1. R. S. Devine, Bush Versus the Environment (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2004).

2. A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “Anti-Reflexivity: The American Conservative Movement's Success in Undermining Climate Science and Policy,” Theory, Culture and Society 26 (2010): 100–33.

3. L. Saad and J. M. Jones, “U.S. Concern about Global Warming at Eight-Year High,” at http://www.gallup.com/poll/190010/concern-global-warming-eight-year-high.aspx?g_source=globalwarming&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles

4. D. L. Guber and C. I. Bosso, “‘High Hopes and Bitter Disappointment’: Public Discourse and the Limits of the Environmental Movement in Climate Change Politics” in N. J. Vig and M. E. Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy: New Directions for the 21st Century, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013), 55–56.

5. Ibid., page 56.

6. J. A. Layzer, Open for Business: Conservatives' Opposition to Environmental Regulation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

7. D. Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); E. Pooley, The Climate War New York: Hyperion, 2010); T. Skocpol, “Naming the Problem: What It Will Take to Counter Extremism and Engage Americans in the Fight Against Global Warming” (Cambridge, MA: Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 2012). On the impact of the recession on public concern about climate change see M. E. Kahn and M. J. Kotchen, “Business Cycle Effects on Concern about Climate Change: The Chilling Effect of Recession,” Climate Change Economics 2 (2011): 25773.

8. W. J. Miller, “One Nation … Indivisible? Polarization in America Today,” American Behavioral Scientist 66 (2012): 1607–611.

9. R. Draper, Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of Representatives (New York, NY: Free Press, 2012).

10. C. Hare and K. T. Poole, “The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics,” Polity 46 (2014): 411.

11. G. C. Jacobson, “The Electoral Origins of Polarized Politics,” American Behavioral Scientist 56 (2012): 1612–630; G. C. Jacobson, “Partisan Polarization in American Politics: A Background Paper,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43 (2013): 688–708.

12. Miller, note 8.

13. L. Mason, “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Position,” American Journal of Politics 59 (2015): 141.

14. Ibid., page 131.

15. A. I. Abramowitz and S. Webster, “The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century,” Electoral Studies 41 (2016): 14. For further evidence along these lines see Pew Research Center, Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2016).

16. Ibid., page 18.

17. T. E. Mann and N. J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse Than It Was (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2016); Jacobson, note 11, 2012 and 2013; Hare and Poole, note 10; Mason, note 13.

18. J. Mayer, Dark Money (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2016), Chap. 7. See Jacobson, 2012, note 11, on the impact of Tea Party sympathizers in Republican primaries in 2010; L. A. Bradberry and G. C. Jacobson, “The Tea Party and the 2012 Presidential Election,” Electoral Studies 40 (2015): 500–8, on the Tea Party's impact on the 2012 elections and current political stalemate; and V. Williamson, T. Skocpol, and J. Coggin, “The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism,” Perspectives on Politics 9 (2011): 25–43, on the Tea Party's role in pulling the Republican Party to the right.

19. T. Skocpol and A. Hertel-Fernandez, “The Koch Network and the Rightward Shift in U.S. Politics,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, 2016.

20. Layzer, note 6. Nonetheless, historically the Democratic Party has tended to be somewhat more pro-environmental in orientation. See R. E. Dunlap and M. P. Allen, “Partisan Difference on Environmental Issues: A Congressional Roll-Call Analysis,” Western Political Quarterly 49 (1976): 384–97.

21. See, e.g., Editorial Board, “G.O.P. Assault on Environmental Laws,” New York Times, June 8, 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/opinion/gop-assault-on-environmental-laws.html?_r=0; J. Plautz, “10 Environmental Regulations the Republican Congress Wants to Kill,” The Atlantic, February 5, 2015, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/10-environmental-regulations-the-republican-congress-wants-to-kill/452625; and R. Leber, “The Five Battlefronts in Republicans' War on the EPA,” New Republic, November 10, 2014, at https://newrepublic.com/article/120228/what-expect-gop-war-epa.

22. A. M. McCright, C. Xiao, and R. E. Dunlap, “Political Polarization on Support for Government Spending on Environmental Protection in the USA, 1974–2012,” Social Science Research 48 (2014): 251–60.

23. Thanks are due to Robert J. Brulle for providing LCV scores for the two parties through 2014. We computed the 2015 scores.

24. Mayer, note 18; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez, note 19.

25. A. Leiserowitz, E. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, and J. D. Hmielowski, Politics & Global Warming: Democrats, Republicans, Independents, and the Tea Party (New Haven, CT: Yale University and George Mason University, Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, 2011); and L. C. Hamilton and K. Saito, “A Four-Party View of US Environmental Concern,” Environmental Politics 24 (2015): 212–27.

26. Mayer, note 18. page 216.

27. Pooley, note 7; Mayer, note 18; Skocpol, note 7. For indicators of the resurgence of the denial campaign during the first two years of the Obama Administration see R. E. Dunlap and P. J. Jacques, “Climate Change Denial Books and Conservative Think Tanks: Exploring the Connection,” American Behavioral Scientist 57 (2013): 699–731; and S. W. Elsasser and R. E. Dunlap, “Leading Voices in the Denier Choir: Conservative Columnists' Dismissal of Global Warming and Denigration of Climate Science,” American Behavioral Scientist 57 (2013): 754–76.

28. See, e.g., G. S. Sargent, “They're Not Scientists,” New Republic, December 2015, 32–37; T. Germain, K. Ellingboe, and K. Kroh, “The Anti-Science Climate Denier Caucus: 114th Congress Edition,” Climate Progress, January 8, 2015, at https://newrepublic.com/article/123240/theyre-not-scientists; Editorial Board, “The Latest Attack on Climate Science,” New York Times, December 4, 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/opinion/the-latest-attack-on-climate-science.html.

29. R. E. Dunlap and A. M. McCright, “A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on Climate Change,” Environment 50 (September/October 2008): 26–35.

30. A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, “The Politicization of Climate Change: Political Polarization in the American Public's Views of Global Warming,” Sociological Quarterly 52 (2011): 155–94; D. L. Guber, “A Cooling Climate for Change? Party Polarization and the Politics of Global Warming,” American Behavioral Scientist 57 (2013): 93–115; L. C. Hamilton, J. Hartter, M. Lemcke-Stampone, D. W. Moore, and T. G. Safford, “Tracking Public Beliefs About Anthropogenic Climate Change,” PLoS ONE 10 (2015): e0138208, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138208; and A. Leiserowitz, E. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, G. Feinberg, and S. Rosenthal, Politics and Global Warming, Fall 2015 (New Haven, CT: Yale University and George Mason University, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2015).

31. Kahn and Kotchen, note 7.

32. Dunlap and Jacques, note 29; Elsasser and Dunlap, note 27. See A. Leiserowitz, E. W. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, N. Smith, and E. Dawson, “Climategate, Public Opinion and the Loss of Trust,” American Behavioral Scientist 57 (2013): 818–37, on the impact on public opinion of the denial campaign's ability to create a controversy over climate scientists' leaked e-mails.

33. R. J. Brulle, J. Carmichael, and J. C. Jenkins, “Shifting Public Opinion on Climate Change: An Empirical Assessment of Factors Influencing Concern over Climate Change in the U.S., 2002–2010,” Climatic Change 114 (2012): 169–88; and E. Maiabach, A. Leiserowitz, C. Roser-Renouf, T. Myers, S. Rosenthal, and G. Feinberg, The Francis Effect: How Pope Francis Changed the Conversation about Global Warming (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University and Yale University, George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication, 2015).

34. In the scientific realm, global warming refers to the overall pattern of increased warming of the earth's atmosphere over the past century and a half, while climate change refers to the changing climatic conditions that result from this warming. However, in the public and media spheres, the two are used interchangeably. Gallup continues to use global warming in order to enhance comparisons over time. In addition, results from Gallup's 2014 environment poll and an April 2014 tracking poll both indicate that the two terms elicit very similar responses overall and in terms of partisan differences. See R. E. Dunlap, “Global Warming or Climate Change: Is There a Difference?,” http://www.gallup.com/poll/168617/global-warming-climate-change-difference.aspx?g_source=dunlap&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles.

35. Each survey is based on telephone interviews with nationally representative samples of adults (age 18 years or older) in the United States. As is typical in most national surveys, the Gallup Organization employs weighting procedures on the sample data to ensure that the samples are representative of the U.S. adult population. Data weights were not employed here when performing bivariate or multivariate analyses, because weighting can lead to inflated standard errors and misleading tests of significance.

36. Gallup interviewers ask respondents a range of questions to ascertain their demographic, social, and political characteristics at the end of the telephone interviews. For political party identification, interviewers ask, “In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?” For those respondents who answer “Independent,” mention another party, or do not answer the question, interviewers ask a follow-up question, “As of today, do you lean more to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?,” and only those who do not choose remain Independents. For Figures 2–7, “Republican” and “lean to Republican” responses and “Democrat” and “lean to Democratic” responses are combined, and in subsequent statistical analyses party is coded into Republican, Independent, and Democrat. It is typical to treat “leaners” in this fashion, as they have been found to be strong partisans. See J. R. Petrocik, “Measuring Party Supporters: Leaners are Not Independents,” Electoral Studies 28 (2009): 562–72, and Abramowitz and Webster, note 15. We do not show the responses for the remaining “Independents” as they typically number less than 100 each year, and their percentages fluctuate considerably due to the small numbers of cases.

37. C. Bousallis and T. G. Coan, “Text-Mining the Signals of Climate Change Doubt,” Global Environmental Change 36 (2016): 89–100, and J. Farrell, “Corporate Funding and Ideological Polarization About Climate Change,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America) 113 (January 5, 2016): 92–97.

38. Gallup uses this question: “Which of the following statements reflects your view of when the effects of global warming will begin to happen—they have already begun to happen, they will start happening within a few years, they will start happening within your lifetime, they will not happen within your lifetime, but they will affect future generations, (or) they will never happen?” In the 2016 poll, the percentages giving these five responses (in the order in which they were asked) were 59, 5, 9, 17, and 10 percent, with 1 percent having “no opinion.”

39. Bousallis and Coan, note 37, and Farrell, note 37.

40. Gallup uses this question: “And from what you have heard or read, do you believe increases in the Earth's temperature over the last century are due more to—the effects of pollution from human activities OR natural changes in the environment that are not due to human activities?” In the 2016 poll, 65 percent gave the first response and 31 percent gave the second, with 4 percent having “no opinion.”

41. A. Seifter, D. Robbins, and K. Kalhoefer, “How Broadcast Networks Covered Climate Change in 2015,” Media Matters for America, March 7, 2016, at http://mediamatters.org/research/2016/03/07/study-how-broadcast-networks-covered-climate-ch/208881; and M. T. Boykoff, “Public Enemy No. 1? Understanding Media Representations of Outlier Views on Climate Change,” American Behavioral Scientist 57 (2013): 796–817.

42. Gallup uses this question: “Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is the seriousness of global warming generally exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally underestimated?” In the 2016 poll, the percentages giving these three responses were 34, 25, and 40 percent, respectively, with 2 percent having “no opinion.” This does not add to 100 percent due to rounding error.

43. Boykoff, note 41.

44. N. Oreskes and E. M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 2010); and R. E. Dunlap and A. M. McCright, “Challenging Climate Change: The Denial Countermovement,” in R. E. Dunlap and R. J. Brulle, eds., Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 300–32.

45. Gallup uses this question, “Just your impression, which one of the following statements do you think is most accurate—most scientists believe that global warming is occurring, most scientists believe that global warming is NOT occurring, or most scientists are unsure about whether global warming is occurring or not?” In the 2016 poll 65 percent choose the first option, 7 percent the second, and 25 percent the third, while 3 percent have “no opinion.”

46. In a similar vein, Leiswerowitz et al. find that only 16 percent of registered voters estimate that at least 90 percent of “climate scientists think that human-caused global warming is happening,” even though 90 percent is among the lower estimates from a variety of studies. See A. Leiserowitz, E. Maibach, C. Roser-Renouf, G. Feinberg, and S. Rosenthal, Politics and Global Warming, Spring 2016 (New Haven, CT: Yale University and George Mason University, Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, 2016). Also see J. Cook et al., “Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming,” Environmental Research Letters 11 (2016): 048002.

47. Gallup uses this question: “Do you think that global warming will pose a serious threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime?” In the 2016 poll, 41 percent responded “yes,” 57 percent responded “no,” and 2 percent had “no opinion.” It should be noted that in 1997 only half of the sample was given this question.

48. Gallup uses this question: “I'm going to read you a list of environmental problems. As I read each one, please tell me if you personally worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or not at all. First, how much do you personally worry about … (Global Warming or Climate Change)?” In the 2016 poll, the percentages giving these responses were 37, 27, 17, and 19, respectively. Gallup shifted from using “global warming” to “global warming or climate change” in 2015.

49. To compute Pearson correlation coefficients, party identification is treated as (1) Republican, (2) Independent, and (3) Democrat, while the responses to the six global warming items are coded from low to high, with the categories shown in the respective figures treated as the high scores except for saying global warming is generally exaggerated in the news, which is coded as low.

50. In 2008 we reported (in Table 2) the results of regression models controlling for the effects of sex, age, race, income, and education, noting that the resulting standardized regression coefficients for the effects of party on global warming views were negligibly affected. We ran similar models for 2016, which we do not report here in the interest of space, and again the effects of party on global warming views were negligibly affected by controlling for these social and demographic variables.

51. Mason, 2015, note 13; and Jacobson, 2012, note 11.

52. McCright and Dunlap, note 30; and Guber, note 30.

53. Oreskes and Conway, note 44; Layzer, note 6; and Dunlap and McCright, note 44.

54. Dunlap and McCright, note 44; McCright and Dunlap, note 30; and Oreskes and Conway, note 44.

55. D. L. Levy, “It's the Real Thing: The Power of Koch,” Climate Inc., September 8, 2010, at http://climateinc.org/2010/09/koch_climate/

56. Jacobson, 2012, note 11, page 1620.

57. Gallup asks respondents to describe their “political views” as “very conservative, conservative, middle of the road, liberal or very liberal.” We classified Republicans (including leaners) who choose very conservative or conservative as “conservative Republicans” and Democrats (including learners) who choose very liberal or liberal as “liberal Democrats.”

58. A. Leiserowitz et al., note 45, similarly report large differences among conservative Republicans, moderate/liberal Republicans, moderate/conservative Democrats, and liberal Democrats.

59. Jacobson, 2012, note 11; and Mason, note 13.

60. S. C. Moser and L. Dilling, L., “Making Climate Hot: Communicating the Urgency and Challenge of Global Climate Change,” Environment 46 (2004): 32–46; and M. C. Nisbet, “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter to Public Engagement,” Environment 51 (2009): 514–18.

61. 61. R. Gifford and L. A. Comeau, “Message Framing Influences Perceived Climate Change Competence, Engagement, and Behavioral Intentions,” Global Environmental Change 21 (2011): 1301–7; and T. A. Myers, M C. Nisbet, E. W. Maibach, and A. Leiserowitz, “A Public Health Frame Arouses Hopeful Emotions about Climate Change,” Climatic Change 113 (2012): 1105–12.

62. A. M. McCright, M. Charters, K. Dentzman, and T. Dietz, “Examining the Effectiveness of Climate Change Frames in the Face of a Denialist Counter-Frame,” Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (2016): 76–97.

63. P. S. Hart and E. C. Nisbet, “Boomerang Effects in Science Communication: How Motivated Reasoning and Identity Cues Amplify Opinion Polarization about Climate Mitigation Policies,” Communication Research 39 (2012): 701–23; and J. Zhou, “Boomerangs Versus Javelins: How Polarization Constrains Communication on Climate Change,” Environmental Politics 25 (2016): 788–811.

64. G. Goebbert, H. C. Jenkins-Smith, K. Klockow, M. Nowlin, and C. Silva, “Weather, Climate, and Worldviews: The Sources and Consequences of Changes in Local Weather Patterns,” Weather, Climate, & Society 4 (2012): 132–44.

65. B. Kvaløy, H. Finseraas, H. and O. Listhaug, “The Publics' Concern for Global Warming: A Cross-National Study of 47 Countries,” Journal of Peace Research 49 (2012): 11–22.

66. S. D. Brody, S. Zahran, A. Vedlitz, A. and H. Grover, “Examining the Relationship Between Physical Vulnerability and Public Perceptions of Global Climate Change in the United States,” Environment & Behavior 41 (2008): 72–95.

67. L. C. Hamilton and B. D. Keim, “Regional Variation in Perceptions about Climate Change,” International Journal of Climatology 29 (2009): 2348–52.

68. P. J. Egan, and M. Mullin, “Turning Personal Experience into Political Attitudes: The Effect of Local Weather on Americans' Perceptions about Global Warming,” Journal of Politics 74 (2012): 796–809.

69. S. T. Marquart-Pyatt, A. M. McCright, T. Dietz, and R. E. Dunlap, “Political Orientation Eclipses Climate Extremes for Climate Change Perceptions,” Global Environmental Change 29 (2014): 246–57.

70. L. Hamilton, and M. Stampone, “‘Blowin’ in the Wind: Short-Term Weather and Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change,” Weather, Climate, & Society 5 (2013): 112–19; and Egan and Mullin, note 67, 2012.

71. P. S. Hart and E. C. Nisbet, note 62; D. M. Kahan, H. Jenkins-Smith, and D. Braman, “Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus,” Journal of Risk Research 14 (2011): 147–74; and X. Zhao, “Media Use and Global Warming Perceptions: A Snapshot of the Reinforcing Spirals,” Communication Research 36 (2009): 698–723.

72. McCright and Dunlap, note 30; and L. C. Hamilton, “Education, Politics, and Opinions About Climate Change: Evidence for Interaction Effects. Climatic Change 104 (2011): 231–42.

73. Dunlap and McCright, note 29; and A. M. McCright, “Political Orientation Moderates Americans' Beliefs and Concern about Climate Change,” Climatic Change 104 (2011): 243–53.

74. Gallup uses this question: “Thinking about the issue of global warming, how well do you feel you understand this issue? Would you say very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all?” It was not used in 2009, and thus Figure 9 compares 2001–2008 with 2010–2016. The percentages responding “very well” or “fairly well” have gradually risen from 61 percent in 1997 to 80 percent in 2008 and stayed at 79 percent in 2016. The percentages reporting “very well” or “fairly well” for Republicans increased from 67 percent in 1997 to 79 percent in 2008 and remained stable at 79 percent for 2016, while for Democrats the increase has been from 56 percent to 80 percent and then 79 percent during those years.

75. We see the same patterns with the other three climate change beliefs items. Given space limitations, however, we do not present them here.

76. Dunlap and McCright, note 29, page 33.

77. Dunlap and McCright, note 29, p. 34.

78. M. Hertsgaard, “Exxon and the Climate Fight After Paris,” The Nation 302 (February 2016), page 19.

79. See, e.g., N. Buxton, “COP 21 Charades: Spin, Lies and Real Hope in Paris,” Globalizations, doi:10.1080/14747731.2016.1161936; and C. L. Spash, “This Changes Nothing: The Paris Agreement to Ignore Reality,” Globalizations, doi:10.1080/14747731.2016.1161119. For an optimistic assessment see D. King, “Biggest Opportunity of Our Age,” Science 351 (January 8, 201): 107; and for a cautiously optimistic one see P. Christoff, “The Promissory Note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement,” Environmental Politics 25 (2016): 765–87.

80. S. Goldenberg, “How US Negotiators Ensured Landmark Paris Climate Agreement was Republican-Proof,” The Guardian, December 13, 2015, at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/13/climate-change-paris-deal-cop21-obama-administration-congress-republicans-environment.

81. See, e.g., Sargent, note 28; A. Parker and C. Davenport, “Donald Trump's Energy Plan: More Fossil Fuels and Fewer Rules,” New York Times, May 26, 2016, at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/us/politics/donald-trump-global-warming-energy-policy.html; and J. Redman, “Trump's Climate Change Denial Is Already Complicating the Paris Climate Deal,” Huffington Post, May 27, 2016, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/janet-redman/trumps-climate-change-denial-complicating-paris-deal_b_10151148.html.

82. Hare and Poole, note 10, page 472.

83. Jacobson, 2013, note 11.

84. S. Kull, Considering the Cost of Clean: Americans on Energy, Air Quality and Climate (College Park, MD: Program for Public Consultation, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, 2016); and A. Leiserowitz et al., note 45.

85. Mason, note 13, page 141; also see Jacobson, 2013, note 11.

86. See, e.g., C. Moser and M. Lee-Ashley, “The Fossil-Fuel Industry Spent Big to Set the Anti-Environment Agenda of the Next Congress,” Center for American Progress, December 22, 2014, at https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/12/22/103667/the-fossil-fuel-industry-spent-big-to-set-the-anti-environment-agenda-of-the-next-congress; and E. Pilkington, “Republican Hopefuls Receive $62m in Support from Donors with Fossil Fuel Ties,” The Guardian, August 12, 2015, at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/12/republican-candidates-fossil-fuels-donors-super-pacs.

87. The Democratic National Committee's preliminary 2016 platform is only moderately strong on climate change, disappointing activists like Bill McKibben (a member of the platform committee) but vastly better than how the issue will fare in this year's Republican platform. See Eric Wolf, “Climate Hawks Wing Some, Lose Some in Dem Platform Fight,” Politico, June 27, 2016, at http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-energy/2016/06/climate-hawks-win-some-lose-some-in-dem-platform-fight-215038.