![Full access]({"type":"image" , "src":"/pb-assets/3rdPartyLogos/accessFull-1452596451717.png"}){kind=small}
![CrossMark Logo]({"type":"image" , "src":"/templates/jsp/images/CROSSMARK_Color_horizontal.svg"})
Abstract
In this paper we describe energy policy discourses and their story-lines in German parliamentary debates, and trace their evolution over the past decades. Through content analysis and coding with MAXQDA, changes in the discourses and in the use of story-lines by different political parties are analyzed. Our study shows that while the concept of a transition towards a nuclear-free, renewables-based energy system became hegemonic within three decades, the discourse itself underwent major changes. Energy Transition was de-radicalized and became part of a discourse of Ecological Modernization, thus aligning with mainstream economic logic. There are still considerable differences in the story-lines narrated by parliamentarians about pathways to Energy Transition and its effects. Discursive struggles into the meaning and the means of the transition project continue, suggesting that discourse structuration is far from complete.
1. Introduction
“Does one have to listen to this nonsense?”1 When in 1986 a Green Party representative outlined his ideas on the future of the energy system in the German Federal Parliament, his speech was met with derision by the well-established parties (Deutscher Bundestag 1986, 17725). The publication by the newly founded Öko-Institut which coined the term “Energiewende” (Krause, Bossel, and Müller-Reißmann 1980) was considered ideological and non-rational by mainstream scientists at the time (Schmitz and Voß 1980). Three decades later, in 2011, the transition to a renewables-based, nuclear-free energy supply was declared a national project by a conservative–liberal government. Today, “Energiewende” is embraced by a large majority of policy actors in Germany (Joas et al. 2016), and the term (here translated as energy transition) is spreading around the globe (Hockenos 2012).
Shifts in the German political discourse on energy over recent decades have been intertwined with processes of changing power constellations, societal dynamics and a number of path-defining policy decisions (Hake et al. 2015; Strunz 2014). While the movement against nuclear power has been fueled by salient external events such as the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, renewable energy has expanded more continuously and largely through national political processes and decisions. Over time and in interaction with these developments, statements of policy actors on the feasibility of major changes in the energy system, on the effects of a transition, and on the boundary conditions and goals of energy policy have changed remarkably.
However, do these changes imply that the Energy Transition discourse of the early pioneers has become hegemonic? To what degree did the discourse itself adjust, adapt and change on its way to hegemony? Do representatives of the political parties today really share the same discourse, or do they tell different stories under the same label? In this paper we take a closer look at energy debates in the German Federal parliament in a historical perspective, in order to better understand the dynamics of the fundamental discursive changes that have taken place.
By drawing on discourse analysis, we take an “idea-based perspective on the policy process, assuming that [ … ] policymaking tends to be about institutionalizing policy ideas in a competitive political environment” (Winkel et al. 2011, 372). Idea-based perspectives help to address the social and cultural dimensions of policy problems that at first glance seem to be of a technical or physical nature. We assume that ideas play a particularly important role in large-scale transition projects which, entailing fundamental changes in economic structures and living conditions, affect virtually all members of society. Such transitions may challenge major discursive pillars on which legitimacy and political support for existing regulation, markets, business models, individual behavior and political ideas rest. While technical details may be dealt with by relatively small groups of experts, the overall debate involves major parts of society and requires exchange between experts, policy-makers, media and the public.
It has been previously shown in analyses of framings, discourses and policy narratives that ideas and conceptualizations of energy policy problems are important for policy outcomes. Scrase and Ockwell (2010) argue that overcoming existing high-carbon energy policies will require a reframing of problems and solutions in a way that speaks to core government priorities such as economic growth and national security. The implementation of energy transition policies may be hindered by policy narratives that strengthen the status quo (Curran 2012). Tensions and emerging shifts in story-lines may be an indicator for imminent changes of coalitions and power relations within national energy regimes (Bosman et al. 2014). Discursive structures of the debate on hydraulic fracturing in Germany have been shown to be reflected in the legislative process on this novel technology (Schirrmeister 2014). Thus, investigating discourses on policy can make a contribution to understanding and possibly better managing the policy processes in question.
Our study contributes an analysis of the discursive dimension and evolution of story-lines during a constitutive phase of German energy transition to the large body of research that already exists on its technical, economic and political implications. Our research questions are: (1) what major discourses on the energy future have been present in the German Parliament in the past three decades, (2) how did the discourses evolve over time and (3) how can the apparent convergence of discourses across political parties be interpreted? By addressing the first question we want to better understand parliamentary arguments by looking at them from a discourse perspective. Through the second and third question we aim to trace and understand changes in the discourses themselves and in the story-lines used by different actors. The analysis reveals that while the general concept of an Energy Transition clearly became hegemonic, parliamentarians continue to tell different stories about pathways to achieve it and about the side-effects of the transition. Discursive struggles into the meaning and the means of Energy Transition continue.
2. Research design
2.1. Discourse analysis
Adopting a constructivist approach, our research starts from the assumption that the meaning of objects and processes is socially constructed through the use of language (Fischer 2003, 48; Keller 2011, 9). Contemporary policy problems are often so complex that understanding remains limited and uncertainty high, no matter how much scientific research is undertaken. In addition, facts and values are closely entangled, not only in everyday discourse, but also in scientific argument (Kowarsch 2016, section 5.2). Humans have no choice but to construct their social realities based on limited information and previously acquired values and beliefs. There are good reasons to be skeptical “toward claims of single rationality and objective truth” (Feindt and Oels 2005, 163), and to assume that the “struggle over ideas” plays an essential part in policy processes (Stone 2012, 13).
For our analysis of parliamentary debates, we draw on discourse analysis and on the literature on policy stories and policy narratives. With Hajer (1995) we understand discourse to be “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (44). There may be several or multiple social constructions of a single reality (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 176), that is, different co-existing discourses. Discourses are collectively produced and used, representing “shared ways of apprehending the world” (Dryzek 2005, 9). Different discourses may be promoted by competing discourse coalitions, that is, groups “of actors who share a social construct” (Hajer 1993, 45) and who aim to establish their ideas as a basis for policy-making. A discourse becomes hegemonic if the conditions of both “discourse structuration” and “discourse institutionalization” are met. Discourse structuration occurs when actors are under pressure to draw on a certain discourse in order to be credible, or when the discourse dominates the conceptualization of a policy problem across actors. Discourse institutionalization occurs when a discourse is “translated into institutional arrangements”, for example, concrete policies (Hajer 1995, 60–61).
In order to reduce discursive complexity and create coherent images of problems and processes, actors make use of story-lines. Story-lines are the format in which actual everyday communication and argument between actors occurs; they are “the medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements” (Hajer 1993, 47). Discourse coalitions are formed as networks of actors using the same story-lines (Hajer 1995, 65).
Other authors who have highlighted the relevance of policy stories as a medium of political argument emphasize their structural set-up and provide helpful tools for their analysis. Policy stories have a plot that constructs causal relationships between events and actions; they often start with a problem and end with a solution. Recurring plot types are “stories of decline” that claim a (rapid) worsening of the situation, predict crisis and propose action to avoid it, or “stories of rise” that present the original state of affairs as dismal, and describe how some event or action remedies the problems and leads to widespread improvements (Stone 2012, 158–164). Policy stories typically have characters such as heroes, villains and victims, and the definition of characters and their relationships may be used as a strategic tool to attribute blame and responsibility and to create justification for action (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014; Roe 1994; Stone 2012).
Our analysis is based on a content analysis of transcripts of parliamentary debates. Coding is used to construct competing discourses from parliamentarians’ accounts, to identify the story-lines they use and to trace their development over time. Since we look at one type of actor only – parliamentarians as members of parliamentary groups – the definition of discourse coalitions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, studies on German energy policy in an advocacy coalition framework (ACF) perspective (e.g. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014) are informative to illustrate the different parties’ positions in the wider society’s argumentative landscape.2
During the period covered by our analysis, there were five parliamentary party groups in the German Bundestag: Christian Democratic and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU, conservatives), Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP, liberals), Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens since 1993) and Left Party (PDS – Party of Democratic Socialism between 1990 and 2007). ACF studies on German energy policy usually sketch a dichotomy between an “ecological” coalition in favor of energy transition or of ambitious expansion of renewables and an “economic” coalition opposed to these goals. The Green Party and the Social Democrats (SPD) tend to be positioned in the ecological coalition, with the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democrats (FDP) in the economic coalition. However, the large CDU/CSU and SPD parties may include members of both coalitions, and lines have become blurred more recently (Hirschl 2007, 192–196; Joas 2013, 36–46; Reiche 2004, 139–144).
In order to show how the story-lines put forward by parliamentarians are grounded in overarching worldviews, we look at the relationship between energy discourse and the broader discourses on environment and economy. Here we draw on Dryzek’s (2005) work, which describes different environmental discourses classifying them as either “reformist” or “radical” based on their stance towards the dominant economic paradigm; a “general overarching commitment to growth in the quantity of goods and services” (13). We hypothesize that energy discourses that resonate with reformist environmental discourses are more likely to become widespread or hegemonic, because they will not tend to entail a “radical redistribution of power or wealth” (Stone 1989, 294), rather being compatible with core imperatives of policy-making such as sustaining economic growth (Dryzek 2003, 1 and 11; Scrase and Ockwell 2010).
2.2. Selection of time periods
We are interested in the dynamics of German federal parliamentary debates between the late 1980s, when parliamentarians started talking about Energy Transition, and 2011, when the government officially adopted plans to build an energy supply without nuclear, based mainly on renewable energy, by 2050. While the violent conflicts around nuclear energy certainly prepared the ground for later developments (Hake et al. 2015, 4), the notion of an Energy Transition required renewable energy to become conceivable and eventually available as an alternative. Therefore, our analysis focuses on three time periods that encompass major policy decisions which shaped the way renewable energy was promoted and laid the ground for their substantial expansion. The second and third period also include major policy decisions on the future of nuclear power. The policy developments captured by these three periods correspond to major “path-defining developments” for German energy transition identified by Hake et al. (2015). An analysis of energy policy debates from these three periods provides a snapshot of parliamentary arguments during decisive legislative moments.
Period 1: 1989–1991. During this period, the first feed-in tariff law for renewable energies (Electricity Feed-In Tariff Act) entered into force. It required utilities to connect renewable electricity generators to the grid and buy electricity at a price defined as a percentage of the average tariff for final customers. Its financial implications were thought to be minor, and minds were focused on the challenges of German reunification at the time (Berchem 2006), so the law received limited attention in parliament. It was passed with the support of a large majority of MPs in 1990, and led to a considerable expansion of the market for renewable energy (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006, 264). The share of renewables in gross electricity consumption increased from 3.4% in 1990 to 5.2% in 1999 (BMWi and AGEE 2015). Conflicts over nuclear energy ran deep in this period. After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the majority of the German population was opposed to nuclear power (Radkau and Hahn 2013, 309), while the conservative–liberal government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl held on to it. Around the time of period 1, policy-makers started to acknowledge climate change as a serious problem (e.g. Kohl 1987).
Period 2: 1999–2001. In this period, the newly elected Social Democrat–Green government passed the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) and made an agreement with the energy industry to phase out nuclear power. Both policies were fiercely opposed by Christian and Free Democrats. After the liberalization of energy markets in 1998, electricity prices had dropped, and with them the feed-in tariffs to which they were linked. The EEG introduced fixed rates that were guaranteed for 20 years and declined every year for new installations. Feed-in tariffs were financed through the EEG surcharge which was paid by all electricity consumers. The EEG further accelerated the expansion of renewables: by 2009, electricity produced from renewable sources made up 16.3% of consumption (BMWi and AGEE 2015, 5, 7).
Period 3: 2009–2011. At the beginning of period 3, the conservative–liberal government launched an initiative to extend the lifetime of nuclear power plants, thus reactivating the large anti-nuclear protest potential within the population. This decision was part of a more comprehensive energy concept (BMWi and BMU 2010), which contained ambitious long-term targets for renewables development (shares of 80% in electricity and 60% in total energy consumption) and greenhouse gas emissions (cutback of 80–95% compared to 1990) until 2050. After the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011, the extension of nuclear power plant life spans was reversed, and a legislative package on energy transition was passed.
2.3. Document sample
The empirical work in this study is based on plenary debates in the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). We assume that speeches of parliamentarians of the different political parties reflect wider societal debates to a significant degree. Members of parliament (MPs) are situated at the interface of policy, science and society: they interact with the media and scientists, being informed about relevant scientific publications through their secretariats and scientific services, and for example through their offices in their electoral districts they can be expected to be in touch with the general public. As elected representatives, and as members of a legislative body at the federal level, their views expressed in parliament can be considered both representative of public opinion and influential for the policy process. In the scoping phase of the research, approximately 100 speeches of members of government (chancellors, ministers of environment and ministers of economic affairs) between 1980 and 2014, before and outside of parliament, were screened.3 Relevant political documents as well as texts by pioneer writers on Energy Transition (e.g. Huber 1982; Krause, Bossel, and Müller-Reißmann 1980; Scheer 1989, 1999) were evaluated as background information to better understand the origins of the Energy Transition discourse.
We selected five transcripts of plenary debates for each of the three periods. Transcripts were retrieved from the parliament’s database (http://pdok.bundestag.de/). Key word searches were conducted for each period, using terms such as “(promotion of) renewable energy”, “Energy Transition”; “Energy Mix” and “Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)” (in German). Both the number and length of debates on energy increase over time. The several dozens of plenary debate transcripts obtained were screened individually in order to identify five highly relevant debates for each period. Debates were firstly excluded where the key words featured as minor references to energy issues in other contexts (e.g. budget consultations, general debates on climate change). They were also excluded if they focused on specific or more technical aspects such as nuclear energy risk assessment, external energy policy, carbon capture and storage, and grid management or grid extension. From the remaining debates (8 in period 1, 9 in period 2 and 17 in period 3), we selected those relating to the period’s major policy decisions (see above), as well as those with fundamental arguments about the general set-up and the future of energy supply, particularly with respect to the role of renewable energies. In view of time and resource constraints, the analysis was restricted to 15 parliamentary debates (Deutscher Bundestag 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1991, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c), which were then coded using MAXQDA. Each transcript contains the speeches of several parliamentarians (typically between 10 and 30) of all parties speaking on the subject in question, often including ministers or the chancellor.
2.4. Coding and reconstruction of discourses and story-lines
We used a content analysis to understand and structure the statements of MPs in the parliamentary debates. Inductive coding was used to reconstruct competing discourses on energy future and the story-lines employed by parliamentarians. The analysis focuses on the most prominent elements of energy transition, that is, the expansion of renewables in the electricity sector and nuclear phase-out. We thus share a pragmatic approach with Strunz (2014, 151), who points to the fact that “the German Energiewende discourse focuses on electricity while employing the term energy”. Text segments referring to related but less central issues and instruments (e.g. ecological tax reform, nuclear waste storage, subsidies for domestic coal, combined heat and power generation, liberalization of the energy sector and others) were not coded to keep the material manageable and focused. The coding of references to environmental discourses was based on the work of Dryzek (2005) and thus deductive. In addition to the qualitative evaluation and comparison of the coded text segments, we perform a quantitative evaluation of the codings which allows us to illustrate broad trends in the evolution of the debate.
A first draft of the code system was developed based on a screening of speeches and parliamentary debates, and was applied to six speeches and two plenary parliamentary debates for each period using MAXQDA. After the retrieval and evaluation of these preliminary codings, the system was revised. The final code system (Table 1) was then applied to the full set of 15 parliamentary debates. The codes were grouped into six main categories that were found to represent key components of the speakers’ accounts.
Motivation: Problems and challenges to energy policy
Vision for the future energy system
Expected effects of Energy Transition policies
Policy preferences on renewable energy support
International dimension
Overarching environmental discourse
Table 1. Code system.
The same operational definitions were used for all three time periods. The codes thus represent lines of argument that are recognizable over time. The qualitative evaluation of the codings and their comparison between the periods, however, reveal more subtle changes in how these arguments are used and combined by the members of the different parties (see Section 3.2). We applied the codes to text segments of variable length, from several paragraphs to single sentences and words, assuming that a common argument may be evoked by a key word or brief reference.
All coded text segments were assigned an additional code for the speaker’s party membership. Using the complex retrieval function and the code relations browser in MAXQDA, the use of these discourse elements by members of the different political parties was traced. The size of the parliamentary groups determines how much time is allocated to speakers in the debates (Deutscher Bundestag 2014). Thus, when interpreting the number of codings per political party (Figures 2–4), the differences in time taken to deliver the speech have to be considered.
The statements of individual MPs may not always exactly represent the opinion of the majority of their parliamentary party group. For instance, Hermann Scheer (SPD), pioneer writer on Energy Transition and one of the initiators of the EEG, pushed more urgently for renewable energy expansion than other Social Democrats might have done. Similarly, Norbert Röttgen (CDU) as environment minister in period 3 made statements on Energy Transition that not necessarily all members of his own party, and particularly their coalition partner FDP, are likely to have supported. Our method registers what was said in the debates, without any cross-checking for congruence with the party’s majority opinion. However, the fact that these individuals spoke on energy issues in parliament on behalf of their party groups indicates that their positions were at least accepted by their colleagues.
3. Results
3.1. Two major energy discourses
From the codings we first construct two general antagonist discourses. These represent an aggregate of the accounts of the numerous parliamentarians who spoke in the debates and thus can be regarded as “constructed text” (Yanow 1995, 113). Closest to these prototypes are the arguments of the Social Democrat–Green governing coalition (“Energy Transition”) and the Christian Democrat–Free Democrat opposition (“Energy Mix”) in period 2. However, there is no exclusive association between the codes and the political parties, and speakers combine the different lines of argument as represented by the codes in different ways over time. Section 3.2 analyzes in more detail how the story-lines of these two major discursive traditions changed and partly converged.
3.1.1. Energy Transition
The “classic” Energy Transition discourse is characterized by strong environmental concerns, in particular with respect to climate change and the risks of nuclear energy, and the conviction that fundamental changes in the energy system will be needed to address them. The long-term vision is an energy system without nuclear power and based primarily on the decentralized use of renewable energy sources. The stories employed by parliamentarians promoting Energy Transition are usually “stories of rise” (Stone 2012) and win–win situations, where the rapid expansion of clean and abundant renewable energy will build a system of environmentally friendly energy supply that will also create new jobs, benefit the economy, reduce import dependence and improve supply security:
The renewable energies are inexhaustible, and using them saves finite fossil energy resources. They are environmentally friendly and significantly contribute to climate protection, since their use gives rise to no or very small quantities of pollutants and CO2 emissions. Renewable energies are innovative technologies which open up new export chances and create and secure jobs particularly in small and medium-sized business. The Federal Government is doing everything to secure these innovative jobs for tomorrow. (Siegmar Mosdorf, SPD, in Deutscher Bundestag 2000a, 8428)
The incumbent utility companies tend to be presented as villains who obstruct the transition with the aim of securing their high profits from nuclear and coal plants: “The electricity giants are already trying to raise dams against the logical continuation of the support to regenerative and rational energy sources” (Wolfgang Daniels, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 1990c, 17754). Citizens and small businesses who invest in renewables or protest against nuclear power are the most prominent heroes in the story-line:
However, he is right in one aspect: It is the citizens who carry out the energy transition. But they have been doing this … for almost 30 years already. The truth is that citizens have fought this through against you and your government coalition. This is what happened here … (Sigmar Gabriel, SPD, in Deutscher Bundestag 2011c, 13371)
The benefits of Energy Transition will reach beyond German borders. Germany is seen as adopting a leadership role through ambitious climate and renewables policies, eventually convincing others to follow its course. For the proponents of Energy Transition, the renewable energy law (EEG) with its feed-in tariffs for renewable energies is a central and indispensable building block of the transition, in addition to efforts to increase energy efficiency and phase out nuclear power. The benefits of transition are often ascribed directly to the EEG itself: “This law is the birth certificate of the solar age” (Hans-Josef Fell, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 2000a, 8441). Its costs are presented as negligible or at least tolerable compared to the avoided environmental costs and given the widespread benefits.
3.1.2. Energy Mix
The discourse among Christian and Free Democrats in period 2 is antagonistic to the Energy Transition discourse in many respects. We label it “Energy Mix”. Although it shares concerns about environmental challenges, in particular climate change, at its heart are problem definitions that center around the economic viability of energy supply and its security. Statements reflect a status quo-oriented position, emphasizing that a broad energy mix continues to be necessary in order to ensure a reliable supply. Parliamentarians drawing on this discourse up until 2011 portray nuclear energy and renewables as necessary “partners” in the fight against climate change.
The story-lines tend to warn of the risks of major changes and of decline, portraying plans that build on major contributions of renewable energies as illusionary and dangerous given their limited technical and economic potential:
It is our goal to … increase the share of renewables in our energy supply in the long term. At the same time, there must be an urgent warning of exaggeratedly high expectations with respect to the economic potential of regenerative energy. (Matthias Engelsberger, CDU/CSU, in Deutscher Bundestag 1989, 9463)
The stories warn of harmful consequences of the policies proposed by the Social Democrat–Green government, for instance rising electricity prices and resulting damages to the German industry’s competitiveness. Victims are numerous, with both citizens and businesses as electricity consumers being affected by rising prices or loss of jobs that result from the deteriorating competitiveness:
The price of electricity … must not rise. It is wrong to regulate this based on a surcharge and thus to reduce the competitiveness of German industry and endanger jobs. (Walter Hirche, FDP, in Deutscher Bundestag 1999, 7273)
Again, energy has to be inexpensive. Energy policy without cost awareness is a policy at the expense of jobs, of families and of ordinary people. (Dagmar Wöhrl, CDU/CSU, in Deutscher Bundestag 2000b, 8755)
While proponents of the Energy Mix discourse may also praise Germany’s exceptional performance in terms of climate protection and renewable energy, they tend to emphasize the country’s negligible contribution to global emissions. National climate protection efforts in the absence of international coordination are considered futile in terms of the reduction of global greenhouse gas reduction but dangerous to the national economy – a useless self-sacrifice to a green ideology. Within the Energy Mix discourse, policy preferences for energy efficiency and renewables development are expressed, but the feed-in tariff system of the EEG is criticized or rejected, and stronger market-orientation of policy instruments is called for.
3.2. Evolution of discourse
The following sections describe the development of energy discourses and their coded components in the parliamentary debates over the three periods. The figures show the numbers of codings for selected codes over time periods and for different political parties. They are illustrative for broad trends and comparisons. However, statistical relevance cannot be claimed given the limited sample of documents, the differing lengths of speeches of the political party groups and the increase in the overall length of plenary debates over time.
3.2.1. Motivation
Figure 1 shows how often the different codes for policy challenges were applied in the three periods. Overall, climate change is the challenge most frequently mentioned. It is referred to regularly by members of all parties (not disaggregated in Figure 1) with a sometimes catastrophic framing in period 1 subsequently yielding to more factual commitments to politically established climate policy goals. However, the issue of climate change generates different conclusions: while Green Party and Social Democrat MPs use it to justify calls for increasing energy efficiency and use of renewable energy, Christian and Free Democrats routinely build on climate change to make a case for nuclear energy.
Published online:
05 August 2016![]({"type":"image","src":"/na101/home/literatum/publisher/tandf/journals/content/ciej20/2017/ciej20.v030.i03/13511610.2016.1215241/20170510/images/medium/ciej_a_1215241_f0001_c.jpg"})
Figure 1. Number of codings of major challenges.
In period 3, there are fewer references to climate change than in periods 1 and 2, and the coded text segments also tend to be shorter. We assume, however, that this does not necessarily point to a decreasing relevance of climate protection perceived by parliamentarians, but that climate change has become “institutionalized” as a term, so that key words are sufficient to evoke the full story on emissions, climate impacts and the need for policy action (Viehöfer 2004, 254).
While there is a consensus on climate change, nuclear risk as a motivation for policy change is proposed exclusively by Social Democrats, Green Party and Left Party members up until 2010. It is only after Fukushima that conservative and liberal MPs adopt nuclear risk as a major concern and explicitly commit to nuclear phase-out. Economic viability features more and more often as a boundary condition for energy policy over time, frequently framed as part of a “golden triangle” presenting economic viability, environment-friendliness and supply security as equally important goals of energy policy. The need to protect scarce resources is a key argument for the expansion of renewables in some speeches of period 1 and 2, but is of limited and decreasing relevance overall.
3.2.2. Vision for the future energy system
Figure 2 shows the development of codings for visions on the future of energy in the speeches of MPs from the five political parties. In the debates of period 1, the vision of an Energy Transition towards an electricity supply system without nuclear power and with large increases in efficiency and share of renewables is spelled out twice by Green Party MPs; the term is also used twice by Social Democrats. The dominant view at the time, put forward by CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP, however claims that a broad, well-balanced “Energy Mix” is necessary to secure supply. Christian and Free Democrats stress the need to use both nuclear and fossil energy sources, while Social Democrats, having abandoned their pro-nuclear position after Chernobyl, focus on the merits of domestic coal.
Published online:
05 August 2016Figure 2. Number of codings of (a) “Energy Transition” and (b) “Energy Mix”. Note: The number of codings for the different parties in part reflects different proportional speaking times. Approximate shares of speaking times are as follows: period 1, governing coalition CDU/CSU & FDP 55%, SPD 30%, Green and Left Party 8%; period 2, governing coalition SPD & Green Party 51%, CDU/CSU 31%, FDP 10%, Left Party 7%; period 3, CDU/CSU 38%, FDP 15%, SPD 23%, Green and Left Party 12% (Deutscher Bundestag 2014, chapter 7.11).
![]({"type":"image","src":"/na101/home/literatum/publisher/tandf/journals/content/ciej20/2017/ciej20.v030.i03/13511610.2016.1215241/20170510/images/medium/ciej_a_1215241_f0002_c.jpg"})
Figure 2. Number of codings of (a) “Energy Transition” and (b) “Energy Mix”. Note: The number of codings for the different parties in part reflects different proportional speaking times. Approximate shares of speaking times are as follows: period 1, governing coalition CDU/CSU & FDP 55%, SPD 30%, Green and Left Party 8%; period 2, governing coalition SPD & Green Party 51%, CDU/CSU 31%, FDP 10%, Left Party 7%; period 3, CDU/CSU 38%, FDP 15%, SPD 23%, Green and Left Party 12% (Deutscher Bundestag 2014, chapter 7.11).
By the end of the 1990s, “Energiewende” has become a familiar term in parliamentary debates. In period 2, some protagonists start establishing the idea that energy demand might be covered completely by renewables by 2050. However Energy Mix is coded as often as in period 1. The idea of replacing the safe and solid nuclear base-load energy with renewables is still considered preposterous (e.g. Kurt-Dieter Grill, CDU/CSU, in Deutscher Bundestag 2000b, 8749). Despite this, opposition party MPs cautiously start adopting aspects of Energy Transition in their own story-line, stating the need to eventually replace fossil fuels with renewables or envisaging substantial shares of renewable electricity by 2050.
In period 3, Energy Transition features prominently in speeches of all parties’ MPs, even in those of Free Democrats who had previously avoided the term. As in period 2, lines of conflict run primarily between CDU/CSU and FDP on the one hand and SPD and Green Party on the other. However, both groups’ energy discourses are now largely aligned with each other. SPD and Green Party members express more ambition in terms of targets and speed of transition. They envision 100% renewables in electricity and want this to be achieved “as soon as possible” (Hermann Scheer, SPD, in Deutscher Bundestag 2010a, 2201). CDU/CSU and FDP MPs support the government’s 80% target for the year 2050 and are generally less hurried. They continue to refer to the necessity of an “Energy Mix”, now as a condition in the nearer-term future for a successful transition towards renewables in the longer term. Before Fukushima, the role of nuclear energy as a “bridge” towards the solar age was highlighted; after March 2011 new, efficient fossil power plants are called for to ensure supply security.
The vision of a decentralization of energy supply structures is a distinctive feature of the early Energy Transition discourse. Green MPs in period 1 want the old monopolist, centralist, capitalist structures and “sclerotic large-scale technology” to be replaced, in order to pave the way for “modern efficient decentralized” technologies (Wilhelm Knabe, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 1990a, 15875; similarly Wolfgang Daniels, Green Party, Deutscher Bundestag 1990a, 15865). “Villainization” of the big utility companies and criticism of their market power in the early Green Party story-line is combined with calls for breaking up monopolies and transferring their energy production capacities into communal public entities (Die Grünen 1990a, 6). There is a perception among left-wing Energy Transition pioneers that decentralized energy structures will not only respond to environmental challenges, but also remedy broader economic and social deficits and thus be a “catalyst for a more thorough transformation of the whole society” (Strunz 2014, 154).
In period 2, decentralized energy supply is still seen as preferable by the Social Democrat–Green coalition and the Left, but framings are more compromising. An efficient, “in many cases decentralized” energy structure is the goal to be achieved (Jürgen Trittin, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 2001a, 14289). Interestingly, the frequency of “Decentralization” codings increases in period 3 (Figure 3), and they feature in speeches of all parties except those of the Free Democrats. CDU/CSU MPs acknowledge the contributions of small, decentralized actors, albeit without criticizing the big suppliers. The focus on citizens and small business actors is broadened; Energy Transition becomes a “society’s project”, where the size of the challenge demands everyone’s contribution (e.g. Norbert Röttgen, CDU/CSU, Deutscher Bundestag 2011b, 12987).
Published online:
05 August 2016![]({"type":"image","src":"/na101/home/literatum/publisher/tandf/journals/content/ciej20/2017/ciej20.v030.i03/13511610.2016.1215241/20170510/images/medium/ciej_a_1215241_f0003_c.jpg"})
Figure 3. Number of codings of “Decentralization”.
3.2.3. Effects of Energy Transition
The graphs in Figure 4(a) and (b) show how often the codes “Benefits” and “Costs and Risks” of Energy Transition were applied to the speeches of MPs of the different parties. Those in Figure 4(c) and (d) show how many of these codings refer to environmental, economic, supply-side or social effects.
Published online:
05 August 2016Figure 4. Number of codings on effects of Energy Transition. Graphs (a) and (b) show the number of codings for “Benefits” and “Costs and Risks” for the five parties. Graphs (c) and (d) show how many of these codings refer to environmental, economic, supply-side or social effects (all parties).
![]({"type":"image","src":"/na101/home/literatum/publisher/tandf/journals/content/ciej20/2017/ciej20.v030.i03/13511610.2016.1215241/20170510/images/medium/ciej_a_1215241_f0004_c.jpg"})
Figure 4. Number of codings on effects of Energy Transition. Graphs (a) and (b) show the number of codings for “Benefits” and “Costs and Risks” for the five parties. Graphs (c) and (d) show how many of these codings refer to environmental, economic, supply-side or social effects (all parties).
In period 1, the environmental and supply security benefits of renewables are highlighted by MPs of all parties except the Left, reflecting the broad support for the 1990 feed-in tariff law. Energy Mix proponents, however, take care to emphasize that while renewables deserve support as a supplementary source, they will not become a serious competitor to conventional energy. In period 2, positive effects of Energy Transition are almost exclusively highlighted by Social Democrats and Green Party members. In this period they praise economic benefits as often as (Greens) or more often than (SPD) environmental benefits. They stress that a large number of jobs would be created in the renewables industry, which would be boosted by the increasing chances of exporting their technologies to global emerging markets. In period 3, benefits are talked about evenly by all parties, with an even stronger focus on economic aspects than in period 2. Statistical data are used to substantiate a success story, with repeated references to the number of (approximately) 300,000 jobs that have already been created in the renewable energy industry. Government members extensively use stories about economic co-benefits, promising “technological modernization, innovation, the opening up of new markets, the creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs, the strengthening of competitiveness and provision for the future” (Norbert Röttgen, CDU/CSU, in Deutscher Bundestag 2010b, 7179).
Costs of Energy Transition are hardly an issue in period 1, but start playing a key role in the story-line of the opposition parties in period 2. Economic aspects clearly dominate from the start. The typical argument claims that nuclear phase-out and the renewables support scheme would cause increases in electricity prices, which in turn would lead to job losses in the nuclear or energy-intensive industry and be damaging to German industry’s international competitiveness.
In period 3, Christian and Free Democrats refer even more frequently to actual or expected costs of Energy Transition. Sometimes they also describe negative environmental effects, warning mostly of damages to landscapes resulting from renewables; some speakers conjure up threats to supply security and large-scale blackouts. A new version of the cost argument emerges in period 3, which criticizes transition policies, in particular the EEG surcharge, for creating a disproportionately large burden for poor households. It is used by conservatives and liberals, who criticize the profits of renewable investors from the guaranteed feed-in tariffs, and by Left Party members, who tend to blame the incumbent utility companies. However, in period 3, references to costs are no longer targeted against Energy Transition as such, but are used to motivate reforms of policies.
3.2.4. International dimension
From the beginning, the international leadership aspect is present in speeches of MPs of all parties except the Left. Speakers praise Germany’s exceptional effort or performance, or emphasize that the country’s pioneering action on renewable energy and climate protection will eventually convince others to follow suit. They argue that Germany’s negotiating position in international climate negotiations will be improved. In period 2, Social Democrat and Green MPs present the EEG as an act of leadership, underlining its globally unique character and its potential to be an example for others. In period 3, references to leadership become more frequent. They often imply that Germany has a unique capacity to perform, and at the same time tend to emphasize the competitive advantages a leading country might enjoy on international markets.
Christian and Free Democrats – sometimes in the same speeches – also use an argument that runs counter to leadership, emphasizing the need for global action on climate protection. It often refers to Germany’s negligible contribution to global emissions and marginal effects of isolated national action, and to ensuing risks for national competitiveness. In its strongest version, it paints a lose–lose picture where national efforts do nothing for the climate but cause harm domestically.
3.2.5. Policy preferences
The differences between the Christian Democrat–Free Democrat discourse on the one side and the Social Democrat–Green discourse on the other shrink also with respect to policy preferences over time. The division over the use of nuclear power, previously the most prominent conflict between the two camps, vanishes after Fukushima. All parties consistently call for measures to increase the efficiency of energy use. From the beginning both coalitions in principle support the expansion of renewables, but present differences in the level of ambition and in positions on the specific design of renewables support.
In period 1, there is a general agreement that support for renewables in the form of Feed-in Tariffs is necessary and justified. Many MPs argue that given the external costs of fossil energy use, the tariffs would not in essence be a subsidy, but make prices tell the ecological truth. Social Democrat and Green Party MPs hold on to this position in period 2 when making a case for the EEG. At this point, in contrast, Christian and Free Democrats start calling for greater market-orientation. They heavily criticize the EEG support scheme for being an overly large intervention in the market, for not being “technology-neutral”, and for not creating sufficient incentives for renewables to become competitive. As alternative policy options, Free Democrats in period 2 propose quota systems, while Christian Democrats suggest the maintenance of the coupling of tariffs to market prices.
In period 3, however, with a Christian and Free Democrat government that is not prepared to abolish an established policy instrument, the conservative–liberal coalition in parliament also commits to the EEG. The conservative–liberal coalition now turns a stronger market-orientation into a condition: the Energy Transition project can only be successful if renewables eventually become competitive without subsidization (e.g. Hermann Otto Solms, FDP, in Deutscher Bundestag 2011a, 11295), and it will only be accepted by the public if costs are kept under control.
3.2.6. Relationship with environmental discourses
Early Energy Transition proponents strongly draw on a “Survivalist” environmental discourse (Dryzek 2005, 27). Radically departing from the dominant paradigm of industrialism and economic growth, Survivalism predicts collapse should the carrying capacity of environmental systems be surpassed, and calls for fundamental changes in the ways of producing and living. In a survivalist spirit, Green Party and some Social Democrat MPs in period 1 perceive environmental crises as imminent and describe their consequences as catastrophic: “the chances that the blue planet will be saved are getting worse and worse” (Wolfgang Daniels, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 1989, 9455). A fundamental conflict between the growth-bound economic system and the long-term health of the planet is diagnosed (e.g. Die Grünen 1987, 33); environmental protection needs to be placed above economic interests (Die Grünen 1990b, 8; Scheer 1989, 20).
The mainstream discourse of the conservative–liberal governing majority in period 1, however, is characterized by a strong commitment to the market economy. It leans towards “Economic Rationalism”, with a high level of confidence in the “deployment of market mechanisms to achieve public ends” (Dryzek 2005, 121), and skepticism towards government intervention. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989, which exposed the immense environmental problems within its territory, strengthened the belief in the superiority of market-based systems also in terms of environmental protection (Haussmann 1990).
In period 2, the Social Democrat–Green government makes Ecological Modernization the overarching discourse that guides policy-making (Mez 2003). Reformist in Dryzek’s classification (2005), Ecological Modernization aims to reconcile economic development and environmental protection through more efficient use of resources, product and process innovation, and economic instruments (e.g. Jänicke 1985). It requires “conscious and coordinated intervention” into market systems in order to achieve the desired outcomes, but advocates cooperation with business (Dryzek 2005, 167). In the speeches of Social Democrat and Green MPs in period 2, warnings of ecological catastrophe and critiques of capitalism largely give way to a concept more easily compatible with mainstream economic thinking: greening the economy will also boost the economy.
Ecological Modernization becomes the mainstream discourse after period 2 and is also adopted by Christian Democrats (Jänicke 2010, 491) although Social Democrats and Green Party MPs tend to more strongly emphasize the need for rules to ensure that the forces of the market support environmental goals. In period 3, the idea of absolute environmental limits to economic activity receives new impulses (Rockström et al. 2009), and a broad new debate on economic growth and the environment also takes place in parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2010). However, this does not fundamentally shake the mainstream confidence in the possibility to reconcile environmental and economic goals (Röttgen 2010).
4. Discussion
We identify two different discourses in German parliamentary debates on energy policy. One promotes Energy Transition towards a nuclear-free, renewables-based regime. It is primarily motivated by environmental concerns, and emphasizes the benefits of policy change. The proponents of Energy Transition tell “stories of rise”, conjuring up positive expectations and benefits accruing across society, and present citizens as the most prominent heroes. The antagonist Energy Mix discourse emphasizes the economic impacts of energy policy changes, and tends to hold on to conventional energy sources. Parliamentarians skeptical towards Energy Transition tell “stories of decline” that emphasize the costs and risks and assign a central role to the alleged victims of the adverse impacts of the transition, which are presented as widespread and overwhelming.
4.1. Hegemony of Energy Transition?
Over time, the proponents of Energy Transition have clearly been able to impose major elements of their discourse on the majority in parliament. By the end of period 3, Energy Transition as a vision was voiced by all parliamentarians, being understood not only as a transition to any low-carbon energy system (Bosman et al. 2014), but specifically to a renewables-based, nuclear-free energy supply. Furthermore, members of all parties mention beneficial economic effects of the transition, and many praise the role of citizens and small businesses. Thus, discourse structuration has clearly occurred.
Moreover, the discourse has clearly been institutionalized in the form of legislation, government programs (e.g. BMWi and BMU 2010) and processes (e.g. the Energiewende monitoring process4). In fact, the establishment of the Energy Transition discourse was interdependent with the substantial associated changes in policy between the 1980s and 2011. Before the Energy Transition discourse itself had become influential, a discursive consensus on the need to fight climate change, and on the environmental merits of renewable energy, facilitated the introduction of the Feed-in Tariff law in 1990 and later the EEG. These “path-defining developments” (Hake et al. 2015, 7; 10) institutionalized major elements of the Energy Transition discourse. They caused changes in economic structures of the electricity system and in political power relations which in turn required political parties and parliamentarians to adapt their story-lines. The story of Energy Transition was reinforced by some of these changes, for instance by the fact that the renewables industry actually created a significant number of jobs, and that other countries introduced similar feed-in tariff legislation.
On the one hand, it can thus be argued that the Energy Transition discourse has become hegemonic within a brief period of time. On the other hand, however, our analysis suggests that the discourse itself has undergone major changes over this period. It also shows that the story-lines regarding Energy Transition still exhibit fundamental differences, which indicates that, under the surface, discourse structuration is far from complete.
4.2. Changing discourse
On its way to hegemony, the Energy Transition discourse was transformed from a radical to a reformist discourse and today it strongly resonates with Ecological Modernization. Survivalist and critical towards capitalism in its left-wing origins, it was integrated into a worldview that envisions the ecological renewal of industrial structures within the existing market economy and through market mechanisms. By putting an ever stronger focus on economic benefits of transition policies, the perception of a win–win situation was established; “trading a radical stance for a more respectable one” (Hajer 1993, 64) proved a successful strategy.
The pressure to portray environmental policy problems in terms of economic logic and economic efficiency concerns may be discussed critically (e.g. Shaw and Nerlich 2015), but its existence cannot be empirically doubted. A body of research shows that economic co-benefits are a strong driver for national and sectoral action on climate change (Edenhofer et al. 2015, 19; Somanathan et al. 2014, 1152). Economic framing has been identified as a success factor for renewable energy policy formulation (Lauber and Schenner 2011). It is likely to gain relevance in discourses on climate change in developing countries, where climate change protection measures are presented as supportive of domestic economic priorities such as poverty alleviation or growth (Thaker and Leiserowitz 2014). Our case study confirms these results and supports the hypothesis that winning environmental discourses align with mainstream economic logic and key economic imperatives.
Similarly, the discourse has shed some of its radical concepts concerning energy supply structure. In its early years Energy Transition was targeted against established political and economic structures and associated with calls for fundamental re-organization and decentralization. While the EEG in effect did lead to some degree of decentralization of material energy structures and to the emergence of new business and lobby groups (Sühlsen and Hisschemöller 2014), the idea of a more decentralized energy production was sufficiently flexible to allow for a change in character from conflict towards consensus and inclusiveness. In period 3, the Green Party no longer called for a break-up of monopolies, but rather suggested measures to enhance competition and improve the market position of small competitors. Christian Democrats created a story-line that conjured up a national, common project, the realization of which needed everyone’s efforts and invited almost everyone to identify with the project. Thus, while actors in German energy policy still hold different visions on the desirable degree of decentralization (Schmid, Knopf, and Pechan 2016), trenches are less deep than they used to be.
4.3. Persistently different story-lines
While the long-term vision of a renewable energy future clearly structures the discourse by the end of period 3, the story-lines on routes to achieve this still differ considerably, revealing many of the old divisions. The story-lines continue to differ fundamentally in the time horizon of their plot. While the starting point for Greens and Social Democrats is the long-term need to decarbonize the economy, Christian and Free Democrats tend to focus on the more short-term securing of reasonable electricity prices and supply security. Social democrats and Greens adhere to a “pure” version of the Energy Transition story, claiming that new fossil power plants are not necessary and calling for rapid expansion of renewables. They continue to talk about benefits and hardly mention costs and risks (Figure 4). They often insinuate that the transition towards a clean and renewable energy future is in fact endangered by government action and that the conservative–liberal commitments to Energy Transition are not sincere:
What you are aiming at is to replace nuclear energy as baseload by coal as baseload. (Jürgen Trittin, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 2011b, 12974)
How should the expansion of renewable energy still be possible if in the details you build in such obstacles? (Hans-Josef Fell, Green Party, in Deutscher Bundestag 2011b, 12987)
The story of the conservative–liberal coalition, by contrast, still assigns an important role to conventional energy in the short to medium term and is much less ambitious with respect to transition speed. Nuclear energy before Fukushima or new coal plants after March 2011 are described as “bridges” to the solar age. There are persistent, ever more urgent references to economic costs and risks of the new national Energy Transition project, often used to question the design of the policy instruments in place:
One thing, in any case, cannot work. We must not make energy so expensive in Germany that we drive away industries at the end of the day. I still would like Germany to remain an industrialized country. (Michael Fuchs, CDU/CSU, in Deutscher Bundestag 2010a, 2204)
A de-industrialization which is directed against jobs and wealth in Germany will not be possible with [the Christian and Free Democrat government]. (Rainer Brüderle, FDP, in Deutscher Bundestag 2011a, 11286)
Statements of this kind are no longer used to openly question the transition project as such, but to caution against overly large ambition, raise awareness of the size of the challenge and illustrate the need for “repair work on the undesirable consequences related to the energy transition” (Hake et al. 2015, 13, emphasis original).
The persistent differences in the stories that are told by parliamentarians by the end of period 3, all under the heading of Energy Transition, suggest that conflicts are far from solved. These conflicts now center on the implementation rather than the overall feasibility and desirability of the transition. Many CDU/CSU/FDP members appear to have subscribed to Energy Transition more or less reluctantly because it could no longer be avoided (although there is also some enthusiasm), while Greens and SPD constantly fear their achievements in initiating the Ecological Modernization of industrial society are endangered. To conclude, while Energiewende as a term has become commonplace, discursive struggles continue into the meaning and the means of the transition project.
5. Conclusions and outlook
From our case study we raise two questions for further study. Firstly, the persistent presence of different story-lines under the shared discursive “roof” of Energy Transition invites further exploration. Does this tension between story-lines imply that the conservative–liberal commitment to Energy Transition in period 3 was not sincere – as insinuated by the Social Democrat–Green coalition? In other words, to what extent is the change in rhetoric and strategy of the Christian and Free Democrats the product of a policy learning process, that is, reflects an enduring alteration of ideas and beliefs? (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, 486) Alternatively, have Social Democrats and Greens failed to recognize the dimension of economic risk inherent in the Energy Transition policies they proposed, and will they have to adjust their story-line? Research into the more recent energy discourse could explore whether story-lines develop to appropriately address these inner tensions.
Secondly, our results support calls for more intensive research into processes and conditions of consensus-building and convergence in environmental policy discourses (Lovell, Bulkeley, and Owens 2009). We observe dynamics of convergence and broadening of discourses with a shifting of conflicts to lower levels. Are these typical for countries following a consensus model of democracy (Lijphart 2012) and more cooperative, coordinated types of political and economic systems (Hall and Soskice 2001), where power is shared across different dimensions and compromises a prerequisite for successful policy-making?
In addition, the German case may lend itself well to researching the relationship between policy stories, science and policy learning. Changes in policy narratives have been postulated to be more decisive to policy learning and policy change than science (McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan 2014, 243). However, scientists may be influenced by their own beliefs when advising policy-makers (Spruijt et al. 2014). In the German Energy Transition debate, scientists and scientific policy advisors clearly participate in creating and changing stories, being intensely engaged for instance in the construction of the costs and benefits (e.g. Pahle, Knopf, and Edenhofer 2012; SRU 2011; SVR 2011). Therefore, rather than trying to determine the influence of science versus discourses as separate domains, we suggest that studying their interaction could yield important insights into processes of policy learning and policy change.
| Category | Codes | Operational definition |
|---|---|---|
| Motivation | Nuclear Risk Climate Change Environment Sustainability Economic Viability Resource Scarcity Supply Security | References to these issues as challenges to energy policy or motivation for policy change. |
| Vision | Energy Transition | The future energy system should or will be completely or mostly based on renewable sources. Germany is heading for an Energy Transition or the “solar age”. |
| Decentralization | The energy system should be less centralized. Citizens and SMEs are important actors; the power of the big industrial energy suppliers should be reduced. | |
| Energy Mix | A broad energy mix is necessary. Renewables cannot replace conventional energy sources. | |
| Effects of Energy Transition | Benefits | Renewable energy/Energy Transition policies make things better, with benefits for the environment, economy, or supply security. |
| Costs and Risks | Renewable energy/Energy Transition policies make things worse. They negatively impact the environment, cause economic risks or high costs or a particular burden for poor households, or they endanger security of supply. | |
| International dimension | Germany’s Leadership | Germany’s climate and renewable energy policies are particularly ambitious in the international sphere. Germany takes on a leadership role and serves as an international role model. |
| International Coordination | The climate problem is global and calls for global solutions/coordinated action at international/European level. Isolated national action does not help. | |
| Policy preferences | Support for Renewables | Renewable energy needs state support to succeed in the market. |
| Market-orientation of RE Policy | The current support scheme for renewable energy is not cost-efficient; there should be a stronger role of market mechanisms. | |
| Environmental discourse | Survivalism | References to environmental limits to growth and/or the need to place the environment above economic concerns. |
| Economic Rationalism | Statements of confidence in the market and/or opposition to market intervention. | |
| Ecological Modernization | Statements of belief in reconcilability of environmental and economic concerns. |
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Ottmar Edenhofer, Karoline Steinbacher and Fabian Joas for their helpful comments on the research design. We are also grateful to the participants of the PhD seminar at MCC and of the 27th PhD Workshop on International Climate Policy 2015 in Berlin, Germany, for their feedback. Previous versions of the paper were presented at the 2nd International Conference on Public Policy 2015 in Milan, Italy, and at the 10th International Conference on Interpretive Policy Analysis 2015 in Lille, France. We are grateful for the feedback from participants, and in particular thank Tanya Heikkila, Elizabeth Shanahan, Imrat Verhoeven, Jennifer Dodge and Tamara Metze for their valuable comments and suggestions. The manuscript also benefited greatly from the comments of two anonymous reviewers.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. All citations from parliamentary debates in this paper were translated into English by the authors.
2. Although the ACF and Hajer’s discourse coalition approach are based on different epistemological assumptions, there is a certain amount of comparability (Winkel et al. 2011).
3. Speeches were retrieved from the federal government’s bulletin, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Service/Bulletin/_node.html. The electronic version covers documents starting from 1987. Speeches dating before 1987 were retrieved from the archive of the Federal Press Office.
4. http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiewende/monitoring-prozess.html.