1. Imperial Russia was ruled by a Tsar before the rise of Lenin's communists.

1. Early Soviet communists.

1. The first of the four orthodox Sunni schools of law. It is distinguished from the other schools through its placing less reliance on mass oral traditions as a source of legal knowledge. The Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence was founded by Abu Hanifa, one of the earliest Muslim scholar-interpreters, to seek new ways of applying Islamic tenets to everyday life. He died in Iraq in AD 767. Abu Hanifa's interpretation of Muslim law was extremely tolerant of differences within Muslim communities. He also separated belief from practice, elevating belief over practice.

1. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 26.

1. Community of legal scholars of Islam.

1. Islamic law.

1. Pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. One of the five pillars that has to be done once in a lifetime unlike the other pillars that are done daily, weekly or annually. It takes place in the month dhul-hijjah, which is the twelfth month of the Muslim calendar. The definition of the word Hajj is ‘to set out with definite purpose’. This ‘definite purpose’ is to fulfill their duty to God.

1. In February of 1917 the revolutionary events in Russia's capital, Petrograd (now St Petersburg), were quickly repeated in Tashkent, where the Tsarist administration of the governor general was overthrown. In its place, a dual system was established, combining a provisional government with direct Soviet power and completely excluding the native Muslim population from power. Indigenous leaders, including some of the Jadids, attempted to set up an autonomous government in the city of Kokand in the Ferghana Valley, but this attempt was quickly crushed. Following the suppression of autonomy in Kokand, some Jadids and other loosely connected factions began what was called the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule, which by 1922 had survived the civil war and was asserting greater power over most of Central Asia. For more than a decade, Basmachi guerrilla fighters fiercely resisted the establishment of Soviet rule in parts of Central Asia.

1. ‘Holy warriors’ (Arabic). Initially used to mean US and Pakistani-trained Afghan rebels who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1987.

1. The name was a derogatory Slavic term used by Russian Bolsheviks that the fighters did not apply to themselves.

1. Great Britain was afraid of the spread of Bolshevism/Communism throughout Europe.

1. Former Tsarist armed forces, who after the Tsar's abdication on 15 March 1917, first served the Provisional governments in Russia and later on continued to serve some of the former Tsarist officers in their British-supported struggle for power against the Bolsheviks and the new Soviet state. In contrast, Bolshevik armed forces were called ‘Red Army’.

1. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, op. cit., p. 35.

1. The Basmachi revolt eventually was crushed as the civil war in Russia ended and the communists drew away large portions of the Central Asian population with promises of local political autonomy and the potential economic autonomy of Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy. The remainder of the Basmachis fled the Soviet Central Asia to neighboring Muslim Northern Afghanistan which was out of the Soviet reach.

1. ‘… In the spring of 1926 a congress of Turcologists assembled in Baku, under Soviet auspices. One of the decisions was to introduce the Latin in place of the Arabic script in the Turkic languages of the Soviet Union, and in the following years a number of varying Latin scripts were introduced in Central Asia. One aim of this Soviet policy of Romanization was to reduce the influence of Islam; another was no doubt to cut off contact between the Turks of the Soviet Union and those of Turkey, who were still using the Arabic script. The contrary consideration is—that of maintaining contact between the different Turkic peoples—induced some Turkish nationalists to favor the adoption of the Latin script in Turkey. When, eventually, this was done, the Russian countered again by abolishing the Latin script and introducing the Cyrillic, thus reopening the gap between the Soviet Turks and Turkey …’ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 432.

1. The Spiritual Board of Central Asian and Kazakhstan Muslims (SADUM, 1943–1991) concentrated on shaping the ‘loyalist attitudes’ of the faithful, serving the population with regard to holding religious rites and ceremonies. The Board's inconsistent and conformist position began to be criticized by unofficial spiritual leaders. First to come under their fire were religious rites in which representatives of the Board used to take part. Unofficial Muslim clerks not happy with the subjects taken up by priests (readings from the Qur'an, sermons on neutral topics instead of discussing burning issues), the low standard of the imams' knowledge, their remoteness from the people, etc. At this time unofficial authorities began to emerge.

1. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, op. cit., p. 39.

1. Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, New York University Press, 2000, pp. 151–153.

1. Dushman means ‘enemy’ in Uzbek and was widely used to refer to the Afghan Mujaheddin. The latter was never used in the Soviet Union.

1. Walter Ruby, “Islam vs. Islam in Uzbekistan”, The Jerusalem Post, 1 December 1991 (accessed December 2003); available online at: Lexis-Nexis.

1. Andrey Grozin, Islamic Extremism and Its Prospects in the Central Asian Region, Russian Institute of Diaspora and Integration, 25 December 2000 (accessed April 2003); available online at: <http://www.uzland.info/2000/december/12_26.htm#terrorism>.

1. “Will Uzbekistan Copy the Scenario of the Iranian Revolution?”, Russian Vremya PO (Povtorit li Uzbekistan scenariy iranskoy revolyucii?), 16 October 2000 (accessed October 2003); available online at: <http://www.uzland.info/2000/special38.htm>.

1. Mikhail Falkov, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): History, Financial Base and Military Structure”, Moscow's Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Islamskoe Dvijenie Uzbekistana (IDU): Istoriya, finansovoya baza i voennaya struktura), Online version in Russian, 24 August 2000 (accessed October 2003); available online at <http://www.ng.ru/net/2000-08-24/0_idu.html>.

1. Ibid.

1. Turkish Miliy Gurush (National Outlook) organization based in Cologne, set up by Turkey's former Prime Minister Erbakan, gave away hundreds of thousands of dollars to the IMU, with Erbakan's consent, to buy arms through Milliy Gurush Secretary Muhammad Kuchak on condition that the IMU would become subordinated to Milliy Gurush and only Erbakan can specify a precise time when the jihad against Uzbekistan would begin. Leading Turkish company Ulker, controlled by Milliy Gurush, generates $1.5 billion in profits annually. Bakhram Tursunov, “Extremism in Uzbekistan”, Conflict Studies Research Centre, British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, July 2002 (accessed October 2003); available online at: <http://www.csrc.ac.uk/pdfs/K37-hpz.pdf>.

1. One of the alleged organizers of those terrorist attacks, a leading IMU member, Zayniddin Askarov, was sentenced to a ten-year imprisonment in 2000. However in November of 2004 he was allowed to meet with a group of journalists representing foreign media during which he said he was forced to give evidence against the IMU leaders, Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldash, as well as the exiled political opposition leader Muhammad Salih. In reality he said to the journalists, that the terrorist attack was carried out by one of the imams dissatisfied with Karimov's policy. It is still unknown what motivated Askarov to make this confession to the journalists. Why did the prison administration allow him to meet with the journalists? Why didn't the Uzbek security service censor or tap what Askarov told them? Was it some kind of a game within the security apparatus or a move against the president himself ?

1. International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Uzbekistan, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State, 7 October 2002 (accessed October 2003); available online at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13990.htm>.

1. By the end of 2004 Russia pulled out its border guards from the 881, 6 km-long Pamirs section of the Tajik-Afghan border leaving the security of the border of Tajikistan.

1. The Treaty on Collective Security was signed on 15 May 1992 in Tashkent by presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan.

1. Interview with an Uzbek intelligence official in 2002.

1. There are about three million ethnic Uzbeks living in the Middle East and South-West Asia. Of them, two million live in Afghanistan and 700 thousand live in Saudi Arabia. “Military and Political Conflicts in Central Asia”, Center for Foreign Policy and Analysis, Kazakhstan, 2000 (accessed April 2003); available online at: <http://www.cvi.kz/text/Experts/Kozhikhov_pub/Konflikt_Central_Asia.htm>.

1. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, op.cit., p. 141.

1. Ibid, pp. 140, 154.

1. Interview with an Uzbek intelligence official in 2002. (IIRW was established in London in 1984. Today it has a large network of branches around the world.)

1. Uzbekistan has been the only country with the Muslim majority that has been consistent in its UN votes with the United States and/or Israel. (Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohammad. Remarks at the Opening of the Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference. Official website of the 10th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference. 16 October 2003 (accessed December 2003); Mahathir Mohammad's speech is available online at: <http://www.oicsummit2003.org.my/speech_03.php>.

1. Aleksei Malashenko, “Islam and Politics in Central Asian States”, Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, Journal of Central Asia and the Caucasus, (accessed October 2003); available online at: <http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/02.malash.shtml>.

1. Although initially the airbase was agreed to be provided on a temporary basis, in February of 2004 then-Uzbek Foreign Minister Sodiq Safaev said that Uzbekistan would allow the US to keep military forces there as long as needed for operations in Afghanistan, and would consider a permanent US outpost if the US government wanted one. Safaev said the Uzbek government would make a decision after the Pentagon completed its assessment of US military deployments. “Uzbek Foreign Minister Welcomes US Forces”, The Associated Press, 21 February 2004 (accessed December 2003); available online at Lexiz-Nexis.

1. Tom Malinowski and Acacia Shields, “Uzbekistan's Empty Promises”, The Washington Times, 12 March 2002 (accessed December 2003); available online at Lexiz-Nexis.

1. International Religious Freedom Report 2002: Uzbekistan, US Department of State, op. cit.

1. Ibid.

1. Aleksei Malashenko, “Islam and Politics”, op. cit.

1. John Bolender, “Uzbekistan and the US: Sometimes It Really is a War on Islam”, Z Magazine, 18 October 2003 (accessed December 2003); available online at: <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID = 40&ItemID = 4367>.

1. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 171.

1. There seems to have been disagreement already within the leadership of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir on tactics and at least two cases of fairly significant groups establishing separate political movements independent of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir leadership. In early 1997 a group in the Ferghana region of Uzbekistan led by Yu. Akramov left the main body after disputes with the local leadership; a further split in 1999 reportedly took place in the Tashkent branch when a fairly significant group set up its own party, called Hizb-an-Nusra (Party of Victory). ‘The IMU and the Hizb-Ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign', International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 11, p. 10 30 January 2002, (accessed March 2003); available online at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id = 1760&I%2B1>.

1. Ibid.

1. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad, op. cit., p. 9.

1. Olga Oliker and Thomas Szayna, eds., “Sources of Conflict and Paths to US Involvement”, in Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, : RAND Arroyo Center, 2003: Santa Monica, CA, USA, pp. 307–352. http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1598/MR1598.ch9.pdf.