In the context of the Eurozone crisis, Germany is widely seen to have emerged as the EU’s most influential member state. More is now expected of Germany also in the area of security and defence, where its ability and willingness to provide leadership have traditionally been highly circumscribed. Currently, Germany’s role in this policy area is evolving. Germany has since 2014 underscored its readiness to assume more responsibility in its foreign and security policy. Against this background, this article assesses German leadership in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The article emphasises that leadership in the EU can only be exercised jointly, therefore concentrating on Germany’s ability to act as a ‘co-leader’ or to provide, together with France, ‘shared leadership’. We argue that apart from a short period in the early years of the CSDP, Germany has not been a co-leader in this area. However, the Brexit vote and the dynamics set in motion by Donald Trump’s presidency have spurred Franco-German shared leadership in the CSDP. This shared leadership has then been ‘Europeanised’, leading to some significant steps in the CSDP. The endurance of this leadership remains unclear and depends crucially on the compatibility of French and German strategic views.