On 18 April 2021, the Financial Times carried a report suggesting that longstanding rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran had opened up a direct line of dialogue, facilitated by Iraq, in an effort to reduce tensions between the two states. While the story was quickly dismissed by Saudis, Iranians and Iraqis, less than two weeks later, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) appeared on a state-run TV channel declaring that “Iran is a neighboring country, and all we aspire for is a good and special relationship with Iran. We do not want Iran’s situation to be difficult. On the contrary, we want Iran to grow and prosper”. Later in the interview, MbS articulated a hope that the Kingdom would overcome differences with its neighbour “and build a good and positive relationship with Iran that would benefit all” (Luck 2021).

Fusing competition over claims to Islamic legitimacy and geopolitical aspirations, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played a central role in a number of conflicts across the Middle East in recent years, including (but not limited to) wars in Yemen and Syria, violence in Iraq and instability in Bahrain and Lebanon. After a decade of overt hostility prompted by the fragmentation of political projects post 2011, the Crown Prince’s latest remarks reflect a dramatic shift in Saudi perceptions of Iran. This change reflects the shifting (geo-)political environment in which both Saudi Arabia and Iran are operating, amidst increasing financial pressures – brought about by the combination of demographic changes, the price of oil, the Covid-19 pandemic and sanctions on Iran – and changing United States (US) policy in the Middle East.

In this article, we argue that there are pragmatic reasons for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage in dialogue and cooperation, albeit acknowledging the importance – and complexity – of moves to reduce tensions, stemming from economic pressures (and opportunities) and fears about regional security. Indeed, with Saudi Arabia moving towards its Vision 2030 and Iran facing an array of economic challenges, a pragmatic form of cooperation is deemed essential to meet these goals and create a more stable regional security environment.

Whilst somewhat aspirational – and contentious to many – this article offers a justification for such moves along with a conceptual approach that can help support these efforts. In pursuit of this, we draw on the work of the Copenhagen School and, in particular, ideas of de-securitisation as a means of returning the rivalry – and discourse around it – from the realm of security politics to the realm of normal politics. Using the ideas of Ole Wæver and Lene Hansen (in particular), we argue that relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have long been viewed through the lens of security, which has created a cycle of distrust between the two states; as a consequence, security politics has become the normal politics of relations between the two, albeit not of global politics. To facilitate a lasting rapprochement, a rigorous deconstruction of the apparatus of security is needed. In doing this, we present one of the first articles of its kind on the topic, written by scholars affiliated with SEPAD¹ – including one from Saudi Arabia and one from Iran alongside an external voice – who collectively suggest that a pragmatic engagement with the other is an integral step in aiding the political development in both states and the wider regional security environment. We argue that this process of de-securitisation is in the pragmatic interests of both states and can occur in three areas: language, economy and energy.

Saudi-Iranian relations

Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have had a devastating impact on regional politics (Chubin and Tripp 2014). The fusion of a political rivalry with a competition over leadership of the Islamic world has resulted in a rivalry that cuts across the Middle East, exacerbating political and religious divisions. Yet, as acknowledged in the literature (Keynoush 2016; Mabon 2013; Mason 2014; Chubin and Tripp 2014; Fraihat 2020; Rubin 2014, amongst others), the rivalry is not static but rather is shaped by the peculiarities of time and space.

Underpinning much of this geopolitical tension is an incongruent vision of the organisation of security in the Persian Gulf. For Saudi Arabia, security in the Gulf is maintained through a longstanding network of relations with the US. However, from Iran’s perspective, security should be maintained solely by those within the region. This contradiction was exacerbated in the years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, where Saudi officials urged their US counterparts to curtail the burgeoning Iranian influence across the state; indeed, at the height of the violence in Iraq, the late King Abdullah urged the US to “cut off the head of the snake” (Wikileaks, cit. in Mabon 2016).

During the presidency of Barack Obama, US diplomatic overtures to Iran caused a great deal of consternation amongst many in Saudi Arabia, prompting a more proactive foreign policy that sought to curtail Iranian influence across the region (Mabon 2016). Saudi fears were exacerbated by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear deal agreed by the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, Germany and Iran. Under Obama’s successor, the vociferously anti-Iranian Donald Trump, relations with the Saudi Kingdom – and MbS in particular – dramatically improved, in no small part due to the decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal.

In such precarious contexts, it is hardly surprising that tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have increased, playing out across political, social, economic and religious arenas. While some point to sectarian tensions as a source of this longstanding animosity between the two states (Nasr 2007) and others point to national interest (Fürtig 2002; Keynoush 2016; Chubin and Tripp 2014), we argue that the fusion of material and ideational concerns is central in shaping the rivalry, while the fragmentation of state projects across the region provides arenas in which Riyadh and Tehran can engage in competition (Gause 2014; Mabon 2020b). This fusing of local and regional politics had a dramatic impact on relations, opening new areas of competition and leading to the escalation of tensions between the two and the framing of relations in the language of security. In particular, this prompted increasing militarisation across the Gulf, driven by Saudi Arabia and Iran, but drawing other state and non-state actors into a complex and precarious (set of) security dilemma(s).

Unsurprisingly, speeches from elites in Riyadh and Tehran sought to frame the other as a threat to regional security and stability (Mabon 2016). Yet such language was also used publicly: Adel Al Jubeir, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, suggested that Iran sought to “obscure its dangerous sectarian and expansionist policies, as well as its support for terrorism, by levelling unsubstantiated charges against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. He later claimed that Iran is “the single most belligerent actor in the region” (cit. in ibid.). Similarly, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared that Iran “has intelligence that Saudi Arabia is actively engaged in promoting terrorist groups” (REFWorld 2017).

In spite of the challenges, there remain pragmatic reasons for seeking to improve relations between the two states (Mabon and Wastnidge 2020). Chief amongst them are the longstanding concerns about an escalation of conflict – perhaps best seen in the aftermath of the 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco that were widely believed to have been conducted by Iran. For many in the Kingdom, the attacks were the latest instance of an increasingly precarious regional security environment, which prompted moves to ease tensions (Faucon et al. 2019). As one US official observed, to “begin easing the various conflicts in the region, one of the single biggest things you can do is to start a dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran that could bring down the tensions” (Ghattas 2015).

As Hussein Ibish (2021) notes, the groundwork for diplomatic efforts takes time to develop and, in the case of talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it has believed to have taken over two years. This groundwork was multifaceted, taking place in the guise of track-II diplomatic efforts, mediatory processes and the publication of two-high profile opinion pieces written by Hossein Mousavian and Abdulaziz Sager, who possess relations with prominent officials in Tehran and Riyadh respectively. Additionally, one area that has routinely provided a modicum of hope is the ongoing dialogue over the allocation of pilgrimage visas, which brought officials from the two states together. That being said, as Simon Mabon and Lucia Ardovini argue (2021), there is little scope for using this channel as an opportunity to further dialogue due to the importance of retaining the apolitical nature of the pilgrimage. Despite this, there are areas of possibility, albeit requiring a number of developments in order to facilitate such efforts. In recent months, however, these efforts have taken on an official component. Acknowledging this, Saeed Khatibzadeh, the Spokesman of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, declared that “Iran has embraced negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Peace and regional stability between Riyadh and Tehran are in the interests of people of both countries” (EN News 2021). Yet challenges remain, given the complexity of regional politics and de-securitisation.

(De-)securitisation

Central to improving relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the need to transform the discourse around the rivalry from one of security to one predicated on less antagonistic forms of politics, referred to by scholars identifying with the Copenhagen School as a process of de-securitisation. Literature on de-securitisation emerged in response to a growing body of work that looked at the ways in which security is constructed – a process of securitisation – and its repercussions for politics, to examine instead the processes through which security could be deconstructed. The process of securitisation occurs across a number of stages, beginning with a “speech act” from a securitising actor that names a particular issue as an existential threat, prompting a move away from normal politics and the legitimisation of the extraordinary. Such moves take place within what Matt McDonald (2008) terms the “facilitating conditions”, which give such processes traction, and for particular audiences (both intended and unintended).

In contrast to securitisation, de-securitisation looks at the ways in which issues can be removed from their position on the “security agenda” (Wæver 1995, 58). For Barry Buzan et al. (1998, 29), “desecuritization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures’ but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere”.

Building on this, Ole Wæver (1995) articulates three forms of de-securitisation: the first is not speaking about an issue as a threat; the second is managing the securitisation process to avoid a spiral; and third, returning the previously securitised issue to the realm of normal politics. Similarly, Lene Hansen (2012, 529) suggests that there are four approaches: stabilisation, replacement, rearticulation and silencing.

Of course, the challenges involved in facilitating such processes are vast, conditioned not only by the ways these issues are defined by elites, but by the very essence of elites themselves. Indeed, as Buzan and Wæver acknowledge, at the heart of securitisation are questions about “identity politics of self and other” (2009, 261). Conversely, de-securitisation then requires traversing the “friend-enemy distinction” (Hansen 2012, 533).

In the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is easy to see how elites in both Riyadh and Tehran have embraced processes of securitisation, with devastating repercussions for regional politics. Here, the spiral of the security dilemma risks consuming all in its path and creating an environment from which there is no escape. In the context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, de-securitisation then necessitates the movement of particular issues out of the realm of “threat-defence sequences” and into the ordinary public sphere.

In pursuit of de-securitisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, we now explore the pragmatic areas for collaboration in both states, with a consideration of the language used for de-securitisation. Here, we argue that it is pragmatically in the interests of both states to return these issues to the realm of normal politics through a combination of stabilisation and rearticulation. Through this, the two states may be able to embark on a broader process of de-securitisation.

As McDonald (2008, 580) suggests, security need not solely emerge from the failure of normal politics but can also be a site of contestation and competition, necessitating a broader reflection of competition rather than solely focusing on the designation of threats. It is such a view that is of interest in our case. Indeed, as we shall see, the roots of such possible de-securitisation moves are already apparent in the actions of both states. In what follows, we identify the pragmatic areas pushing for de-escalation and the possible shift in discourses in both states, based on public statements from officials in Riyadh and Tehran, and examination of economic capacity.

Saudi Arabia: regional pragmatism and Vision 2030

In October 2018, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman announced his aspirations for the future of the Kingdom and the wider Middle East to be “the new Europe”. MbS was speaking at the Future Investment Initiative conference, an international gathering hosted annually in Riyadh, to attract global investments as part of his framework to diversify the Saudi economy to implement Vision 2030. During this meeting, he expressed the wish “that the new Europe will be the Middle East. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the next five years will be totally different” (Kane and Ben Gassem 2018). However, for this socio-economic and political dream to be achieved, Saudi Arabia must navigate away from a number of conflicts and lead efforts to de-securitise the region. Central to this is the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, which requires dramatic financial investment. This section discusses the necessity of de-securitisation of the regional system from conflicts involving Saudi Arabia in order for the country to achieve the social and economic plans detailed in Vision 2030.

In September 2019, oil refineries in Abqaiq-Khurais, in the east of Saudi Arabia, were damaged in a drone and ballistic missile attack. In 2020 and 2021, further attacks were launched revealing a serious threat to the Kingdom’s national security. Reports emerged that the Yemeni insurgent Houthi group had carried out those assaults, while other media sources pointed to an Iraqi militia that belongs to the Popular Mobilisation Forces. All significant regional conflicts, from Yemen to Syria, have been securitised by Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, this status quo must change if Saudi Arabia wants to achieve the ambitious set of targets suggested by the Vision 2030; as argued by Samira Nasirzadeh and Eyad Alrefai (2019): “It is evident that Saudi Arabia and Iran will benefit more from direct dialogue than hostile rhetoric. Through discussing and working together on domestic, regional and international issues, it is in the interests of both states – and the wider region – to reduce conflict and increase cooperation through diplomatic ties.”

Recent positive developments in the Kingdom’s rhetoric and political discourse towards Iran are constructive and necessary steps to moving towards the realm of ‘normal’ politics. On 5 May, Iraqi President Barham Salih declared that “Iraq has hosted more than one round of talks between regional foes Iran and Saudi Arabia” (Davison 2021). Such remarks also tally with a softening of rhetoric that can be seen in the content of Saudi newspapers and media outlets. For instance, in May 2019, after the attacks on Aramco’s oil refineries, which was the most serious attack on the Kingdom’s soil since the beginning of the war in Yemen, an op-ed titled “No to War!” in Okaz – a very influential Saudi newspaper – written by a leading Saudi intellectual, Khaled Al-Suliman, noted that:

Moreover, in a piece analysing Saudi op-ed discourses towards Iran, Andrew Leber (2019) observes that “a broader view of Saudi op-ed commentary reveals a range of articles that have emphasized deterrence and international action against Iran rather than an open use of force. While ‘elite opinion’ of any kind is hard to pin down in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where state-licensed media faces complex red lines and there is no right to free speech, these subtle differences suggest there is less policy consensus”. Building on those statements from policymakers and public intellectuals that suggest Saudi Arabia wants and needs regional stability and domestic coherence to achieve social and economic development as mentioned in the agenda of Vision 2030, the following will discuss how solving regional conflicts and de-securitisation can help the country secure its future ambitions.

Why Saudi Arabia needs to reduce tensions with Iran

Resolving regional disputes will enhance the global image of Saudi Arabia and Iran as states that are worthy of leading the region in future years, which will have positive outcomes for both states and their budgets as well as further improving their global reputation. More importantly, and pragmatically speaking, the aim of the process of peacebuilding and conflict resolution must be focused on creating new investment and financial opportunities. Related to the need for reducing tensions and bringing stability to the Middle East is an urgent need for domestic socio-economic changes that lead to societal and economic development. As Nada Aggour (2021) argues, the “COVID-19 crisis has catalyzed Vision 2030. The pandemic has prompted a much-needed re-evaluation, pushing Saudi leaders to move with a greater sense of urgency toward economic diversification”. Moreover, it is finally time for the Kingdom

The potential for economic coocountries account for overperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran is very promising. When it comes to natural resources, oil is a great example to study how an enormous potential may be achieved through reconciliation. Instead, as previously noted, oil is being used as a tool in the struggle. The two countries account for over a third (35.5 per cent according to OPEC [2020]) of the world’s proven reserves of oil. There is little doubt that the rivalry negatively affected oil prices due to the damage to the Abqaiq facility and precarious supply routes through the Persian Gulf. Given the role of oil in both economies, creating a more stable environment to secure prices would have a dramatic impact on both states and their socio-economic development. From this, a range of other activities can emerge, including tourism, a central tenet of Vision 2030 that can benefit both states, while also aiding the broader de-securitisation of relations.

Yet, ongoing regional struggles play a prominent role in preventing such developments. The implementation of Vision 2030 promised a new age of social and economic liberalisation in Saudi Arabia. This leaves Saudi society under constant pressure from conservative and extremist currents opposed to the vision. Opening up society has been the most critical internal social challenge facing the Saudi leadership for years. At least since 1979, and after the implementation of strict interpretations of Sunni Islam to please extremists who were unsatisfied with the process of social liberalisation, the country went through one of the most complex and violent periods in its history. This has, historically, affected relations with Iran, particularly through the treatment of the Kingdom’s Shia Muslims (Keynoush 2016). A move towards a more nationalist and apparently inclusive Saudi identity provides opportunities here, albeit opposed by many.

This can be seen vividly during the annual commemoration of the month of Muharram and religious events that Shias celebrate in Saudi Arabia. It is also evident from the names of the heads of some huge governmental projects and public and private companies in Saudi Arabia, such as Nazmi Al-Nasr, the CEO of NEOM, and Amin H. Nasser, the CEO of Aramco, who both come from prominent Shia families in the East of Saudi Arabia. After the implementation of Vision 2030 and the rise of MbS, the Saudi nationalist discourse went beyond sectarian differences to unify the nation under the Saudi banner. This can also be seen in the infrastructural and economic development that Shia-populated areas experienced since 2015. For example, Abdullah Alrebh writes on Awamyia:

Simon Mabon (2020a) suggests that “The dramatic transformation of Awamiya is a consequence of evolving relations between the Saudi state and the Shi’a population”, although he argues that this process should be considered as a “by-product” of Vision 2030 targets:

The struggle over the role of religion in the Saudi state is not new (Nevo 1998; Commins 2015; Teitelbaum 2017). When asked by the Atlantic’s Editor-in-Chief Jeffrey Goldberg in 2018: “Is the problem in your mind religious?”, MbS responded: “As I told you, the Shiites are living normally in Saudi Arabia. We have no problem with the Shiites. We have a problem with the ideology of the Iranian regime. Our problem is, we do not think they have the right to interfere with our affairs.” Yet, in recent years, such views have softened, as seen in the Crown Prince’s comments in April 2021 albeit with some remaining concerns about the wider role of religion in the foreign policies of states across the Middle East, including Iran, necessitating a broader process of de-securitisation.

Accordingly, for confidence-building and to de-escalate tensions across the Middle East, it is crucial to resolve the Yemen war in order to achieve a regional security framework (Vakil and Quilliam 2021). The Saudi proposal to end the war in Yemen in March 2021 was a significant milestone in the rivalry, as it includes a

Saudi leadership knows that the war in Yemen is harming its image globally, and recent attacks might raise suspicion in the eyes of global investors. Without a political solution in Yemen, the implementation of Vision 2030 will be affected. International investors need to operate in a safe environment, although, by now, attacks carried out by the Houthis have not succeeded in targeting significant areas in large Saudi cities that might scare the business community.

Against this backdrop, in his wide-ranging April 2021 interview mentioned before, the Saudi Crown Prince spoke regarding the conflict in Yemen in a more positive light than in the past. By mentioning their Arab roots, MbS attempted to emphasise their common Arab identity:

At the time of writing this article, the Saudi government and the Houthi movement are engaged in serious talks facilitated by Oman.

In Iraq, Saudi Arabia re-established its position and went successfully beyond those sectarian alliances that had persisted in the previous four decades by cultivating relations with Shia figures. The governmental and public relations between the Saudis and the Iraqis have developed noticeably, and they are now clearly in the realm of ‘normal politics’. This has happened under the last three Iraqi Prime Ministers, Haider Al-Abadi, Adel Abdul-Mahdi and currently Mustafa Al-Khadimi, who are Shias and represent the Al-Dawah Party, an ally of the Islamic Republic. This process of political normalisation has already proved fruitful for the Saudi and the Iraqi economy. Saudi Arabia donated a football stadium and reopened two border crossings, as well as financing the reconstruction of hospitals in Baghdad and Basra and roads across Iraq. Saudi brands, like Al-Marai for dairy products, are flooding the Iraqi market, which contributes to the Vision 2030 target of diversifying the Saudi economy.

Iran: regional pragmatism and HOPE initiatives

The statement from the Iranian government to “invest in hopes towards a better future” declared by President Rouhani in the 74th United Nations General Assembly in September 2019 sent a message of “peace, promises and negotiating tables” to the world (UN News 2019). Considering several multilateral regional security frameworks that have been proposed by Iran, Tehran emphasises a culture of regional security and calls for a reduction in foreign intervention in the region, underpinned by a quest for pragmatic solutions to peacebuilding and reconciliation between Iran and its neighbours. The proposal is driven by the 20-year vision document of the Islamic Republic of Iran, outlining the knowledge, security, societal, economic and cultural development goals for the country by 2025, through which engagement and integration with its neighbours are highlighted. The vision significantly points to a constructive relation with countries in the region (Iranian 2025 Vision 2005, 6).

Iran’s policies towards its neighbours have often been shaped by “pragmatic, national interests rather than ideological convictions” (Menashri 2007, 156), yet demonstrating to its neighbours that such policies fit neatly within a state-centric vision of regional security is a key challenge (Ibish 2021). Since the pragmatic steps pursued by Tehran for peace and reconciliation with its Persian Gulf neighbours, five countries have positively responded to the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE), including Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, but Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are reluctant to accept the initiative. For Tehran, managing tensions and trust-building with its neighbours have often been viewed as a provider of security in the region. As Javad Zarif emphasises, “the regional efforts are necessary to prevent war, conflict, violence, extremism, terrorism, and sectarian tensions” (Tasnim News Agency 2019). In this respect, the UAE agreed to launch a dialogue with Iran on HOPE. Zarif tweeted:

The UAE is a key trade partner for Iran, being the recipient of 6.2 per cent of total Iranian export in 2019. Therefore, close economic ties increase the desirability of peace and reconciliation. As the UAE embraced the HOPE initiative to reduce tensions with Iran, it may also bring Riyadh to the negotiating table with Tehran. In fact, as mentioned, on 18 April 2021, Saudi Arabia and Iran reportedly opened up a direct line of dialogue, facilitated by Iraq to reduce tensions and encourage rapprochement.

Why Iran needs to reduce tensions with Saudi Arabia

Despite the size of their economies, there is little trade between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The trade share between Riyadh and Tehran has dropped since 2007 (Shana Petro Energy Information Network 2007, 98410). Trade also stood at over 130 USD million (KSA to IRN) and 211 million (IRN to KSA) in 2015 and then dropped dramatically (OEC 2021). It is worth noting that Tehran’s nuclear dispute with the West and economic sanctions, which have had an undeniable effect on Iran’s economic relations (Habibi 2010, 10), urge Tehran to improve its regional collaboration to stop sanctions impacting its economy. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran pursues regional cooperation and integration with a view to “the region first” (Reuters 2021e). More specifically, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 led to less than half of Iranians approving of a renegotiation with the West (School of Public Policy 2019). People have lost their trust in the JCPOA negotiations. Instead, Iran emphasises the “resistance economy” against US “maximum pressure” (United States Institute of Peace 2020), through which regional cooperation with neighbouring countries is highlighted. Accordingly, the regional security framework could open doors for trade between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a key step for peacebuilding and reconciliation.

However, the ‘secondary sanctions’ against Iran that affect oil exports, the Covid-19 pandemic and the mismanagement of the Rouhani administration weakened the economic situation. Tehran adopted a policy of ‘maximum resistance’ to tackle the crisis by relying on domestic capabilities. As Mohammed Nuruzzaman (2020, 580) articulates, the secondary sanctions against Iran under “maximum pressure” have been the “most intrusive sanctions in contemporary history, which was seeking to devastate its economy and society”, to which Tehran responded with a “resistance economy” approach. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had originally estimated that Iran’s economy would shrink by 5 per cent in 2020, but then revised upwards its estimate to a 1.5 per cent growth in 2020 and a 2.5 per cent growth in 2021, even though the rate of inflation remains high (Reuters 2021e; IMF Data Mapper 2021). These figures demonstrate that attempts by the Trump administration to weaken Iran’s economy have been countered with the resistance economy policy by Tehran. As the Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei emphasises, the economy is the priority issue for the country, which requires domestic efforts of the authorities within Iran. He declared: “In my opinion, all these problems that exist in the economy today can be solved and fixed domestically. This mighty strength of the country must be used” (Khamenei.ir 2020).

The economic pressures from the US have nonetheless had a devastating impact on the Iranian people. As a wealthy country possessing vast natural resources, Iran’s economy must prosper in order to meet peoples’ demands. To this end, Iran now pursues regional cooperation rather than relying on the European countries under the JCPOA. In contrast to the Rouhani presidency, which reduced diplomatic ties with Arab neighbours and emphasised diplomatic relations with the US and European countries, the new Raisi government presents an opportunity for improving regional ties with Arab neighbours. According to the ‘region first’ policy (Reuters 2021e), in a speech on Saudi-Iranian relations, President Ebrahim Raisi declared: “We are ready to reopen embassies”, which reveals the desire of the new government to improve diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia (ILNA 2021).

The economic situation of Iran can be improved by increasing trade with its neighbours. For instance, as mentioned, Tehran and Riyadh have high capacity to expand their trade. Although Saudi Arabia views the Iranian economy through the “lens of competition rather than regional integration” (Al-Rasheed 2018, 7), both states have large capacity for trade deals. The last economic meeting between Riyadh and Tehran dates back to May 2005 with the seventh Iran-Saudi Arabia Commission in Riyadh, but there is potential to strengthen economic ties between the two countries. With regard to Iran’s oil export, this dropped due to the sanctions against Tehran to less than 500,000 barrels per day (Trading Economics 2021; United States Institute of Peace 2020); thus, it is in the interest of Iran to diversify its economy through non-oil trade with its neighbours to achieve its goals under the 2025 Vision. Tehran’s emphasis on regional cooperation could lead to strengthening its ties with Riyadh through diplomatic relations, trade and cultural programmes.

Although structural factors influence Iran-Saudi relations, including geopolitical differences, such as disparities in demography and geography and consequent differing perspectives on regional issues (Chubin and Tripp 2014), there are political, economic and social grounds for rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. A survey by the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland asking public opinion in Iran about Iran’s regional involvement shows that “four in five want diplomatic discussions with other Middle Eastern countries to continue; a little under half support expanding them” (School of Public Policy 2021). Similarly, according to a survey conducted by Khabar Online (2021) in Tehran about the potential rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, although some opposed negotiating with Saudi Arabia, most Iranians embraced negotiations and believed it is in the interests of both countries to achieve reconciliation. Hence, in Iran, the desire for pragmatic solutions to move from ‘extraordinary’ to ‘normal’ politics can be observed both from ‘below’ (society) and ‘above’ (political elites), which could provide a positive path for rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.

Operational paths to de-securitisation

To reduce tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, there are a wide range of possibilities for de-securitisation on economic, religious and cultural grounds, which can perhaps lead to fruitful negotiations and peace between the two states. In light of the need for pragmatic engagement, we propose here that there are three main areas in which de-securitisation can occur: language, economy and energy.

Conclusion

At the time of writing, there appear to be positive improvements in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Over the past decade, several track-II and track-1.5 programmes have taken place bringing Iranians and Saudis together in pursuit of an improvement in relations, facilitated by a range of international actors. Although a range of issues remain – perhaps most importantly, a resolution of the conflict in Yemen –, there is growing optimism for the future. As we have shown, there are pragmatic reasons behind this optimism and, if enacted, positive reverberations will be felt across the region.

While the challenges to de-securitisation and improving relations between the two states are many, there are also possibilities, as has been shown by diplomatic efforts and discursive openings. The emphasis on the end of war in Yemen by international and regional actors could open doors for negotiations and reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Similarly, questions about the role of the US also remain unresolved.

Although the multiplicity of (past and present) conflicts affecting relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran makes de-securitisation and reconciliation more challenging, this is not insurmountable. Indeed, as we have shown, there are pragmatic reasons for embarking on this path. This proposal may seem idealistic, but it is an integral step in creating mutual trust, reducing tensions and arms races between states across the Persian Gulf and, with it, helping return relations to the realm of some form of ‘normal politics’. A key outcome of de-securitisation processes could be the transformation of mutual threat perceptions between Arab states and Iran to achieve a comprehensive security framework in the region.

Yet there remain a number of possible spoilers who oppose to such moves, reflecting the myriad political and religious collectives operating in Saudi Arabia and Iran; as Simon Mabon argued (2013), this demonstrates the multifaceted and multicausal challenges to improving relations between the two. If, however, spoilers can be mitigated, there are a number of key reasons as to why Saudi Arabia and Iran may want to engage in de-securitisation.