The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is undoubtedly the most powerful body of the international community (Luck 2006). It is comprised of fifteen members: five permanent (P5) and ten non-permanent (E10), elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Between these two categories, due to disparities in power, equality has never been a matter of principle. Conventional wisdom holds that the P5, wielding the power to veto any draft resolution as well as having the advantage of permanent membership, substantially dominate the UNSC. This implies that the E10, despite their legitimacy as elected representatives of every United Nations (UN) member state, have relatively modest opportunities to make their mark on the Council.

Such assumption seems to be shared also in the scholarly debate on the UNSC as most studies focus primarily on the dominant position of the P5 (see, for example, Cronin and Hurd 2008). Even those scholars who look into the E10 often tend to neglect ways the elected members could make a meaningful impact and rather focus more on inherent constraints. However, since we are currently experiencing, as numerous scholars suggest, a systemic transition to multipolarity that may change the balance of power and the way power is measured, the previously neglected domain of small state influence may, indeed, grow in prominence in the scholarly debate over the next years (see for example Neumann and Gstöhl 2004).

Given the above, this study examines the role of the elected members and tries to address this question against a broader discussion about whether they are a lost cause or, on the contrary, influential players that can shape the Council’s decision-making process and produce tangible outcomes. From this perspective, it looks into the tools that are at the E10’s disposal to make their presence felt in the UNSC.¹ To this end, it uses the cases of South Africa and Poland serving as elected members of the Council respectively in 2019-2020 and 2018-2019. The choice of these two cases allows us to scrutinise several interesting recent developments in the E10’s agency against the backdrop of substantial regional interests and dynamics that are increasingly impacting the depth and breadth of the E10’s involvement in dynamics of multilateralism in such a prominent global institution. On a methodological note, the conscious choice of these cases has also been made against the backdrop of a nearly total absence of published material on them; this has entailed a certain degree of reliance on grey literature and primary sources, which we hope may, in turn, strengthen the original contribution of this piece.

Historical background

The concept of non-permanent members can be traced back to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920. The constitutional document of the League, the Covenant, assigned the primary role in achieving world peace to the Council of the League of Nations, also known as the League Council. The composition of the League Council was addressed in Article 4 of the Covenant. It provided that the Council would be comprised of nine members, that is, five representing the Allied Powers and four to be selected by the Assembly of the League of Nations (Malone 2006). The first category was later referred to as permanent members and the second one as non-permanent ones. The Assembly increased the number of the non-permanent members from the original four several times: to six in 1922, to nine in 1926, to ten in 1933 and finally to eleven in 1936. It has to be remembered that the aforementioned enlargements of the League Council, that is, structural reforms, did not require any alterations of the Covenant (Mathias and Okimoto 2020).

After the League of Nations had turned out to be weak and unable to prevent the outbreak of World War II, a more reliable and credible international body needed to be established. The major stumbling block, as noticed by Stephen Mathias and Keiichiro Okimoto (2020), was agreeing on the composition of the Security Council. During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, it had been assumed that the body would consist of eleven members: that is, five permanent (France, the United States [US], the United Kingdom [UK], the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and the Republic of China) and six elected members to serve for a term of two years with no possibility of two subsequent appointments.² Against this backdrop, it has to be remarked that the Charter did not provide an unequivocal definition of such a composition, which proved to be a major point of contention between the growing number of UN members expecting more recognition in the Council’s structure (ibid.). Meeting their demands, though, was not easy since pursuant to Article 108, an amendment to the UN Charter requires the two-thirds majority of the UN members and consent from all the P5 (United Nations 1945). Nevertheless, after exhaustive negotiations in 1963, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1991, increasing the number of non-permanent Council members from six to ten and, therefore, the whole composition of the Council from eleven to fifteen members (Mathias and Okimoto 2020).

The final point relevant to non-permanent members in terms of the provisions of the UN Charter is their role in the UNSC decision-making process. Pursuant to Article 27, the Council can take a decision when there are nine affirmative votes of its members with no veto by any of the P5 (United Nations 1945). This means that, in principle, a Council resolution can be passed by the votes of the E10 if the P5 abstain from voting or do not participate in the voting at all. In practice, this happens very rarely. Such a case took place in 1973 when the Council adopted Resolution 344 by ten votes of non-permanent members. Four permanent members abstained from voting, and China did not participate in the voting (Mathias and Okimoto 2020).

Influence in the UNSC

An interesting framework to examine the E10 influence is offered by Jeremy Farrall et al. (2020). They postulate that, in order to grasp the dynamics of influence in the UNSC, it is necessary to go beyond the conventional understanding of the Council. In this model, four unique characteristics are distinguished. First, the UNSC is not an isolated institution but rather a part of a more complex global governance network not limited to the UN structure. Second, the UNSC is defined as much by formal proceedings pursuant to the strict provisions of the UN Charter as by its behind-the-scene activities. Third, the UNSC is comprised of fifteen members, and, therefore, it is essential to focus on how decisions are made, who plays what roles, as well as what the relationships between actors are. And finally, it is also key to study influence dynamics within different constellations of members that may emerge at any stage of their terms (Farrall et al. 2020; van Bohemen 2020).

This framework posits that there are four means by which the elected members can affect the Council, namely (i) legitimacy dynamics, (ii) diplomatic capacities, (iii) favourable conditions, as well as (iv) formal and informal mechanisms of influence (Farrall et al. 2020). As indicated by the authors, although these four means are distinguished, in practice, they often overlap so that the E10’s influence frequently occurs through multiple means. While this model may not provide a comprehensive framework for the study of the UNSC, in particular with regard to constructivist ideational factors, the agency and psychology of individual actors, critical bureaucratic/organisational dimensions or the non-negligible impact of soft power and influence, it proves capable of offering a functional framework for scrutinising the most salient processes and dynamics in the Security Council. Accordingly, this study attempts to operationalise this framework to contribute to a better appreciation of the extent of influence of these members throughout their related terms in the Council.

Operational perspectives

Comprehensive analyses of the Security Council were conducted by Ian Martin (2018; 2020) and Sebastian von Einsiedel and David Malone (2018). In this context, they point out numerous impediments hindering the activity of the E10 in the Council, such as the brevity of the term, the burden stemming from chairing subsidiary bodies, the increased amount of work, as well as unfavourable working methods, including the penholdership system (see below). To this, we need to add significant economic, financial and logistic burdens that preparing and sending delegations to New York entail for small countries. Despite these challenges, as noticed by Martin (2020), in recent years, there has been a sharp surge in the operational quality and determination of non-permanent members, which has, in turn, enhanced the Council’s overall performance in several respects. In line with this, as discussed below, one trend development that this study encountered was a steady transition towards a deeper involvement of the civil society and third-party organisations that, if continued, could provide grounds for significant future developments.

One of the principal impediments to the effectiveness of the elected members in the Council appears to be the brevity of the two-year tenure, which is in stark contrast with the permanence of the P5’s membership (Martin 2020; Paul 2017). Accordingly, permanent members benefit profoundly not only from the veto power but also from having uninterrupted institutional memory, which is crucial when it comes to mastering the Council procedures (von Einsiedel and Malone 2018). In this sense, the very fact that the P5 have been serving in the Council since its establishment obviously works in their favour. They can enjoy the privilege of being at the heart of decision-making and the development of working methods, and act as the primary norm entrepreneurs of the Council’s dynamics.

It comes as no surprise that, given the colossal pace of work in the Council, only the P5 can keep up with it when it comes to both human and material resources. Against this backdrop, for countries like South Africa or Poland, which may serve as an elected member once or twice in a couple of decades, it proves extremely difficult to maintain their engagement in the Council’s affairs in between terms. Compared to Poland, South Africa has been in a better position for having served more often in close succession. Yet, this persistent deficit in institutional memory meant that ahead of each membership, these countries faced the challenge of rebuilding their knowledge, understanding of the Council and diplomatic capacities almost from scratch.

Another obstacle for the elected members is the burden of chairing subsidiary bodies of the Council, including sanctions committees. Obviously, keeping the elected members busy with administrative tasks rather than substantive political engagements works to the benefit of permanent members (Roele 2020). In this light, important prerogatives such as the allocation of chairs lie mainly with the P5, with little input from the E10.

Furthermore, the elected members also struggle with an increasingly heavy workload in the Council. In this regard, Martin (2020) remarks that between 1990 and 2017, the number of hours spent in meetings and consultations has multiplied by four. Currently, the Council spends more than fifty hours a month in official gatherings. To this, we should add others spent in Arria-formula meetings, informal dialogues, as well as countless meetings in the subsidiary bodies (Martin 2018). Besides, the elected members typically hold two monthly presidencies, during which they are responsible for leading and coordinating all Council’s proceedings.

On top of all this, arguably the greatest impediment to the effectiveness of the elected members are the Council’s working methods, and precisely the penholdership system (Martin 2020). It refers to a practice of continuous, individual or collective, leadership in the Council of particular members on specific issues on the Council’s agenda (Sievers and Daws 2014). It means that the member ‘holding the pen’ assumes responsibility for a given issue and initiates all actions by the Council related to that issue, including drafting documents, chairing negotiations, holding emergency meetings, scheduling open debates and organising visiting missions (Loiselle 2020). In practice, the so-called P3, namely France, the UK and the US, are sole penholders on most country-specific items on the Council’s agenda (Martin 2020). In light of this, it is often claimed that this arrangement substantially hinders the ability of the E10 to influence the Council’s decision-making (Loiselle 2020).

Interestingly, this study could capture evidence of another P3 aggregation in the working groups of the Council, where we seem to be witnessing a surprising convergence between the US, China and Russia on specific procedural matters. This block, which we could label as the VP3,³ appears to be united in an entrenched opposition to all initiatives spearheaded by the E10 aimed at promoting transparency and accountability in the working methods of the Council.⁴ It is indeed interesting to highlight that France and the UK, on the other hand, have increasingly shown to be receptive to and even supportive of such trends, in addition to their de facto waiving of their veto prerogative since 1989. These could well be regarded as instances of informal structural transformations of the Security Council against the backdrop of a debilitating impossibility of introducing formal structural reforms (Bourantonis 2005) entailing alterations to the UN Charter.⁵

To be sure, one cannot deny the fact that the veto power has put the permanent members on a veritable primus inter pares pedestal compared to the elected members. Quantitative research has shown that holding the veto power gives a permanent member (primarily VP3) a high percentage share of voting power of around 19.6 per cent, compared to a mere 2 per cent for a non-permanent member (O’Neill 1996).

Despite the aforementioned realities, there have recently been a few instances in which certain functions, such as the penholdership, had to be vested in the elected members. Martin (2020) holds that for certain difficult questions such as the conflict in Syria since 2013, each time the P5 were at loggerheads, the elected members stepped in and tried to break the deadlock, at least with regard to the humanitarian issues. As a result, they have come to be recognised as penholders of the Syrian humanitarian file. Both Poland and South Africa appear to have played very important roles in this regard. This, at times, has even gone as far as voting two opposing resolutions of the Council’s blocks, as was the case with South Africa, in an attempt to break the deadlock in an increasingly polarised Council.⁶ Far from being a mere act of fence-sitting, this proved to be a principled approach by South Africa that went beyond the politicised red-lines of a zero-sum game dynamic based on the veto power, which has resulted in the number of Council’s resolutions currently being at its lowest since 1991 (Security Council Report 2020b).

This is just one example of an emerging trend whereby the elected members can take a more assertive approach to their activity in the Council. They have also come to be seen as a more consolidated group being aware of joint strength as well as the need to decrease the P5 supremacy mainly through pushing for reforms in the working methods (Martin 2020) or extending the proceedings and encounters outside the Council. Towards this end, in 2018, the E10 adopted “Ten Elements for Enhanced E10 Coordination and Joint Action”. A similar tendency can also be observed among particular subgroups of the elected members, such as the EU Member States. In this regard, a joint non-paper “European Cooperation in the United Nations Security Council – Examples and Lessons Learned by the Elected EU UNSC Members in 2018”, which was co-drafted by Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands (2018), all of whom served together as elected EU UNSC members in 2018, deserves to be noted.

Legitimacy dynamics

In order to answer the question of how South Africa and Poland influenced the Council as elected members, it is necessary to explore different means of such influence, the first of which refers to an ongoing practice of legitimation, also known as legitimacy dynamics. It denotes that the P5 simply need the E10 to maintain the authority of the Council. Without such legitimacy, it would be impossible to convince all states to respect the Council and voluntarily abide by its decisions. This implies that to be seen as effective, the Council requires elected members that are seen as being effective too (Farrall et al. 2020). In this respect, legitimacy creates space for elected members to leave their mark in the Council and to be an integral part of decision-making, which is seen as more representative with the active participation of the E10.

Being elected as a non-permanent Council member carries with it a multilateral commitment to act on behalf of all the UN members in order to fulfil the fundamental aims of the organisation in terms of maintaining international peace and security. This implies that the priorities set by a candidate running a campaign for a non-permanent Council seat must incorporate themes that are relevant to the international community. Therefore, it can be argued that, to a greater or lesser extent, the decision to seek UNSC membership often entails a normative shift from state-centric foreign policy and “thin” cosmopolitanism towards a “thick” liberal institutional ethics.⁷

In this light, the most effective means for the elected members to make use of legitimacy dynamics to strengthen their position in the Council is arguably through their coalition-building capacity. In this respect, it has to be highlighted that the UNSC is not just a group of fifteen countries but rather a cluster of alliances and particular political groupings.⁸ South Africa, for example, being a member of the BRICS, may be expected to exhibit a natural tendency to align its policies with its block partners Russia and China. Yet, following its grassroots transition to democracy in 1994, it has embarked on one of the most liberal constitutional orders in Africa with entrenched advocacy of individual and minority rights and elaborate provisions for a participative civil society (Southall 2008). All this has brought its socio-political settings much closer to the Western liberal institutionalist patterns. Notably, four out of five South African foreign ministers since 1994 have been female.⁹ Such an entrenched tendency to promote minority and gender rights could partially explain South Africa’s resolve to pursue a resolution as part of the normative framework on Women, Peace and Security that promotes gender mainstreaming and “women’s full, equal and meaningful inclusion and participation in peace talks […,] peacebuilding efforts, and in the prevention of conflict” (UNSC 2019a).¹⁰ In addition, South Africa acts as a prominent member of the African Union with pressing and at times overriding regional interests, which unquestionably influence and shape its foreign policy. All this has turned South Africa into a likely bridge between the Global North and the Global South on several levels (Mbete 2020).

Consequently, it can be argued that South Africa pursued two main objectives throughout its mandate in the Council: promoting and strengthening liberal international values, in particular, the protection of civilians in armed conflict with a special focus on gender-based violence, and strengthening and deepening the UN’s relationship with the African Union. While on the first point, South Africa’s position appears to be closer to Paris, London and Washington, the second point proved to be clearly a matter of regional interest.

As regards Poland, it also appears to have chosen two main areas to focus on while serving in the Council, namely the protection of civilians in armed conflict and peace and security in Eastern Europe. Here again, while the first theme was broad enough to appeal to a wider audience, the second was a regional priority. In this respect, Poland, like South Africa, had to present itself as a country first and foremost committed to global politics but, at the same time, pursuing strategic interests in its close neighbourhood.

Poland was actively engaged in building multiple coalitions with other countries, such as the EU Council members, including former and future ones, the E10, as well as some of the P5, to extend its legitimate ability to influence the Council’s decision-making. These alignments obviously offered different capacities to influence the Council. It could be claimed that the most significant achievement of Poland’s membership was the unanimous adoption of resolution 2475 on the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict (UNSC 2019b). The document was passed on the initiative of Poland with the endorsement of the United Kingdom (MFA 2019). It appears that, indeed, a significant role in the successful adoption of this resolution was played by Poland’s ability to gain the support of the UK. However, this success was not repeated when it came to the other two initiatives that Poland keenly pursued in the Council, namely a resolution on genocide and a resolution on mine action. The greatest obstacle preventing the adoption of both documents appears to have been the opposition from some of the permanent members.¹¹ Therefore, building coalitions with other Council members, and particularly the P5, is arguably the most efficient way for the elected members to assert their position as power brokers in the UNSC context.

In the case of South Africa, coalition-building was also pursued through internal A3 mechanisms. There are usually three members from the African continent in the UNSC: one from West Africa, one from North or Central Africa and one from Southern or Eastern Africa. Since many of the issues on the Council agenda are related to Africa, this alignment of policies between African Union countries becomes of prime importance. To be sure, the A3 members appear to be working as a loose coalition that does not always agree on everything. Yet, in the last few years, they have proven to be more successful in reaching consensus and making several joint declarations.¹² All these dynamics were vital to building consensus on the aforementioned resolution 2493 under the normative framework on Women, Peace and Security, which could be said to be the most remarkable achievement of South Africa’s most recent membership of the Council.

Drafting a resolution on such liberal institutionalist assumptions of ‘thick’ global ethics, that is, gender-informed protection of civilians in conflict by an international institution, was unsurprisingly challenged by those P5 members whose understanding of international ethics appears to be fundamentally divergent from the Western liberal institutionalist interpretations. In this light, one main objection concerned the human rights language of the text. Russia contended that the human rights logocentrism of the text went beyond the mandate of the Council. China also pointed out that most of the issues highlighted in the text should be left to the states concerned. Both China and Russia raised serious questions regarding the legitimacy of the Informal Expert Group that had been called to submit annual updates on the implementation progress to the Council. Yet through long, tortuous negotiations entailing several concessions and compromises, South Africa managed to have the resolution adopted in October 2019, which was unsurprisingly defined by South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor as “a welcome return to consensus in the Council” (Security Council Report 2019a).

In contrast to such dynamics, this study also encountered instances in which certain elected members appeared to be more willing to simply align with the existing blocks in the Council rather than critically engage with debates. It should be noted that opting for the most convenient course of action might arguably result from political opportunism underpinned by these countries’ contentment with having attained membership, which in itself could be regarded as a remarkable milestone considering a notoriously arduous election campaign. To this group, a second category of Council members should be added that appear to go out of their way to assertively affirm this newly acquired status, thus questioning the arrangement of power in the Council through the persistent exercise of disruptive voting practices, as can be observed in the minutes of UNSC debates, explanation of votes and meeting records.¹³

Despite this, based on the evidence explored above, it becomes evident that there is great potential for collective action through diplomatic means by drawing upon the defining dynamics of legitimacy, which can be effectively exploited by the elected members.

Diplomatic capacities

An extended diplomatic network can be beneficial, but it has been shown to play a much more important role during the campaign for the election to the Council.¹⁴ In fact, a wide diplomatic reach does not appear to translate directly into the elected members’ success in fulfilling their goals while present at the Council. This is because, for most members, the majority of the Council-related activities are being handled directly in New York. Notwithstanding, as it will be shown below, having access to a well-developed network of embassies, especially in those areas where international and diplomatic presence is rather limited, such as in Africa, can be helpful in bolstering the country’s performance as an elected member.

To this end, South Africa’s capital Pretoria proves to provide a very supportive diplomatic environment by bringing together a great number of diplomatic representatives and other international organisations from around the world. In 2017, Sweden and South Africa proposed an initiative that the elected members of the Council should meet informally once a month by involving the civil society to provide an informative setting for the Council members interested in African affairs (Government Offices of Sweden 2018). This was first held in Pretoria in November 2018. Once South Africa was elected to serve in the Council, it proposed to turn this initiative into a permanent annual event by involving the incoming, outgoing and current members of the Council.¹⁵ For instance, in 2020, this event was hosted by Vietnam (serving member), South Africa (the outgoing member) and Norway (the incoming member). This is a significant achievement towards enhancing the diplomatic capacities of the new members in addition to the already existing arrangements, such as the “Hitting the Ground Running” workshop, which was an initiative aimed at incoming members, originally proposed by another elected member, Finland, in 2003 (UNSC 2004).

Another key factor increasing the efficiency of an elected member in the Council is the introduction of clear diplomatic decision-making procedures. In this regard, being able to respond decisively and swiftly enough to developments in the Council requires good communication between the mission and the ministry, especially when there is a substantial time difference, such as the one between New York and Pretoria or Warsaw. It has to be acknowledged, though, that sometimes it is a major challenge to decide whether you have or not the mandate to decide on an issue under discussion. Therefore, in an emergency situation, it is considered desirable to have a politically strong permanent representative who is either capable of making decisions on their own or not hesitant to make a phone call, often in the middle of the night, to the top political decision-makers back in the capital.¹⁶

In this regard, South Africa, by drawing upon its previous experiences in the Council, appears to have opted for a different arrangement than that of most other elected Council members, including Poland, in which the bulk of the tasks related to day-to-day functioning in the Council is carried out in New York. On its most recent mission, South Africa had between twelve to fourteen officials transferred to the Council at any given time to cover all committees and functions. Yet, there had been an organisational decision to transfer some of the capacities, such as the important responsibility of drafting statements or key engagements and procedural facilitations back to Pretoria.¹⁷ It is believed that this arrangement enabled the South African delegation to engage better with other parts of the government and also to include other actors from civil society in debates. In addition, while this arrangement inevitably gives rise to certain operational challenges due to a considerable lack of delegation’s autonomy, it is claimed to have provided for better pooling of resources between government branches: a practice that could prove extremely valuable for smaller countries. Sending delegations to the Council could turn out to be a very costly enterprise, both economically and administratively, at a time when most countries have to face more pressing economic challenges.¹⁸

Favourable conditions

The effectiveness of elected members does not exclusively depend on hard power or their diplomatic posture alone. These resources, while necessary, may not prove adequate as they can be constrained by certain conditions which oftentimes go beyond the control of the E10. In other words, to a large extent, it is fairly unlikely to predict the circumstances that a given state would face when serving in the Council. If these conditions are favourable, they can substantially increase the ability of an elected member to influence the Council’s decision-making. Having acknowledged that, Farrall et al. (2020) distinguish such determinants as timing, political context as well as the Council’s composition in a given year.

With regard to timing, holding rotating monthly presidencies appears to be particularly pertinent. In their most recent experiences as elected members, Poland served as the president of the Council on two occasions, in May 2018 and August 2019, while South Africa did so in October 2019 and December 2020.

Each month’s realities are different, and it is difficult to anticipate the political context when planning the Council’s agenda in advance. With that acknowledged, Poland had to deal, on an ad hoc basis, with the serious escalation of violence in and around Gaza during its May 2018 presidency, as well as with the volatile situation surrounding Kashmir in August 2019.

In contrast, South Africa’s 2019 presidency proved to be taking place in a more auspicious setting. Deciding on the thematic debates to be held during one’s own presidency always proves to be challenging. For South Africa, this question proved to be a straightforward one to answer. There was an overwhelming understanding that the topic of Women, Peace and Security, which the country had placed at the top of its list of priorities, would be a popular one in which most countries would want to participate. Hence, a smart choice of timing, that is, South Africa’s presidency combined with a clever selection of a debate theme such as Women, Peace and Security, resulted in a very strong turnout and a supportive setting that bolstered the chances of reaching an outcome.

As an example of a supportive Council’s composition, we may cite the election of St. Vincent and the Grenadines as a Council member in January 2020. This country, while being formally part of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, appears to have aligned itself with the African block. This effectively resulted in the alliance A3+1, which also produced several joint statements. A quick survey of the track record of the Council demonstrates that the emergence of such a supportive environment is indeed far from being a rare occurrence.

In the pursuit of promoting multilateralism and consensus-building in the Council, Poland was also actively engaged with other Council members and the wider international community, especially the EU. In this respect, the period 2018-2020 in the Council was quite unique, with as many as five EU member states accounting for one-third of the whole UNSC composition, which substantially enhanced the European voice in the Council (Nunes da Silva 2019). The European format of cooperation was particularly beneficial for Poland in terms of handling regular activities in the Council as well as pursuing its regional priority, namely peace and security in Eastern Europe. From the very beginning of its membership, Poland was strongly engaged in embedding the Eastern European dimension in the Council’s agenda. To this end, it initiated several Council meetings dedicated to Ukraine, including inter alia on the situation in Crimea or the escalation of the conflict in the Sea of Azov. It also played an active role in convincing the Council to hold two meetings on the situation in Georgia (MFA 2020).

Formal and informal mechanisms of influence

Other conduits of exercising the E10’s influence in the Council are formal and informal channels. As regards the former, these include the aforementioned rotating monthly presidency giving the power to formulate the Council’s agenda as well as the provisional rules of procedure, with particular emphasis on rules 37 and 39, which provide for the invitation of non-members to participate in UNSC meetings. Another available formal channel is chairing subsidiary organs, by means of which it is possible, for example, to influence the sanctions regimes in a given country. In some limited circumstances, it is also possible to assume the penholdership function, as happened, for example, in the Syria humanitarian crisis.

The informal channels, instead, include informal Arria-formula meetings (see below), cooperation with NGOs and external experts, and deploying particular individuals to participate in the Council’s proceedings.

Both Poland’s presidencies were used as opportunities to promote its key priorities. In this context, during the May 2018 presidency, Poland organised inter alia two open debates, namely on international law and on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with the latter setting the ground for the adoption of the related resolution 2417. Furthermore, the Council held a briefing on the situation in Ukraine. In August 2019, instead, Poland scheduled an open debate on children in armed conflict, a briefing on international humanitarian law, which eventually led to the adoption of the Presidential Statement on the topic, a debate on the situation in the Middle East and a meeting on the situation in Georgia, marking the 11th anniversary of the Russian aggression against that country (Security Council Report 2019b).

In the case of South Africa, in addition to the previously mentioned presidency in October 2019, the country happened to be simultaneously holding the presidency of the Council and the African Union in 2020. This provided an extremely favourable circumstance to effectively promote one of the two main items on South Africa’s agenda, namely strengthening the relations between the UN and the AU. The December 2020 presidency was the final month of South Africa’s term in the Council, and South Africa was approaching the end of its AU presidency as well. In addition, this was the final month of the “Silencing the Guns” campaign in the African continent, which is an aspiration that the African Union had set for itself (which has now been renewed). Unsurprisingly, this favourable setting turned the formal channels of influence into a very efficient lever to strengthen UN-AU relations.¹⁹

As regards the informal mechanisms of interaction at the Council, official statistics show a significant rise in the number of informal meetings in recent years and a discernible decline in formal ones (Security Council Report 2020b). For example, the total number of formal meetings was 258 in 2019, then registered a sharp decrease to a mere 81 in 2020 (United Nations 2021). In addition to obvious technical impediments arising from the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, such an observable downward trend may well have resulted from a growing level of politicisation and polarisation of debates within the formal channels of the Council. This was evident in the debilitating stalemates regarding Syria, Crimea and Yemen in recent years, for instance. In addition, this significant rise in the number of informal meetings may be a sign of a fundamental frustration of the E10 with the Council’s workings not providing adequate levels of involvement for other actors such as non-Council members, expert groups or civil society.

In this light, one can safely argue that Council’s proceedings can indeed be meaningfully impacted through such informal channels. The most important role in this regard appears to be played by the so-called Arria-formula meetings. This format of behind-closed-doors informal meetings was introduced by Venezuelan Ambassador Diego Arria to allow non-Council members to speak on the issues on the Council’s agenda (Paul 2017). Over time, however, it seems to have lost its original character, and currently, it resembles a kind of an ordinary side-event that nonetheless still offers value for preparing the ground for promoting initiatives at the Council. Arria-formula meetings proved to be extremely consequential to the success of the aforementioned resolutions 2475 on the protection of persons with disabilities in armed conflict and 2493 on Women, Peace and Security.

In the case of resolution 2475 proposed by Poland, British Ambassador Jonathan Allen (2019) acknowledged in the Explanation of Vote (EoV) that a decisive role in focusing the Council’s collective attention on the very issue was played by Poland’s initiative to host a related Arria-formula meeting the previous year, attended inter alia by representatives of NGOs and outside experts. Similarly, this was the case with resolution 2493 proposed by South Africa, which initially faced significant challenges. As mentioned above, Russia and China, in particular, raised concerns against the human rights language employed in the text but also the inclusion of an Informal Expert Group whose legitimacy was questioned (Security Council Report 2019a). Nonetheless, it could be argued that South Africa managed to achieve a global consensus primarily by drawing upon its strong history of interacting with other stakeholders such as NGOs, civil society and specialised third-party organisations and through an intense series of informal meetings and Arria-formula meetings in 2019. This was also obtained through intense advocacy as well as by making several compromises, in particular with regard to the language of the text and the scope of the resolution (ibid.).

Finally, the actions undertaken in the UNSC can also be supported by the high-level political engagement of an elected member. It is no secret that the high-level political advocacy of an elected member can galvanise other members into action. Throughout its two-year membership, Poland provided high-level representation at more than 20 meetings in the Council. In this respect, President Andrzej Duda participated in three meetings, whereas Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz in 13 formal meetings as well as one Arria-formula meeting. In addition to this, at five meetings, Poland was represented by other ministers and high-level representatives of the President’s Chancellery (MFA 2020).

This proves to have been the case with South Africa as well. Indeed, the leading team from Pretoria that included the President and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation was extremely active when it came to participating in the Council-related initiatives.²⁰ For instance, Minister Pandor presided over the Security Council during October 2019, specifically the debate on Women Peace and Security, which resulted in the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2493 (DIRC 2019a). The Minister also presided over a meeting of the Security Council on the Middle East on 28 October 2019 (DIRC 2019b) and another one on Security Sector Reform on 3 December 2020 (DIRC 2020a). During South Africa’s presidency of the Council, President Cyril Ramaphosa presided over a debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations on 4 December 2020, with a specific focus on UN-AU cooperation (DIRC 2020b). Accordingly, the engagement of high-profile political figures of the E10, which may stem from a wide range of underlying factors, including the pursuit of international prestige or grassroots pressure from domestic actors, can undoubtedly play a substantial role in strengthening the position of the elected members. Such engagements of highly visible political actors and other socio-political entities can, in turn, foster extremely promising prospects of opening up the Council’s debates and procedures to wider international and domestic audiences.

Conclusion

This study confronted the well-known claim that due to the dominant position of the P5, the E10 members are left with little space to be influential in the UNSC and argued that, in fact, there could be powerful channels for them to exercise significant influence.

As regards the dynamics of legitimacy, these case studies have demonstrated that the position of elected members can be strengthened by building various coalitions with other members to extend their ability to influence the Council’s decision-making. In the cases of Poland and South Africa, the coalitions built with P5 and other E10 members paved the way for important accomplishments, such as the adoption of resolutions 2475 and 2493.

As far as diplomatic capacities are concerned, the example of South Africa appears to provide an interesting alternative for arrangements of resources for medium and small powers through keeping a considerable number of decision-making functions back in the capital. Despite obvious procedural challenges, this seems to have provided significant advantages such as reduced costs, resource-sharing with other government sectors and, most importantly, opportunities for involving a broader number of actors, in particular the civil society. Such potential for change in the working methods may contribute to strengthening the overall position of the E10 in the Council.

The study has also confirmed that even though the agency of an elected member, primarily manifested through its effectively deployed resources and diplomatic capacities, is important in determining its influence in the Council, no less important are conditions extending beyond the Council member’s direct control. In this light, Poland’s and South African’s voices were at times significantly amplified by the presence of other supportive members in the Council and other favourable conditions.

In the case of South Africa, its concomitant presidency of the Council and of the African Union and numerous proactive diplomatic initiatives combined with unexpected support from other E10 members acted as enabling factors to simultaneously promote geopolitical questions of national interest and build and strengthen consensus in the Council. Therefore, when serving in the Council, one must factor in such elements as timing, political context and the composition of the Council in a given term. All these conditions can be either favourable or detrimental to the overall performance of an elected member.

Furthermore, this study has confirmed that the E10’s influence can be exercised through formal and informal mechanisms in the Council’s decision-making. In this vein, both cases clearly demonstrate that UNSC presidencies, Arria-formula meetings and high-level political engagement were especially useful, as highlighted for the aforementioned resolutions 2493 and 2475.

To be sure, the resolutions tabled by Poland and South Africa were hardly controversial as these were themes that most countries could agree upon. It must be borne in mind, however, that due to the political polarisation of the Council highlighted above, even the P5 are increasingly incapable of reaching a consensus on difficult questions, as evidenced by the official Council data on the number of consensus resolutions. As shown above, this, in turn, could open up significant perspectives for influence for the elected members.

Taking everything into account, it becomes evident that, despite the prevailing position of the P5, the elected members can play an important and sometimes even crucial role in the Council’s decision-making. One interesting conclusion from the above cases could be an appreciation of the fact that the E10’s capacity for playing such a fundamental role in the Council has been underpinned by their less pronounced national and geopolitical interests at the Council compared to the P5. This undoubtedly puts the E10 in a more flexible negotiating position, capable of going beyond ‘red lines’ and even acting as power brokers in the Council. This important attribute, which could be regarded as a foundational element of multilateralism, might be even more sorely needed in an increasingly polarised Council faced with the realities of a systemic shift towards a multipolar world. Accordingly, it could be argued that the presence of the E10 in the Council not only underpins its dynamics of legitimacy but also safeguards its very foundations of multilateralism, reposing on elements of devolution of power, pooling of sovereignty and compromise. In addition, the emerging trends towards the reform of the Council’s working methods and the inclusion of wider global actors and the civil society in debates have the potential to turn the E10 into veritable norm entrepreneurs of the Council’s developing working methods that could lead to future structural reforms. Such drives to informal reforms appear to be even more crucial as the debates over the nature, the viability or even the desirability of structural reforms of the Council proves to be far from over for the foreseeable future.²¹