Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Islamic “terrorists” are able to legitimize their movement as an act of violent Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially because of religious sanctions that permit the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities. The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shariat through its discourse on revivalism. Based on the Quranic principle of ijtihad, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. According to ijtihad Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually as long as these are directed toward ensuring the will of God in an Islamic community. Thus terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent Jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. The manner in which terrorists use ijtihad to contextualize geopolitical factors as a cause for violent Jihad is determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran. These interpretations also determine the extent of violence used in a Jihad for religious amelioration. The religious legitimacy of this violence prevails until the cause and course of violent Jihad correlates with the Quran's discourse on violence and revivalism. In contemporary times an extreme interpretation of the movement of Revivalism 1 that is inspired by “revivalism” also provides an organized premise for Islamic terrorism. When implemented, this causes variations within specific geopolitical conditions and in different Jihadi groups. However a common understanding of religious doctrines determines the extent of Revivalism in Islamic communities because this movement relies heavily on the Quranic discourse for its existence. Thus, the religious basis for Islamic terrorism is primarily found when extreme interpretations of the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism are directed toward obtaining an equally radical version of Revivalism in specific geopolitical conditions. In this manner, extreme Quranic and Revivalist interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic terrorism as a religious effort to preserve the will of God in an Islamic community. The aim of this article is to show the manner in which religion can cause the emergence of Islamic violence as it is known today. The discourse on Islamic violence and counterterrorism needs to be urgently studied given the numerous instances of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Many writings on Islamic violence and statements released after an act of Islamic violence allude to the impact of religion on violent Jihad, but they rarely explore it or present a premise for its existence. This exploration will be conducted based on research of the author's on the Kashmir crisis and the insurgency in it. Thus, examples from insurgency in Kashmir will be used on occasion to illustratively develop this argument. In his book The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington states that a theory must be causal and simple. Using the words of Thomas Kuhn, he explains that “to be accepted as a paradigm [it] must seem better than its competitors but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” 2 Furthering such simplicity and exploration, will be the central effort of this discourse. The sources for this exploration will be mainly derived from theoretical and practical understandings of terrorism, Islamic religion and theology, and the movement of Islamic Revivalism. A comparison between Islam and other religions will not be presented when evaluating the impact of Islam on violent Jihad. It will essentially present religious premises for violent Jihad from a Muslim rather than non-Muslim or “Western” perspective; although it is accepted that parallels in the understanding of “violence” do exist in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim perspectives on violence and terrorism are relevant and known to the author. However a perpetual emphasis on these factors or a failure to acknowledge them limits the scope of the study of Islamic terrorism itself. The aim will be to present an Islamic perspective on violent Jihad. Then, it is accepted that a complex interplay between religious understandings and geopolitical events influence the emergence of Islamic violence in contemporary times. Thereafter, it must be stated that extreme psychological and sociological factors intrinsic to the Jihadis influence the religious choices that cause violent Jihad. An analysis of these factors is outside the realm of this discourse, which remains political in its scope. Further, on occasion a lack of empirical data and non-circumstantial evidence is encountered to substantiate some contentions mentioned ahead. As it has been suggested previously 3 this is mainly because there is a dearth of such data and reliable evidence pertaining to religious terrorism. At certain points, it becomes difficult to validate external opinions mainly because of the right to individual interpretations vested by the Quran in all Muslims. The validity of these opinions is vested in the fact that they are taken from informed Muslims who practice moderate and radical interpretations of Islam. Any reader may be expected to believe that any kind of terrorism is unjustifiable. However, in order to address these movements effectively, they must be studied from all possible dimensions and especially from the cultural contexts from which they arise.
Acknowledgments
The author's deepest gratitude is extended to Professor Richard Langhorne for his invaluable support in compiling and completing this article.
Notes
1. Refers to the contemporary movement of Islamic Revivalism.
2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1996), p. 30.
3. Nancy C. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups available at (http://www.dissertations.com), 2002.
4. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups, p. 18.
5. Speech given by Tony Blair to UN General Assembly on 21 September, 1998 Britain and the Fight against International Terrorism, An FCO Network Feature, available at (http://www.fco.org), p. 2.
6. Criteria to Declare a Country and Organization as Terrorist, Unstarred Question, No. 1982, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs.
7. Security Council Foreign Ministers Discuss Counter-terrorism, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, available at (http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 01111206.htm).
8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at (http://www.un.org), p. 1.
9. Britain and the Fight against International Terrorism, p. 1.
10. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003. United States Department of State, available at (http://www.state.gov), June 2004.
11. Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam—The House of Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror (New York: Doubleday—Random House, 2002), p. 250.
12. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003.
13. Charles Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil (New York: Harper San Francisco, 2003), p. 46.
14. Ibid., p. 41.
15. Ibid., p. 32.
16. Ibid., p. 70.
17. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups.
18. Ruf Werner, Islam and the West-Judgments, Prejudices, Political Perspectives (Munster: Verlag GmbH & Co. Kg, 2002), p. 21.
19. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil, p. 127.
.20. Ibid., p. 72.
21. Views presented in this section that are not sourced represent the author's own understanding of the Quran, Islamic Revivalism, Islamic theology, and Islamic culture.
22. The Hadis (or Hadith) is the collection of biographic reports about the sayings, customs, and doings of Mohammed and his companions; they also reflect on what Mohammed enjoined and tolerated in his presence or forbade. available at (http://answering-islam.org/Nehls/Ask/sunnah.html).
23. Translated by N. J. Dawood, The Koran (England: Penguin Group, 1999), p. 357 (47:3).
24. Ahmad Khurshid, Islam—Its Meaning and Message (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1975), p. 37.
25. Lewis Bernard, The Crisis of Islam—Holy War and Unholy Terror, p. 31.
26. Sadar Ziauddin, Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures (Virginia: Pluto Press, 2003), p. 64.
27. Refers to people who do not follow Islam and to those societies, states; or communities in which the dominant population is not Muslim.
28. Internal Jihad is that which is declared by a Muslim on himself to improve his adherence to the Quranic revelations.
29. External Jihad is declared by an individual against the Islamic community to attain Quranic justice.
30. Inter-communal Jihad is that declared between communities to attain Quranic objectives.
31. Violence is more rarely advocated in the case of internal as compared to external Jihad.
32. Taher Mohamed, Encyclopedic Survey of Islamic Culture—Vol. 11 (New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd, 1997), p. 25.
33. Refers to a method of Jihad that can be used for internal, external, or inter-communal purposes.
34. Husain Mir Zohar, Global Islamic Politics (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), pp. 37–38.
35. The Koran, p. 107 (6:151).
36. Ibid., p. 29, (2.912 and 2.913).
37. Mohammad Nazar, Commandments by God in the Quran (New York: The Message Publications, 1991), p. 733 (8:25).
38. According to the Quran, Islam is God's true and only religion.
39. The Koran, p. 29 (2.912 and 2.913).
40. Goulam W. Choudhry, Pakistan—Transition from Civilian to Military Rule (Essex: Scorpion Publishing, 1998), p. 92.
41. Ibid., p. 93.
42. The Koran, p. 367 (51:17).
43. Ibid., p. 407 (71:9).
44. Ibid., p. 70 (4:92).
45. Ibid., p.17 (2:84).
46. Ibid., p. 81 (5:16).
47. Ibid., p. 83 (5:34).
48. Ibid., p. 83 (5:34).
49. Ibid., p. 85 (5:49).
50. Ibid., p. 295 (33:28).
51. Ibid., p. 392 (61:14).
52. Ibid., 180 (14:11).
53. Ibid., p. 407 (71:28).
54. Quotation from “Let. … God” is an compilation of extracts from The Spoils, Chapter 8 of the Quran and Repentance, Chapter 9 of the Quran, The Koran, p. 126–146.
55. Choudhry, Pakistan—Transition from Civilian to Military Rule, pp. 92–97.
56. For details on this see Amritha Venkatraman, Kashmir: Islam and Terror (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University, 2005), chapter 1.
57. Paula R. Newberg, Double Betrayal—Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 15.
58. See Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir—Proponents of War, Hope and Peace (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press, 1997).
59. Ghulam Muhammad Bhatt, Tribune Chandigardh, 10 July, 2000, available at (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000710/j&k.htm#3), accessed 3 October, 2004.
60. Pakistan—Transition from Civilian to Military Rule, p. 94.
61. The Koran, p. 146 (9:121).
62. Leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) that was dominant during Phase I of the Insurgency.
63. Yasin Malik, the leader of the JKLF; Interview given to Amritha Venkatraman in May 2004.
64. Participant of the Kashmir-based insurgent group called Al-Badr.
65. Kashmir—Roots of Conflict and Paths to Peace, p. 105.
66. See Infiltration of AlQaeda Terrorists, Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 258, to be answered on 16 July, 2002.
67. Even after 1994, the aforementioned reason of religious violence has been used for Jihad in Kashmir. Geopolitical events have been religious interpreted to support the pro-Pakistan agenda. For details see Venkatraman, Kashmir: Islam and Terror, chapter 3.
68. Alam Khundmiri, Secularism, Islam and Modernity (New Delhi: Thousand Oaks, 2001).
69. The Koran, p. 43 (3:5).
70. Micheal Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books—Perseus Books Group, 2000).
71. Video recording released on 13 December 2001, Transcript page 1 and 6.
72. Public statement made in Cairo on 8 October 2001.
73. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.
74. Empirical evidence will be used only occasionally in this section mainly because Islamic history and practices have rarely been used in this manner, theoretically, to present a cause for Islamic terrorism. Individual analysis will be used to elaborate on those areas where empirical or causal evidence is scant.
75. Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam, p. 29.
76. For instance, on its law on alcohol consumption the Shariat asks a Muslim if he thinks it would be in his best interest to consume intoxicants. The model of the Prophet is presented in this regard; however, the choice is ultimately left to the Muslim.
77. A prominent Modernist is: Sayyid Jamal Ad Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), a modernist who encouraged the amalgamation of Western and Islamic education as a resource for development in the Muslim world.
78. A few prominent pragmatists are: Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Muhammad Anwar-Sadat of Egypt, and the shah of Iran in 1980.
79. Mir Husain, Global Islamic Politics, pp. 80–81.
80. A few prominent Traditionalists are: Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi (1856–1921), Mawlana Mawdudi, Syed Qutb, Haji Muhammad Abidi. The Deoband School, Jaamait, Barewli, and Al-Hadith are some Islamic schools that further the traditional Islamic practices.
81. Husain, Global Islamic Politics, p. 44.
82. A few prominent Fundamentalists are: Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah (a crusader for the creation of a puritanical Islamic in Sudan), Ayatollah Khomeini, and Zia ul-Haq.
83. Based on these principles, the Shi'a community separated itself from the “general Islamic community” soon after the death of the Prophet. The cause of this was that the Shi'as contended that Imam Ali, a cousin of the Prophet, was the second Muslim to embrace Islam and thus should be the Prophet's successor. Since their inception, Shi'as have emphasized the Quran's discourse on martyrdom as central to their religious interpretations. They have also highlighted radicalism as a method to obtain their religious principles. The extent to which this radicalism shows itself is contingent on the Quranic interpretations of each Shi'a Muslim.
84. The Sunnis have faith in Allah and the Prophet alone.
85. The Wahhabis are a radical off-shoot off Sunni-Islam that came into existence in the 1700 s.
86. Sufism focuses on the Quran's discourses on love, religious co-existence, and self-discipline to further Islamic art, culture, and literature.
87. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil, p. 58.
88. Alam Khundmiri, Secularism, Islam and Modernity, God—The Contemporary Debate: The Islamic Perspective, p. 65.
89. Most often violent Jihadis receive their religious education at traditional madrassas funded by Islamic fundamentalists and/or traditionalists.
90. A long-standing power struggle between the government and various Islamic groups also contributed to Saddat's unpopularity in Egypt.
91. Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, p. 31.
92. Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam, p. 117.
93. See Venkatraman, Kashmir: Islam and Terror, chapter 3.
94. A few of these are the Battle of Badr (624 A.D.) in which he and other Muslims defeated the Jewish tribe Quraysh; this was followed Battle of Uhud (625 A.D.) in which Muslims were defeated by the Jews, and the War of the Ditch (627 A.D.), a Raid of the Jewish tribe Qurayzah.
95. The Koran, p. 7.
96. Ibid., p. 8.
97. Karen Armstrong, Holy War—The Crusaders and Their Impact on Today's World (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), p. 237.
98. Ibid., p. 239.
99. Ibid., p. 373.
100. Ibid., p. 373.
101. Ibid., p. 374.
102. Reference to the treaty signed between Anwar Saddat (Egypt) and Israel in 1971.
103. Armstrong, Holy War, p. 318.
104. Mohammad Nazar, Commandments by God in the Quran, p. 171.
105. Ibid., p. 3–21.
106. Ibid., p. 362.
107. Ibid., p. 360.
108. Ibid., p. 364.
109. Ibid., p. 72.
110. John L. Esposito, Islamic Threat—Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Islam and Politics (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984).
111. Leader of the Muslim Jahbaz Force (MJF), which was dominant during the first phase of the Insurgency.
112. Ferdoz Syed, interview given to Amritha Venkatraman in February 2004.
113. An institution of religious learning that originated in Pakistan and now exists in other countries as well, especially in South Asia.
114. Mawdudi Abul A’La. “Jihad in Islam-2,” International Islamic Federation of Students Organization, Al-Faisal Printing Co., Kuwait (year of publication unavailable), pp. 4–5.
115. Ibid., p. 9.
116. Idea paraphrased from ibid.
117. Ibid., p. 29.
118. Ferdoz Syed, interview given to Amritha Venkatraman in February 2004.
119. Gilles Kepel, Jihad—The Trial of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2003), p. 25.
120. Husain, Global Islamic Politics, p. 9–11.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Kepel, Political Jihad, p. 23.
126. Ibid., p. 24.
127. Ibid., p. 26.
128. For details see Venkatraman, Kashmir: Islam and Terrorism, chapter 4.
129. British High Commission: Terrorism Related Deaths—2001.
130. For details see Venkatraman, Kashmir: Islam and Terrorism, chapter 3.
131. British High Commission: Terrorism Related Deaths—2001.
132. Masood Azhar, Guardians of Deen and Country, available at (http://www.dalitstan.org/mughalstan/mujahid/azhar005.html), Accessed 28 March, 2005.
133. Mazood Azhar, “Jaish Threatens “Smashing Blow” in Kashmir,” Press Trust of India, 15 October, 2001.
![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/JournalAd-Sample-Our-Politics-Relations-PB.gif"})
![Your research. Your choice. How-to guide for authors.]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110304/JournalAd-reach-more-readers-SW.gif"})
![Access thousands of documents related to Britain's home front during WWII]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110254/JournalAd-Annouce-WarStateSociety.gif"})
![Format-free submission]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110123/JournalAd-Resources-FormatFree-Submission-PB.jpg"})