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Abstract
The contemporary U.S.-Russian relationship is often characterized as a return to the worst tensions of the Cold War, with the accompanying prospect of global nuclear conflict. Yet although the danger of conflict is real, changes to the strategic environment call into question the wisdom of U.S. Cold War-era containment strategies. U.S. strategy toward Russia must account for a rising China, increased asymmetry between U.S. and Russia in both capabilities and demographic potential, and increased Russian reliance on China and the EU for economic viability. In this light, the U.S. should reevaluate vital interests within countries bordering Russia, and carefully craft a sustainable long-term sanctions regime which is likely to moderate–rather than exacerbate–Russia’s assertive foreign policy.
Notes
1 Russian attempts to influence the U.S. and French elections have been very well-documented, as have long-standing interference by both sides in Ukrainian elections. See: https://www.lawfareblog.com/want-know-whats-next-russian-election-interference-pay-attention-ukraines-elections
2 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy both identify Russia as a primary U.S. competitor and a “revisionist” power.
3 Stephen J. Blank, Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 51–52.
4 In Putin’s own words from his speech at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them.”
5 Vasquez downplays power transition theories and focuses on “the way in which states handle issues and interact with one another” as a primary cause of war. John A Vasquez, Whether and How Global Leadership Transitions Will Result in War: Some Long-Term Predictions from the Steps-to War Explanation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 133–4.
6 Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism,” International Relations, 25, no. 1 (2011): 3–25.
7 Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2016).
8 “Russia,” CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed May 11, 2019).
9 Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster “Russian Strategy Expansion crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 36, no. 1 (2017): 28, 36.
10 One very rough illustrative measure of the change in conventional power is sheer size. The USSR’s overall military strength was estimated at approx. 4.5 million in 1990; by 2017 Russia fielded a force of less than 1 million members, and it is uncertain if it has the resources to field that force for long.
11 Paul Sonne, “U.S. military intelligence steps up accusation against Russia over nuclear testing,” Washington Post, 13 June 2019.
12 Mark B. Schneider, “Russian nuclear “de-escalation” of future war,” Comparative Strategy, 37, no. 5 (2018): 362.
13 In 2017 Russia still led in oil production and trailed the United States in natural gas. As of 2018, the United States led in both categories. CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed May 11, 2019).
14 In all the cases listed above, Russia is able to operate from its own territory, and enlist support from Russian-speaking supporters in neighboring countries, and quickly escalate low-intensity conflicts horizontally (impacting multiple states at once). The United States must deploy capabilities from across the globe to counter Russian efforts, which is inherently unresponsive and unsustainable.
15 Russia can compete with NATO directly in multiple eastern European venues, employing a combination of asymmetric means (cyber attacks, oil/gas supply interruptions, political interference) to put pressure on former Warsaw Pact countries. Russia is also able to create energy and security dilemmas in the Black Sea, within Georgia, within central Asia (in areas bordering Afghanistan), and is suspected of working with Kim Jung Un to undermine international sanctions against DPRK.
16 Per Russia’s 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, ensuring “comprehensive, effective protection of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots residing abroad” is a key foreign policy objective. This objective, combined with Russia’s territorial contiguity with many former Soviet Union states, creates tremendous capability to influence political and security matters within these nations.
17 Andrei P Tsygankov, Russia and the West. From Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 273.
18 “Before the air raids [against Serbia] 57 percent of Russians were positively disposed toward the United States, with 28 percent hostile. The raids reversed those numbers to 14 percent positive and 72 percent negative. Sixty-three percent Russians blame NATO for unleashing the conflict, while only 6 percent blame Yugoslavia.” Victor Chernomyrdin, “NATO Must Stop Bombing, Start Talking,” The Washington Post, May 27, 1999.
19 Anne L. Clunan, “Redefining sovereignty: humanitarianism’s challenge to sovereign immunity,” in Negotiating sovereignty and human rights: actors and issues in contemporary human rights politics, eds. Nha Shawki and Michaelene Cox (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 7–26.
20 The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept also references promoting “the rule of international law, primarily the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations (the UN Charter), as well as equal, partnership relations among States, with the central and coordinating role played by the United Nations (UN) as the key organization in charge of regulating international relations” as a primary foreign policy objective.
21 Sumner Benson, “Can the United States and Russia reshape the international strategic environment?,” Comparative Strategy, 14, no. 3 (1995): 248.
22 Keith B. Payne and John S. Foster “Russian Strategy Expansion crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, 36:1 (2017).
23 Anne L. Clunan, “Russia’s Pursuit of Great Power Status and Security,” in Routledge Handbook of Russian Security Studies, ed. Roger Kanet (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 3–16.
24 Marcin Kaczmarski, “Convergence or divergence? Visions of a world order and the Russian-Chinese relationship,” European Politics and Society, 20, no. 2 (2019): 207–224.
25 The signing of the Treaty of Vladivostok in 2005 settled the last remaining border disputes, and was followed by mutual demilitarization of the border. Lowell Dittmer, China’s Asia (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 75.
26 Alexander Lukin, “The US-China trade war and China’s Strategic Future," Survival, 61, no. 1 (2019): 42.
27 Alexander Lukin, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 84–88.
28 Alexander Korolev, “How Closely aligned are China and Russia? Measuring strategic cooperation in IR,” International Politics, published online 09 May 2019.
29 On the Northern Supply Route, see Elizabeth Wishnick, China’s Interests and Goals in the Arctic: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2017), 3–10. For more on the Nord Stream 2 projects and diplomatic fallout, see: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/22/nord-stream-2-a-failed-test-for-eu-unity-and-trans-atlantic-coordination/.
30 The figure varies by year, dependent on production and market prices. For more information, see: https://www.russiamatters.org/node/11300
31 Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” International Security, 25, no. 2(2000): 28.
32 “Trade with Russia, Total Goods: EU Trade flows and balance, 2008-2018”, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_russia_en.pdf