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This article addresses a particular aspect of EU external governance: rule selection. Drawing on institutionalist and power-based explanations we put forward an account for the choice of the specific rules that guide policy convergence between the EU and third countries. The proposed analytical framework broadens the scope of the studies examining the externalization of EU rules beyond its borders, in that we claim that the EU can promote policy convergence using rules other than the EU's. More specifically, the EU also promotes policy convergence on the basis of international and bilaterally developed rules. These analytical claims for explaining rule selection are checked against empirical data. We compare policy convergence between the EU and four neighbouring countries (Morocco, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia) in three subfields within foreign and security policy: foreign policy dialogue, control of export of dual-use goods in the context of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and crisis management.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are indebted to the guest editors of this special issue, Frank Schimmelfennig and Sandra Lavenex, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The authors would also like to thank the participants of the workshop on the ‘EU's external governance’ held at the University of Luzern on 13 September 2008 as well as three anonymous referees. This article has also benefited from the research carried out within the project EUPROX – ‘Europeanization, Internationalization and Co-ordination in the Proximity of the European Union’ – funded by the R&D National Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (SEJ2006-03134/CPOL).
Notes
For a governance approach to the studies of the EU's security policy, see Kirchner (2006); and specifically for the EU's relations with the neighbourhood in the area of foreign and security policies, see Barbé (2008) and Smith and Webber (2007).
The reasons for this in the case of Ukraine had to do with the high costs for ‘Ukrainian national interests’ of EU stances on topics such as energy security (Uzbekistan), border management and the management of the Chernobyl disaster (Belarus), the peace-settlement process (Transnistria), arms trading (Burma), and general principles of foreign policy (Georgia). Interviews with Ukrainian diplomats, Brussels, 29 March 2007.
Interviews with Ukrainian diplomats, Brussels, 29 March 2007.
Morocco, as an active member of Group 77, voted differently from the EU unified positions in 24 out of 52 instances during the 58th session of the UN General Assembly (2003–2004). In comparison, Ukraine voted differently in nine cases and Georgia in four cases (the authors' own calculation from the voting records of the General Assembly).
For example, as many as 137 states (including Georgia, Morocco, Russia, and Ukraine) provided exhaustive reports about the activities undertaken in order to implement the resolution.
EU–Russia Outreach Project website: http://www.excon.eu-rf.ru/en/?did=5_89 (accessed 14 December 2008).
‘Foreign Policy Strategy 2006–2009’, pp. 9-10: http://www.mfa.gov.ge/files/115_1973_997704_Strategy_MFA2006-2009En.pdf (accessed 14 December 2008).