Notes

[1] Sartre (1958 Sartre, J-P. 1958. Existentialism and humanism (P. Mairet, Trans.), London: Methuen.  [Google Scholar]) wrote that “there is no human nature. Man first of all exists … and defines himself afterwards” (p. 28).

[2] For a discussion of Buller's criticisms, see Machery and Barrett (2006 Machery, E and Barrett, C. 2006. Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science, 73: 232–246. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]).

[3] I owe this analogy to Paul Griffiths.

[4] For a related point, see Griffiths (1999 Griffiths, PE. 1999. “Squaring the circle: Natural kinds with historical essences”. In Species: New interdisciplinary essays, Edited by: Wilson, RA. 209–228. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  [Google Scholar]). In contrast to Griffiths, however, I do not single out the relation of descent as the main source of generalizations among humans.

[5] I am grateful to Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz for pressing me on this point.

[6] The nomological notion of human nature is thus defended on pragmatic grounds. I should note that I am strongly attracted by the alternative proposal sketched by Griffiths and by Stotz.

[7] From an old French advertisement for the ginger-ale soda Canada Dry: “It looks like alcohol, it has the taste of alcohol, but isn't”.

[8] This is of course not to deny that social learning, or indeed any other environmental influence, can be part of the explanation of the development of this trait.

[9] I do not mean to suggest that evolutionary processes causally contribute only to those traits that are common among humans. I focus on traits that are common among humans, because being common among humans is a necessary condition for being part of human nature, according to the notion developed in this article.