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The article examines Israel's successes and failures during the Second Intifada. It argues that Israel's advances came from an effective counterterrorism campaign involving a mix of military operations, defensive measures, and in particular improved intelligence gathering. Domestic resilience also proved strong in the face of a brutal terrorism campaign. Yet long-term victory remains elusive for Israel. Deterrence, always difficult against terrorist groups, is growing harder for Israel. Hamas's control of Gaza, and the mistrust and hatred sown during the Second Intifada, have hindered a political deal between Israel and moderate Palestinians. Much of what went into successful counterterrorism, notably the security barrier and the aggressive campaign of raids and arrests, does not jibe with most visions of what peace would look like and makes a deal harder to achieve. To make a peace deal work, Israeli counterterrorism must change, with measures including relocating parts of the security barrier, bolstering moderate Palestinian politicians, and working with, as opposed to undermining, Palestinian security forces in the West Bank.
Notes
“Four directors of G.S.S. Warn: Israel in grave danger,” Yediot Ahronot, November 14, 2003, 1.
Israel Security Agency, “Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade 2000–2010,“http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx.
Israel Security Agency, “Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade 2000–2010,” http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Fatalities/Pages/default.aspx.
For overviews of Hamas, see Matthew Levitt,Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History From Within (Charles City, VA:Olive Branch Press, 2007); and Paul McGeough, Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas (New York: The New Press, 2010).
For a review of the causes and nature of the Second Intifada, see Jeremy Pressman, “The Second Intifada: An Early Look at the Background and Causes of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Studies 22, no. 2 (2003): 114–141; Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, The Seventh War (Tel Aviv: Sifrei Hemed, 2005 [Hebrew]); Sergio Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army (London: Routledge, 2008); David Jaeger and Daniele Paserman, “Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence,” The American Economic Review 96, no. 2 (2006): 45–49; and Yaacov Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion: The Public Imperative in the Second Intifada (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 64–115.
Sample works that discuss Israel as a model for issues ranging from targeted killings to defensive and legal measures include Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle—A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005).; and Jonathan Tucker, “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience,” March 2003, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/tucker-israel.html; Steven Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001); and E. Felner, “Torture and Terrorism: Painful Lessons from Israel,” in K. Roth, M. Worden, and D. Bernstein, eds., Torture: A Human Rights Perspective (Portland: Book News, 2005), 28–43.
See, for example, Stephen Van Evera, “Vital Interest: Winning the War on Terror Requires a Mideast Peace Settlement,” The American Conservative 4, no. 5 (2005): 7–10; and Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 2002).
For work on partition, see Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International Security 20 (1996): 136–175; and Nicholas Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature,” World Politics 52 (2000): 437–483.
For arguments emphasizing the importance of individual motivations stemming from and societal grievances, see Assaf Moghadam, “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003): 65–92; Nichole Argo, “Why Fight? Examining Self-Interested versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion,” Security Studies 18 (2009): 651–680; and Mohammad Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: USIP, 2006), 33–52.
See Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 7–48.
For an argument that ties the growth of suicide bombing to foreign occupation, see Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); for work linking suicide bombing to intergroup competition, see Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); and the critique, Robert Brym and Bader Araj, “Palestinian suicide bombing revisited: A critique of the outbidding thesis,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 3 (2008): 485–500; for an excellent review essay, see Martha Crenshaw, “Explaining suicide terrorism: A review essay,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (2007): 133–162.
A similar point is made in Sergio Catignani, “The Israel defense forces and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: When tactical virtuosity meets strategic disappointment,” in Daniel Marson and Carter Malkasian, eds., Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey, 2008), 203.
For a discussion of the importance of local, allied intelligence services for counterterrorism, see Paul Pillar, “Intelligence,” in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes, eds., Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 115–139.
See Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2008/09): 79–109.
Backing this view is a report that Israeli military intelligence wrote an assessment a year before the intifada predicting its outbreak, almost to the day. Yossi Kuperwasser, who was head of the Research Department of the IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence from 2001 to 2006, notes: “We saw what was coming in detail—it is rare that intelligence is that good” (Interview with Yossi Kuperwasser, Tel Aviv, July 1, 2008). A closer look, however, suggests that Arafat did not plan the intifada's outbreak (though he did exploit it once it occurred). The above predictions were made in the belief that Arafat would unilaterally declare a Palestinian state in September 2000: something effective diplomacy dissuaded him from doing. Palestinian negotiators even tried to block Sharon's visit, recognizing it might precipitate violence, and Arafat himself warned Barak against the visit. Shin Bet interviews with captured terrorists after the Second Intifada broke out back up the argument that there was no initial central guidance. See Harel and Issacharoff (note 5 above), The Seventh War, 90–93; Martin Indyk, Innocent Abroad: An Intimate History of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 345; Ephraim Lavie, “Israel's Coping with the Second Intifada: A Critical Review,” Strategic Assessment Vol. 13, no. 3 (2010), http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1289897475.pdf (footnote 1); and Pressman, “The Second Intifada” (see note 5 above), 117.
John F. Mahoney, “Israel's Anti-Civilian Weapons,” The Link 34, no. 1 (2001): 1–13.
Ari Shavit, “Sharon is Sharon is Sharon,” Haaretz, April 12, 2001, http://www.cephasministry.com/israel_sharon_sharon.html; and Uri Dan, Ariel Sharon: An Intimate Portrait (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 173.
Gideon Levy, “They Won't Allow Us Not to Know,” Haaretz, December 3, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1130951.html.
The debate over Arafat's “real” intentions during the Camp David talks and other negotiations remains fierce and unresolved. For a mix of views, see: Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004); Indyk, Innocent Abroad (see note 15 above); and Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, “The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 1 (2001): 62–75. On Arafat's ties to violent groups, see Anat Kurz, Fatah and the Politics of Violence (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 135–151.
See U.S. Department of State, “Report on PLO Compliance,” 2001.
Quoted in R. Kim Cragin, “Palestinian Resistance through the Eyes of Hamas,” Ph.D. dissertation, Clare College, Cambridge, 2008, 185.
Yoram Schweitzer, “Palestinian Istishhadia: A Developing Instrument,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2007): 677.
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Results of Poll #6,” PSR Survey Research Unit, 2002, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p6a.html.
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Public Opinion Poll #3: Palestinians Support the Ceasefire, Negotiations and Reconciliation between the Two Peoples but a Majority Opposes Arrests and Believe That Armed Confrontations Have Helped Achieve National Rights,” PSR Survey Research Unit, 2001, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2001/p3a.html.
Cragin, “Palestinian Resistance” (see note 21 above): 187.
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, “Palestinian Authority Support of Hamas Suicide Terrorism,” October 11, 2004, http://www.dailyalert.org/archive/2004-10/2004-10-11.html.
Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 179.
Giora Eiland, “The IDF in the Second Intifada,” Strategic Assessment 13, no. 3 (2010): 31.
John Kampfner and Stuart Tanner, “The Ugly War: Children of Vengeance,” BBC Correspondent, February 22, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/183452.stm.
Author's interview, Jerusalem, 2008.
Kampfner and Tanner, “The Ugly War: Children of Vengeance” (see note 29 above).
Ari Shavit, “The Enemy Within,” Haaretz Friday Magazine, August 30, 2002.
Quoted in Ross Dunn, “Sharon Vows to Hit Palestinians Until It Is ‘Very Painful,‘” Sydney Morning Herald, March 6, 2002, http://newsstore.smh.com.au/apps/viewDocument.ac?page=1&sy=smh&kw=Ross+Dunn&pb=all_ffx&dt=enterRange&dr=1month&sd=01%2F03%2F2002&ed=08%2F03%2F2002&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=author&sf=headline&rc=50&rm=200&sp=adv&clsPage=1&docID=SMH020306HJ4K64876OE.
Uzi Benziman, “A Breaking Point,” Haaretz, March 29, 2002, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/a-breaking-point-1.49128.
For background, this chapter draws on Harel and Issacharoff, The Seventh War (see note 5 above); Moshe Yaalon, Derech Arooka Ktzara [The Long Short Way] (Tel Aviv: Sifrei Hemed, 2008); and Ofer Segal, “Az-K'ariel, ‘Homat Magen’ Sheli” [My Defensive Shield: Fighting in Jenin 2002] (Tel Aviv: IDF Ministry of Defense Publishing House: 2006).
Shin Bet, Distribution of Fatalities from Palestinian-Based Terrorism in the 2nd Intifadah, 2009, http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/KReport130809_en.pdf.
Author's interview, Jerusalem, March 2009.
PM Sharon's Address to the Knesset, April 8, 2002, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2002/PM%20Sharon-s%20Address%20to%20the%20Knesset%20-%208-Apr-2002.
IDF, Geut Va-Shefel—Sikum Netuney Shnat 2004 Ve-Hashva'aa Rav Shnatit [Ebb and Flow—2004 Year Summary and Perennial Comparison], http://www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/4/37604.pdf.
B'Tselem, Detainees & Prisoners: Statistics on Palestinians in the Custody of the Israeli Security Forces, http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp (accessed August 11 2009); and B'Tselem, Administrative Detention: Statistics on Administrative Detention, http://www.btselem.org/english/Administrative_Detention/Statistics.asp (accessed August 11 2009).
“UN Report on the Incident in Jenin,” Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10, June 30, 2002, paragraphs 30, 37(a).
Author interview with intelligence official, Tel Aviv, June 2008.
B'Tselem, Palestinians Killed by Israeli Security Forces in Gaza Strip, 2008, http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp.
See Adam Stahl, “The Evolution of Israeli Targeted Operations: Consequences of the Thabet Thabet Operation,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 2 (2010): 111–133.
Interview with intelligence official, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
Quoted in “Ex-Shin Bet Chief: Israeli Assassination Policy Led to Period of Calm,” Officer.com, June 3, 2005, <http://forums.officer.com/forums/showthread.php?t = 31719.at (accessed January 10, 2010).
Graham Usher, “Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On,” Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 34.
Author's interview with Israeli intelligence official, July 2005.
“Hamas’ Mish'al Views Yasin's Assassination On ‘Today's Encounter’ Program,” Al-Jazirah, 2004.
David Margolick, “Terrorism: Israel's Payback Principle,” Vanity Fair, January 2003, 40–47.
Hillel Frisch, “Motivation or Capabilities? Israeli Counterterrorism against Palestinian Suicide Bombings and Violence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006): 853.
See United Nations, Six Years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Barrier (Jerusalem: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 2010), http://unispal.un.org/UNSPAL.nsf/0/2C565CF02FA191128525775900613966; and Isabel Kershner, Barrier: The Seam of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, The Leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Again Admits That the Israeli Security Fence Built by Israel in Judea and Samaria Prevents the Terrorist Organizations from Reaching the Heart of Israel to Carry Out Suicide Bombing Attacks, March 26, 2008, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/ct_250308e.htm (accessed January 13, 2010).
Author's interview, July 2005.
Daniel Byman and Gad Goldstein, “The Challenge of Gaza: Policy Options and Broader Implications,” Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 23 (July 2011): 4; see also Israeli Security Agency, “Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade (2000–2010)” http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/decade/Mortar/Pages/default.aspx.
Jake Sharfman, “Tiny organization fights to make Sderot's voice heard,” Haaretz, December 17, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/news/tiny-organization-fights-to-make-sderot-s-voice-heard-1.1883.
Bruce Hoffman, “The Capability of Emergency Departments and Emergency Medical Systems in the U.S. to Respond to Mass Casualty Events Resulting from Terrorist Attacks,” submitted to U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, May 5, 2008.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
In addition to these closures there were 63 crossing points along the barrier into the West Bank, known as “barrier gates,” and on average 70 temporary road barriers a week during 2009: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, West Bank Movement and Access Update, June 2009, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_movement_access_2009_june_english.pdf.
Author's interview with IDF officer, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
Eiland, “The IDF in the Second Intifada” (see note 28 above): 33.
See his speech at the 2005 Sharm al-Shaykh summit, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/082617960CDB7E168525707B0046A4C4.
Steven Erlanger, “Israelis and Palestinians Look to a Quiet Gaza and a Cease-Fire,” The New York Times, January 24, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/24/international/middleeast/24mideast.html; Steven Erlanger, “2 Sides in Mideast Resume Public Meetings,” The New York Times, January 27, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/international/middleeast/27mideast.html; and Tamimi, Hamas (see note 4 above), 211.
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, The Nature and Extent of Palestinian Terrorism, 2006, March 1, 2007, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since +2000/Palestinian+terrorism +2006.htm.
International Crisis Group, Ruling Palestine II, July 17, 2008, 6–8 http:// www.crisisgroup.org/.../Israel%20Palestine/79_ruling_palestine_ii___the_west_bank_model.ashx.
Author's interview, Jerusalem, March 2009.
Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 230.
“UN Report on the Incident in Jenin,” paragraphs 43, 77.
Sharon Sadeh, “How Jenin battle became a ‘massacre,‘” The Guardian, May 16, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/may/06/mondaymediasection5.
“President Bush Calls Gaza Attack ‘Heavy Handed,‘” Online Newshour, July 23, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/reaction_07-23-02.html.
B'Tselem, Siege: Imposition of Siege, http://www.btselem.org/english/Freedom_of _Movement/Siege.asp (accessed August 12, 2009).
Amira Hass, “Life under Prohibition in Palestine,” Counterpunch, January 22, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/01/22/life-under-prohibition-in-palestine/.
B'Tselem, Closure: Figures on Comprehensive Closure Days, http://www.btselem.org/english/Freedom_of_Movement/Siege_figures.asp (accessed August 12, 2009).
Catignani (see note 5 above), 117.
Amos Guiora, “Balancing IDF Checkpoints and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of Conduct,” Jerusalem Issue Brief 3, no. 8 (2003), http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-8.htm.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
Chris McGreal, “Human-Bomb Mother Kills Four Israelis at Gaza Checkpoint,” The Guardian, January 15, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/15/israel.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, The West Bank Barrier, http://www.ochaopt.org/?module=displaystory§ion_id=130&story_id=1456&format=html&edition_id=(accessed January 13, 2010).
Shaul Arieli and Michael Sfard, Homa Ve-Mehdal: Geder Ha-Frada—Bitahon Ao Hamdanut [The Wall of Folly] (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonot, 2008), 64–65.
Israeli Knesset Information Center, Mediniyut Hata'asuka Be-Anaf Ha-Binyan Ve-Hashlachoteya ‘Al Ha-‘Avoda Ve-‘Al Ha-‘Aovdim Ba-‘Anaf [Employment Policy in the Construction Field and Its Ramifications on Working and Workers in the Field], 2009, http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02180.pdf; Israeli Ministry of Defense, Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories, Positive Trend in Economic Indicators for the West Bank, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/C1A9F626-4E6C-4271-B598-41C911A793CF/0/WBEconomyNov2008.pdf; and Dani Rubenstein, “Ha-Calcala Ha-Falastinit: Shuvam Shel Ha-Po'aalim Le-Yisrael” [The Palestinian Economy: The Return of the Palestinian Workers to Israel], Calcalist, February 9, 2009.
Moshe Yaalon, “Lessons from the Palestinian ‘War’ against Israel,” Policy Focus 64 (2007): 6.
Author's interview, July 2008.
B'Tselem, Restrictions on Movement: Effect of Restrictions on the Economy, http://www.btselem.org/english/Freedom_of_Movement/Economy.asp (accessed August 12, 2009).
Amira Hass, “Israel's Closure Policy: An Ineffective Strategy of Containment and Repression,” Journal of Palestine Studies 31, no. 3 (2002): 6, 10.
World Bank, Palestinian Economic Prospects: Gaza Recovery and West Bank Revival, Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, June 8, 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCJune09Reportfinal.pdf.
B'Tselem, Separation Barrier: Statistics, http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp.
Author's interview, July 2008.
Israel resumed punitive house demolitions in 2009, when it destroyed the houses of the families of two Palestinians responsible for terrorist attacks in Jerusalem: Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, Statistics on House Demolitions (1967–2010), http://www.icahd.org/?page_id=5508. These figures exclude houses demolished because they lacked a permit or during a military operation. For similar figures, see also Ron Dudai, “Through No Fault of Their Own: Punitive House Demolitions During the Al-Aqsa Intifada,” Human Rights Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2006): 20; see also Amos Harel, “IDF Panel Recommends Ending Punitive House Demolitions for Terrorists’ Families,” Haaretz, February 17, 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/idf-panel-recommends-ending-punitive-house-demolitions-for-terrorists-families-1.150620.
Yaalon, “Lessons from the Palestinian ‘War'” (see note 83 above), 13; Dudai, “Through No Fault of Their Own” (see note 90 above).
Jeffrey Heller, “Israeli Justice Minister Yosef Lapid Compares Demolitions and Destruction of Palestinian Homes in Rafah Refugee Camp to Nazi Atrocities Against Jews During the Holocaust,” Reuters, May 23, 2004, http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20archives/2004%20News%20archives/May/23n/Israeli%20Justice%20Minister%20Yosef%20Lapid%20%20Compares%20Demolitions%20and%20Destruction%20of%20Palestinian%20homes%20in%20Rafah%20Refugee%20Camp%20to%20Nazi%20Atrocities%20Against%20Jews%20During%20the%20Holocaust.htm.
BBC World Service Poll, “Global Views of United States Improve While Other Countries Decline,” April 18, 2010, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbc2010_countries/.
As quoted in Aiza Hussain, Quotes from Hamas Leaders on Hamas, Israel, Palestinian Politics, July 19, 2006, http://www.fmep.org/analysis/articles/quotes_from_hamas_leaders_on_hamas _israel_and_Palestinian_politics.html.
Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, “Palestinian Public Opinion Poll #17,” September 28 2005, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p17a.html (accessed July 30, 2009); see also Charmaine Seitz, “Coming of Age: Hamas's Rise to Prominence in the Post-Oslo Era,” in Joel Beinin and Rebecca L. Stein, eds., The Struggle for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel, 1993–2005 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 113–117; and Tamimi, Hamas (see note 4 above).
See, for example, Rodney Dalton, “Arafat's ‘billion dollar stash,‘” The Australian, November 29, 2003, http://www.mafhoum.com/press6/171E19.htm.
Poll results are available at Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/2000/poll47a.html, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p17a.html, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/2000/poll46c.html, and http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/2000/poll46b.html; for 2009 data see: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2009/p32e.html.
For reports that Hamas leaders feared a U.S. and Israeli-backed coup by Fatah in Gaza, see David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” Vanity Fair, April 2008, http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/04/gaza200804.
As quoted in Ethan Bronner, ‘‘A Year Reshapes Hamas and Gaza,” The New York Times, June 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/world/middleeast/15gaza.html?pagewanted=all.
Matthew Gutman, “Destruction, Constructively Speaking,” The Jerusalem Post, January 9, 2003, 1.
Quoted in Laurie Copans, “Ex-Israeli Generals Denounce Checkpoints,” Fox News, February 13, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2008Feb13/0,4675,IsraelPalestinians,00.html.
Catignani (see note 5 above), 120.
For a representative view of this, see Yaakov Amidror, “Winning the Counterinsurgency War: The Israeli Experience,” JCPA Strategic Perspectives, 2008. A draft can be found at: http://spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=4174. Memoirs of key officials like General Yaalon share this perspective.
The best data on the drone campaign can be found at the “Long War Journal” website. See http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.
Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 4 (2004): 22.
The literature on deterrence is vast. Classic works include, but are by no means limited to, Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Alexander George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); and Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Library of Social Science, 1977).
See Stuart Cohen, Israel and Its Army: From Cohesion to Confusion (New York: Routledge, 2008).
This definition is drawn from Gabriel Ben-Dor, Daphna Canetti, and Eyal Lewin, The Social Component of National Resilience, briefing available at http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3054madadeyHaifaE.pdf.
Meir Elran, Societal Resilience: A Key Response to Severe Terrorism: The Israeli Perspective, July 7, 2010, briefing available at http://www.sicherheitundgesellschaft.uni-freiburg.de/workshopsymposium/elran/view?set_language=en.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, July 2008.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, June 2008.
Author's interview, Tel Aviv, June 2008.
For a discussion of how Israel managed this in the first 35 years of its existence, see Baruch Kimmerling, The Interrupted System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985). Kimmerling argues that Israel has been able to avoid dealing with the deeper causes of violence on the Palestinian side because of successful efforts to reduce the violence.
Author's interview with Meir Elran, July 2008.
Nadav Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 314.
For a breakdown of attitudes, see Ben-Dor, Canetti, and Lewin, “The Social Component of National Resilience” (note 108 above).
Author's interview, January 2008.
See Dan Horowitz, “The Israeli Concept of National Security,” in A. Yaniv, ed., National Security and Democracy in Israel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 11-40.
Ami Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 8.
See, for example, many of the Israeli viewpoints in The Camp David Summit—What Went Wrong?, eds. Shimon Shamir and Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); for a skeptical view of Arafat's commitment to peace, see Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Yasir Arafat: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
As quoted in International Crisis Group, “Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?” Middle East Report no. 79 (July 17, 2008): 26.
Nathan Brown, “Palestine: The Schism Deepens,” Web Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2009, 3, http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/08/20/palestine-schism-deepens/3v05; and “PA Security Commended for Anti-Hamas/Hizballah Actions,” Haaretz.com, May 5, 2009.
International Crisis Group, “Squaring the Circle: Palestinian Security Reform under Occupation,” Middle East Report no. 98 (September 7, 2010): 21–28, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/israel-palestine/98-squaring-the-circle-palestinian-security-reform-under-occupation.aspx; and Nathan Thrall, “Our Man in Palestine,” The New York Review of Books, October 14, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/our-man-palestine/?pagination=false.
Thrall, “Our Man in Palestine” (see note 123 above).
Mouin Rabbani, “A Hamas Perspective on the Movement's Evolving Role: An Interview with Khalid Mishal,” Journal of Palestine Studies 37, no. 4 (2008): 71.
International Crisis Group, “Squaring the Circle” (see note 123 above): 37.
“Former Heads of Shin Bet Reflect on Israel's Present and Future,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 2 (2003): 184.
See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
“Former Israeli Shin Bet Head Speaks Up for Peace,” Le Monde, December 22, 2001, http://www.lemonde.fr/cgibin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=734279&xtmc=paix&xtcr=10.
Quoted in International Crisis Group, “Ruling Palestine II”: 12.
Charles Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): 654.
See in particular Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington, DC: USIP, 2006).
For a description of this ethos, see Yaakov Hasdai, “Doers and Thinkers in the IDF,” The Jerusalem Quarterly 24 (1982): 14 and Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel” (see note 131 above).
Thrall, “Our Man in Palestine” (see note 123 above).