1. Stephen Walt has been one of the more outspoken advocates of “self-restraint” in US foreign policy, as well as of offshore balancing. See, for instance, Stephen M. Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance’: Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 141–152. Walt offered a full-throated endorsement of offshore balancing in a 2011 address at the Naval War College. See “Keynote Address: Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University,” US Naval War College Web site, June 8, 2011. Available at http://www.usnwc.edu/Events/Current-Strategy-Forum/Current-Strategy-Forum-2011/CSF-2011-Video.aspx See also Stephen M. Walt, “The End of the American Era,” The National Interest No. 116 (November/December 2011), pp. 6–17.

2. Halford Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 21, No. 4 (July 1943), p. 602.

3. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010), p. xi.

4. Michael Auslin, Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, December 2010), p. 7.

5. George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 134–135.

6. US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower,” October 2007. Available at US Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf

7. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 80, No. 5 (September/October 2001), p. 46. Mearsheimer expands his analysis to book length in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

8. See, for example, Doug Bandow, “How Many Enemies, How Much Military Spending?” Huffington Post, August 18, 2009. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/how-many-enemies-how-much_b_262509.html

9. For the conference agenda, see “China's Strategy for the Near Seas,” May 10–11, 2011. Available at US Naval War College Web site, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/c4b75950-2fcb-436a-8df5-4a55d8a326a2/CMSI-Sixth-Annual-Conf_May2011_draft8

10. John Ikenberry and Stephen M. Watt “Offshore Balancing or International Institutions? The Way Forward for US Foreign Policy,” Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. 14, No. 1 (Fall 2007), p. 14.

11. Josef Joffe also identified British and Bismarckian German precedents for offshore balancing and presented these as templates for 21st-century US grand strategy. Josef Joffe, Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 127–157.

12. Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier,” p. 46.

13. Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategy for America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 172.

14. Robert J. Art, “The Strategy of Selective Engagement,” in Kenneth Waltz and Robert J. Art, eds., The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 6th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 317.

15. Art, “Strategy of Selective Engagement,” p. 317.

16. Mearsheimer, “Future of the American Pacifier,” p. 60.

17. Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, ed. Helen R. Nicholl, intro. Frederick Sherwood Dunn (New York: Horcourt, Brace, 1944). pp. 45–61.

18. Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” International Security Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86–124; Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Christopher Layne, “America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing Has Arrived,” Review of International Studies Vol. 35 (2009), pp. 5–35. Layne and other offshore-balancing advocates recently restated their views at a conference convened by the Center for Naval Analyses. See Michael Gerson and Alison Lawler Russell, American Grand Strategy and Seapower (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, November 2011). Available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/American%20Grand%20Strategy%20and%20Seapower%202011%20Conference%20Report%20CNA.pdf

19. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” p. 124. See also Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, “Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5–48. Stephen C. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth cover this debate in World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 15–16.

20. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” p. 112.

21. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” pp. 117–118.

22. It would also pull out of the Middle East, renounce Taiwan, court Russia as a “geostrategic linchpin,” and allow Asian powers to balance against China. Layne, Peace of Illusions, pp. 187–189.

23. Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 279.

24. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” pp. 87, 94, 97–109, 111, 112, 116.

25. US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st-Century Seapower.”

26. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; repr., New York: Dover, 1987), p. 71.

27. Art, “Strategy of Selective Engagement,” pp. 317–318.

28. Bradley A. Fiske, The Navy as a Fighting Machine, intro. Wayne P. Hughes Jr. (1916; repr., Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 268.

29. Fiske, Navy as a Fighting Machine, p. 269.

30. This is a reasonable reading of Layne's views on the timing of US balancing strategy. For instance, he commends US actions in 1939–41 as an example of offshore balancing while suggesting that the United States could have abstained from direct involvement in World War II altogether. Even outright German conquest of Eurasia would not have posed a mortal threat. This suggests that he would be willing to let conditions degenerate into open war – indeed, to near-defeat for friendly Eurasian powers – before actually siding with them against an aspiring hegemon. Layne, Peace of Illusions, pp. 184–185.

31. Layne, Peace of Illusions, pp. 161–163.

32. George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796, in Washington: Writings ed. John Rhodehamel (New York: Library of America, 1997), p. 974.

33. Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” March 4, 1801, in Jefferson: Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), p. 494.

34. John Quincy Adams, “Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy,” July 4, 1821. Available at Miller Center Web site, http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3484

35. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), chaps. 5 and 6; Serge Ricard, “Theodore Roosevelt: Principles and Practice of a Foreign Policy,” Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal Vol. 18 (Fall/Winter 1992), pp. 2–6.

36. Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, ed. Helen R. Nicholl, intro. Frederick Sherwood Dunn (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

37. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 457.

38. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 19, 22, 33, 60.

39. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 19, 22, 33, 60.

40. Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “A New Grand Strategy,” The Atlantic, January 2002. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2002/01/schwarzlayne.htm

41. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, p. 38.

42. Spykman, Geography of the Peace, pp. 24–25.

43. US Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China,” 2010, p. 32. Available at US Defense Department Web site, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf

44. Layne, Peace of Illusions, pp. 189–190.

45. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans., intro. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 129, 212. Death ground connotes life-or-death circumstances – peril so dire that national leaders will do almost anything to survive.

46. “Keynote Address: Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University.”

47. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 138.

48. Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” p. 113.

49. See, for instance, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010). Available at http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2010.02.19-Why-AirSea-Battle.pdf

50. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 76.

51. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 80, No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 483–493.

52. “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at University of Chicago Conf on Terrorism & Strategy, October 12, 2010.” Available at US Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/101012-UofChicagoremarks%20FINAL.doc

53. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” pp. 483–493.

54. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), pp. 132–136.

55. Fiske, Navy as a Fighting Machine, p. 272.

56. Fiske, Navy as a Fighting Machine, pp. 272–273.

57. Daniel Whiteneck, Michael Price, Neil Jenkins, and Peter Swartz, The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, March 2010), esp. pp. 4–17, 33–36. Available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf

58. Whiteneck et al., The Navy at a Tipping Point, p. 36.

59. Mahan's “broad formula” is that a fleet “must be great enough to take the sea, and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it … .” Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), p. 198.

60. N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 327.

61. Winston Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. 3, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948–53), p. 265.

62. Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future p. 177.

63. Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, pp. 180–181.

64. Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, p. 193.

65. For instance, Pakistan recently implored China to construct a naval base at its port of Gwadar. If Islamabad is ready to grant access to Chinese warships, it would hardly refuse access to missiles meant to protect the port. US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, pp. 30–32; Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,” Financial Times, May 22, 2011. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html

66. See Mark Stokes and Tiffany Ma, “Second Artillery Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Brigade Facilities under Construction in Guangdong?” Asia Eye, Project 2049, August 3, 2010.

67. For a more complete assessment of the operational dynamics involved, see James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Mahan's ‘Active Defense’ Is Turning Offensive,” Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 137, No. 4 (April 2011), pp. 24–29.

68. Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 22, 2011), pp. 8–14. Available at Federation of American Scientists Web site, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

69. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 131, 134.

70. “Keynote Address: Stephen M. Walt, Harvard University.”

71. For a capsule summary, see “World-Wide Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines.” Available at GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ssn.htm See also “World-Wide Conventional Submarines – 2010.” Available at GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ss.htm

72. Although it is not an iron law of naval operations, a US Navy thumb rule holds that three hulls are needed to keep one at sea and fully combat ready: One is on deployment, another is working up for deployment through exercises and periodic maintenance, and the last is in extended shipyard overhaul and completely unavailable. Consequently, commanders can count on no more than two-thirds of the navy's full strength – and usually less.

73. China's PLA Navy conducted sea trials for its first carrier, the retired Soviet flattop Varyag, in August 2011. Estimates of the final Chinese carrier fleet range from two to four indigenously built ships. The Varyag will likely remain a training vessel, so we chose the top-end figure of three and sized the US carrier contingent accordingly. (So long as the PLA Navy limits operations to maritime Asia, holding down the wear and tear on its ships, it may be able to improve on the US Navy's three-to-one ratio, keeping two or even three of four PLA Navy carriers ready for immediate service.) With their bigger air wings, US CVNs will remain more than a match for their Chinese counterparts on a one-to-one basis for the foreseeable future. Consequently, a three-carrier US task force would enjoy considerable superiority over a three-carrier Chinese force.

74. Eleven of these would be big-deck amphibious helicopter carriers (LHA or LHD), with the remainder divided between smaller amphibious platform dock (LPD) and dock landing ship (LSD) hulls. Most ESGs are composed of an LHA or LHD, an LPD, and LSD, and assorted escort ships. Juan Ortiz, “Amphibious Ship Programs”. Available at Headquarters Marine Corps Web site, http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/i&L/v2/LP/LPD/LPD.../PPO%20Brief.ppt See also “Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on H.R. 1540,” 112th Cong., 1st Sess., May 17, 2011, p. 36. Available at http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7cb6f96d-b253-4ee4-aec1-9f342b8374b3

75. “UNITAS.” Available at Global Security.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/unitas.htm

76. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; repr., Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 131–132.

77. See, for instance, “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 16, 2011.” Available at US Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/110316%20SAC-D.pdf See also “Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Gary Roughead HAC-D Oral Statement, March 9, 2011.” Available at US Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/110309-HAC-D%20opening%20remarks.pdf We were present during a 2011 address at the Naval War College when he offered similar commentary.

78. Jonathan Greenert, “Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee on the Future of the Military Services and Consequences of Defense Sequestration, 2 November 2011.” Available at US House Web site, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=57509469-d31e-48ac-9c95-0c4c2be42da0

79. For some of Pape's specific strategic recommendations, see Robert Pape and Jenna Jordan, “How the US Can Finish Off al-Qaeda,” Atlantic, May 4, 2011. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/how-the-us-can-finish-off-alqaeda/238312 See also Robert Pape, “To Beat the Taliban, Fight from Afar,” New York Times, October 15, 2009; Robert Pape, “We Can Watch Iraq from the Sea,” New York Times, December 10, 2006.

80. “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at University of Chicago Conf on Terrorism & Strategy, October 12, 2010.”

81. “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at University of Chicago Conf on Terrorism & Strategy, October 12, 2010.”

82. Robert A. Pape, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).

83. “21st Century Seapower and America's Global Interests,” Delex Systems Inc. Current Issues Brief No. 18, November 17, 2010. Available at http://www.delex.com/pub/cib/Current%20Issues%20Brief%2018-ADM%20Roughead%20at%20the%20Hudson%20Institute.pdf See also “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., 16 November 2010.” Available at US Navy Web site, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Roughead/Speech/Hudson%20Institute_11_18_2010_9_31_18.pdf

84. “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at University of Chicago Conf on Terrorism & Strategy, October 12, 2010.”

85. “Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead Delivers Remarks at University of Chicago Conf on Terrorism & Strategy, October 12, 2010.”

86. Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2010), pp. 2–11.

87. “Fleet Size,” August 10, 2011. Available at Naval Vessel Register Web site, http://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvrships/FLEET.HTM

88. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 82–117.

89. See, for instance, Rory Medcalf and Andrew Shearer, “PM Faces Challenge of Deeper Alliance,” The Australian, March 7, 2011. Available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/pm-faces-challenge-of-deeper-alliance/story-e6frg6so-1226016729247