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The animosity between Jimmy Carter and Helmut Schmidt is legendary. One crisis, however, which was arguably largely responsible for setting the tone of this relationship has been mostly forgotten: the debate over the German–Brazilian agreement on nuclear co-operation, which envisioned the export of a full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil. Analysing this crisis not only allows us to examine both countries’ approach to nuclear proliferation in the 1970s, but also their attitude towards transatlantic relations. The crisis showcases the changed international environment of the late 1970s, a weakened United States, an emboldened Germany, and the potential and pitfalls of a ‘uniting’ European continent.
This article was originally published with errors. This version has been corrected. Please see Corrigendum (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2014.900911)
First of all, my heartfelt thanks to Malcolm Craig for sharing some of his archival research. I would also like to thank Cengage Learning for providing quick and uncomplicated trial access to the Declassified Documents Reference System. I am also grateful to Scott Kaufman for organising a panel for the Transatlantic Studies Association in 2007, which provided the opportunity to present my findings for the first time. The input of colleagues, particularly all members of the American History Workshop and Dr Pertti Ahonen at the University of Edinburgh, who have read an earlier version of this paper, has been invaluable and much appreciated. Finally, I want to thank the reviewers whose comments were instrumental for revising and strengthening the article. Unless otherwise noted, all passages from German documents have been translated by me.
Notes
1. Doc. 94, in D. Taschler, A. DasGupta, and M. Mayer et al. (eds), A[kten zur] A[uswärtigen] P[olitik der] B[undesrepublik] D[eutschland, 1978] (Munich, 2009). On Schmidt's Atlanticism, see R.E. Powaski, The Entangling Alliance: The United States and European Security, 1950–1993 (Westport, CT, 1994), 108.
2. On the ‘Year of Europe’, compare D. Möckli, ‘Asserting Europe's Distinct Identity: The EC Nine and Kissinger's Year of Europe’; F. Hilfrich, ‘West Germany's Long Year of Europe: Bonn between Europe and the United States’ in M. Schulz and T.A. Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance: U.S.–European Relations from Nixon to Carter (Cambridge, 2010), 195–220, 237–56.
3. On these commitments, compare ‘Democratic Party Platform of 1976’, 12 July 1976, in J. Woolley and G. Peters (eds), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid = 29606#axzz1qVA0AAOG [Accessed 29 March 2012]; J. Stein, ‘The Locomotive Loses Power: The Trade and Industrial Policies of Jimmy Carter’ in G.M. Fink and H.D. Graham (eds), The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence, KS, 1998), 74; B.I. Kaufman and S. Kaufman, The Presidency of James Earl Carter. 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS, 2006), 45. Potentially better transatlantic relations under Carter were also stressed by Rudolf Wolff, head of the division of English-speaking and Nordic countries in the German Foreign Office; Wolff to Foreign Minister, 22 Nov. 1976, Section 204, vol. 110297, [Berlin, Archive of the] G[erman] F[oreign] O[ffice].
4. H. Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (London, 1990), 182, 187.
5. J. Carter, Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President (London, 1982); Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (London, 1983), 23, 26.
6. W.F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1989), 79–80; H. Haftendorn, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung (Stuttgart, 2001), 274–5.
7. Unfortunately, I became aware of W.G. Gray's ‘Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7’, International History Review, xxxiv, no. 3 (2012), 449–74, only after completing my own article. I was therefore unable to include or respond to his findings. For earlier material on the controversy, see M.J. Brenner, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation: The Making of U.S. Policy (Cambridge, 1981), 130–2 and passim; J. Goldemberg, ‘Brazil’ in J. Goldblat (ed), Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore (London, 1985), 85–6. The Fundação Getulio Vargas is declassifying Brazilian sources on the agreement and the row with the United States. Compare T. Coutto and D.K. Nedal, ‘The 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany’, O Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, http://cpdoc.fgv.br/relacoesinternacionais/nuclearhistory/dossies/nb1, and Nedal, ‘The US and Brazil's Nuclear Program’, ibid., http://cpdoc.fgv.br/relacoesinternacionais/nuclearhistory/dossies/1 [Accessed 17 September 2012]. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis: Helmut Schmidt, Jimmy Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin, 2005). For the more typical passing references, in German more than in US publications, compare C. Hacke, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Weltmacht wider Willen? 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1997), 217; W. Jäger and W. Link, Republik im Wandel 1974–1982: Die Ära Schmidt, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, v, no. 2 (Stuttgart, 1987), 311; G. Schöllgen, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1999), 141; M. Schulz, ‘The Reluctant European: Helmut Schmidt, the European Community, and Transatlantic Relations’ in Schulz and Schwartz (eds), The Strained Alliance, 295–6; M. Schwelien, Helmut Schmidt: Ein Leben für den Frieden (Hamburg, 2003), 229. Gaddis Smith discusses the controversy in the context of deteriorating US–Brazilian relations; Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York, 1986), 130.
8. Quotation in P. Hermes, Meine Zeitgeschichte, 1922–1987 (Paderborn, 2007), 250. Most academics echo the view that the crisis was resolved at the time of the World Economic Summit in London in early May 1977; H. Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1982. 2nd ed. (Baden-Baden, 1986), 700–1; B. Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika: Eine schwierige Partnerschaft (Bonn, 1990), 79–81; S. Kaufman, Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (DeKalb, 2008), 105–6; Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 97.
9. Some of the most detailed studies of the agreement and the dispute were published at the time: Brenner, Nuclear Power; K. Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate: German-American Disagreements’, Foreign Policy, xx (1978), 84–110; N. Gall, ‘Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All’, Foreign Policy, xxiii (1976), 155–201; W.W. Lowrance, ‘Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975’, International Security, i, no .2 (1976), 147–66. The journal International Organization devoted its entire Winter 1981 (35.1) issue to the question of non-proliferation and several articles addressed the controversy over the German–Brazilian agreement. This issue was subsequently published as G.H. Quester (ed), Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison, 1981).
10. A. Kelle, Deutsche NV-Politik in den 80er Jahren: Zwischen Regimezwängen und Wirtschaftsinteressen (Münster, 1992), 59; Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 674–6.
11. ‘Excerpts from Carter Speech on Nuclear Policy’, New York Times, 14 May 1976; Richard Livingston to Alvin L. Alm, 25 Aug. 1976, Doc. NP01501, D[igital] N[ational] S[ecurity] A[rchive], [Accessed 21 September 2012]. On Carter's non-proliferation stance in the election campaign, compare J.M. Martinez, ‘The Carter Administration and the Evolution of American Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1977–1981’, Journal of Policy History, xiv, no. 3 (2002), 263–7. On the details and significance of the agreement, compare Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 696; Kelle, Deutsche NV-Politik, 66; Coutto and Nedal, ‘The 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany’.
12. Giscard in Doc. 112, AAPD 1977. Compare also P. Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules without quite Stopping the Bomb: European Views’, International Organization, xxxv, no. 1 (1981), 39–42; J.S. Walker, ‘Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980’, Diplomatic History, xxv, no. 2 (2001), 224.
13. Stoessel, Bonn, to Secretary of State, no. 21125, 16 Dec. 1976, [National Archives, Access to] A[rchival] D[atabase], http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 320669&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 [Accessed 23 September 2012]; Doc. 26, AAPD 1975. On the export dependency of Germany's nuclear industry, see Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 76–7; Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 696.
14. In a meeting with Foreign Minister Genscher, his Brazilian counterpart Azeredo da Silveira added that his country preferred to lessen its overall dependence on the United States, Doc. 179, AAPD 1975. On the commercialisation of nuclear energy in the early 1970s, compare Brenner, Nuclear Power, 15–6; on the Brazilian deal in particular, compare P.A. Clausen, Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York, 1993), 130–1; Coutto and Nedal, ‘The 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany’. R. Gillette, ‘Nuclear Proliferation: India, Germany May Accelerate the Process’, Science, clxxxviii (30 May 1975), 913, concurs ‘that U.S. companies competing for the Brazilian reactor market found themselves unable to match the breadth and attractiveness of the German offer’.
15. Hermes to Ambassador Berndt von Staden, Washington, 24 March 1975, Confidential vol. 8887 (Section 413); B 150, File Copies 1975, GFO (emphasis mine); Genscher in Doc. 179, AAPD 1975; Schmidt in Doc. 191, AAPD 1978. On German industry suspicions, compare Ambassador Crimmins, Brasilia, to Secretary of State, no. 9622, 19 Nov. 1976, AAD, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 288287&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 [Accessed 24 September 2012]. Compare also Doc. 22, AAPD 1977. On German misunderstandings of US motives in the controversy, compare Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 79. On the nature of such arguments as a mix of justification and rationalisation, see Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules’, 46.
16. For the press warnings, see Stoessel, Bonn, to Secretary of State, no. 21125, 16 Dec. 1976, AAD, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 320669&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 [Accessed 23 September 2012]; Doc. 82, AAPD 1977.
17. Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate’, 89; Art. IV, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html [Accessed 6 April 2012].
18. Genscher in Doc. 61; Schmidt according to Murrey Marder, ‘Schmidt Firm on Nuclear Sale’, Washington Post, 16 July 1976; Hermes in Doc. 52, AAPD 1977; Genscher in Doc. 238, AAPD 1978. Tuchman to Brzezinski, 30 March 1977, D[eclassified] D[ocuments] R[eference] S[ystem]. The German justification remained unchanged throughout the duration of the controversy. A succinct summary was cabled by the Foreign Office to all embassies, Circular no. 24, 23 February 1977, Section 012, vol. 106593, GFO. Alexander Kelle has referred to the argument that the agreement would make Brazil comply with NPT regulations as ‘incorporation through cooperation’, emphasising that Canada and the United States made the same argument up until 1975; Deutsche NV-Politik, 65; Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 78.
19. Senator Pastore, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975: 16582. Senator Stuart Symington affirmed this in relation to the French-Pakistani agreement, ‘Letter to the Editor’, New York Times, 11 May 1976. Compare also Norman Gall, ‘Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All’, Foreign Policy, xxiii (1976), 159–61.
20. Brzezinski, memo for the President, 29 April 1977 (Carter's handwritten comment in the margins), DDRS; Ambassador Crimmins, Brasilia, to Secretary of State, no. 9622, 19 Nov. 1976, AAD, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 288287&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 [Accessed 24 September 2012]. Hermes denied that Brazil had any desire to build a bomb; Meine Zeitgeschichte, 231.
21. Nye and Christopher in Doc. 29, AAPD 1977.
22. Hermes, Meine Zeitgeschichte, 248; Schmidt in Doc. 292, AAPD 1975. Von Staden told Barbara Heep that he received visits by twenty US Senators who registered their opposition to the deal in the summer of 1975; Schmidt und Amerika, 73.
23. ‘A Message for President Scheel’, Washington Post, 16 June 1975; Pastore and Symington in Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975: 16591–2. James Reston, ‘The Nuclear Power Race’, New York Times, 4 June 1975.
24. Docs. 46, 59, 157, AAPD 1975. See also David Binder, ‘U.S. Wins Safeguards in German Nuclear Deal with Brazil’, New York Times, 4 June 1975.
25. Kissinger in Doc. 163, AAPD 1975. There was also no reference to the agreement in talking points prepared by Kissinger for an October 1975 meeting between Schmidt and Ford; Kissinger to Ford, 2 Oct. 1975, DDRS.
26. For the US record of the May 1976 conversation, compare memcon, 23 May 1976, Doc. 01958, DNSA. For the German record, see Doc. 156, AAPD 1976 (emphasis mine). For the October conversation, see Doc. 299, AAPD 1976. For the pressures on Ford and the re-evaluation, compare Walker, ‘Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation’, 233–5.
27. Kissinger also emphasised congressional pressure in a meeting in July 1976, Doc. 235, AAPD 1976. Quotation in Kissinger to the President, 6 September 1976, DDRS. Sonnenfeldt in memcon, 8 March 1976, Doc. 01908, DNSA. For the contrast between Ford's and Carter's approaches, compare Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 74.
28. Doc. 246, AAPD 1976; compare Doc. 179, AAPD 1975. Hermes's impressions in January 1977 cited in Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 86–90.
29. Roth in Doc. 25; Hermes in Doc. 26, AAPD 1975. For the cabinet recommendations, see Draft by Hermes, 18 Feb. 1975, Confidential vol. 9497 (222); B150, File Copies 1975, GFO.
30. Doc. 164, AAPD 1975. For details on the memo's route in the Foreign Office, compare fn.1 in that document.
31. Van Well in Doc. 192; Schmidt in Doc. 333; Hans Lautenschlager in Doc. 334, AAPD 1975.
32. ‘Excerpts from Carter Speech on Nuclear Policy’, New York Times, 14 May 1976; ‘Democratic Party Platform of 1976’, 12 July 1976; Carter in ‘Presidential Campaign Debate’, 6 Oct. 1976; ‘University of Notre Dame – Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame’, 22 May 1977, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu [Accessed 31 March 2012] (emphasis mine). Kaufman, Plans Unraveled, 16, 52. On Schmidt, compare Marder, ‘Schmidt Firm on Nuclear Sale’, Washington Post, 16 July 1976.
33. Doc. 314, AAPD 1976. On coalition support for this decision, compare Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 84.
34. See, for example, ‘Kuschen vor Carter’, Der Spiegel, 6 Dec. 1976; ‘Größter Exportauftrag der Bundesrepublik droht zu scheitern’, Die Welt, 9 Dec. 1976. Hermes's successor as head of Section 4, Hans Lautenschlager, urged talks before the inauguration; Doc. 357, AAPD 1976.
35. Brenner, Nuclear Power, 123–7. The confusion of Carter's initial approach to proliferation was criticised in a memorandum by the head of the Foreign Office's planning staff, Klaus Blech, Doc. 49, AAPD 1977. Joseph Nye deplored the time pressure the Brazil deal imposed on a review of proliferation issues; ‘Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime’, International Organization, xxxv, no. 1 (1981), 23–4.
36. Hermes, Meine Zeitgeschichte, 220; Doc. 3, AAPD 1977.
37. ‘Schmidt May Modify Rio Atom Pact’, New York Times, 27 Jan. 1977. ‘Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 31’, Department of State Bulletin, lxxvi, 21 Feb. 1977, 140.
38. Hermes, Meine Zeitgeschichte, 249. For the talks, compare Docs. 29–32, AAPD 1977. On the delay of enriched uranium deliveries, compare three cables by Ambassador Araújo Castro, Washington, to State Secretariat, Brasilia. In the last of these, Araújo Castro concluded that ‘the nuclear cooperation with the United States takes an increasing[ly] restrictive or “discretionary” character.’ Cables no. 4806, 1 Dec. 1975; no. 4994, 15 Dec. 1975; and no. 122, 12 Jan. 1976; translations at D.K. Nedal, ‘U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil's Nuclear Program in 1970s’, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, The Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-efforts-stalled-brazils-nuclear-program-1970s [Accessed 25 September 2012].
39. Doc. 35, AAPD 1977. On the antagonistic nature of the talks, compare also Brenner, Nuclear Power, 130–1.
40. Binder, ‘Bonn Stands by Sale of Atomic Equipment’, New York Times, 12 Feb. 1977. Silveira to Geisel, 13 Jan. 1977, Azeredo da Silveira Archive, mre d 1974.03.26, pp. 9014–19; and Silveira to Geisel, 25 Feb. 1977, ibid., mre pn 1974.08.15, pp. 544–9, translations at D.K. Nedal, ‘U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil's Nuclear Program in 1970s’; Crimmins, Brasilia, to Secretary of State, Nos. 09622 and 09631, 19 Nov. 1976, AAD, http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 288287&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 and http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid = 281985&dt = 2082&dl = 1345 [Accessed 22 September 2012].
41. On Brazil's reaction to the delay, see Doc. 41, AAPD 1977. For the Genscher quotations, compare Docs. 61 and 59, AAPD 1977. On the consultations in mid-March, see also Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 77–8.
42. Silveira to Geisel, 31 Jan. 1977, Azeredo da Silveira Archive, mre d 1974.03.26, pp. 9014–19, translation at D.K. Nedal, ‘U.S. Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil's Nuclear Program in 1970s’; Action memo, ‘Further Steps on Brazil and Pakistan’, 28 Jan. 1977, RG59, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff: Office of the Director (1974–), Records of Anthony Lake, box 17, N[ational] A[rchives &] R[ecords] A[dministration]. Blech in Doc. 49, AAPD 1977. For the Carter quotation of ‘all diplomatic means’, see ‘President Carter Interviewed by AP and UPI Correspondents’, Department of State Bulletin, lxxvi (14 Feb. 1977), 124. Interestingly, Blech's quotation had not been used by Carter in reference to the Brazil agreement.
43. On widespread German resentment, compare Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 77, Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 92–3 and Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate’, 99. On the Council meeting, see Rouget to Embassy Brasilia, Cable no. 80, 25 March 1977, Confidential vol. 9320 (413); B150, File Copies 1977, FO; Schmidt with Vance in Doc. 82, AAPD 1977 (emphasis mine). On Schmidt's decision, compare Schmidt, memo, 1 April 1977, Confidential vol. 14067 (010); B150, File Copies 1977, GFO. For the German perspective that the blueprints had to be transmitted, compare Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate’, 99. Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 78, assumes that the meeting with Vance de-escalated the crisis. It is more appropriate to view this as the climax, after which both sides slowly retreated from the bilateral abyss.
44. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 557; Walker, ‘Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation’, 237. Treverton to David Aaron, 11 April 1977, DDRS; Carter to Schmidt, transmitted in Schönfeld to Embassy Washington, no. 427, 19 April 1977; Schmidt to Carter, 26 April 1977, Confidential vol. 527 (014); B150, File Copies 1977, GFO. Schmidt's summary in Doc. 145, AAPD 1977. Already in mid-March, Warren Christopher had called Brzezinski from Bonn to report ‘very heavy weather’ in his negotiations. Brzezinski to Carter, 14 March 1977, DDRS.
45. For the German statement, compare Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (1977), 131; Washington Post, 9 April 1977.
46. Carter, ‘Nuclear Power Policy Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters on Decisions Following a Review of U.S. Policy’, 7 April 1977, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu [Accessed 10 April 2012]. Paul Lewis, ‘U.S. Assures Europe it Won't Curb Trade’, New York Times, 22 April 1977. For positive evaluations of INCFE, see Nye (who had actually invented the concept), ‘Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime’, 24–6; Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate’, 105–8.
47. Carter, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Message to Congress’, 27 April 1977, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu [Accessed 10 April 2012]. For charges of vacillation and Carter advisors’ surprise, compare Stanley Hoffmann, ‘The Hell of Good Intentions’, Foreign Policy, xxix (1977–8), 16; Walker, ‘Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation’, 238; for Schmidt's criticism, see ibid., 241. On the difference between the German and US statements, see Kaiser, ‘The Great Nuclear Debate’, 99. Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's chief domestic-policy advisor, recommended ‘Presidential flexibility on application of criteria to both existing and new agreements’ in relation to the Non-Proliferation Act already in 1977; Eizenstat and Kitty Schirmer to the President, 19 April 1977, DDRS. On the pragmatic handling of the act, compare Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 702.
48. For the declaration, see Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung (1977), 613; Schmidt to Carter, 22 June 1977, original German letter and undated English translation, DDRS; also Doc. 163, AAPD 1977. Craig Whitney emphasised the exemption of Brazil, ‘Schmidt Agrees to Stop Export of Nuclear Data’, New York Times, 18 June 1977. Wiegrefe, Das Zerwüfnis, 98.
49. Carter to Schmidt, transmitted in Rouget to Embassy Washington, no. 687, 5 July 1977, Confidential vol. 9323 (413); B150, File Copies 1977, GFO; Christopher to the President, 8 October 1977, Doc. 01431, DNSA. Carter and Schmidt, Doc. 112; Schmidt and Fukuda, Doc. 113, AAPD 1977 (emphasis mine).
50. Brzezinski to the President, 12 May 1977; Armacost to the Secretary of the Treasury, 20 May 1977, DDRS (emphasis in the original).
51. Hermes on partner interests in Doc. 46; for EC discussions of the Suppliers Guidelines, see Doc. 83, AAPD 1976; French opposition to full-cycle safeguards discussed in Doc. 84; British opposition in Randermann, memo, March 4, 1975, Section 300, vol. 100509, GFO. Lautenschlager in Doc. 143, AAPD 1976. For the French memo suggesting closer co-operation, see Section 202, vol. 113547, GFO. Schmidt and Giscard in Doc. 18, AAPD 1977. Compare also Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules’, 54.
52. For early British concerns and Bonn's response, see Doc. 84, AAPD 1975. For French and British scepticism about IAEA safeguards, compare J.C. Edmonds to J.E.C. Macrae, Embassy Paris, 7 March 1977, FCO 37/2066; on the preparations of the 1977 consultations, J.C. Edmonds to Moberly, 21 Jan. 1977, FCO 37/2066, T[he] N[ational] A[rchives of the UK]. Callaghan in Doc. 13, AAPD 1977.
53. For Dutch opposition, see Doc. 372, AAPD 1976, Doc. 4, AAPD 1977. On the compromise and renewed controversy, see Doc. 68, and on Schmidt's comments, Doc. 121, AAPD 1978.
54. Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules’, 53.
55. C.H. Farnsworth, ‘Paris will Embargo Atomic-Fuel Plants’, New York Times, 17 Dec. 1976; on the Pakistan deal, see Doc. 19; Soutou in Doc. 309, AAPD 1977.
56. Action memo, ‘Further Steps on Brazil and Pakistan’, 28 Jan. 1977, RG59, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff: Office of the Director (1974–), Records of Anthony Lake, box 17, NARA. On the joint declaration, compare Doc. 22, AAPD 1977. For the French communications to the Americans about the consultations, see Telegram Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, no. 03993, 8(?) February 1977, RG59, Department of State, Policy Planning Staff: Office of the Director (1974–), Records of Anthony Lake, box 17, NARA.
57. Expert consultations in Doc. 57; Giscard in London, Doc. 145; German response in Doc. 161; Soutou in Doc. 152, AAPD 1977. Lellouche has emphasised that Germany's export embargo announcement in June was ‘phrased exactly like France's,’ ‘Breaking the Rules’, 47. For the view that French pressure was decisive, compare also Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 700; Heep, Schmidt und Amerika, 81.
58. Doc. 22; Soutou in Doc. 57, AAPD 1977. On the differences, compare Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules’, 49. For French efforts to emphasise dissonances to the British, see J.E.C. Macrae, Embassy Paris, to J.C. Edmonds, Foreign Office, 16 Feb. 1977, FCO 37/2066, TNA.
59. On such efforts, see Doc. 131, AAPD 1977 and Doc. 191, AAPD 1978.
60. Carter, ‘The President's News Conference’, 30 March 1978, APP, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu [Accessed 14 April 2012]. Genscher on German unease about Carter's public statements in Doc. 91, AAPD 1978. Schmidt in Doc. 301, AAPD 1977.
61. Falin in Doc. 52, AAPD 1977; compare White House Situation Room to Embassy Bonn, no. 5298, 29 Sep. 1977, DDRS. Soutou in Ambassador Hartman, Paris, to Secretary of State, no. 28414, 25 Aug. 1978, DNSA, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc17.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2012].
62. Excerpt from US memo on the Quadripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers in London, 17 July 1978, attached to G.G.H. Walden to Crowe, July 18, 1978, FCO 96/823, TNA.
63. Giscard's reference to evidence in Doc. 269, AAPD 1978; on larger French fears, compare Lellouche, ‘Breaking the Rules’, 55–6. Blech in Doc. 49, AAPD 1977.
64. Already in 1979, Washington became aware of ‘a marked slow-down in the nuclear program’ due to Brazil's ‘troubled economy’. Ambassador Sayre, Brasilia, to Secretary of State, no. 10578, 10 Dec. 1979, DNSA. Compare also Coutto and Nedal, ‘The 1975 Nuclear Agreement with West Germany’; Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 704.
65. Kelle, Deutsche NV-Politik, 69; Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 699.
66. Doc. 379, AAPD 1978.
67. Doc. 112, AAPD 1977; Schmidt, Men and Powers, 187.