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Pages 669-695
Received 12 May 2013
Accepted 18 Jul 2013
Published online: 27 Feb 2014
 
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Following two frustrating counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a drive to find new and more viable ways of addressing irregular security challenges. In this effort, the 1980s' campaign in El Salvador has gained prominence, as it resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla adversary yet involved only a modest deployment of US personnel and resources. The use of history to search for models and precedents can be fruitful, but past conflicts must be understood on their own terms and not made to fit the preconceived ideas of the day. A deeper appreciation of what happened in El Salvador reveals not only the unique circumstances that shaped the campaign but also the limited results of the counterinsurgency program to which the war's outcome is now being ascribed. This article adopts a broader lens, focusing on the real yet undervalued factors that produced peace in El Salvador and whether the final outcome was truly quite as successful as is now commonly assumed.

Additional information

Acknowledgements

Fieldwork for this article was made possible through Faculty Development Funds from the College of International Security Affairs of the NDU in Washington, DC. It builds upon research conducted for a RAND Corporation project (see Rabasa et al. Rabasa, Angel, JohnGordonIV, PeterChalk, Audra K.Grant, K.Scott McMahon, StephaniePezard, CarolineReilly, DavidUcko, and S.Rebecca Zimmerman. From Insurgency to Stability, Volume II: Insights from Selected Case Studies. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011. [Google Scholar], From Insurgency to Stability, Vol. II). Opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the US government. The author would like to thank Michelle Parker, Ryan Evans, and Thomas A. Marks for their comments on previous drafts of this article. He would also like to thank Katelyn Guy, Ricardo Gomez Hecht, Bill Rosenau, Herard Von Santos, and David Spencer for their roles in making this article possible. Special thanks go out also to those who accepted to be interviewed for this study.