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Western scholars of jihadi strategic studies traditionally concentrate either on ideological-strategic or on tactical questions. This intellectual disposition overlooks operational art—an important layer of knowledge between strategy and tactics. Despite the absence of the term from classical jihadi literature, the discourse in the Salafi jihadi strategic studies community is replete with discussions related to it. Neither “small strategy” nor “grand tactics,” operational art is a separate domain of knowledge. It serves as a framework for formulating principles of war, concrete fighting doctrines and integrates ends, methods, and means across all spheres of war-fighting. This article contributes to the Western scholarly understanding of Salafi strategic behavior by outlining a research program that will follow this overlooked development in jihadi military thought.
Acknowledgments
This article is based on the research project conducted under the auspices of the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies. I am grateful to the head of the Dado Center, BG Itai Brun, for his intellectual inspiration and stimulating remarks. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Assaf Moghadam of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point for his invaluable advice, guidance, and thoughtful suggestions.
Notes
1. The term introduced by Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004), pp. 355–375.
2. Edward Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” International Security 5(3) (Winter 1980), pp. 61–79.
3. Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), especially pp. 10–14.
4. Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., Fault Lines of Global Jihad: Organizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures within and around Al-Qaida (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009); Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al Qaida and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage, 2007); Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Tail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002); The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), especially chap. 3.
5. Vahid Brown, ed., Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qaida 1989–2006 (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2007); Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
6. Moghadam and Fishman, eds., Fault Lines of Global Jihad; Joe Felter, ed., Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qaida's Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2006).
7. Jeffery B. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda's Warfare: Function, Culture, and Grand Strategy,” in Magnus Ranstrop, ed. Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps, and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 127–164. Reuven Paz, “Middle East Islamism in the European Arena,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 6(3) (September, 2002); Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, and Jim Lacey, The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 42–44; Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering Al-Qaeda: Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestion of Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002); Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); Lee Harris, Civilization and Its Enemies: The Next Stage of History (New York: Free Press, 2004).
8. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Scheuer, Through Our Enemy's Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America (New York: Potomac Books, 2007); Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (New York: Potomac Books, 2007); Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay,” Security Studies 16(1) (January 2007), pp. 133–162.
9. Lia and Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies”; Jarret M. Brachman and William McCants, Stealing Al-Qaida's Playbook (West Point, NY: CTC Press, 2006); Steven Brooke, “Jihadist Strategic Debates before 9/11,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008), pp. 201–226.
10. Brynjar Lia, “Abu Musab al Suri's Critique of Hard Liner Salafists in the Jihadist Current,” CTC Sentinel 1(1) (2007), pp. 1–4; Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda's Warfare.”
11. The Terrorist Perspective Project, pp. 45–52.
12. Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, “Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating Containment of al Qaeda's Leadership,” Foreign Affairs 87(4) (July/August 2008), pp. 163–166; and also see Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs 87(3) (May/June 2008), pp. 133–138.
13. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
14. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
15. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs 86(3) (May/June 2007), pp. 24–40.
16. TPP, pp. 118–119.
17. Ibid., pp. 31–37.
18. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 532.
19. Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 3.
20. Ibid., pp. 27–28.
21. The motto nizam, la tanzim (order, method, arrangement, system, regulation, as opposed to organization) presents this idea in a condensed way. See Lia, “Doctrine,” pp. 532–533; Umar Abd al Hakim Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1355–1428; TPP, pp. 129–131.
22. Jeni Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting: The Bosnia Precedent,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31 (2008), pp. 813–814.
23. Jeffrey B. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda's Warfare: Function, Culture and Grand Strategy,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 127–164.
24. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” p. 817.
25. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness: The First World War (Allen & Unwin, 1989); Military Effectiveness: The Second World War (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1991).
26. Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 16–20.
27. “Operativnoe iskusstvo,” Voennyi Entziklopedicheskii Slovar’ (Moscow: Ministerstvo Oborony RF, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 220–221; “Operational Art,” in JP 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf
28. “Operational Level of War,” in JP 1–02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008. Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/
29. Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly 51(1) (2009), pp. 34–40.
30. B. J. C. McKerchrer and Michael A. Hennessy, The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War (London: Praeger Press, 1996), p. 4.
31. Ketti Davison, “From Tactical Planning to Operational Design,” Military Review (October 2008), pp. 37–38.
32. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (The United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Version 1.0, 28 January 2008), pp. 15– 16.
33. “Operational Design,” p. 34.
34. Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 13–14; Ketti Davison, “From Tactical Planning to Operational Design,” Military Review (October 2008), p. 33.
35. Luttwak, “The Operational Level of War,” pp. 176–177.
36. Consider the introduction of operational art as a distinct concept in the American, German, Russian, Soviet, British, French, and Canadian militaries. See McKerchrer and Hennessy, The Operational Art; also see Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington: Unites States Army, 2005). Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
37. Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 15–16.
38. G. S. Isserson, Novye formy bor’by (Moscow: Voengiz, 1940).
39. TPP, pp. 156–157.
40. AFGP-2002–003251, Abu Huthayfa “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 39. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp. The nizam, la tanzim doctrine, for example, rests on lessons learned from operational setbacks. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 6–7, 27; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1357, 1359, 1363, 1367–1368, 1378; David Cook, Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements (New York: West Point Press, 2006).
41. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 1–28; TPP, pp. 117, 156–157; Jim Lacey, The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 48, 162; Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30(1) (2007), pp. 1–14.
42. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” pp. 810–812; 817–818.
43. TPP, pp. 75, 114–137.
44. Ryan Thornton, “Changing the Game: Assessing al Qaeda's Terrorist Strategy,” Harvard International Review 27(3) (2005), pp. 35–37.
45. S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Wajidalis Lahore: Associated Printers and Publishers, 1979), pp. 27–35, 44–55, 143; Naji demonstrates a similar awareness. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which Umma Will Pass (translated by William McCants, 2006) (Cambridge, MA: The John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 16–17; 28–30.
46. TPP, pp. 129–130.
47. AFGP-2002-600080, “Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria,” Harmony Database; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 83.
48. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1357, 1359. Among the rest, this happened due to a failure in training in the field of doctrine and concepts. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1358–1359. By “concept” he probably means here “concept of operations” (fikrat amal), to judge by analogy from p. 1365.
49. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 3.
50. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1363–1367; AFGP-2002–600080, pp. 3–12.
51. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting.”
52. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1405.
53. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 21.
54. Gaetano Joe Ilardi, “Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence—A Key Prerequisite to Action,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31(12) (December 2008), pp. 1072–1107.
55. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1379–1387; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 41; Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda's Warfare,” p. 128; Cook, Understanding, p. 151.
56. Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1992).
57. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 63–71.
58. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 26–27.
59. Lia and Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies,” p. 355.
60. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 536.
61. TPP, p. 119.
62. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Peirre Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Raymond Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader (New York: Random House, 2007); Lacey, The Canons of Jihad; William McCants, Military Ideology Atlas (West Point: CTC, 2006); David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 93–110; “The Recovery of Radical Islam in the Wake of the Defeat of the Taliban,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15(1) (2003), pp. 33–40; Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006); Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History; Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Quran to bin Laden (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 199–224; TPP, pp. 119, 138–139.
63. T. P. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Quran and in Islam: Insights for Military and Government Leaders (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2004), pp. 41–91; Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 52–55.
64. For example, see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), especially pp. 3–42; Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Quran: Themes and Style (London: Taurus Publishers, 2001), especially chap. 5.
65. Khadduri, pp. 70–72.
66. Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader.
67. Schwartz-Barcott, War, Terror and Peace in the Quran and in Islam, pp. 275–277.
68. Youssef Aboul Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004).
69. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 3.
70. Cozzens, “Approaching Al-Qaeda's Warfare,” pp. 142–143.
71. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 37.
72. TPP, p. 203.
73. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 28–29.
74. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1379.
75. Ilardi, “Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence,” p. 1073 and footnote no. 8, p. 1094.
76. Harmony Disharmony database. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp
77. Al-Suri differentiates between combat doctrine and military theory. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1394–1396.
78. Ibid., pp. 877–878, 1355.
79. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1355.
80. Ibid., pp. 1356–1366.
81. Ibid., pp. 1359–1361, 1365.
82. Ibid., p. 1396.
83. Ibid., p. 1405.
84. Ibid., pp. 1406–1407.
85. Ibid., p. 1398. Al-Suri uses the model of the Sufi orders as a frame of reference for his theory of victory and uses the same word used for Sufi orders—tariqah—order, method, and way. The words nizam and tariqah are synonyms and can both be translated as method (Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1398). Lia suggests that this is not coincidence because similar to the Sufi orders this model combines a mass following with a decentralized structure (Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 445). This is not surprising, given that al-Suri was brought up in North-Western Syria, one of the centers for the Naqshbandiyya order. Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi Tradition (London: Routledge, 2008); Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (London: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004).
86. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1373, 1378–1387, 1390–1391, 1393–1397, 1405, 1409.
87. Ibid., p. 1407.
88. Lia, “Doctrine,” p. 533.
89. Joseph C. Myers, “The Quranic Concept of War,” Parameters (Winter 2006–2007), pp. 108–121.
90. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 142–143.
91. I. E. Shavrov and N. I. Galkin, Metodologiia voenno-nauchnogo poznaniia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977).
92. Stout et al., Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 38–39.
93. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War.
94. Assaf Moghadam, The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al-Qaeda, Salafi Jihad and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
95. Raymond Ibrahim, “Studying the Islamic Way of War,” National Review Online, 11 September 2008.
96. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 97.
97. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1366, 1423; Stout et al., Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 130–131; Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 37–38; Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 65.
98. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, pp. 67–68.
99. Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, pp. 138–146; Ilardi, “Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence”; Ibrahim, The Al Qaeda Reader.
100. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy and History (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), p. 175.
101. Truls Hallberg Tonnesson, “Training on a Battlefield: Iraq as a Training Ground for Global Jihadists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 543–562.
102. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 145.
103. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 28–30, 43.
104. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1424.
105. Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 23.
106. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1402.
107. AFGP-2002-003251, Abu Huthayfa “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah,” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 39.
108. Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 20–23.
109. TPP, pp. 125–127.
110. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 19–22, 23, 28, 30; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1373–1374.
111. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1368–1369, 1373–1374, 1405, 1408.
112. Ibid., p. 1409.
113. Calvert Jones, “Al-Qaeda's Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffusive Transnational Network,” Review of International Affairs 19(4) (December 2006), pp. 555–569; TPP, p. 119.
114. Stout et al., The Terrorist Perspectives Project, pp. 74–79, 62–85, 114–137; Ilardi, “Al Qaeda's Operational Intelligence,” pp. 1072–1107.
115. TPP, pp. 119–120; AFGP-2002-003251, Abu Huthayfa, “A Memo to the Honorable Sheikh Abu Abdullah” (20 June 2000), Harmony Database, p. 14; Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 23–24.
116. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1361, 1368; Lacey, Canons of Jihad, p. 61.
117. Stealing Al-Qaida's Playbook, especially pp. 3–10; Lia, “Doctrines,” pp. 527–528; Cook, Understanding, pp. 151–152.
118. Imperial Hubris, pp. 101–102; Sarah Zabel, The Military Strategy of Global Jihad (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 2007). TPP, p. 99.
119. Qutb, Milestones, p. 75; Lia, “Doctrines,” p. 522; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 28.
120. Emphasis mine. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, p. 3.
121. Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, “Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries,” in Emily Goldman and Leslie Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 63–93; Edmund Bosworth, “Armies of the Prophet: Strategy, Tactics and Weapons in Islamic Warfare,” in Bernard Lewis, ed., Islam and the Arab World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).
122. TPP, pp. 125–132.
123. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1370.
124. Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 648–677.
125. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1356, 1365, 1394, 1396, 1403, 1414–1428; Naji, The Management of Savagery, p. 60; Brynjar Lia, “Dotrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 518–542. Tonnessen; Petter Nesser, “How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20(2008), pp. 234–256. Architect, pp. 23–24, 26.
126. Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah.
127. TPP, pp. 118–119.
128. Martin van Creveld, Air Power and Maneuver Warfare (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), pp. 3–7.
129. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 16–17.
130. Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, pp. 13–15; Kobi Michael, “The Dilemma Behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations: The Discourse Space Model,” Armed Forces and Society 33(4) (2007), pp. 518–546.
131. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. 109–125; Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, pp. 12–17; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, p. 1397.
132. The Canons, pp. 148–161.
133. TPP, pp. 137–138; Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” p. 824.
134. Mitchell, “The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War Fighting,” pp. 814–815.
135. Naji, The Management of Savagery, pp. 25–27, 40, 42, 50–51; Al-Suri, Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-’alamiyyah, pp. 1390, 1392, 1393.
136. Aboul Enein and Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare, pp. 1–3.
137. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and David S. Power, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation and Their Fatwas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996); Majid Khadurri, Islamic Jurisprudence: Shafii's Risala (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 295–304 and also Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, pp. 34–38 and 102–103.
138. See discussion at the MESH project, following Raymond Ibrahim's post, “Islamic War Doctrines Ignored,” Middle Eastern Strategy at Harvard. Available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/05/islams_war_doctrines_ignored/
139. William McCants, “Al Qaida Strategic Thinking and Its Implications for US Policy,” Security Studies Program Seminar, MIT, 15 May 2007.
140. TPP, pp. 120–121.