¹The major national security statement released by the Bush administration in September 2002 is perhaps the most transparent indicator that the United States will seek to maintain its dominant position over other great powers (three of which are identified: China, India, and Russia) or any other challengers, particularly on p. 30 of the document: “The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy—whether state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends,” and “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. In July 2002, the United States government released two other reports noting the growth of Chinese power, the United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China July 2002; and U.S.-China Commission, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, July 2002, available at http://www.uscc.gov/anrp.htm

²Ambassador Sha Zukang, “U.S. Missile Defence Plans: China's View,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 43 (January/February 2000), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd43/43usnmd.htm. In 2000, the ambassador was the Director-General of the Department of Disarmament and Arms Control at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conception that the U.S. is hegemonic and aggressive seems to be widely shared among the population. This is reflected in Chinese commentary on the Iraq War. One individual, identified as 40-year-old bureaucrat Wang Ping of Beijing, declared: “I hope Iraq can defeat the U.S. with a surprise move, teaching it a lesson and making it less aggressive and arrogant in the world.” Another citizen remarked at the Strong Country Forum website run by the People's Daily: “Now the United States wants to invade Iraq, but next time it might want to attack China.” Both remarks are quoted in Geoffrey York, “Chinese Rooting for Iraq in Possible Conflict with U.S.” The Globe and Mail, October 10, 2002, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/PEstory/TGAM/20021010/UCHINN/Headlines/headdex/headdexInternational_temp/3/3/24/ China was also instrumental in creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—involving China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—to advance its interests in Central Asia while seeking to prevent the growth of U.S. influence there. Obviously, 9/11 caused an expansion of the U.S. presence, to the chagrin of China.

³“American Empire Steps Up Fourth Expansion: News Analysis,” People's Daily, March 12, 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/11/eng20030311_113105.shtml

⁴The 8% estimates are from the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook—China, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html. The 2001 estimate is from the United States Department of Energy's Energy Information Agency, “Country Analysis Briefs—China,” June 2002 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/china.html.

⁵Literature that emphasizes accommodation with China includes Michael O'Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 25 (Fall 2000): pp. 51–86; Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, “China's Hollow Military,” The National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1999): pp. 56–62; Joseph S. Nye, “China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific,” Survival, vol. 39 (Winter 1997–1998): pp. 65–79; Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” International Security, vol. 23 (Spring 1999): pp. 81–118; and Ross, “Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong,” The National Interest, no. 49 (Fall 1997): pp. 42–51. For research that is more pessimistic about the relationship, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming Conflict with America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (March/April 1997): pp. 18–32; Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000); David Shambaugh, “Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” Survival, vol. 42 (Spring 2000): pp. 97–115. Thomas Christensen's scholarship submits that China could be a significant problem for the United States at the present time, if it pursues asymmetric strategies, such as using information warfare or working to undermine U.S. alliances. See Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems with Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security, vol. 25 (Spring 2001): pp. 5–40. Also informative is Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, vol. 23 (Spring 1999): pp. 49–80. For an excellent analysis of how the September 11^th terrorist attacks affect Sino-American relations see Aaron L. Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,” Survival, vol. 44 (Spring 2002): pp. 33–50.

⁶United States Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 2002, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. The purchasing power parity method of analyzing economic size converts Gross National Income into international dollars.

⁷Data are from the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables3_4.html. In 2004, the United States consumed 20 million bbl/d and produced 9.0 million bbl/d for a net import of 9.8 million bbl/d. Japan consumed 5.4 million bbl/d, and produced 0.1 million bbl/d, for a net import of 5.6 million bbl/d.

⁸Energy Information Agency, “Country Analysis Briefs—China,” June 2003 at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/china.html.

⁹Oil and gas proven reserves as of January 1, 2002. Data drawn from United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “South China Sea Region,” March 2002, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/schina2.html. However, estimates of petroleum and gas reserves vary widely. China has claimed that there are 213 billion barrels in the South China Sea.

¹⁰Russian domestic consumption is static at around four million barrels per day, while production is rising at about 10% a year, and is already running at over 8.1 million barrels per day. So Russia must export oil if it is to be sold profitably. Export capacity at the moment is only 3.5 million barrels per day. By the year 2012, most forecasts indicate that Russian oil output will be 11.5 million barrels per day, and so export capacity must be greatly increased.

¹¹In July 2003 the Three Gorges Dam began producing electricity for China's electrical grid.

¹²An excellent assessment of whether China will be able to accomplish such a transformation is Frederick S. Tipton, “China and the Information Revolution,” in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 231–265.

¹³Zhu is quoted in David Murphy, “Aiming for the Top,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 19, 2002, p. 27.

¹⁴Murphy, “Aiming for the Top,” p. 27.

¹⁵Tony Allison, “Indians Take IT Battle into Dragon's Den,” Asia Times Online, September 19, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI19Df06.html.

¹⁶Terho Uimonen, “Who Needs China?” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 18 2002, p. 35.

¹⁷Tony Allison, “China Ready for Indian Invasion,” Asia Times Online, September 20, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI20Df06.html.

¹⁸Allison, “China Ready for Indian Invasion,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI20Df06.html.

¹⁹Murphy, “Aiming for the Top,” p. 30.

²⁰Murphy, “Aiming for the Top,” p. 28.

²¹Tsering Namgyal, “What Is Next for Taiwan and China?” Asia Times Online, October 3, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DJ03Ad04.html.

²²Uimonen, “Who Needs China?” p. 35. The used equipment Taiwanese companies would transfer to China will produce chips on 200-millimeter wafers with circuitry measuring 0.25 micron or thicker. In contrast, advanced plants make 300-millimeter wafers with circuitry of 0.13 micron and finer. Uimonen, “Who Needs China?” p. 36.

²³Murray Hiebert with Ben Dolven, “How U.S. Fears Hurt Business,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 29, 2002, p. 13.

²⁴Hiebert with Dolven, “How U.S. Fears Hurt Business,” p. 15.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷See Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security, vol. 26 (Fall 2001): pp. 45–86.

²⁸Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chained Gangs or Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, vol. 44 (Spring 1990): pp. 138–168.

²⁹All data are from 2003. Source for all data is International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³⁰Ramtanu Maitra, “US-Indian Ties: An Adept Adaptation,” Asia Times Online, October 8, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DJ08Df07.html.

³¹Chinese have made attempts to improve their relationship with India. During prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's six-day visit to China in June 2003, both sides made progress on border disputes. The Chinese implicitly recognized the Changgu of Sikkim as part of India, with the quid pro quo being Tibet. Both stated the need to end the mistrust that characterizes the relationship, each preferring “healthy competition” between them to a “divisive rivalry.” Of course, significant issues, including disagreements over borders and Chinese aid to Pakistan and its warming relationship with Bangladesh, still mar the relationship.

³²Quoted in Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Militaries Meet As Indian-U.S. Relations Warm,” Defense News, November 4–10, 2002, p. 21.

³³Russia now supplies about 70% of India's weapons imports so this would be a major loss for its arms industries and a concomitant boom for Israel's. Stephen Blank, “Indian Defense Policy in Major Transition,” Asia Times Online, July 29, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EG29Df01.html.

³⁴Matthew Smith, “Cross-Strait Links: US Muddies the Waters,” Asia Times Online, October 8, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DJ08Ad01.html.

³⁵Allen S. Whiting, “China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 26 (Fall 2001): pp. 103–131.

³⁶Whiting, “China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” p. 130.

³⁷The Shanghai Communiqué states that the “United States Government does not challenge” that “There is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” Joint United States-China Communiqué, Shanghai, China, February 27, 1972.

³⁸ Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. Public Law 96-8, 96^th Cong., 1^st Session, April 10, 1979.

³⁹I use KMT because Wade-Giles romanization is used by Taiwan, or Guomintang (GMT) using the PRC's pinyin romanization.

⁴⁰It appears that the operations at the Linkou facility were absorbed by Yangmingshan after 1985.

⁴¹According to Desmond Ball, an agreement was reached in February 1998 between Beijing and Havana leading to the establishment of two facilities in Cuba. Both have operated since early 1999. The first is just south of Havana at Bejucal and appears to be concerned with intercepting telephone conversations in the U.S. Also, there is a cyber warfare unit of the Chinese military. The second is northeast of Santiago de Cuba, and reportedly intercepts satellite communications of the U.S. military. It is believed that China also has intelligence facilities in Myanmar. Hamish McDonald, “Beijing Spies a Useful Friend in Castro,” The Age, February 27, 2003, http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/02/26/1046064102910.html. On the ELINT capabilities of the Shenzhou see Desmond Ball, “China Pursues Space-Based Intelligence Gathering Capabilities,” Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 15 (December 2003): pp. 36–39.

⁴²Two years after they were promised, the Pentagon suggested to Taipei that it purchase used Spanish or Italian diesel-electric submarines as a stopgap measure until it would begin producing the eight advanced diesel-electric boats envisioned in the arms agreement in 2012. Jason Sherman, “Pentagon Suggests Taiwan Shop for Used European Sub,” Defense News, July 14, 2003, p. 3.

⁴³Laurence Eyton, “The Price of Taiwan's Defense,” Asia Times Online, October 2, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DJ02Ad01.html.

⁴⁴Anonymous sources quoted in Eyton, “The Price of Taiwan's Defense.” The Taiwanese wanted to deploy the Aegis radar system on their eight Cheng Kung (U.S. Perry) class frigates but political pressure from China caused the U.S. to refuse the transfer.

⁴⁵Significant minority groups are Zhuang, Manchu, Hui, Miao, Uighur, Yi, Mongolian, Tibetan, Buyi, and Korean. Numbers are from the U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: China,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2742.htm.

⁴⁶The figure is from the U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: China,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2742.htm.

⁴⁷Erkin Dolat, “Washington Betrays China's Uighurs,” Asia Times Online, September 5, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DI05Ad03.htm.

⁴⁸The figure is from the U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: China,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2742.htm. Some Tibetan human rights organizations provide a higher number, about 6 million Tibetans in China.

⁴⁹Two excellent accounts are Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA's Secret War in Tibet (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002); and Thomas Laird, Into Tibet: The CIA's First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa (New York: Grove Press, 2002).

⁵⁰U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2002), p. 2; and “China's Defense Spending Shoots Up 9.6%,” Asia Times Online, March 8, 2003 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EC08Ad03.htm.

⁵¹U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2003), p. 5.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China [2002], p. 13.

⁵⁴U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China [2002], pp. 14–15.

⁵⁵For a discussion of sea control and sea denial strategies see Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 40–41. “Blue water” power projection is usually defined as at least fifteen hundred miles.

⁵⁶Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 10–11. Cole provides an exceptional analysis of the PLAN's establishment, growth, force structure, doctrine, and operations.

⁵⁷U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, p. 4.

⁵⁸John Hill, “China Offended by U.S. ‘Threat’ Theory,” Jane's Intelligence Review, September 2002, p. 47.

⁵⁹Douglas Barrie, “Chinese Air Force in Throes of Cultural Revolution,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 4, 2002, pp. 55–57.

⁶⁰Michal Fiszer and Jerzy Gruszczynski, “PRC Launches Ambitious Stealth Fighter Program,” The Journal of Electronic Defense, vol. 26 (February 2003): p. 24.

⁶¹U.S. pressure on Israel resulted in the termination of the Phalcon airborne early warning aircraft project, where an Israeli AEW suite was placed on a Chinese (Ilyushin Il-76) air-frame.

⁶²U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), p. 4.

⁶³Quoted in Alan Boyd, “U.S. Politicking in Asia to Rein in China,” Asia Times Online, May 15, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EE15Ad01.htm.

⁶⁴In the first stage, U.S. troops will move from about 15 bases near the DMZ to two major bases, Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud north of Seoul. In the second phase, the troops will move to unspecified “key hubs” south of the Han River and at least 75 miles south of the DMZ.

⁶⁵Of course, bases in the Pacific are important for China as well in order to defeat the designs of the United States. The U.S. watches with significant concern the establishment of a Chinese “satellite tracking station” in Kiribati in the central Pacific—now reportedly closed—and the growing economic relationships with other states in Micronesia.

⁶⁶Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002).

⁶⁷These arguments are advanced in Owen R. Coté, Jr., The Future of the Trident Force: Enabling Access in Access-Constrained Environments (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Security Studies Program, 2002); and Coté, Assuring Access and Projecting Power: The Navy in the New Security Environment (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Security Studies Program, 2001).

⁶⁸Details of the incident are provided in Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” The Washington Times, September 27, 2002, http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020927-99893286.htm.

⁶⁹For an exceptional analysis of the Sino-Indian nuclear deterrent relationship, see Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), pp. 58–75.

⁷⁰National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassified ballisticmissilefinal.htm.

⁷¹U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, p. 27.

⁷²Cited in Whiting, “China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan,” pp. 129–130.

⁷³Susan V. Lawrence, “They Just Fade Away,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 8, 2002, pp. 26–27.

⁷⁴See Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 84–85.

⁷⁵National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassified ballisticmissilefinal.htm

⁷⁶U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China [2003], p. 31.

⁷⁷National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassified ballisticmissilefinal.htm.

⁷⁸Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 40.

⁷⁹Geoffrey Forden, “Strategic Uses for China's Bei Dou Satellite System,” Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 15 (October 2003): pp. 26–31.

⁸⁰The ranges of Chinese missiles are taken from Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases, p. 38.

⁸¹Jing-dong Yuan, “US vs. China: A New Cold War?” Asia Times Online, September 28, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DI28Ad02.html.

⁸²Wade L. Huntley, “Missile Defense: More May Be Better—for China,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 9 (Summer 2002): pp. 68–81.

⁸³An excellent analysis is O'Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” pp. 51–86.

⁸⁴Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” The Washington Times, July 4, 2003, http:dynamic.washtimes.com/StoryID = 20030703-114654-2110r.