1. M. Kent Jennings, “Political Responses to Pain and Loss,” American Political Science Review 93(1) (1999), p. 5.

2. Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

3. Hayley Watson, “Dependent Citizen Journalism and the Publicity of Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24(3) (2012), pp. 465–282.

4. Arjen Boin, Paul't Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

5. Kari Palonen, “Four Times of Politics: Policy, Polity, Politicking, and Politicization,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 28 (2003), pp. 171–186. Despite the fact that in common language politicking sometimes has a pejorative meaning, here it refers to styles and ways of conducting politics without any judgmental stance.

6. María José Canel and Karen Sanders, “Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks: Framing a Response to the 2004 Madrid Bombings and 2005 London Bombings,” in Timothy Coombs and Sherry Holladay, eds., The Handbook of Crisis Communication (West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), pp. 449–466; Narciso Michavila, “Guerra, terrorismo y elecciones: incidencia electoral de los atentados islamistas en Madrid,” Real Instituto Elcano Documento de trabajo 13 (2005); Jose Olmeda, “Fear or Falsehood? Framing the 3/11 Terrorist Attacks in Madrid and Electoral Accountability,” Real Instituto Elcano Working Paper 24 (2005); Teemu Sinkkonen, Political Responses to Terrorism: Case study on the Madrid terrorist attack on March 11, 2004, and its aftermath (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009).

7. According to the opinion poll conducted by the national broadcasting company TV2. Available at http://www.tv2.no/nyheter/politisk/stoltenbergeffekten-er-ikke-like-sterk-ved-kommunevalg-3814148.html, there was an increase in support for the prime minister's party after the attack, although it was not as pronounced at the local level as it was at the national level. This was also seen in the local elections that were held 42 days after the attack, on 12 September 2011 when the Arbeiderpartiet had a mere two per cent increase in votes compared to the local elections of 2007 (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation statistics available at http://www.nrk.no/valg2011/valgresultat/). This increase was so small and the chronological distance from the terrorist incident so long that no causal explanations can be drawn between the terrorist attack and the electoral success of the Labour Party. The Labour Party was the target of the terrorist attack, which can to some degree explain the increased support for it in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

8. For example, Roper Center, “Job Performance Ratings for President Bush.” Available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/roper/presidential/webroot/presidential_rating_detail.cfm?allRate=True&presidentName=Bush

9. The murder of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 was followed by a spiral of religion- and ethnicity-based political violence and vandalism in the Netherlands. See Jaap van Donselaar and Peter Rodrigues, “Developments Following the Murder of Theo van Gogh,” Racism and Extreme Right Monitor: Sixth Report (Leiden/Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting, and Leiden University, 2004).

10. Peter Bouckaert, “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004,” Human Rights Watch 16(6) (2004).

11. There was also a violent backlash after the Paris shooting on 7 January 2015. For example, The Telegraph, “Paris Shootings: The backlash begins against French Muslims,” 10 January 2015. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11337938/Paris-shootings-The-backlash-begins-against-French-Muslims.html

12. Craig A. Smith, Kelly N. Haynes, Richard S. Lazarus, and Lois K. Pope, “In Search of the ‘Hot’ Cognitions: Attributions, Appraisals, and their Relation to Emotion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(5) (1993), pp. 916–929. See also Richard S. Lazarus, “Cognition and Motivation in Emotion,” American Psychologist 46(4) (1991), pp. 352–367.

13. It is necessary to make a distinction between an appraisal and other types of reasoning, like attributions, inferences, and evaluations. Although in common language, there may not be a significant difference between these terms, in Appraisal Theory appraisal is distinct from the aforementioned other words exactly in its direct relationship with emotions. See Smith et al., “In Search of the ‘Hot Cognition.”

14. Richard S. Lazarus, “Relational Meaning and Discrete Emotions,” in Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr, and Tom Johnstone, eds., Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 61–62.

15. Salli Saari, Kuin salama kirkkaalta taivaalta: Kriisit ja niistä selviytyminen (Helsinki: Otava, 2003).

16. Compare to Klaus R. Scherer, “Appraisal Considered as a Process of Multilevel Sequential Checking,” in Klaus R. Scherer, Angela Schorr, and Tom Johnstone, eds., Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 92–120.

17. Jennings, “Political Responses to Pain and Loss”; Saari, Kuin salama kirkkaalta taivaalta. Natural disasters also have political implications. They may become relevant regarding causal attribution, especially if there is a failure of crisis management, since people can then point the finger at the authorities for not being able to protect them from the natural disaster. See, for example, Michael J. Trebilcock and Ronald J. Daniels, “Rationales and Instruments for Government Intervention in Natural Disasters,” in Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther, eds., On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), pp. 89–108.

18. Lazarus (in “Cognition and Motivation in Emotion”) calls this primary appraisal. See also Smith et al., “In Search of the Hot Cognition.”

19. Vamık Volkan, Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror (Charlottesville: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004).

20. Leonie Huddy, “Group Identity and Political Cohesion,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 511–558.

21. Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, and Jeff Greenberg, In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003).

22. Ben Sheppard, James Rubin, Jamie Warman, and Simon Wessely, “Viewpoint: Terrorism and Dispelling the Myth of a Panic Prone Public,” Journal of Public Health Policy 27 (2006), p. 238.

23. Harumi Ito and Darin Lee, “Assessing the impact of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks on US Airline Demand,” Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics, 2003–16 (2003); Jorge Araña and Carmelo León, “The Impact of Terrorism on Tourism Demand,” Annals of Tourism Research 35(2) (2008), pp. 299–315.

24. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 5.

25. An interesting case study based on the Appraisal Theory of Emotions by Krista De Castella, Craig McGarty, and Luke Musgrove, “Fear Appeals in Political Rhetoric about Terrorism: An Analysis of Speeches by Australian Prime Minister Howard,” Political Psychology 30(1) (2009), pp. 1–26.

26. De Castella et al., “Fear Appeals in Political Rhetoric about Terrorism”; Krista De Castella, Craig McGarty, and Luke Musgrove, “Two Leaders, Two Wars: A Psychological Analysis of Fear and Anger Content in Political Rhetoric About Terrorism,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 11(1) (2011), pp. 180–200.

27. Howard M. Weiss, Kathleen Suckow, and Russel Cropanzano, “Effects of Justice Conditions on Discrete Emotion,” Journal of Applied Psychology 84(1999), pp. 786–794; Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese, “On the Distinct Political Effects of Anxiety and Anger,” in Russel Neuman, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler, and Michael MacKuen, eds., The Affect Effect: Dynamic of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 210.

28. Jennings, “Political Responses to Pain and Loss.”

29. Palonen, “Four Times of Politics,” pp. 171–186. Despite the fact that in common language politicking sometimes has a pejorative meaning, here it refers to styles and ways of conducting politics without any judgmental stance.

30. On the different phases of crisis governance, see Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management.

31. Various sources. Both the video and the original text in Spanish of Aznar's first speech available at http://albertmedran.com/bloc_cast/2011/03/13/11m-el-discurso-de-jose-maria-aznar/. The second speech available at José María Aznar's own Web page: http://www.jmaznar.es/discursos/pdfs/01901A1901.pdf

32. All the speeches can be found on the Web page of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs both in Norwegian and translated into English. English version used here. Available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles.html?id=886

33. Comparison of different opinion poll results, for example in ABC, “El PP se centra en Cataluña en busca de un voto oculto clave en la mayoría absoluta.” 7 March 2004. The Instituto Opina, which conducts surveys related to public opinion and marketing, was the one that predicted the smallest margin between the two biggest parties. According to its estimate, the PP was going to win between 163 and 171 (41.5 percent) seats against the 134–143 (36.5 percent) seats of the PSOE in the 350-seat parliament.

34. In fact, some of the conservative politicians were very persistent in insisting that there was at least some cooperation between ETA and the actual perpetrators of the attack, or that the socialist party tampered with the evidence during the police investigation for their political benefit. For example, Jaime I. del Burgo Tajadura, 11-M: Demasiadas preguntas sin respuesta (Madrid: La Esfera de los libros, 2006).

35. Sinkkonen, Political Responses to Terrorism.

36. Detailed description of Aznar's governance in Teemu Sinkkonen, Political Responses to Terrorism: Case Study on the Madrid Terrorist Attack on March 11, 2004, and Its Aftermath (Tampere: Tampere University Press, 2009), pp. 107–157.

37. Olmeda, “Fear or Falsehood?” Causality was relevant for the parliamentary elections that were held four days after the attack. The PSOE opposition party had been criticizing the ruling PP for its decision to participate in the war in Iraq and if the perpetrators had turned out to be Islamic, it would have given them an important political tool.

38. For example ABC, “Otegi solo se limitó a poner en duda que ETA fuese la autora del asesinato masivo,” 12 March 2004.

39. De Castella et al., “Fear Appeals in Political Rhetoric about Terrorism.”

40. Aage Borchgrevink, A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Massacre on Utøya (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).

41. One of the slogans used in the protests against Prime Minister Aznar's Popular Party was “you have your chauffeurs, we have the suburban train,” which underlines the distance between the prime minister (and the political class in general) and some of the affected people. VV. AA., ¡Pasálo!: Relatos y análisis sobre el 11-M y los días que le siguieron (Madrid: Traficantes de sueños, 2004), pp. 70–71.

42. Frank Furedi, Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown (London: Continuum, 2007), p. 171.

43. 22. juli-kommisjonen, “Rapport fra 22. juli-kommisjonen: Preliminary English Version of the Selected Chapters,” Norges offentlige utredninger 14 (2012).