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Asian Affairs

Volume 50, 2019 - Issue 4

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A REPORT OF THE 2019 HONG KONG PROTESTS

This article is written by a former Royal Hong Kong Police officer whose service included Special Branch engaged in counter-terrorism intelligence, and who is currently resident in Hong Kong. It offers a detailed chronological overview of the development of the 2019 protests in Hong Kong; analyses the problems with the political response on the part of the Hong Kong and Beijing governments; it also looks at the tactics employed by the protesters, and critically examines the tactical and strategic response to the protests by the Hong Kong police. It also discusses the broader social and economic causes of the protests, and how the Hong Kong government might best respond to these challenges.

Introduction

In the summer of 2019 Hong Kong has been shaken by prolonged protests, ostensibly regarding the issue of amendments to the extradition law but with deeper roots in the discontent of large parts of the population. The initially peaceful protests, on several occasions numbering according to the organisers at least a million people, frequently deteriorated into violent clashes between protesters and the Police, creating a cycle of violence that proved beyond the capability of the government to break. The protesters grew more radical and more willing to engage in violence to achieve their aims, or indeed as a nihilistic expression of discontent. The Police used traditional riot control tactics originating from the 1967 communist-related disturbances, applied colonial era laws, and on several occasions failed to distinguish between the majority of protesters who were peaceful and the minority who turned to violence.

The Hong Kong Government under Chief Executive Mrs. Carrie Lam was paralysed by indecision, failed to grasp the changed expectations of Hong Kong people, and stunned by the realisation of the extent of discontent amongst the population. The PRC Government has shown restraint from physical interference in the Hong Kong crisis, although it has been increasingly vocal and stepped up its United Front activities. The political crisis has cast doubt on the long term viability of the “one country two systems” formula that has been the basis of the return of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty. The crisis signalled that changes in the approach to governance are urgently needed to satisfy the needs of an increasingly sophisticated Hong Kong society.

The road to perdition – from amending the law to chaos

On 13 February 2019, the Hong Kong Government announced that it had

reviewed the current regime for the co-operation between Hong Kong and other places on juridical assistance in criminal matters and is considering to amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance (Cap 525) and the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap 503).11 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Government Response to Procession, 13 February 2019.View all notes

Members of the public were asked to give any views within less than three weeks. This was an unusually short consultation period compared, for instance, with the three-month public consultation launched in April 2019 to solicit views on measures for enhancing animal welfare.22 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Public Views Invited for Proposals to Enhance Animal Welfare in Hong Kong, 26 April 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201904/26/P2019042500733.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

The proposed changes to the law were tabled as the “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019” (the “Bill”). The changes were justified by the Government because of loopholes in the current system of extradition of suspects in criminal cases to other jurisdictions. The Government suggested that there were limitations in current law which were exemplified by two key issues. Firstly, under current legislation surrender of suspects to jurisdictions where there do not yet exist suitable long-term legal arrangements must be made through the enactment of subsidiary “case-based” legislation that would have to be approved by the Legislative Council, which is not ideal as criminal case details would have to be scrutinised by the legislature and leave grounds for judicial challenge on the grounds that information has been publicly divulged and hence the opportunity for a fair hearing in court compromised.

Secondly, and most contentiously, the existing laws are not applicable to requests for extradition of suspects between Hong Kong and other parts of the PRC, of which the Government included Taiwan and referred to a homicide case that took place last year involving a Hong Kong man killing his pregnant girlfriend in Taipei. Whilst this gap in the law might seem obvious given the example of the murder case in Taiwan, the amendments immediately raised wider concerns of who might be extradited to Mainland China and for what reasons.

The Democratic Party in Hong Kong quickly warned that the change in law could lead to the facilitation of political dissidents being returned to the Mainland. The Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council warned that it could issue a travel warning for Hong Kong as the law would allow Taiwanese residents to be sent from Hong Kong to the Mainland, and the Taiwan government later announced that it would not accept the extradition of the killer in the murder case.

Even traditional pro-establishment figures raised concerns. On 22 February, Priscilla Leung Mei-fun, a vice-chairwoman of the Business and Professionals Alliance (BPA), stated that people in the business sector had raised concerns and she proposed exempting people suspected of white-collar crimes from the fugitive plan, and said that “The thresholds for some offences are so different between [Hong Kong and the mainland] … We should be open to discussing if we could exempt some laws from the list.”33 South China Morning Post, The Gruesome Taiwan Murder that Lies behind Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam’s Extradition Push, 27 March 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3003381/gruesome-taiwan-murder-lies-behind-hong-kong-leader-carrie (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

Senior business leaders spoke against the Bill. Former Government Chief Secretary Henry Tang Ying Yen, chairman of the Trade Development Council Peter Lam Kin Ngok, and Executive Council member Jeffrey Lam Kin Fung all expressed concerns about the extent of the proposed law. On 6 March, the American Chamber of Commerce criticised the proposed extradition law changes and warned it would damage the city’s reputation as a “secure haven for international business”.44 Ibid.View all notes

There were clear messages from diverse sections of society that there were serious concerns regarding the Bill. This should have been a strong political signal to the Government that even though they had a built-in majority in the Legislative Council to pass the Bill, there was such substantial concern amongst a wide cross section of people in society that this was a politically toxic issue. Those warnings were ignored and the Government pressed ahead to table the Bill for a second reading on Wednesday 12 June in the Legislative Council.

There then followed a prolonged series of mass public protests against the Bill prior to the scheduled tabling in the Legislative Council on 12 June. The extent of the growing protests, from around 10,000 on 31 March to hundreds of thousands on 9 June (the organiser claimed over a million people took part), as well as clashes between protesters and Police with 19 arrests on the latter date, were another indication that there was widespread and diverse public opposition to the Bill.

On 5 June, the Law Society published a detailed submission regarding the Bill in which they outlined multiple unanswered legal questions that were of concern, stating that:

The above worries are particularly grave when members of the public focus their attention on the differences between the criminal justice systems of HKSAR and that of the Mainland China. The prospect of being extradited to the Mainland China underpins their concerns, which are exacerbated in the light of the fact that Mainland China has signed but has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The legal amendments could thus conveniently be used for political persecution and suppress freedom of speech.

The proposed safeguards in the Bill do not address the above concerns. Among other things, the CE is politically appointed. Holder of the office is not subject to election by universal suffrage. Under this political arrangement, a Certificate from the CE cannot be any safeguard at all.55 The Law Society, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, Submission, 5 June 2019. http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/news/submissions/20190605.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

On 6 June, members of the legal sector marched from the Court of Final Appeal to the Central Government Offices in a silent protest against the Bill. The organisers, members of the Legal Subsector of the Election Committee, stated that 3,000 people had taken part66 Civic Party, Nearly 3,000 legal professionals demanded withdrawal of the extradition bill in silent protest, 6 June 2019. https://www.civicparty.hk/?q=en/node/8323 (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes (the Police claimed 800) including two former chairmen of the Bar Association, a former judge, and even some prosecutors from the Department of Justice.77 South China Morning Post, “Record 3,000” Hong Kong Lawyers in Silent March Against Controversial Extradition Bill, 6 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013461/thousands-hong-kong-lawyers-launch-silent-march-against. (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

On 9 June, a protest march from Victoria Park to the Admiralty District involved according to the organiser, Civil Human Rights Front, over a million people (the Police claimed that the march peaked at 240,000 people).88 South China Morning Post, Violent Clashes Mar Protest After “More than a Million” Hongkongers of all Ages and Backgrounds March against Controversial Extradition Bill, 10 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013461/thousands-hong-kong-lawyers-launch-silent-march-against (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The march included a wide range of sections of Hong Kong society, but deteriorated into violence in the evening when some protesters clashed with Police outside the Legislative Council, a foretaste of the violence to come. However, the Government pressed ahead. On 10 June, Carrie Lam gave a news media briefing and said:

There's no question of us ignoring views expressed in society. But Hong Kong has to move on, there are severe deficiencies and gaps in our existing system to deal with cross-border crimes and transnational crimes. There is a very difficult area to understand – why Hong Kong cannot have any mutual legal assistance on criminal matters with our closest neighbours, that is the Mainland of China, Taiwan and Macao? … as we have said in the Government's response issued last night, the bill will resume its Second Reading on June 12.99 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting, 10 July 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201906/10/P2019061000710.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

The response from the Chief Executive to a protest march by an estimated one million people the preceding day, as well as concerns expressed by both pro-democracy and pro-establishment people and organisations since February was that “the bill will resume its reading”. The Chief Executive and her administration seemed to fail to comprehend the deep concern in Hong Kong society regarding surrendering fugitives to be dealt with by the PRC legal system.

These fears were repeatedly outlined by the legal profession in Hong Kong. On 12 June the Chairman of the Bar Association wrote to the Chief Executive and stated that:

I refer you to the three sets of observations of the Hong Kong Bar Association on the proposals dated 4 March 2019, 2 April 2019 and 6 June 2019. HKBA questioned, amongst other things, why the Government has in the current exercise reneged on the Government’s previous commitment to carry out a full consultation of the subject of rendition to Mainland China in view of serious concerns of the domestic population as well as the international community with regard to the lack of protection of minimum rights to a fair trial, in Mainland China.1010 Philip Dykes, Chairman, Hong Kong Bar Association, Re: The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, 12 June 2019. https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/Letter%20dated%2012%20June%202019%20from%20the%20Chairman%20of%20the%20Hong%20Kong%20Bar%20Association%20to%20the%20Chief%20Executive%20of%20the%20HKSARG.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

The key issue was the future rendition of persons to mainland China and the lack of public confidence in the right to a fair trial. This issue united democrats, business people, and many ordinary people in Hong Kong, illustrating the extent to which the separate legal system of Hong Kong from the mainland has been an essential part of the growth and success of the city.

Clearly from when the Government announced in February that the law would resume its second reading in the Legislative Council on 12 June there were vocal concerns and opposition across society. It is highly questionable why the Government insisted on proceeding with tabling the Bill at the Legislative Council on 12 June when there was such obvious opposition from the public as well as its traditional supporters, which suggests a political failure.

On Wednesday 12 June, a protest started early, around 7.00am, in Admiralty outside the Central Government Offices and Legislative Council, where the Bill was to be tabled for a second reading. To enable Legislative Council members and staff to attend the reading, a large force of Police with anti-riot equipment were deployed around the building. However, by 8.00am the entire government and legislative complex was surrounded by the growing number of protesters.

Later in the morning it was announced by Legislative Council officials that the reading of the Bill would be delayed to a later date, practically because no legislators or staff were able to enter the government complex as it was surrounded by protesters. Whilst most protesters were peaceful, a few hundred started to make determined and violent efforts to break into the Legislative Council compound. The Police responded at around 3.00pm with pepper spray.1111 South China Morning Post, As it Happened: Violence Erupts at Hong Kong Protest, 12 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/scmp-originals/3014239/it-happened-violence-erupts-hong-kong-protest (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The violent protesters at first retreated, but soon after charged again at the Police lines that were protected only by Mills Barriers. The Police then withdrew into the Legislative Council compound and protesters occupied Tim Wa Avenue on the east side of the Legislative Council building. The Police next used tear gas against the few hundred violent protesters, forcing them back as most had not started to use gas masks (widespread later in the protest movement).

However, some protesters managed to gain access to the Legislative Council compound, and the Police were pelted with objects thrown from the violent front part of the crowd. This led to a determined effort by the Police to force back the entire crowd, which was done by using a large amount of tear gas and rubber bullets. The Police proceeded to attempt to clear the entire crowd, which numbered at least several tens of thousands, stretching around the government complex and back into Admiralty and Central Districts. In doing so the Police engaged with the rear of the protest crowd that was peaceful and not attempting to storm the Legislative Council.

Amnesty International published a report detailing 14 instances of excessive use of force by the Hong Kong Police and found that “the use of force by police in the largely peaceful protest that took place on 12 June violated international human rights law and standards.”1212 Amnesty International, How not to Police a Protest: Unlawful use of Force by Hong Kong Police, June 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1705762019ENGLISH.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The issues raised by Amnesty International, with reference to video recordings, included unlawful use of batons and rubber bullets, improper use of tear gas and pepper spray, lack of visible Police identification, and restrictions on journalists and medical aid providers.

The Police use of force against the entire protest crowd of several tens of thousands, and not only the few hundred violent protesters who had instigated the violence, shocked many people in Hong Kong. What seemed to be indiscriminate use of force by the Police against both violent as well as peaceful protesters, and journalists resulted in wide local and international criticism.

The Commissioner of Police stated that 150 rounds of tear gas were fired by the Police1313 South China Morning Post, “WE had no Choice”: Hong Kong Police Say they Fired 150 Rounds of Tear Gas during Anti-extradition Protests, 14 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/3014430/we-had-no-choice-hong-kong-police-say-they-fired-150-rounds-tear-gas-during (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes, and also that the situation in Admiralty was a “riot”. This point was important as the offence of “Riot” carries a maximum penalty on conviction of ten years imprisonment. The interpretation by the Police of the protest as a Riot was based on colonial-era law.

The Public Order Ordinance was first enacted in Hong Kong in 1967 by the British colonial authorities, mainly in response to the communist-inspired riots that took place during the summer of that year. The authorities in Hong Kong have left the key parts of the Public Order Ordinance unchanged, which has resulted in sections remaining that have evolved in different ways in other common law jurisdictions. For instance, Section 18(1) defines an “Unlawful Assembly” as

When 3 or more persons, assembled together, conduct themselves in a disorderly, intimidating, insulting or provocative manner intended or likely to cause any person reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such conduct provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace, they are an unlawful assembly.

Furthermore, in Section 19(1) this becomes a Riot “When any person taking part in an assembly which is an unlawful assembly by virtue of section 18(1) commits a breach of the peace, the assembly is a riot and the persons assembled are riotously assembled.”

However, the UK Public Order Act of 1986 defines “Riot” as

Where 12 or more persons who are present together use or threaten unlawful violence for a common purpose and the conduct of them (taken together) is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety.

Hence under the law in Hong Kong every person gathered at a protest, even if not engaged in violence and not intending violence, commits the offence of Riot if there is any breach of the peace and the Police determine that they are part of an Unlawful Assembly. The law in the UK is more tightly-drafted, and only defines the persons using violence as taking part in a Riot.

On 14 June an estimated 6,000 people staged a “Mothers’ protest” in Central against the Police use of force against student protesters on 12 June as well as Carrie Lam’s response. On Sunday 16 June, organisers of a protest march claimed that 2 million people had joined (the Police claimed 338,000). On Friday 21 June, student protesters blocked roads in Admiralty and that evening besieged Police Headquarters, assaulting several Police officers and vandalising the exterior of the compound.

On 1 July, the anniversary of the return of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China, a protest march forced the annual flag raising ceremony to be moved to a secure indoor venue. That evening, protesters stormed into the Legislative Council building when Police withdrew for safety reasons, leaving the building undefended. The protesters destroyed furniture, defaced portraits, and sprayed slogans on the walls, including “It was you who taught me peaceful marches do not work.” The cycle of violence was escalating continually.

The Government tried to defuse the crisis without success, on 14 June announcing that the Bill would be delayed indefinitely. On 16 June Carrie Lam issued a written apology. There were however pro-government protests, including on 30 June in Admiralty District, 20 July in Admiralty, and on 11 August in Causeway Bay, but with far smaller attendances than the anti-government protests.

The protest movement widened as people raised other long-standing issues and grievances. On Saturday 6 July, a protest took place in Tuen Mun, New Territories, against “dancing aunties”, middle-aged mainland Chinese women who dance in public parks, illustrating deep anti-mainland feeling amongst Hong Kong people. On Saturday 13 July, a protest in Sheung Shui, New Territories, against cross border “parallel-trading,” which was impacting on local residents, led to violent clashes with Police.

The violence escalated every week. A pivotal moment occurred on Sunday 14 July, when a march in Sha Tin, New Territories, resulted in chaotic running-battles between Police and protesters inside the New Town Plaza shopping mall, with many innocent shoppers caught in the fighting as isolated Police officers and groups of protesters fought running battles. Many people were irate that the Police would pursue protesters inside a busy shopping mall, leading to further public antipathy towards the Police.

On 9 July, Carrie Lam stated to the news media that there was no Government plan to restart the process to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in the Legislative Council and that “the Bill is dead.”1414 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting, 9 July 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201907/09/P2019070900608.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes This meant that the Bill would be inactive until the current legislative session ends after which it would lapse. In reality, the Government had retracted the request for the Legislative Council to resume the second reading of the Bill, but this could in fact resume. The Government’s insistence on suspension but refusal to withdraw the Bill led to further lessening of public confidence in the honesty of the Chief Executive and her principle officials as many people did not believe that they would not proceed with the Bill.

This did not stop the now weekly anti-government protests, which started with peaceful marches or assemblies and ended later in the day with violence instigated by increasingly large numbers of radical protesters. The Police seemed to be exercising restraint during early protests after the excesses of 12 June, but after provocations from violent protesters they stepped up the use of pepper spray, tear gas grenades and projectiles, rubber bullets and “sponge” rounds.

Protesters responded to the arsenal of Police weaponry with innovative means of protection including uniform black clothing, construction helmets to protect against projectiles and batons, gas masks or swimming goggles to counter tear gas and pepper spray, the ubiquitous umbrellas to counter tear gas as well as to hide the identities, and mobile phones to exchange intelligence and communicate.

Saturday 21 July was a turning point. Protesters vandalised the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government and defaced the emblem of the PRC, by doing so attacking the central government. Meanwhile in Yuen Long, New Territories, a gang of at least one hundred white clad thugs attacked protesters returning home as well as ordinary people not involved in any protests. At around 10.30pm in the Yuen Long MTR (train) station, gang members attacked ordinary people with rattan canes and clubs, reportedly used to represent the punishment of wayward children.1515 South China Morning Post, At Least 45 Injured as Rod-wielding Mob Dressed in White Rampages through Yuen Long MTR station, Beating Screaming Protesters, 22 July 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3019524/least-10-injured-baton-wielding-mob-suspected-triad (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes Although hundreds of emergency calls were made to the Police, no officers arrived until 39 minutes after the first calls were made. Two uniform Police officers left the MTR station during the attacks and did not intervene.

Police officers arrived at 11.15pm after the attackers had left the MTR station. The Police questioned men dressed in white at the entrances to several local villages but did not make arrests. Incredibly, the attackers returned at around midnight, forced open the MTR station shutters, and started a second wave of attacks on passengers. The Yuen Long attack, believed to have been conducted by local villagers and gangs of triad (criminal secret society) members, shocked Hong Kong and led to a widespread believe that the Police were in collusion with triads. This event turned a substantial number of the passive Hong Kong population against the Police, and many people started to label the Police as “haak ging” (黑警), or “black police”.

The protest movement – silent minority or majority?

The protest movement seems from the scale of the assemblies and marches to have substantial, if not majority, support amongst Hong Kong people. Yet it has been difficult for the Government to enter into any dialogue as the movement is leaderless and diverse.

The Civil Human Rights Front was formed in 2002 as an alliance of more than 50 civil society groups, initially in opposition to the “Article 23” National Security legislation proposed by the Government. In the current situation, this group organised protest marches against the Bill in March and April, as well as what they claimed to be a million-people march on 9 June, the annual 1 July event, and subsequent marches. They cooperate with other pro-democracy groups, such as the Democratic Party, as well as newer groups such as Demosisto which originated from student-led groups in 2016 and advocates democracy and autonomy for Hong Kong.

In addition, “Localists” have emerged in the 2000s as a reaction to what they see as a colonial approach by the PRC Government to Hong Kong. They advocate democracy, the separateness of Hong Kong from the PRC, and reject what they see as “Mainlandisation” of Hong Kong. More radical are the few pro-independence groups such as the Hong Kong National Party, prohibited in 2018 by the Government under the Societies Ordinance due to its advocacy of an independent Hong Kong.

However, the 2019 protests have been leaderless and more organic than organised. Although a large part of the adult population has taken part in huge protest marches, several claiming over one million participants, the protest movement has been sustained by the energy of school and university students, but also radicalised by the violence of a minority of them that has the tacit support of the majority.

After large protest marches during the day, young people have taken to the streets to stage flash protests, block streets and trains, and attack the Police. The extent, sophistication and impact of these protests has confounded the authorities and resulted in claims that the students are supported by “foreign forces”.

The difficulty of the Government in understanding how the protesters organise has been compounded by the open platform nature of the protest movement which is not led by visible leaders who have an identifiable agenda. Because these groups organise and project themselves via Internet and social media there is no central organisation. The protest movement, in particular young people and students, has made great use of the Internet, social media, and mobile communications to discuss, grow support, communicate, exchange intelligence, and organise action. The decentralisation and diversity of the protest movement has benefitted from three main areas for digital collaboration.

Protest discussions have utilised LIHKG (https://lihkg.com), a Chinese-language Hong Kong based website of forums, similar to Reddit. LIHKG has so many users and forums that traditional structural organisation or search would be complicated, but the tool is efficient because users vote discussion threads up or down and hence popularity drives the top threads that people see first. LIHKG hence has a democratic approach to protest and levels decision-making based on the popularity of ideas. Users must provide an email address to register an account, but LIHKG is free to use and anonymous as personal details are not required. The dark side of LIHKG is the use of the forums to “dox” people, especially Police officers and their families, by posting their personal information.

Protest communications and intelligence use Telegram, the open-platform cloud-based instant messaging service. There are hundreds of Telegram groups and channels that facilitate the exchange of information amongst the tens of thousands of users and has changed how political protesters confront the Government. For instance, the “HK Confirmed Sightings Channel” has users posting real time sightings of Police officers and vehicles and their locations, providing protesters with immediate intelligence of Police movements and locations so that they can change their own locations and “Be like water” (the protest slogan based on Kung Fu legend Bruce Lee).

Protest information and propaganda is often exchanged using Airdrop, untraceable as it allows the peer to peer transfer of files between Apple iOS devices over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Not only is Airdrop untraceable, but information can be pushed out to all Apple iOS devices in the area around the distributor and reach them without the need for any App.

The use of mobile Apps for protest organisation is apparent in the download data. The LIHKG mobile App had 120,000 first time downloads in July 2019, compared to 12,000 in July 2018. The Telegram App has been installed 1.7 million times in Hong Kong and 365 million globally, with 110,000 new Hong Kong users from Apple Store and Google Play in July 2019, compared to 26,000 new users in July 2018. The Stand News App, which distributes protest movement news, had 92,000 new users in July 2019.1616 Sensor Tower, Hong Kong Unrest Drives 4x Surge in Telegram Downloads, Boosts other Apps Used by Protesters, 22 August 2019. https://sensortower.com/blog/hong-kong-protests-app-downloads.View all notes The data indicates around 100,000 new users of these applications in July at the height of the protest movement. In addition, protesters have used other mainstream Apps to distribute information widely, including Tinder (the dating App), Uber (the car ride service), and Pokemon Go (the mobile game) to share protest maps.1717 BBC News, Hong Kong Protesters Turn to Uber and Pokemon, 9 August 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49280726 (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes This use of diverse and popular Apps which are used by large parts of the population essentially results in protest information being available to everyone.

The pervasive access to protest information coincides with a major segment of the adult population supporting the anti-government protest movement, evidenced from the multiple major assemblies and marches of possibly over a million people. The distinct youth part of the protest movement, although not centrally organised, has evolved with a loose structure recognisable to the participants and encompasses large numbers of secondary school and university students.

The youth participants seem to have an image of themselves in the protest movement, and select their role based on their own perception. The segment on the front line of clashes with Police are the Yung Mo (勇猛) “valiant”, who see themselves as guerrilla fighters. The largest segment is the Wo Lei Fei (和理非) “peaceful rational, non-violent”, who do not fight with the Police but deliver resources and provide support. There are also Kei Sau, (旗手) “flag bearers”, Yuen Kung (遠方的攻) “distant attackers”, and Siu Fong Yuen (消防員) “firefighters”.1818 Dim Sum Daily, Dummies Guide to Confrontation and War Strategies by Frontline Protesters in Hong Kong, 25 August 2019. https://www.dimsumdaily.hk/exclusive-dummies-guide-to-confrontation-and-war-strategies-by-frontline-protesters-in-hong-kong/ (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The role playing and use of collaborative Apps seems very similar to online gaming, and shows in Hong Kong the “gamification” of political protest.

The Hong Kong police force – not the political solution

The lack of any political solution has left the Hong Kong Police in the impossible position as the face of government and the target of protesters. It has been clear from the prolonged and frequent violent protests that the Police use of force is not the political solution and cannot stop the protest movement. The early protester anger at the Government has been increasingly directed against the Police, resulting in officers becoming increasingly angry in response. The Police have been caught in a “Catch 22” situation as they cannot tactically win the conflict with protesters, have to respond to provocations, but because of the absence of a political solution every time the Police respond with force they alienate more of the public.

Moreover, early in the protest movement the Police made serious operational errors, and suffered from a lack of discipline on the part of some front-line officers; the anger of protesters and large sections of the public worsened after repeated clashes. The Hong Kong Police moved from a situation of widespread public acceptance and support to one of public distrust and even hatred. This is a crisis of legitimacy for the Police.

As mentioned, this has resulted in widespread use of the phrase “Black Police” (黑警), a colloquial expression dating from when the Police colluded with criminals during endemic corruption in the city in the 1960s to 1980s. Public opposition to the Police was due to three key incidents. Firstly, the use of force on a largely peaceful protest crowd on 12 June, secondly the running battles inside New Town Plaza shopping mall on 14 July, thirdly and most crucially the attacks by suspected triad society members on people in the Yuen Long MTR train station late in the evening of Sunday 21 July.

These incidents, widely broadcast with shocking television footage of violence, led many people to believe that the Police could not distinguish between violent and peaceful protesters (on 12 June), that they were indifferent to the safety of non-protesters (14 July), and that they colluded with triad gangsters (22 July). The negative public perception was worsened by the use of aggressive tactics, such as from the Special Tactical Squad wearing black jump suits with no rank, serial number, or other insignia.

The Police strategy of forcibly dispersing protesters in specific directions to clear roads and other areas has raised concerns. This approach is reasonable when crowds are violent, but there is an adverse reaction from peaceful protesters not involved in violence who are angered by the use of force by Police and may return. In addition, they are radicalised against the Police. This situation happened after the Police dispersal of the violent protesters as well as the larger number of non-violent protesters on 12 June, and although Police were successful in this tactical exercise it was a strategic failure as it turned more peaceful protesters, as well as non-protesters, against the Police.

The Hong Kong Police historically had a special role in the city as a pillar of support for the colonial British government prior to the return of sovereignty to China in 1997. The 1967 communist riots had a deep effect on the structure and culture of the Police. The structure has remained largely similar from the 1970s to 2019 with the same ranks, districts, and the ability of the Police to change from the routine daily policing mode to an internal security structure, known as “Force Mobilisation” (or FORMOB). These Police formations have substantial firepower and equipment to suppress riots or internal security challenges.

However, this change of district police structure to a paramilitary internal security mode raises problems for the Police. District policing is put aside and replaced by a structure that visibly projects force to the community. This projection of force is ideally kept temporary to ensure that the majority of the community remains supportive of the Police, but if maintained for too prolonged a period or if the paramilitary force negatively impacts on ordinary people there is a danger of the loss of support from the community for the Police.

During the 1967 communist inspired unrest, the Police would not have been able to sustain their operations against the leftist extremists and eventually ensure that the movement was unsuccessful in undermining the colonial government without the support of the majority of the community. This is a salient point for the Police in 2019, since for the paramilitary response to the protest movement to be successful the support of the majority of the community is essential. The indications in 2019 are that a significant section of the community not only does not support the Police but has lost confidence in the Police as a force to protect people.

The paramilitary internal security mode of the Police in 2019 raises further questions regarding the relevance of this structure in policing a wealthy and sophisticated international city. Before 1997, Hong Kong had a colonial police force intended to maintain British rule by force if necessary, although experienced colonial officers understood that they governed by co-opting local interests rather than by coercion. That this same paramilitary structure has continued from the colonial period to the post-1997 return of the largely Chinese local population to PRC sovereignty raises the question of why the Police structure has not changed to a community policing model. One obvious reason often cited is that the paramilitary mode is essential to ensure that the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) is not called upon to maintain order in Hong Kong, which after the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 is considered the worst case scenario for the city.

The current Police strategy is rooted in the approach taken by the British colonial authorities to quell internal security disturbances, developed from experiences in the riots of 1956, 1966, and 1967. There have now been two occasions after 1997 when the Police have used ‘internal security’ methods to disperse political protesters, firstly on 28 September 2014 prior to the “Occupy” protests and again on 12 June 2019. It seems from the approach taken by the Police that the strategy remains to use force against all participants in unauthorised political protests. This inevitably results in strategic political defeat.

Hong Kong government – not ruling Hong Kong

The protest movement has triggered a crisis of governance. The scale of the protests and broad opposition to the Government seemed to shock the administration into inaction. The Chief Executive and her principal officials were almost lost for words answering questions from the press. The turning point for the Government was 12 June.

The dispersal of the large protest crowd on Wednesday 12 June outside of the Central Government Offices and Legislative Council turned large sections of the population against the Police as they were perceived as having used indiscriminate violence against a largely peaceful crowd. The Government did not help to improve public confidence. In a TV interview on 12 June, Carrie Lam said that

If young people have taken action, and you don’t give them what they want, what then? To use a metaphor, I am a mother, I have two sons. If I let him have his way every time my son acts this way, I believe we will have a good relationship in the short term. But if I indulge his wayward behaviour, he might regret it after he grows up. He will then ask me, Mum, why didn’t you remind me back then?1919 South China Morning Post, Carrie Lam’s Clumsy Parenting Analogy was Designed to take the Sting out of the Extradition Bill Protests, but only Burns Relationships with Hong Kong Mothers, 17 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3014863/carrie-lams-clumsy-parenting-analogy-was-designed-take-sting (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

The remarks by the Chief Executive, perceived by the community as condescending, worsened the growing crisis of confidence in the Government.

What seemed to be a disconnect between the Government and community was illustrated by Carrie Lam when on 15 June she said that “I have to admit that our explanation and communication work has not been sufficient or effective.”2020 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Opening Remarks by CE, 15 June 2019.View all notes Carrie Lam seemed to think that it was simply poor communications by the Government that had led to the protests and crisis of confidence.

What seemed to be disdain for the community was again demonstrated when the Secretary for Security was questioned in the Legislative Council on Wednesday 19 June as to why officers of the Special Tactical Squad did not display their Police Unique Identification (UI) numbers, common to uniform Police duties, and he stated that there was no room on their uniform to do so.2121 Radio Television Hong Kong, No Room on Uniform to Display ID: John Lee, 19 June 2019. https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1463825-20190619.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The Police use of force at the protest as well as the refusal of the Government to address this issue led to a major expansion of support from usually politically apathetic Hong Kong people for the protest movement, and contributed to the next phase of prolonged protest movement.

After 12 June the Chief Executive and principal government officials made few public appearances and rarely engaged with the news media, and when Mrs. Lam did appear she looked nervous and emotional. This gave the appearance of a government with a “bunker mentality”. However, that changed from 29 July when the PRC Government spoke out.

China – the “second government” in Hong Kong

On Monday 29 July the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (“HKMAO”), which reports to the State Council of the PRC, gave a press briefing in Beijing. The spokespersons for the Office said that because “A lot of Hongkongers are unfamiliar with the legal system in China, many of them expressed concerns”, but went on to state clearly that the central government “strongly supports the Carrie Lam-led Hong Kong government, and the police to enforce the law.”2222 South China Morning Post, How Beijing Expressed Resolute Support for Hong Kong’s Government, 29 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3020466/hong-kong-and-macau-affairs-office-speak-extradition-bill (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes The spokesperson stressed that the work of the Hong Kong Police was highly appreciated, a clear sign of support to boost morale. Most importantly, the spokesperson stressed three bottom lines: No harm to national security, no challenge to the central government's authority and the Basic Law, and no using Hong Kong as a base to undermine China. A second press briefing was held by the HKMAO on 6 August, showing this to be normal central government commentary on Hong Kong affairs.

The central government continued to give clear messages regarding their views. On 7 August, Zhang Xiaoming, the Director of the HKMAO, hosted a briefing for 500 Hong Kong members of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and informed them that the central government was highly concerned about the situation and was making strategic plans.

The HKMAO has been the “second government” since Chief Executive Tung Chee Wah was forced to abandon national security legislation following massive public protests in 2003. This structure was openly stated by Cao Erbao, head of the research department of the Communist Party of China in Hong Kong in an article in 2008 in the Study Times in which he explained that there are “two governing teams”, the first being the local administration and the second the PRC team responsible for Hong Kong affairs.2323 Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2018, p. 204.View all notes This definition of the role of the HKMAO office in governing Hong Kong is openly acknowledged, but has not well recognised by Hong Kong people until the primacy of the PRC central government has been visible during the 2019 protest crisis. The HKMAO office now speaks openly about issues in Hong Kong, and even seems to organise Hong Kong Government responses: On 26 August, a meeting of Carrie Lam with youth group representatives was initiated by the HKMAO.2424 South China Morning Post, Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam meets Young People a Day after Unprecedented Violence as Police Vow to Match Force with Proportionate Response, 27 August 2019.View all notes

The “second government” includes other entities such as the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xinhua (New China News Agency, a key United Front organisation), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) garrison. The leadership of the HKMAO led to a more concerted effort from other PRC government organs to support the Hong Kong Government and oppose the protests. On 31 July, the PLA Hong Kong garrison released two videos showing anti-terrorism and anti-riot drills that was interpreted as a warning that the PLA have the capability to intervene and combat violent protests. The videos included soldiers shouting warnings to protesters in Cantonese (the primary Chinese dialect in Hong Kong and Guangdong Province) as well as firing tear gas, water cannon, and displaying warning banners remarkably similar to those used by the Hong Kong Police.2525 South China Morning Post, Chinese Army’s Hong Kong Garrison Releases Video Showing Anti-riot Drills, Featuring Tanks, 1 August 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/3020985/chinese-armys-hong-kong-garrison-releases-video-showing-anti-riot-drills (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes

The PRC authorities also seemed to suggest that other agencies could become involved in Hong Kong affairs. On 15 August, it was reported by the US State Department that hundreds of People’s Armed Police officers and vehicles had been deployed to Shenzhen, immediately across the border from Hong Kong, at a sports stadium. It is questionable whether the “second government” had in fact become the first government in Hong Kong.

The people and the city – a better tomorrow?

An amendment to a law has triggered a protest movement that has challenged the system of governance in Hong Kong. That protests have been so widespread with support across diverse sections of society, so sustained for over four months, resulted in so much violence as well as hatred, shows that the Bill was only a trigger based on far wider social discontent.

The rendition of people from Hong Kong to mainland China has touched on a deep-held fear of generations of Hong Kong people who fled from chaos in China in the past century and have an abiding distrust of the systems in the mother country. Although China has developed economically, the legal system does not protect the rights of individuals, and this is recognised in Hong Kong as a key reason for the “One country two systems” structure. There remains widespread suspicion and mistrust of the PRC government, and the extradition of Hong Kong people to the different legal system in Mainland China where there are not the checks and balances of the Common Law system in place in Hong Kong has heightened such fears.

The Bill is the trigger for protests but there are underlying problems in Hong Kong that have not been addressed by the local Government. There is considerable worsening economic disparity, with a growing low-income section of society not benefiting from the economic growth of the city. This is illustrated in the housing situation as large sections of the population cannot afford to enter the housing market (ever) and access to public housing is limited.

To regain the confidence of the population, the Government must prioritise the interests of the residents of the city. The three key areas that require immediate attention and rapid solutions are housing, poverty, and governance.

Housing is so unaffordable for most of the population that young people are not able to see their economic stake in the future. The Government should consider a major public housing programme that includes a new class of housing for young people aged between 18–30 so that they can access affordable accommodation and enter the workforce as independent adults.

Poverty must be recognised as a serious problem of relative deprivation that has worsened as economic growth has benefitted a wealthy upper middle class but left behind 594,000 poor households of 1.377 million poor people, according to the Government’s own data2626 Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2017, November 2018. https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp461.jsp?productCode=B9XX0005 (accessed 5 September 2019).View all notes (18 per cent of a population of 7.3 million people). The Government should devise a major poverty reduction strategy to raise the living standards of the section of the population in Hong Kong that is categorised as being below the poverty line.

Governance backwardness is a key factor in the legitimacy crisis of the Government. The lack of elected leaders in both the Executive and the Legislature is recognised as a major democratic deficit in such a developed city, but in addition the key organs of government including the Civil Service and Police suffer from an expectation gap between government services and the community. The Government should commence a thorough review of purpose, structure, and organisational culture with the aim of further public sector reform to align with the rapid changes in society, in particular the expectations of the post-80s, post-90s and Millennial generation who are now a political force and are the future of Hong Kong.

These three areas – housing, poverty, and governance – are critical to ensure the future success, and indeed the survival, of Hong Kong. To undermine the wide popular support for the protest movement the Government should focus on tangible action in these areas rather than on indistinct strategies such as the “Greater Bay Area” integration with the mainland that do not provide clear benefits to ordinary Hong Kong people and for which there is clearly not a popular consensus.

This will involve a change of mindset in those governing Hong Kong to focus first on the well-being of the people. This change needs to come with recognition that Hong Kong geographically is not a blessed place: the mountainous terrain is hard to build on, the climate is hot and humid, and there are no natural resources. Hong Kong is a blessed place because of its people, who are responsible for the success of the city. Hong Kong people are dynamic, eager to succeed, compassionate, welcoming to foreigners, good at business, and have created a global finance and trading centre. The people, not the place, are responsible for the success of this city, which can contribute to the development of China. If the Government can understand this, there will be a better tomorrow for Hong Kong.

* * *

At the time of writing, on 4 September, Chief Executive Carrie Lam announced that the Government will take four actions to foster dialogue and help society move forward. The Government will formally withdraw the Bill from the Legislative Council agenda; will fully support the work of the Independent Police Complaints Council and follow the recommendations made in their report; will begin direct dialogue with the community; and will invite community leaders, professionals and academics to review the deep-seated problems in society and advise the Government on solutions.2727 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, CE Announces withdrawal of Fugitive Offenders Bill among “Four Actions” to Help Society Move Forward, 4 September 2019.View all notes

After three months of no political solutions, the Government has made a concession on one key demand from the public, which is withdrawal of the Bill (the establishment of some form of review is not the IPCC). This political action that will likely lessen the scale of the protest, but is too little and too late to diminish public discontent with the Government.

How does this end? Clearly repression by the Police will not defeat a protest movement that has significant public support, and it is widely recognised that political actions are necessary. There are various possibilities for what comes next if protests continue.

The intervention of the PRC authorities remains possible, but only in certain circumstances, which should be understood with reference to the HKMAO “three no” statement: No harm to national security, no challenge to the central government's authority and the Basic Law, and no using Hong Kong as a base to undermine China. If violent protests are perceived by the central government as damaging PRC national security, authority, or spreading to Guangdong Province then there remains the possibility that the People’s Liberation Army garrison or the People’s Armed Police could be used to support the Hong Kong Police. It is conceivable that the PLA or PAP would be used to augment the Police by protecting key facilities, hence allowing more Police manpower to be deployed to front-line protest management.

The prolonged continuation of protests of lesser scale but more violent and resembling terrorism is likely, and although popular support is likely to wane after the concessions from the Government there is deep discontent with Carrie Lam which is unlikely to dissipate until she leaves office along with other principal officials who have been involved in the crisis.

Hong Kong remains a highly resilient city, but Government strategies to deal with the underlying causes of discontent are needed to ensure that the 2019 protests do not repeat in a cycle every several years.

Notes

1 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Government Response to Procession, 13 February 2019.

2 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Public Views Invited for Proposals to Enhance Animal Welfare in Hong Kong, 26 April 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201904/26/P2019042500733.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).

3 South China Morning Post, The Gruesome Taiwan Murder that Lies behind Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam’s Extradition Push, 27 March 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3003381/gruesome-taiwan-murder-lies-behind-hong-kong-leader-carrie (accessed 5 September 2019).

4 Ibid.

5 The Law Society, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, Submission, 5 June 2019. http://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/pub_e/news/submissions/20190605.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).

6 Civic Party, Nearly 3,000 legal professionals demanded withdrawal of the extradition bill in silent protest, 6 June 2019. https://www.civicparty.hk/?q=en/node/8323 (accessed 5 September 2019).

7 South China Morning Post, “Record 3,000” Hong Kong Lawyers in Silent March Against Controversial Extradition Bill, 6 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013461/thousands-hong-kong-lawyers-launch-silent-march-against. (accessed 5 September 2019).

8 South China Morning Post, Violent Clashes Mar Protest After “More than a Million” Hongkongers of all Ages and Backgrounds March against Controversial Extradition Bill, 10 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3013461/thousands-hong-kong-lawyers-launch-silent-march-against (accessed 5 September 2019).

9 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting, 10 July 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201906/10/P2019061000710.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).

10 Philip Dykes, Chairman, Hong Kong Bar Association, Re: The Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, 12 June 2019. https://www.hkba.org/sites/default/files/Letter%20dated%2012%20June%202019%20from%20the%20Chairman%20of%20the%20Hong%20Kong%20Bar%20Association%20to%20the%20Chief%20Executive%20of%20the%20HKSARG.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).

11 South China Morning Post, As it Happened: Violence Erupts at Hong Kong Protest, 12 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/scmp-originals/3014239/it-happened-violence-erupts-hong-kong-protest (accessed 5 September 2019).

12 Amnesty International, How not to Police a Protest: Unlawful use of Force by Hong Kong Police, June 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1705762019ENGLISH.pdf (accessed 5 September 2019).

13 South China Morning Post, “WE had no Choice”: Hong Kong Police Say they Fired 150 Rounds of Tear Gas during Anti-extradition Protests, 14 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/3014430/we-had-no-choice-hong-kong-police-say-they-fired-150-rounds-tear-gas-during (accessed 5 September 2019).

14 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, Transcript of remarks by CE at media session before ExCo meeting, 9 July 2019. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201907/09/P2019070900608.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).

15 South China Morning Post, At Least 45 Injured as Rod-wielding Mob Dressed in White Rampages through Yuen Long MTR station, Beating Screaming Protesters, 22 July 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-and-crime/article/3019524/least-10-injured-baton-wielding-mob-suspected-triad (accessed 5 September 2019).

16 Sensor Tower, Hong Kong Unrest Drives 4x Surge in Telegram Downloads, Boosts other Apps Used by Protesters, 22 August 2019. https://sensortower.com/blog/hong-kong-protests-app-downloads.

17 BBC News, Hong Kong Protesters Turn to Uber and Pokemon, 9 August 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49280726 (accessed 5 September 2019).

18 Dim Sum Daily, Dummies Guide to Confrontation and War Strategies by Frontline Protesters in Hong Kong, 25 August 2019. https://www.dimsumdaily.hk/exclusive-dummies-guide-to-confrontation-and-war-strategies-by-frontline-protesters-in-hong-kong/ (accessed 5 September 2019).

19 South China Morning Post, Carrie Lam’s Clumsy Parenting Analogy was Designed to take the Sting out of the Extradition Bill Protests, but only Burns Relationships with Hong Kong Mothers, 17 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3014863/carrie-lams-clumsy-parenting-analogy-was-designed-take-sting (accessed 5 September 2019).

20 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Opening Remarks by CE, 15 June 2019.

21 Radio Television Hong Kong, No Room on Uniform to Display ID: John Lee, 19 June 2019. https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1463825-20190619.htm (accessed 5 September 2019).

22 South China Morning Post, How Beijing Expressed Resolute Support for Hong Kong’s Government, 29 June 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3020466/hong-kong-and-macau-affairs-office-speak-extradition-bill (accessed 5 September 2019).

23 Christine Loh, Underground Front: The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2018, p. 204.

24 South China Morning Post, Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam meets Young People a Day after Unprecedented Violence as Police Vow to Match Force with Proportionate Response, 27 August 2019.

25 South China Morning Post, Chinese Army’s Hong Kong Garrison Releases Video Showing Anti-riot Drills, Featuring Tanks, 1 August 2019. https://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/3020985/chinese-armys-hong-kong-garrison-releases-video-showing-anti-riot-drills (accessed 5 September 2019).

26 Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report 2017, November 2018. https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp461.jsp?productCode=B9XX0005 (accessed 5 September 2019).

27 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Press Release, CE Announces withdrawal of Fugitive Offenders Bill among “Four Actions” to Help Society Move Forward, 4 September 2019.

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    Martin Purbrick

    Martin Purbrick has lived and worked in Asia for over 31 years. He is a former Royal Hong Kong Police officer whose service included Special Branch engaged in counter-terrorism intelligence. Since leaving the police in 2000, he has worked in the security industry for various corporations. He has written previously for the Asian Affairs Journal. Email:
     

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