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Accepted author version posted online: 09 Apr 2020
Published online: 13 May 2020
 
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Abstract

To estimate causal effects from observational data, an applied researcher must impose beliefs. The instrumental variables exclusion restriction, for example, represents the belief that the instrument has no direct effect on the outcome of interest. Yet beliefs about instrument validity do not exist in isolation. Applied researchers often discuss the likely direction of selection and the potential for measurement error in their articles but lack formal tools for incorporating this information into their analyses. Failing to use all relevant information not only leaves money on the table; it runs the risk of leading to a contradiction in which one holds mutually incompatible beliefs about the problem at hand. To address these issues, we first characterize the joint restrictions relating instrument invalidity, treatment endogeneity, and non-differential measurement error in a workhorse linear model, showing how beliefs over these three dimensions are mutually constrained by each other and the data. Using this information, we propose a Bayesian framework to help researchers elicit their beliefs, incorporate them into estimation, and ensure their mutual coherence. We conclude by illustrating our framework in a number of examples drawn from the empirical microeconomics literature.

Acknowledgments

We thank two anonymous referees, Daron Acemoglu, Thorsten Drautzburg, Richard Hahn, Hidehiko Ichimura, Laura Liu, Ulrich Müller, Frank Schorfheide, and Ben Ukert, as well as seminar participants at Princeton, Penn State, the Philadelphia FRB, the 2015 NSF-NBER SBIES, the 2015 MEG Meetings, and the 2016 ISBA World Meeting for helpful comments and suggestions. We thank Mallick Hossain and Alejandro Sánchez for excellent research assistance and acknowledge support from a UPenn URF award. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.

Notes

1 Referring to more than 60 articles published in the top three empirical journals between 2002 and 2005, Moon and Schorfheide (2009 Moon, H. R., and Schorfheide, F. (2009), “Estimation With Overidentifying Inequality Moment Conditions,” Journal of Econometrics, 153, 136154. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2009.05.003.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) noted that “in almost all of the articles the authors explicitly stated their beliefs about the sign of the correlation between the endogenous regressor and the error term; yet none of the authors exploited the resulting inequality moment condition in their estimation.”

2 If T*=1, the only way it can be mismeasured is downward: T = 0. If T*=0 the only way it can be mismeasured is upward: T = 1. Hence, w˜ must be negatively correlated with T*.

3 Such a decomposition is called a transparent parameterization in the statistics literature (see, e.g., Gustafson 2015).

4 See https://github.com/fditraglia/ivdoctr.

5 See (9) and the discussion immediately following it for details.

6 Note that our convention treats ζ as both a structural and reduced form error.

7 See the proof of Theorem 2.1 for details.

8 For related results, see DiTraglia and García-Jimeno (2019 DiTraglia, F., and García-Jimeno, C. (2019), “Identifying the Effect of a Mis-Classified, Binary, Endogenous Regressor,” Journal of Econometrics, 209, 376390. DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2019.01.007.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) who derived the sharp identified set for a misclassified, binary endogenous regressor given a valid instrument with discrete support, in an additively separable model with arbitrary dependence on exogenous covariates.

9 This is called a transparent parameterization in the statistics literature (see, e.g., Gustafson 2015).

10 Additional results, available upon request, consider alternative specifications that include covariates. The results are essentially unchanged.

11 By Corollary 2.2, the identified set for β is (,) unless ρuξ* is restricted. Here we impose the researchers’ stated belief that ρuξ*>0 along with an extremely conservative upper bound for ρuξ* of 0.9.

12 Footnote #19 of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001), “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” The American Economic Review, 91, 13691401. DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1369.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]) stated “We can ascertain, to some degree, whether the difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates could be due to measurement error by making use of an alternative measure of institutions …This suggests that ‘measurement error’ in the institutions variables …is of the right order of magnitude to explain the difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates.”

13 Suppose T1 and T2 are two measures of institutions that are subject to classical measurement error: T1=T*+w1 and T2=T*+w2. Both T1 and T2 suffer from precisely the same degree of endogeneity, because they inherit this problem from T* alone under the assumption of classical measurement error. Thus, the OLS estimator based on T1 converges to κ(β+σT*u/σT*2) while the IV estimator that uses T2 to instrument for T1 converges to β+σT*u/σT*2. The ratio identifies κ: 0.52/0.870.6.

14 Based on footnote 19 of the article, he expressed the belief that at least 40% of the measured variation in quality of institutions was likely to be noise.

15 Note that under our Jeffreys’ prior the posterior mean equals the maximum likelihood estimator.

16 See Section 4.2.

17 See Section 4 for a detailed discussion of the difference between inference for the identified set and inference for the partially identified parameter.

18 Because the prior is uniform, “small” refers to the relative area of a region on the identified set: in Figure 2(a), for example, the red region is small compared to the blue and white regions.

19 In this exercise we include the controls listed in Section III of Becker and Woessmann (2009 Becker, S. O., and Woessmann, L. (2009), “Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 531596. DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.531.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]), specifically: the fraction of the population younger than age 10, of Jews, of females, of individuals born in the municipality, of individuals of Prussian origin, the average household size, log population, population growth in the preceding decade, the fraction of the population with unreported education information, and fraction of the population that was blind, deaf-mute, and insane.

20 These are: an indicator for whether the girl is a child of the household head, the girl’s age, the number of years the household has lived in the village, a Farsi dummy, a Tajik dummy, a farmers dummy, the age of the household head, years of education of the household head, the number of people in the household, Jeribs of land, number of sheep, distance to the nearest formal school, and a dummy for Chagcharan province.

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