Imagine the following scenario: a group of criminals sets fire to a garment factory, killing 259 people and leaving 50 workers injured. The investigation reveals that the factory was set on fire to threaten the owners and scare them into paying extortion money. While extortion is generally a criminal conduct connected to the realm of organized crime, the intent of the criminals was to intimidate and instill fear in a part of the population, typically a tactic adopted by terrorism organizations. Imagine now that you were responsible to charge those accused of this crime: which charges would you lay against them?

The answer to this question gets us to the core of this Special Issue. This case – which is not as fictional as we might have led the reader to think – resulted in the indictment of 12 people, who are currently facing charges of terrorism, murder and extortion. In other words, the prosecutors considered that this crime could constitute both a form of organized crime and terrorism and should be tried as such. Interestingly enough, this example does not represent an isolated instance. To the contrary, it is one of many that raise fundamental questions for researchers, academics and practitioners alike over the existence and true nature of the linkages between these two criminal conducts.

Any such discussion must begin with a clarification of the nature of these two phenomena. Both terrorism and organized crime evolve over time and vary according to geographical regions. Therefore, neither of these two concepts have a singular universally accepted definition.

It might surprise some to know that the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime does not provide a definition of organized crime. This is not only the result of a lack of agreement amongst States and irreconcilable political perspectives, but rather the outcome of a conscious choice made by the negotiators of this landmark Convention. Any definition would likely include a list of the illicit activities carried out by organized criminal groups, which are constantly changing and adapting to the development of our dynamic world; therefore, such definition would rapidly become outdated and unable to effectively guide the international efforts to prevent and combat transnational organized crime. Rather than the crime, the Organized Crime Convention defines the actor involved in its commission: an organized criminal group. The definition reads:

This definition provides an operational framework broad enough to encompass traditional and emerging types of criminal networks, with various forms of membership and organization, ranging from the “classical” and hierarchical mafia-type criminal association to loose-networks operating in the cyberspace. Irrespective of the role of groups’ affiliates and their relationship, the purpose of such groups can be always traced back to the same end-game: making money or obtaining other material benefits (See UNODC E4J Organize Crime Module Series).

Much like within the organized crime framework, there is no internationally recognized definition of terrorism. While the United Nations has summed up the international efforts to combat transnational organized crime into one legally-binding Convention, the international legal framework against terrorism includes 19 instruments. Efforts to produce a Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism have been frustrated by existing disagreements amongst States over the definition of terrorism. Nevertheless, much has been accomplished since negotiations began and consensus has been reached on a number of key elements. In particular, it is a shared opinion that the definition should cover serious criminal acts against civilians «with the aim of intimidating a population or part of it, or compelling a national government or international organization from doing or abstaining from some act» (See UNODC E4J Terrorism Module Series). The motive of a terrorist group is often ideological, religious or political, and although they might use some of the tactics employed by organized criminal groups to finance their operations, the profit they make generally serves a different - and not necessarily material – goal.

The differences but also similarities between terrorist organizations and organized criminal groups are many and the lines are often blurred. This concern is not new to the international community, as already at the time of adoption of the Organized Crime Convention, on 15 November 2000, the General Assembly of the United Nations noted with deep concern the growing of these links, so much as to include it in one of the preambular paragraphs of this treaty. More recently, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2195 (2014), urged international action to break the links between terrorists and transnational organized crime and called upon States to better understand and address this phenomenon. The interconnections are manifesting themselves in varying ways, and terrorist organizations and organized criminal groups have been found to co-exist, co-operate and sometimes even converge.

In the analysis of this matter, the first issue to tackle might be one of terminology. In a nutshell: how do we effectively refer to these interactions? Some scholars interested in unpacking how, and the extent to which, terrorist organizations and organized criminal groups interact often point to an existing “nexus” between them. While there is certainly not a single way to define these relationships, a number of researchers contend that a nexus is only one of the different typologies of interactions, and perhaps it too narrowly limits the scope of the relationship between these two types of organizations. In line with this view, the use of the term “linkages” would allow to better capture the nature of such interactions.

Still, a lot of the evidence of such linkages remains anecdotal, based on media reports or limited to the intelligence communities. Furthermore, there is no authoritative consensus on which empirically based methodologies should be adopted for collecting, analyzing and evaluating information on the nature and extent of any linkages in different regions. What we do know is that the relationships between terrorist organizations and organized criminal groups encompass a broad range of possibilities and might include terrorist groups involved in organized criminal activity as well as organized criminal groups committing acts of terrorism. This interaction does not represent a firm link between different groups, but it does highlight how the same methods can be employed across these groups with relative ease. The case presented in the first paragraphs of this preface is a clear example of this. Depending on the circumstances, these groups might or might not establish operational partnerships and begin cooperating to carry out particular criminal activities. In the same way, groups coming in regular contacts might decide not to engage with each other because they do not consider it advantageous or for lack of trust. In such cases, a terrorist organization might start engaging in criminal activities when beneficial, and potentially the two groups might start competing over control for illicit markets and territories. At the extreme end of these spectrum of relationships, the groups mix tactics and motivations so much so that they start displaying characteristics of both groups simultaneously and potentially transform.

Examples of some of these practices are in front of us all in daily news and expert reports. For example, as 2017 World Drug Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) highlights, it is well established that terrorists and non-State armed groups profit from the drug trade and by some estimates, up to 85% of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is in territory under influence of the Taliban. Similarly, investigations into the Paris attacks of November 2015 suggests that some of the attackers might have actively participated in criminal networks, instead of just being their clients (EUROPOL, 2016). By the same token, the heart-breaking news of the widespread use of enslavement, rape and human trafficking by ISIS/ISIL has met with international condemnation, also thanks to the courage of ex-victims and survivors, such as Nadia Murad Basee Taha, UNODC Goodwill Ambassador since 2016 and Nobel Peace Prize Winner. These – and many other instances – clearly point at the existence of some type of linkages between terrorism and organized crime.

In order to provide some clarity regarding the existing body of knowledge in this area, invite new academic thinking on the linkages and better inform policy discussion and decision-making, UNODC started exploring the issue under its Education for Justice (E4J) initiative, a component of the Global Program for the Implementation of the Doha Declaration. As part of these efforts, UNODC and the College of Law of the University of Qatar organized an “International Academic Conference on exploring the Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism” in Doha, Qatar, in April 2018 aimed at discussing novel and relevant analyses on the relationship between terrorists and criminal organizations. During the conference, participants tackled a wide selection of topics, ranging from the interplay between international, regional and national legal frameworks, to various types of linkages in different regions, and the appropriate policy, legal and judicial responses. The first outcome of this event is the current Special Issue, which collects the research selected for and presented during the Conference. With a view to encouraging free and independent academic thinking, the papers contained in this Special Issue might not be in line with the position of the United Nations on this topic and the support of UNODC to their development and publication should not be understood as an endorsement of their content.

Our efforts focus on understanding the linkages between organized crime and terrorism not only to better guide future actions of UN Member States, but also to educate the generations to come on the negative impacts of these crimes, which have a detrimental effect on the daily lives of all of us, no matter which country we are born in, the religion we profess or the color of our skin. In a time when multilateralism is under attack and our world seem to suffer from «a bad case of ‘trust deficit disorder’», as UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned, it is our duty to stand up against divisive rhetoric and continue to build and promote inclusive institutions, norms and rules. Investing on education for the generations to come is key and showing them that these global problems require shared and collective solutions is the only way forward.

NOTE: The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.