1. Peter Harling, (International Crisis Group Middle East Report, October 12, 2012), 10; and Ruth Sherlock, “Syria dispatch: from band of brothers to princes of war,” The Telegraph, November 30, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10485970/Syria-dispatch-from-band-of-brothers-to-princes-of-war.html.

2. By August 2015, authors discussed the irrelevance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, an organization with long institutional roots and at the forefront of the initial uprising. Raphael Lefevre, “Islamism within a civil war: The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's struggle for survival,” Working Paper (Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings, August, 2015).

3. Christopher Blanchard, Carla Humud, and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response,” CRS Report No. RL33487, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2015).

4. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was a nationally-oriented movement, distinct from the jihadi or more radical versions of Islamism that replaced its centrality. The latter have been characterized as takfiri Islamists, those who assert their ability to declare other Muslims apostates. While the focus of the SMB is the national political scene, jihadi or radical Islamists focus internationally generally. See Ibid. For simplicity, the supra-national Islamists in this conflict are labeled as extremists or radical Islamists, acknowledging the troublesome nature of those terms. On the change from nationalism to sectarianism, see Christopher Phillips, "Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria,” Third World Quarterly 36 (2) (2015): 357-376.

5. The focus is on Sunni opposition groups, not regime-supporting external patrons, concentrating on the main financial sponsors (Gulf countries and citizens) in order to compare effects on anti-Assad groups from the beginning of the civil war to mid 2015.

6. F. Gregory Gause, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2014).

7. Chris Zambelis, “Royal Rivalry in the Levant: Saudi Arabia and Qatar Duel over Syria,” Terrorism Monitor 11, n. 16 (August 2013): 10.

8. Daniel Byman, "Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36 (12) (2013): 981-1004.

9. See in this vein, Barbara F. Walter, “The New New Civil Wars.” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017): 469-486.

10. Cynthia J. Arnson, Arnson, Cynthia J. “The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate.” In Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Edited by I. William Zartman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

11. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford economic papers 56 (4) (2004): 563-595.

12. Jeremy M Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (4) (2005): 598-624.

13. Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons From Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict,” Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity (2003): 164.

14. Michael L Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence From Thirteen Cases,” International organization 58 (1) (2004): 35-67.

15. Philippe Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20 (5) (2001): 561-584.

16. Jeremy M Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (New York: Cambridge, 2007), 48; Weinstein, "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” 599.

17. Ballentine, Karen, and Heiko Nitzschke. “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons From Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict.” Security and Development: Investing in Peace and Prosperity (2003): 164; Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, "The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation,” (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin 2005).

18. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?”

19. Mats Berdal, "Beyond Greed and Grievance–and Not Too Soon,” Review of International Studies 31 (4) (2005): 687-698.

20. Hazen, Jennifer M. What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime (Cornell University Press, 2013).

21. R T Naylor, "The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of Guerrilla Organizations,” Crime, Law and Social Change 20 (1993): 13-51.

22. Byman, "Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.”

23. Berdal, "Beyond Greed and Grievance–and Not Too Soon.”

24. Hazel Smith and Paul B Stares, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers? (United Nations Publications, 2007).

25. Byman, "Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.”

26. Navin A Bapat and Kanisha D Bond, "Alliances Between Militant Groups,” British Journal of Political Science 42, (4) (2012): 793-824.

27. Nicholai Hart Lidow, Violent Order: Rebel Organization and Liberia's Civil War, Ph.D. Thesis, (Stanford University, 2011).

28. Milos Popovic, “Fragile Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2015): 1-21; Idean Salehyan, ”The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (3) (2010): 493-515.

29. Idean Salehyan, David Siroky and Reed M Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities,” International Organization 68 (3) (2014): 633-661.

30. Barbara F. Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War.” Journal of Peace Research 41 (3) (2004): 371-388.

31. Tamm, Henning, "Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 599-610.

32. Byman, “Outside Support for Insurgent Movements,” 987; Kyle Beardsley and Brian McQuinn, ”Rebel Groups As Predatory Organizations the Political Effects of the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4) (2009): 624-645; Ibrahim A Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars” (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2000); and Patrick M. Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

33. Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83; and Paul Bucala and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran's Evolving Way of War: How the IRGC Fights in Syria,” Critical Threats (The American Enterprise Institute), March 2016, 12-14, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/imce-imagesIrans_Evolving_Way_of_War_IRGC_in_Syria_FINAL-1.pdf.

34. Compare the billions in this war to other wars. For the Lebanese civil war, which attracted numerous wealthy backers, see Anne Marie Baylouny, “Born Violent: Armed Political Parties and Non-state Governance in Lebanon's Civil War.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25 (2) (2014): 334-5.

35. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “How to start a battalion (in five easy lessons),” London Review of Books 35, 4 (2013): 13-14.

36. Abdul-Ahad, “How to start a battalion.”

37. Ibid.

38. Malik Al-Abdeh, “Rebels, Inc.” Foreign Policy, November 21, 2013.

39. Ibid.

40. Jonsson, Michael. “Following the Money: Financing the Territorial Expansion of Islamist Insurgents in Syria.” Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI Memo 4947 (2014).

41. Byman, op. cit.

42. Abdul-Ahad, "How to Start a Battalion;” and Rania Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who Are the Saudis and the Qataris Arming?” Time, September 18, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/09/18/syrias-secular-and-islamist-rebelswho-are-the-saudis-and-the-qataris-arming/.

43. For specifics on the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and the regime's attempt to accommodate them, bringing back leaders, allowing their networks and activity in the decade before the Syrian uprising, see Line Khatib, Islamic Revivalism in Syria: The Rise and Fall of Ba'thist Secularism (Routledge, 2011).

44. Sherlock, “Syria dispatch: from band of brothers to princes of war;” Anne Barnard et al, “Disillusionment Grows Among Syrian Opposition as Fighting Drags On,” The New York Times, 11 November 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/world/middleeast/syria-war.html?_r=0; and Elizabeth Dickinson, Godfathers and thieves, Part One – Four: How the Syrian revolution was crowdfunded,” 14 September 2015, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-09-14-godfathers-and-thieves-part-one-how-the-syrian-revolution-was-crowdfunded/#.VxVGwZMrLRY.

45. Joby Warrick, “Private Donations Give Edge to Islamists in Syria, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, September 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-donations-give-edge-to-islamists-in-syria-officials-say/2013/09/21/a6c783d2-2207-11e3-a358-1144dee636dd_story.html.

46. Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding Smith, “Qatar Bankrolls Syrian Revolt with Cash and Arms,” Financial Times, May 16, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86e3f28e-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de.html#axzz3TfywwIzX.

47. Mariam Karouny, “Saudi Edges Qatar to Control Syrian Rebel Support,” Reuters, May 31, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/31/us-syria-crisis-saudi-insight-idUSBRE94U0ZV20130531.

48. Elizabeth Dickinson, Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syria's Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home ((Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2013), 3.

49. Ibid.

50. Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution,” Financial Times, May 17, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f2d9bbc8-bdbc-11e2-890a-00144feab7de.html.

51. Robert Baer, “Why Saudi Arabia is helping crush the Muslim Brotherhood,” The New Republic, August 26, 2013, https://newrepublic.com/article/114468/why-saudi-arabia-helping-crush-muslim-brotherhood.

52. Kevin Sullivan, “Saudis Line Up Against Syria's Assad,” The Independent, October 8, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudis-line-up-against-syrias-assad-8201837.html.

53. Eric Trager, “The Muslim Brotherhood is the root of the Qatar crisis,” The Atlantic, July 2, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/muslim-brotherhood-qatar/532380/; and Christa Case Bryant, “Behind Qatar's bet on the Muslim Brotherhood,” Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 2014, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0418/Behind-Qatar-s-bet-on-the-Muslim-Brotherhood.

54. Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels.”

55. Najah Ali, “Without Iran's support, Assad regime will collapse: report,” Al Arabiya, November 29, 2012, https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/11/29/252465.html; and Ruth Sherlock, “Iran boosts support to Syria,“ The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10654144/Iran-boosts-support-to-Syria.html.

56. “Syrian Council Wants Recognition as Voice of Opposition,” Reuters, October 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/10/us-syria-opposition-idUSTRE7993NF20111010.

57. “Guide to the Syrian Opposition,” BBC News, October 17, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15798218.

58. Hassan Hassan, “How the Muslim Brotherhood Hijacked Syria's Revolution,” Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/how-the-muslim-brotherhood-hijacked-syrias-revolution/.

59. Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels.”

60. Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

61. Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels.”

62. Ibid.

63. Chris Zambelis, “Royal Rivalry in the Levant,” op. cit.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Holliday, Joseph. Syria's Armed Opposition (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2012), 19, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/syrias-armed-opposition.

67. Aron Lund, Syrian Jihadism (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2012), 11, www.ui.se/upl/files/77409.pdf.

68. Lund, Syrian Jihadism, 11.

69. Joseph Holliday, Syria's Maturing Insurgency (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2012), 27–28, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/syrias-maturing-insurgency.

70. Ibid.

71. Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels.”

72. Zambelis, “Royal Rivalry in the Levant,” 10. Jabhat al-Nusra changed names several times. Often termed al-Nusra Front, mixing the English and Arabic, it became Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and later merged into Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. For simplicity, we maintained the name used during this time period in this article.

73. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Insight: Saudi Arabia Boosts Salafist Rivals to Al Qaeda in Syria,” Reuters, October 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/01/us-syria-crisis-jihadists-insight-idUSBRE9900RO20131001; and Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

74. Zambelis, “Royal Rivalry in the Levant,” 10; and Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

75. “Syrian Rebels Form New Islamic Front,” BBC News, November 22, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25053525.

76. See the discussion on Saudi's role in BBC News, “Is Saudi Arabia to blame for Islamic State?” 19 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35101612.

77. Robert F. Worth, “Saudis Back Syrian Rebels Despite Risks,” The New York Times, January 7, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/world/middleeast/saudis-back-syria-rebels-despite-a-lack-of-control.html; and Joby Warrick, “Private Money Pours into Syrian Conflict as Rich Donors Pick Sides,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/private-money-pours-into-syrian-conflict-as-rich-donors-pick-sides/2013/06/15/67841656-cf8a-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.

78. “Saudis Most Likely to Join ISIS, 10% of Group's Fighters Are Women,” Middle East Monitor, October 20, 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14758-saudis-most-likely-to-join-isis-10-of-groups-fighters-are-women.

79. Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group, June 2, 2014, 13, http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/.

80. Harling, Tentative Jihad, 29.

81. Nir Rosen, “Islamism and the Syrian Uprising,” Foreign Policy Blogs, March 8, 2012, http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/08/islamism_and_the_syrian_uprising; “The Charm of Telesalafism,” The Economist, October 20, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21564913-influential-rebel-preacher-who-needs-tone-things-down.

82. “The Charm of Telesalafism,” The Economist.

83. Harling op. cit.

84. Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

85. Abouzeid, “Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels.”

86. Ibid.

87. Lund, Syrian Jihadism,18-19; Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

88. Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

89. “The Story of Al-Tawhid Brigade: Fighting for Sharia,” Al-Monitor, October 22, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/10/syria-opposition-islamists-tawhid-brigade.html.

90. Ibid.

91. Khalaf and Fielding-Smith, “How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution.”

92. David Blair and Richard Spencer, “How Qatar Is Funding the Rise of Islamist Extremists,” The Telegraph, September 20, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/qatar/11110931/How-Qatar-is-funding-the-rise-of-Islamist-extremists.html.

93. Aaron Zelin and Charles Lister, “The Crowning of the Syrian Islamic Front.” Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/24/the-crowning-of-the-syrian-islamic-front/.

94. “The Story of Al-Tawhid Brigade,” Al-Monitor.

95. Ibid.

96. Mark Mazzetti, C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt, “Taking Outsize Role in Syria, Qatar Funnels Arms to Rebels,” The New York Times, June 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/world/middleeast/sending-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-qatar-muscles-in.html.

97. Ibid.

98. Mazzetti et al., “Taking Outsize Role in Syria.”

99. Karouny, “Saudi Edges Qatar to Control Syrian Rebel Support.”

100. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Saudi–‬Qatar Rivalry Divides Syrian Opposition,” Reuters, January 15, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/15/us-syria-crisis-qatar-idUSBREA0E1G720140115.

101. Karouny, “Saudi Edges Qatar to Control Syrian Rebel Support.”

102. Warrick, “Private Donations Give Edge to Islamists in Syria, Officials Say;” Blair and Spencer, “How Qatar Is Funding the Rise of Islamist Extremists;” and Amena Bakr, “Defying Allies, Qatar Unlikely to Abandon Favored Syria Rebels,” Reuters, March 20, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/20/us-syria-crisis-qatar-idUSBREA2J0WM20140320.

103. Frank Gardner, “Gulf ambassadors pulled from Qatar over ‘interference,’” Patrick Wintour, BBC News, March 5, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26447914; and “Gulf plunged into diplomatic crisis as countries cut ties with Qatar,” The Guardian, June 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism.

104. United States Department of the Treasury, “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen before the Center for a New American Security on ‘Confronting New Threats in Terrorist Financing,’” news release, March 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/jl2308.aspx.

105. Ibid.; and Elizabeth Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 8.

106. United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates al-Qaeda Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” news release, December 18, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2249.aspx.

107. Blair and Spencer, “How Qatar Is Funding the Rise of Islamist Extremists.” See also the report by David Andrew Weinberg, “Qatar and Terror Finance,” Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/qatar-and-terror-finance-part-1.

108. Thomas Hegghammer and Aaron Y. Zelin, “How Syria's Civil War Became a Holy Crusade,” Foreign Affairs, July 7, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139557/thomas-hegghammer-aaron-y-zelin/how-syrias-civil-war-became-a-holy-crusade. Qaradawi's audience is estimated in the tens of millions. See for example, “Sheikh Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi (#32),” The Muslim 500: The World's Most Influential Muslims, http://themuslim500.com/profile/sheikh-dr-yusuf-al-qaradawi.

109. Omar Fahmy, “Sunni Clerics Call for Jihad against Syria's Assad, Allies,” Reuters, June 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/13/us-syria-crisis-sunnis-jihad-idUSBRE95C16U20130613.

110. Zelin and Lister, “The Crowning of the Syrian Islamic Front.”

111. “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” (The Soufan Group, December 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

112. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 3.

113. United States Department of the Treasury, “Kuwaiti Charity Designated for Bankrolling al Qaida Network,” news release, June 13, 2008, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1023.aspx.

114. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 6.

115. Ibid., 22.

116. Ben Hubbard, “Private Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria,” The New York Times, November 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/middleeast/private-donors-funds-add-wild-card-to-war-in-syria.html.

117. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 5.

118. United States Department of the Treasury, “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen.”

119. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 19; and Warrick, “Private Donations Give Edge to Islamists in Syria, Officials Say.”

120. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 2.

121. Ibid., 12–13.

122. “Kuwait Umma Party Formed,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 26, 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/08/26/kuwait-umma-party-formed.

123. Warrick, “Private Donations Give Edge to Islamists in Syria, Officials Say.”

124. Aron Lund, Syria's Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front. (Stockholm: the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2013), 30, www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.

125. Suhaib Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria,” al Akhbar, March 21, 2014, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/unknown-role-kuwaits-salafis-syria.

126. Warrick, “Private Money Pours into Syrian Conflict as Rich Donors Pick Sides.”

127. Lund, Syria's Salafi Insurgents, 29; William McCants, “Gulf Charities and Syrian Sectarianism,” Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/30/gulf-charities-and-syrian-sectarianism/.

128. McCants, “Gulf Charities and Syrian Sectarianism.”

129. Joby Warrick, “Private Money Pours into Syrian Conflict as Rich Donors Pick Side.”

130. Miriam Berger, “Twitter Just Suspended Two Kuwaitis Accused By The U.S. Of Financing Terror In Syria,” BuzzFeed, August 7, 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/twitter-just-suspended-two-kuwaitis-accused-by-the-us-of-fin?utm_term=.uvDv1q7Yp#.jeE35PxK0.

131. Warrick, “Private Money Pours into Syrian Conflict as Rich Donors Pick Sides.”

132. Ibid.

133. Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

134. “Iraqi al-Qaeda and Syrian Group ‘Merge,’” al-Jazeera, April 9, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/201349194856244589.html.

135. Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

136. Warrick, “Private Donations Give Edge to Islamists in Syria, Officials Say.”

137. Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

138. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 10. Mutayri and al-Ajmi are common Kuwait names; there is no known close familial relationship between these actors with the same last names.

139. Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

140. Ibid.; and Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 14, 16.

141. United States Department of the Treasury, “Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen.”

142. Ibid.; and Sylvia Westall, “Kuwaiti Minister Accused by U.S. over Terrorism Funding Quits,” Reuters, 12 May 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/12/us-syria-crisis-kuwait-idUSBREA4B0AX20140512.

143. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 6.

144. Zolton Pall, Kuwaiti Salafism and its Growing Influence in the Levant (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 18.

145. Berger, “Twitter Just Suspended Two Kuwaitis.”

146. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 16.

147. Ibid., 16–17; and Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

148. Anjarini, “The Unknown Role of Kuwait's Salafis in Syria.”

149. United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Three Key Supporters of Terrorists in Syria and Iraq,” August 6, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx.

150. Dickinson, Playing with Fire, 9; and Hubbard, “Private Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.”

151. United States Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Three Key Supporters of Terrorists in Syria and Iraq.”

152. Ibid.

153. The financial story of the most sensational of Syria's opposition groups, the so-called Islamic State, contrasts sharply to the trajectory of those dependent on external resources.