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Survival

Global Politics and Strategy

Volume 50, 2008 - Issue 2

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Arranging Iraq

The Anbar Awakening

Pages 67-94
Published online: 25 Mar 2008
 
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The United States and it allies in Iraq have embraced a tribal strategy to provide security and fight al–Qaeda in Mesopotamia. This approach is not new. Saddam Hussein also sought to use tribal alliances to provide internal security. His experience, and that of the present–day Coalition, demonstrates the prospects and perils of using tribes to provide security. Tension exists between the United States’ two main strategic goals of defeating al–Qaeda in Mesopotamia and building a democratic, unified Iraq. There is also the danger that Iraqi tribes will defect from the Coalition in future.

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Author information

Austin Long

Austin Long is an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Notes

1 ‘Al‐Qaeda in Mesopotamia’ and ‘Anbar Salvation Council’ (ASC) are the terms used throughout this paper, though both groups are known by other names. Al‐Qaeda in Mesopotamia is more officially ‘The Organisation of al‐Qaeda (the Base) in the Land of Two Rivers’ and has overlapping and often interchangeable membership with the Mujahedin Shura Council, the Islamic State of Iraq, and Jamaat al‐Tahwid Wa al‐Jihad (Group for Monotheism and Holy War). The Anbar Salvation Council is also referred to as the ‘Sahawa al‐Anbar’ (Anbar Awakening) or more recently ‘Sahawa al‐Iraq’ (Iraq Awakening), often abbreviated SAA and SAI.

2 See Albert Hourani, ‘Conclusion: Tribes and States in Islamic History’, in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 304–6.

3 Abbas Kelidar provides a concise summary of the historical weakness of the Iraqi state in ‘States without Foundation: The Political Evolution of State and Society in the Arab East’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 28, no. 2, April 1993, pp. 315–39.

4 See Hosham Dawood, ‘The ‘State‐ization of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: the Case of Iraq’, in Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (eds), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003), pp. 115–16.

5 This summary is drawn from Faleh Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Tribes Under Patrimonial Totalitarianism in Iraq, 1968–1998’, in Jabar and Dawood, pp. 103–5.

6 s See Ibid., pp. 85–8.

7 Ibid., p. 87.

8 See Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East.

9 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 75–8; and Amal Vinogradov, ‘The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered: The Role of Tribes in National Politics’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, April 1972, pp.123–39.

10 See Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 75–9. For a much more detailed account, see Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).

11 Amatzia Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies, 1991–1996’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, February 1997, p. 1.

12 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues,’ pp. 80–3.

13 Jabar refers to this as ‘etatist tribalism’. Ibid., pp. 69 and 79–80.

14 See James Quinlivan, ‘Coup‐proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, International Security, vol. 24, no. 2, Autumn 1999, pp. 131–65.

15 See ‘Islamists’ Electoral Disaster’, Economist Intelligence Unit, 22 November 2007, http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10178007.

16 Mordechai Tamarkin, ‘The Roots of Political Stability in Kenya’, African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 308, July 1978, pp. 300–1.

17 Samuel Decalo, ‘Modalities of Civil‐Military Stability in Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 27, no. 4, December 1989, p. ⁁y.

18 See ‘Going Up or Down?’, The Economist, 7 June 2007, http://www.economist.com/world/africa/ displaystory.cfm?story_id=9304146, for comments on the continued importance of tribe in Kenyan politics.

19 Mark Fineman, ‘Militias Reflect Tribal Splits’, Los Angeles Times, 1 October 1989; and Charles Dunbar, ‘Afghanistan in 1986: The Balance Endures’, Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 2, February 1987, pp. 128 and 134–5.

20 Mark Fineman, ‘Powerful Militia Unit in Open Revolt Against Kabul Regime’, Los Angeles Times, 15 March 1992; Mark Fineman, ‘Afghan Leader Forced Out by Army, Rebels’, Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1992; and Shah Tarzi, ‘Afghanistan in 1992: A Hobbesian State of Nature’, Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 2, February 1993, pp. 165–6.

21 See Asaf Hussain, ‘Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan’, Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 10, October 1976, pp. 925–30; ‘Turning a Fight into a War’, The Economist, 29 June 2006, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7121811; and ‘The Frontier Spirit’, The Economist, 13 December 2006, http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8413130.

22 For example, see Mohammed Bin Sallam, ‘Sa'ada War Due to Break Out as Mediation Committee Ceased Work’, Yemen Times, 11 November 2007, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1102&p=local&a=1; and ‘Calm Returns to Shabwa Following Clash between Government and Bilharith Tribe’, Yemen Times, 9 November 2007, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1102&p=local&a=4.

23 Michael Slackman and Mohammed Al‐Asadi, ‘German Family is Kidnapped by Yemeni Tribe’, New York Times, 29 December 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/29/interna‐tional/middleeast/29yemen.html.

24 On CIDG, see Francis Kelly, US Army Special Forces 1961–1971 (Washington DC: Center for Military History, 1973), chapters 3, 5, and 6; and Thomas Ahern, CIA and Rural Pacification in South Vietnam (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), chapters 3, 5 and pp. 179–82.

25 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 5.

26 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 81–3.

27 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, pp. 3–4.

28 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 5.

29 Keiko Sakai, ‘Tribalization as a Tool of State Control in Iraq: Observations on the Army, the Cabinets, and the National Assembly’, in Jabar and Dawood, p. 152; Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 7; and Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, p. 90.

30 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 88–9.

31 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 7; Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 92–3; and David Wurmser, ‘Coping with Crumbling States: A Western and Israeli Balance of Power Strategy for the Levant’, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies Research Paper, December 1996, pp. 9–10. For more on the regime's efforts to provide internal security, see Kevin Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2005), p. 48.

32 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, pp. 12–13.

33 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 95–6.

34 Woods et al., p. 52.

35 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, pp. 97–9.

36 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, pp. 5–6.

37 Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, p. 99–100; Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 6; and Wurmser, pp. 10–11.

38 Baram, ‘Neo‐tribalism’, p. 6; and Jabar, ‘Sheikhs and Ideologues’, p. 100.

39 Woods et al., pp. 113–14.

40 Woods et al., p. 102.

41 Much of the following discussion is informed by the author's observations in Iraq from August to December 2007; conversations with US military and intelligence‐community personnel who have served in Anbar; and discussions with Carter Malkasian of the Center for Naval Analyses, who was an adviser to the Marine Expeditionary Force in Anbar.

42 On the importance of smuggling to many of the tribes, see Nir Rosen, ‘Fallujah: Inside the Iraqi Resistance’, Asia Times, 15 July 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/others/Fallujah.html; and Leila Fadel, ‘Iraqi Tribal, US Relations Could Spell Success or Disaster’, McClatchy Newspapers, 13 June 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/leila_fadel/story/i689o.html. On disputes over revenues between tribes and al‐Qaeda in Mesopotamia, see Carter Malkasian, ‘A Thin Blue Line in the Sand’, Democracy, no. 5, Summer 2007, p. 55.

43 On the strategic use of violence in insurgency, see Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Stathis Kalyvas, ‘Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres in Algeria’, Rationality and Society, vol. 11, no. 3, 1999.

44 See Malkasian, ‘Thin Blue Line’, p. 55; and Hannah Allam and Mohammed al‐Dulaimy, ‘Marine‐led Campaign Killed Friends and Foes, Iraqi Leaders Say’, McClatchy Newspapers, 16 May 2005, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/staff/hannah_allam/story/11656.html.

45 See Allam and al‐Dulaimy, ‘Marine‐led Campaign’; and Ellen Nickmeyer, ‘Looking for Battle, Marines Find That Foes Have Fled; Hunt for Foreign Insurgents Proves Frustrating but Deadly’, Washington Post, 16 May 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/05/15/AR2005051500785_pf.html.

46 Ellen Nickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, ‘Insurgents Assert Control Over Town Near Syrian Border’, Washington Post, 6 September 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/09/05/AR2005090500313.html.

47 Ellen Nickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, ‘US Warplanes Target Alleged Rebel Havens Along Iraq‐Syria Border’, Washington Post, 31 August 2005.

48 See Carter Malkasian, ‘Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq?’ Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 46, Summer 2007, p. 124; and John Ward Anderson, ‘U.S. Widens Offensive in Far Western Iraq’, Washington Post, 15 November 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/11/14/AR2005111400979.html.

49 Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, ‘Iraqi Sunnis Battle To Defend Shiites’, Washington Post, 14 August 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/08/13/AR2005081301209.html.

50 Jonathan Finer and Ellen Nickmeyer, ‘Sunni Leaders Attacked in Iraq’, Washington Post, 19 August 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2005/08/18/AR2005081800330.html.

51 Hala Jaber, ‘Sunni Leader Killed for Joining Ceasefire Talks’, Times, 5 February 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article727041.ece.

52 Declassified, translated internal al‐Qaeda in Mesopotamia document; available from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/IZ‐060316–01‐Trans.pdf.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid. For example, the document mentions Mazhar al‐'Alawani, ‘a candidate for the elections': ‘His pictures were all over Ramadi, where the entire Albu'Alwan tribe was supporting him, proud of him, one day before the elections, the brothers killed him while he was visiting Ramadi, no one from his tribe opened his mouth, instead they got more scared and weaker.'

56 On Special Forces and Albu Nimr, see Ann Scott Tyson, ‘In a Volatile Region of Iraq, US Military Takes Two Paths’, Washington Post, 15 September 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2006/09/14/AR2006091401900.html.

57 See the document cited in note 52 and another declassified, translated internal al‐Qaeda in Mesopotamia document, available from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/IZ‐060316–02‐Trans.pdf.

58 See Greg Jaffe, ‘Tribal Connections: How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq’, Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 118653546614491198.html; and Mark Kukis, ‘Turning Iraq's Tribes Against Al‐Qaeda’, Time, 26 December 2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1572796,00.html.

59 See Malkasian, ‘Thin Blue Line’, p. 55 ; Steve Schippert, ‘This is Counterterrorism, Senator’, National Review Online, 25 April 2007, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NGI4ODY3ZGZmOGM1NGMwMWM3MjgwZDYxMWU5OTQ5ZTI=.

60 Malkasian, ‘Thin Blue Line,’ pp. 55–6.

61 Nancy Youssef and Leila Fadel, ‘Critics: Arming Sunni Militias Undercuts Iraqi Government’, McClatchy Newspapers, 17 June 2007, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/world/story/16989.html; Alexandra Zavis, ‘US Courts Sheikhs in Hussein Terrain’, Los Angeles Times, 14 November 2007; and David Mays, ‘Concerned Local Citizens Vastly Improve Security in Iraq's Diyala Province’, American Forces Press Service, 12 October 2007, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47783.

62 Kim Gamel, ‘Sheikhs Ponder Expanding Anbar Model’, Oakland Tribune, 16 September 2007.

63 Joshua Partlow and John Ward Anderson, ‘Tribal Coalition in Anbar Said to Be Crumbling’, Washington Post, 10 June 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001453.html.

64 See Tyson, ‘In a Volatile Region of Iraq, US Military Takes Two Paths’.

65 See Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (The Duelfer Report), vol. 1, ‘Front Company Conglomerates: Al‐Eman and Al‐Handal’, https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general‐reports‐1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html.

66 See Kirk Semple, ‘Iraqi Says He Plans to Convene Parliament’, New York Times, 12 April 2006, http://www.ny times.com/2006/04/13/world/13iraq.html; and Suleiman al‐Khalidi, ‘Interview: Iraqi Rebels Reject Anti‐Qaeda Pact‐Tribal Leader,’ Reuters, 23 March 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL23556078.

67 Private communication, Iraq, November 2007.

68 See Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, pp. 30–7, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010‐Final‐20070608.pdf; Woods et al., pp. 48–55 and 60–5; and The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), pp. 105–6.

69 Sam Dagher, ‘Sunni Muslim Sheikhs Join US in Fighting Al‐Qaeda’, Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 2007, http://www.csm0nit0r.com/2007/0503/p01s04‐wome.html; and ‘Baghdad Hotel Bombing Kills Anti‐Qaeda Sunni Sheikhs’, International Herald Tribune, 24 June 2007.

70 Malkasian, ‘Thin Blue Line’, p. 56; and Todd Pitman, ‘Iraq's Sunni Sheikhs Join Americans to Fight Insurgency’, Associated Press, 25 March 2007.

71 Lauren Frayer, ‘Former Insurgents Face Al‐Qaida Wrath’, Washington Post, 14 August 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2007/08/14/AR2007081400767.html.

72 Alissa Rubin, ‘Sheik's Allies Vow Revenge for His Killing’, New York Times, 15 September 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html.

73 Tina Sussman, ‘Slain Sheik a Stark Contrast to His Brother’, Los Angeles Times, 13 October 2007; and Hamza Hendawi, ‘Reconciliation in Iraq Goes Local’, Washington Post, 17 October 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2007/10/17/AR2007101701681.html?tid=informbox.

74 James Janega, ‘From Killing to Reconciliation Bid’, Chicago Tribune, 12 October 2007.

75 Greg Miller, ‘Influx of Al Qaeda, Money into Pakistan is Seen’, Los Angeles Times, 20 May 2007; and Alexandra Zavis, ‘Iraq Militants Seen As Taking Kickbacks’, Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2007.

76 Michael Gordon, ‘Sunnis Say Baghdad Hampers Anbar Gains’, New York Times, 3 November 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/03/world/middleeast/03anbar.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss; and Yochi Dreazen and Gina Chon, ‘Will the Security Improvements in Iraq Endure?’, Wall Street Journal, 3 December 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119664380500411225.html.

77 See Faleh Jabar, The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi Books, 2003), especially pp. 63–7.

78 See Babak Rahimi, ‘Basra Tears Itself Apart’, Asia Times, 10 July 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IG10Ak01.html; and Gethin Chamberlin, ‘Message from Basra: “Get Us Out of Here”’, Daily Telegraph, 29 October 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/28/nrbasra128.xml.

79 Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti and Carlotta Gall, ‘U.S. Hopes to Arm Pakistani Tribes Against Al Qaeda’, New York Times, 19 November 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html.

80 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1965; originally published 1919).