around climate and environmental protection versus the economic interests of lignite coal companies.The latter are often defended through arguments such as the alleged necessity of lignite coal for energy supply security or the social impacts of job losses in the lignite coal industry.
The focus of this article is to reconcile the climate component of lignite coal use in Germany with the international 1.5 °C limit and to question the arguments for its energy-related necessity.Results indicate that Germany must make significant adjustments to adhere to its carbon budget, particularly regarding lignite coal extraction, instead of destroying further villages to extract additional coal.
Burning coal that lies beneath the former village of Lützerath and the village of Mühlrose is no longer justifiable for energy-related reasons, as the significance of coal diminishes and sufficient reserves exist elsewhere.Although coal-fired electricity generation is declining in Germany and the profitability of coal is decreasing due to rising CO 2 prices, geopolitical events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a temporary phase where coal could be profitably sold, motivating the demolition of Lützerath in 2023.It can be assumed that RWE excavates Lützerath because it is the most favorable business option.This is because the lignite deposit under Lützerath is relatively thick, and adjustments to the open-pit mine operation plan to allow for the excavation of a southern subfield will incur additional planning costs for the operator.
Hence, they counterpress an earlier coal phase-out with the argument of social disruptions, despite job losses in the lignite coal industry being relatively low and the transformation being well underway.In 2023, fewer than 18,000 people remained directly employed in the German coal sector, and a coordinated phase-out is proposed to expedite recovery.The remaining work force is largely close to retirement, which enables a smooth phase-out.However, the lignite coal industry consistently manages to mobilize its forces and effectively position the argument of employment in the public eye.This is unlike what happened, for example, between 2011 and 2016 when Germany's solar industry lost more than 100,000 jobs without much attention, as the subsidy landscape in that sector underwent significant changes. 55hese different perceptions of the public related to disruptive job losses in the coal and renewable sector showcase the influence of incumbent fossil fuel players compared to the emerging renewable energy industry.
As an additional argument, RWE brought the overburden in Lützerath up to justify its devastation.The debate surrounding the use of overburden in Lützerath, Garzweiler II, for backfilling old pits at the Garzweiler I open pit mine has been fueled by RWE's argument about its need to create new agricultural land.However, this argument overlooks crucial aspects, including the adverse impact on the quality of agricultural soils, alternative ecologically sound solutions, and insufficient consideration of water shortage in renaturation plans.
This case study highlights the challenge of implementing international climate goals at the national level and demonstrates how entrenched actors advance their economic interests through multifaceted arguments.Thus, critically evaluating and potentially refuting corporate arguments remains an essential task to support political processes based on facts.
The appropriation of additional villages and natural areas against the will of the local population, without sufficient energy-related basis but solely for economic reasons with political backing, jeopardizes Germany's image as a leader in climate policy.This could not only affect climate negotiations but also amplify doubts about necessary measures in less affluent countries.Overall, by prioritizing economic interests, Germany risks compromising the achievement of climate goals and should prioritize human well-being over economic interests in the future.Beyond business economics, is the coal under Lützerath and Mühlrose necessary for the energy industry because otherwise there would be the threat of a blackout?Not at any time.In total, the economic costs to our society of burning coal, which leads to additional climate damage in Germany and worldwide, amount to many times RWE's and LEAG's profits.It is therefore up to politicians to intervene and avert damage to society as a whole.
Germany's substantial allocation of 40 billion euros underscores the necessity of adapting structural aid for a just transition in coal regions, involving local actors and addressing socioeconomic challenges like unemployment, poverty, and eroding trust in politics.Proposed solutions, however, should put a stronger emphasis on increased support for women-dominated sectors, expanded public services, and ecological considerations, all aiming for a more equitable and sustainable future.This socioecological transition emphasizes the importance of preventing new coal or gas investments, with regions actively engaging in the transition receiving significant support and having the best prospects for diversification and improvement.Ignoring this trend risks a delayed economic collapse, reducing chances for recovery, particularly in the context of the ongoing climate crisis.
Similar to the failed destruction of the Hambach Forest, the international press, public, and politicians were looking worriedly at the German decision to destroy Lützerath in January 2023.Similar discussions started to arise with respect to lignite mining sites in eastern Germany, where the energy company LEAG is still planning to destroy the village of Mühlrose in 2024.If German climate policy does not want to damage its own reputation even more, it would therefore be well advised to impose a moratorium on devastation and instead begin a transparent dialogue process with all those affected.The goal of this process should be to develop an accelerated phase-out plan that meets climate protection targets, adapts renaturation plans, and actively shapes sustainable structural change and planning security for all local people.Due to the inaction of the last years, we will not be able to stop the climate crisis.However, if we manage to reduce global CO 2 emissions quickly, some of the climate damage will be delayed, giving humanity more time to adapt to the coming damage.
For the coming damage due to climate change, every tenth of a degree of less temperature increase is crucial.The costs of each additional climate protection thus save additional money that would have had to be spent on remedying climate damage.The power sector in particular has an important role to play here, as it is relatively easy and cheap to save CO 2 emissions, and in an electricity-based energy system, emissions in the transport and heat sectors can be reduced by decarbonizing the power sector.The goal for Germany is at least 80% renewable power generation by 2030 and greenhouse gas-neutral power generation by 2035.This can only be achieved with a timely coal phase-out.To achieve this, the course must now be set in Lusatia for an earlier coal phase-out by 2030.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID
Pao-Yu Oei http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6638-0147Dr. Pao-Yu Oei is a full professor for Economics of Sustainable Energy Transition at Europa Universität Flensburg (EUF), directing the study program Industrial Engineering: Energy and Environmental Management, and head of the 30-member research group FossilExit at EUF, TU Berlin, and DIW Berlin.He has been involved in numerous projects on the German and global coal phase-out and worked for the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU).Philipp J. Herpich is an industrial engineer working as a research associate at TU Berlin and Europa Universität Flensburg (EUF), where he is part of the FossilExit research group.As part of his work, he advised (international) think tanks, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, and the Federal Environment Agency in various projects related to lignite and hard coal phase-out in Germany.

NOTES
18.The differences are based on assumptions about the utilization of lignite-fired power plants: BET's "Electron" scenario assumes an electricity demand of 630 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2023 resulting in high full-load-hours for lignite, which is significantly higher than the demand in recent years (2021: 584 TWh; 2022: 577 TWh).In turn, BET's utilization of hard coal-fired power plants appears to be underestimated.In addition to power generation, lignite is used for the production of both briquettes and pulverized lignite.The BET and FossilExit studies take this into account.BET puts the total demand until 2030 at 55 Mt, while FossilExit considers 41 Mt of coal.BET points out that "no detailed industry-specific analyses are conducted to determine future refining volumes.Therefore, this is a rough estimate." FossilExit bases its reduction on the closure of the last briquette factory in Frechen at the end of 2022 (annual consumption 2 Mt), as well as a proportional replacement of the refining product lignite dust.This is because lignite products will be affected by the

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Protest against the destruction of Lützerath in the open pit mine Garzweiler II.
depicted in the figure.The Garzweiler II pit has since been adjusted and none of the remaining villages will be destroyed.ENVIRONMENT 11 JULY/AUGUST 2024 WWW.TANDFONLINE.COM/VENV Hence, Welzow-Süd, Nochten, and Reichwalde will supply the large-scale lignite-fired power plants Boxberg, Jänschwalde, and Schwarze Pumpe, as well as the lignite refining facilities.The open pit Nochten had the largest remaining reserves in 2022 if the subfield Mühlrose was included.The reserves then added up to ∼290 million tonnes, making it the largest open pit mine in terms of reserves in Germany.

Figure 8 .
Figure 8. Demonstration at Lützerath in January 2023 against the devastation of the village.

Figure 10 .
Figure 10.Lignite-fired power plant Niederaußem in the Rhenish region close to Cologne.The unit on the right of the modern "BoA"-unit type.

Figure 12 .
Figure 12.Artificial lakes in Lusatia resulting from lignite mining operations in former East Germany.

Figure 11 .
Figure 11.Comparison of lignite reserves and demand in a scenario in line with 1.5 °C and a reference scenario (likely).
Fuel Emissions Trading Act from 2023 and can be easily replaced in industry by existing climate-friendlier alternatives.19.R. Habeck, M. Neubauer, and M. Krebber, "Stärkung von Versorgungssicherheit und Klimaschutz-Klarheit für die Menschen im Rheinischen Revier; Politische Verständigung zwischen dem Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz, dem Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Industrie, Klimaschutz und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen und der RWE AG zum vorgezogenen Kohleausstieg 2030 im Rheinischen Revier, " 2022.This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/),which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.© 2024 The Author(s).Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC