1. Special Operations Command Annual Report 2005 (United States Department of Defense), p. 4. 〈Available at www.socom.mil〉.

2. Colin Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes On Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?” Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 2–23.

3. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1978), pp. 53–79.

4. David Thomas, “The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82,” Journal of Contemporary History 18, no. 4 (October 1983): 709.

5. Ibid.

6. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes On Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?” 2–7.

7. Thomas, “The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82,” 709.

8. Bryan D. Brown, “U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 38.

9. Leroy Thompson, Secret Techniques of the Elite Forces (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), p. 21.

10. Bryan D. Brown, “U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Joint Forces Quarterly (1st Quarter 2006): 38.

11. Thomas, “The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82,” 704.

12. Initially, the United States and the Soviet Union abided by the 1962 Geneva treaty. The NVA, however, never evacuated from Laos. In 1965, President Johnson begrudgingly allowed U.S. Studies and Observation Group (SOG) personnel to reenter Laos. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), p. 1–100.

13. Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 37.

14. Michael Lee Lanning, Blood Warriors: American Military Elites (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), p. 110–112.

15. The program identified and removed Viet Cong infrastructure in the South. The program utilized a variety of methods, including hunter-killer teams, pseudoforces, direct action raids, sting operations, assassinations, and intensive intelligence gathering missions and arrests. The results were stunning, with over 26,000 Viet Cong agents and supporters killed, 33,000 captured, and 22,000 “turned.” Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 310–311.

16. One incident involved eight Special Forces soldiers who were ordered by the CIA to eliminate a South Vietnamese double agent. The soldiers were arrested for murder but the CIA refused to produce witnesses, citing security reasons, and the case was dropped. Later media stories claimed that SOF members had been involved in the assassination of over three hundred Vietnamese officials suspected of treason. Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1975), p. 1314–1316.

17. The British strategic hamlet program was intended to separate the population from the insurgents by physically relocating the former to areas under protection. This was suppose to prevent insurgents from engaging in recruitment, intimidation, or obtaining supplies from the population. In Vietnam, the concept also called for the army to “clear and hold” the area until local defense could be built up and security restored and maintained. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, p. 1006–1007.

18. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, p. 70.

19. Jonathan Graff, United States Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Implementation in Iraq (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2004), p. 42.

20. Colonel John D. Waghelstein, “What's Wrong in Iraq? Or Ruminations of a Pachyderm,” Military Review (January–February 2006): 114.

21. James E. Hayes III, Honing the Dagger: The Formation of a Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 26, 2005), p. 4.

22. Philip E. Kapusta, A Comparison of U.S. Navy Sea Air Land (SEAL) Teams and U.S. Army Special Forces (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2000), p. 5.

23. At Entebbe, Israeli SOF rescued all but three of 106 captives aboard a hijacked airliner. West German SOF at Mogadishu successfully rescued all 86 hostages aboard a Lufthansa plane. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 98.

24. Lanning, Blood Warriors: American Military Elites, pp. 122–133, 168–171. Originally, the Navy's SMU was called SEAL TEAM Six but has undergone a series of name changes, most recently becoming Naval Special Wafare Developmenit Group (DevGroup).

25. Terry Griswold and D.M. Giangreco, DELTA: America's Elite Counterterrorist Force (Osceola: Motorbooks International, 1992), p. 13.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Billy Waugh and Tim Keown, Hunting The Jackal: A Special Forces and CIA Soldier's Fifty Years on the Frontlines of the War Against Terrorism (New York: Avon Books, 2004), pp. 156–160; Richard Shultz Jr., “Nine reasons why we never sent our Special Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11,” The Weekly Standard 9, no. 19 (January 26, 2004).

29. Jamie Hammond, “Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready And Precise,” Canadian Military Journal (Autumn 2004): 19–20.

30. Special Operation in US Strategy, eds. Frank R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, & Richard H. Shultz (New York: National Defense University Press, National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1984), p. 1–9.

31. Garry Leech, “Latin America-Style Dirty War in Iraq?” NACLA Report on the Americas 37, no. 4 (January/February 2004): 7.

32. Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 358–359.

33. These units rescued downed pilots, “spotted for aerial fires, assisted Arab Coalition brigades and battalions in working with the Americans, aided Kuwaiti resistance, checked out potential landing beaches, ran deceptive missions, and conducted psychological warfare appeals by broadcast and leaflet.” Daniel P. Bolger, Death Ground: Today's American Infantry in Battle (New York: Ballantine Books, 1999), p. 186.

34. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 244.

35. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 417–419.

36. Gordon, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, p. 244.

37. The Iraqis had two launch systems: fixed and mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), which they were quite sophisticated at hiding. The terrain that the SOF teams covered was not only harsh but also extensive. The area of operations was Western Iraq, roughly 29,000 square miles. SOF teams used specially modified (silenced engines) HMMVs and dune buggies that were delivered by helicopter for mobility. The British SAS had discovered the perils of operating without vehicles and recommended to their American counterparts that they use lightly armed and rapid forms of transportation. However, despite the increased mobility, locating mobile launchers proved to be a daunting task. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, pp. 418–420; James F. Dunningan and William Morrow, From Shield to Storm (New York: Austin Bay, 1992), p. 372.

38. Austin Bay, From Shield to Storm (New York: James F. Dunnigan and William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992), p. 259–261.

39. Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace With America's Military (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), p. 1–25.

40. George F. Will, “A Rehearsal for Killing Osama,” Newsweek 138, no. 16 (October 15, 2001): 76.

41. Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 64.

42. Central Spike was a further evolution of the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), a clandestine military intelligence unit specializing in tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) that supported SOF on numerous clandestine and covert operations. Jeffrey T. Richelson, “‘Truth Conquers All Chains’: The U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1981–1989.” International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence 12, no. 2 (April 1999): 169.

43. Ibid.

44. Michael Kennedy, “From Pablo to Osama: Counter-terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs,” Survival 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 187–188.

45. David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats,” Strategic Forum 219 (National Defense University, January 2006): 5.

46. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, xvii.

47. Armando J. Ramirez, From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Evolution of US Army Special Forces From 1995–2004 (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, September 2004), p. 35.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. John Rudy and Ivan Eland, “Special Operations Military Training Abroad and Its Dangers,” CATO Institute: Foreign Policy Briefing 53 (June 22, 1999). Available at 〈www.cato.org〉.

51. Dana Priest, The Mission, p. 14–17.

52. Ibid., p. 1–35.

53. “Counterproliferation is distinguished from nonproliferation in that it emphasizes military rather than diplomatic approaches to addressing WMD threats. It includes pure military deterrence, efforts to discourage foreign governments from acquiring unconventional weapons, and using pre-emptive military force to strike weapons, but also includes cooperative threat reduction, troop defense and incident management.” David Ruppe, “After 10-Year Effort, U.S. Has Much to Do to Improve WMD Defense, Conferees Say,” NTI: Global Security Newswire (December 9, 2003), 〈http://www.nti.org/d-newswire/issues/2003/12/9/cc211b28-e129-454f-87ea-c80d03a85ae1.html〉.

54. David C. Isby, Leave No Man Behind (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), p. 295–314.

55. The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 134–137.

56. David C. Isby, Leave No Man Behind (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2004), p. 295–314; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 497–501.

57. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. “Special Operations Forces after Kosovo,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring/Summer 2001): 6.

58. Adrian Erckenbrack, “Transformation: Role and Missions for ARSOF,” Special Warfare 15, no. 4 (December 2002): 3–8.

59. Dunnigan, The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of U.S. Warfare, pp. 200–241.

60. Eric Micheletti, Special Forces: War on Terrorism In Afghanistan (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2003), p. 4–5.

61. Hammond, “Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready And Precise,” 25.

62. Ibid.

63. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First Blush Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), p. 19.

64. Linda Williams, Intelligence Support to Special Operations in the Global War on Terrorism (Carlise, PA: Army War College, May 3, 2004), p. 1–15.

65. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Special Operations: Force Multiplier in Anti-Terror War,” United States Department of Defense (March 12, 2004). Available at 〈http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n0312204-200403124.html〉.

66. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, “On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Center for Army Lessons Learned (26 May 2004). Available online at 〈http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/intro.htm〉.

67. Sean D. Naylor, “More than door-kickers: Special op forces misused as man-hunters, critics say,” Armed Forces Journal (March 8, 2006).

68. Thom Shanker, “Study Is Said to Find Overlap in U.S. Counterterrorist Effort,” New York Times (March 18, 2006).

69. Michael Vickers, “Implementing GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee, March 15, 2006.

70. Sean D. Naylor, “SpecOps beset by Command Confusion,” Army Times, March 3, 2006.

71. Dick Couch, “Shore Up SOF,” Proceedings (January 2005): 38.

72. Thomas W. O'Connell, “Statement of the Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict,” testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 5, 2006.

73. Fred L. Shultz, “MarSOC: Just Call Them Marines,” Proceedings 132 (January 2006): 50.

74. Eric Schmitt, Intelligence Journal (March 30, 2004): 8.

75. Richard Lardner, “SoCom Gets $168 Million To Retain Its Commandos,” Tampa Tribune (March 21, 2005); Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Sets Bonuses to Retain Members of Special Operations,” The New York Times (February 5, 2005): Section 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk: 10.

76. Stephen Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 24, 2004), pp. 1–22; Hammond, “Special Operations Forces: Relevant, Ready And Precise,” 20.

77. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006.

78. Thomas W. O'Connell, “Statement of the Honorable Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict,” testimony before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 5, 2006.

79. Kalev L. Sepp, “The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional to Unconventional,” Special Warfare (September, 2002): 34–35.

80. John Arquilla, “A Better Way to Fight the War on Terror: Mobile ‘Hunter Networks’ are the Right Strategy to Combat Guerrilla Fighters,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 28, 2004.

81. PRTs are made up of civilians, Afghan military officials, and military personnel, including SOF personnel, primarily Civil Affairs soldiers and in some regions SF, to provide local security while local civic programs are conducted. The PRT model is not without problems, but despite its limited budget and personnel it is viewed as successful; a similar program is being developed for Iraq. Robert Perito, “Hearts & Minds Model?” Armed Forces Journal March 2, 2006; Vance Serchuk, “Hearts and Minds: Innovative Teams are Building Goodwill at the Grass-roots Level,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2, 2006.

82. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, p. 191–296.

83. Kenneth M. Pollack, A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for America in Iraq (The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, February 2006), 28.

84. “CSIS Expands Look at Possible Pentagon Reforms with Special Ops Study,” Inside the Air Force 17, no. 10 (March 10, 2006).

85. Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, “Statement of Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, Deputy Commander Special Operations Command,” testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on the Capability and Force Structure of the United States Special Operations Command to More Effectively Combat Terrorism, April 5, 2006.

86. Cohen, Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, p. 95–96.

87. Christian M. Karsner, “21st-Century Relevance of Mao's Theory on Popular Support in Guerilla Warfare,” Special Warfare 17, no. 3 (February 2005): 32; Adrian Erckenbrack, “Transformation: Role and Missions for ARSOF,” 3–8.

88. Jack C. Zeigler Jr., The Army Special Operations Forces Role in Force Projection (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 2003).

89. Melissa Block and Vicky O'Hara, “Pentagon Sending Special Ops to U.S. Embassies,” National Public Radio NPR, March 8, 2006.

90. Robinson, Masters of Chaos, p. 363.