I would like to thank Dr. Jozef Keulartz, Dr. Holger Hoff, Dr. André Bank and Dr. Terje Oestigard for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also very grateful to a number of people in Syria for sharing their insights and experiences, and helping me conduct the research that contributed to this article. Out of concern for their security I will not name them individually.

1. J. Solomon and B. Spindle, ‘Syria Strongman: Time for “Reform”’, Wall Street Journal, 31 Jan. 2011.

2. A. Bank and E. Mohns, ‘Die Syrische Revolte: Protestdynamik, Regimerepression und Internationalisierung’, in A. Jünemann and A. Zorob (eds.), Arabellions. Zur Vielfalt von Protest und Revolte im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika (Wiesbaden: VS Springer, 2013), pp.85–106.

3. Ibid.

4. T. Friedman, ‘The Scary Hidden Stressor’, The New York Times, 2 March 2013; C.E. Werrel and F.Femia (eds.), The Arab Spring and Climate Change, Center for American Progress, Stimson, The Center for Climate and Security (2013); F. Femia and C.E. Werrel, ‘Climate Change Before and After the Arab Awakening: The Cases of Syria and Libya’, in Werrel and Femia, The Arab Spring and Climate Change, pp.23–38; S. Mohtadi, ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Uprising’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 Aug. 2012.

5. C. Breisinger, T. Zhu, P. Al Riffai, G. Nelson, R. Robertson, J. Funes and D. Verner, ‘Global and Local Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Syria and Options for Adaptation’, International Food Policy Research Institute, Discussion Paper 01091 (2011), p.23.

6. F. Hole, ‘Drivers of Unsustainable Land Use in the Semi-Arid Khabur River Basin, Syria’, Geographical Research, Vol.47, No.1 (2009), pp.4–14.

7. Breisinger et al., ‘Global and Local Economic Impacts’; M. Hoerling, J. Eischeid, J. Perlwitz, X.Quan, Z. Zhang and P. Pegion, ‘On the Increased Frequency of Mediterranean Drought’, Journal of Climate, Vol.25 (2012), pp.2146–61; H. Hoff, ‘Climate Change, Impacts and Adaptation in the MENA Region, with Focus on Syria’, Stockholm Environment Institute and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (2012), unpublished draft.

8. B. Tertrais, ‘The Climate Wars Myth’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3 (2011), p.21.

9. Breisinger et al., ‘Global and Local Economic Impacts’, p.24.

10. Hole, ‘Drivers of Unsustainable Land Use’.

11. Interview with Gianluca Serra, conservation biologist, July 2009.

12. G. Serra, M. Mirreh, H. Kaddour, T. Razzouk, A. Al Jundi, A. Kanani, C. Batello and D. Williamson, Assessment and Characterization of Al Talila Reserve and Surrounding Palmyrean Desert, Italian Development Cooperation, Food and Agriculture Organization, Syrian General Commission for Badia Management and Development, Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (2009), pp.35–6, 81–2.

13. Interview with G. Serra.

14. S. Johnstone and J. Mazo, ‘Global Warming and the Arab Spring’, in Werrel and Femia, The Arab Spring and Climate Change, p.15.

15. Ibid., p.20.

16. A. Brown, ‘Middle East Faces Widespread Drought and Devastated Crops’, Alertnet, 14 Aug. 2008.

17. Syria Drought Response Plan 2009–2010 Mid-Term Review. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2010), p.4 (hereafter UN-OCHA, 2010).

18. J. Lennert, ‘Tough Times’, Syria Today, May 2009.

19. For example, R. Mills, ‘Long Drought that Helped to Spark an Uprising in Syria’, The National, 21 Aug. 2012; Z. Karam, ‘Syrian Troops Fire on Protesters, Kill 20’, The Globe and Mail, 25 March 2011.

20. Syrian Agricultural Database, available at http://www.napcsyr.org/sadb.htm (accessed 13 March 2013).

21. Bank and Mohns, ‘Die Syrische Revolte’.

22. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food on his Mission to Syria, Addendum, United Nations Human Rights Council, 27 Jan. 2011 (hereafter UN-HCR, 2011).

23. ‘Yellow Wheat Rust Hits Supplies’, IRIN News, 19 Aug. 2010.

24. ‘Jezira’ means island in Arabic and refers to the region situated between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in Syria, comprising the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Hassakeh and Raqqa.

25. Poverty in Syria 1996–2004, Diagnosis and Pro-Poor Policy Considerations, United Nations Development Programme (2005), p.27.

26. Drought Assessment Mission Syria 2007/2008, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Programme, United Nations Development Programme, World Health Organization, The United Nations Children's Fund, International Organization of Migration (2008); Syria Drought Response Plan 2009, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009) (hereafter UN-OCHA, 2009); UN-OCHA, 2010; UN-HCR, 2011.

27. The UN needs assessment mission in June 2009 concluded that the severely affected population was largely below the extreme poverty line of $1/person/day with high vulnerability due to loss of assets, lack of future sources of livelihood, and degradation of fields and pastures.

28. UN-OCHA, 2010, p.5.

29. UN-OCHA, 2009, p.9.

30. UN-HCR, 2011, p.4.

31. R. Hinnebusch, ‘Syria: From “Authoritarian Upgrading” to Revolution?’, International Affairs, Vol.88, No.1 (2012), pp.95–113.

32. Y. Meslmani, National Circumstances/Syria's Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, United Nations Development Programme (2008).

33. H. Harding, ‘Working in the Grey Zone’, Syria Today, May 2010. According to the United Nations Development Programme, Syria's informal sector was increasing in size in 2010, making up 45% of the workforce.

34. UN-HCR, 2011.

35. D. Haidar and F. de Châtel, ‘Leaving the Land’, Syria Today, May 2009, pp.35–7. On 12 April 2008, the government instated a coupon system allowing poor families to buy 1,000 L of diesel at 9SYP/L (0.19$/L). While this was intended to cover home heating costs, many farmers used the fuel for agricultural production and heated their house with dried sheep dung and other agricultural waste products. The government-issued coupons expired on 1 April 2009. On 31 March 2009, the government announced it would cut the prices of diesel nationwide from SYP25 to SYP20 ($0.53 to $0.42), but for many farmers it was still impossible to make a profit.

36. F. de Châtel, ‘Mining the Deep’, Syria Today, Jan. 2010, pp.48–51.

37. UN-HCR, 2011, p.15. Prices of fertilizer rose 293% for superphosphate, 202% for nitrate and 458% for potassium.

38. ‘Syria's average monthly salary at SYP11,133’, Syria Today, May 2010.

39. UN-OCHA, 2010.

40. UN-OCHA, 2009.

41. 2009 exchange rate: $1 = SYP47

42. ‘Drought Blamed for Food Scarcity’, IRIN News, 22 Feb. 2009.

43. UN-OCHA, 2009.

44. Syria Drought Response Plan (Revised) (July 2009–June 2010) List of Appeal Projects, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, available at http://fts.unocha.org (accessed 28 April 2012).

45. Syrian Association for Health Promotion and Development and UNICEF Participatory Rural Assessment for Migrant Communities in Rural Damascus due to Drought in North-Eastern Areas, The United Nations Children's Fund, July 2009.

46. Interviews in Jan. 2010 with Mohammed Hassan Katana, director of statistics and planning at the Ministry of Agriculture and Mohannad Hadi, country director of the United Nations World Food Programme in Syria.

47. Interviews in Jan. 2010 with Abdulla Tahir Bin Yehia, representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization in Syria, Niklas Kebbon, Sweden's ambassador to Syria and Mohannad Hadi.

48. UN-HCR, 2011, p.8.

49. F. de Châtel, ‘Q&A: Nader al-Bunni. Syrian Minister of Irrigation’, Syria Today, Jan. 2010, pp.44–6.

50. For example, W. Erian, B. Katlan and O. Beby Babah, Drought Vulnerability In The Arab Region, Case Study – Drought in Syria, Ten Years of Scarce Water (2000–2010), Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands and United Nations, Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2011).

51. ‘Minister of Housing and Construction: No Water Shortage in Damascus’, SANA, 21 May 2008; ‘Safar: Syria to Witness Agricultural Changes Based on Research’, SANA, 11 June 2008.

52. ‘Drought Repercussions and Means for Facing them Locally and Internationally’, SANA, 20 Oct. 2008.

53. M. Kabalan, ‘Syrians Want Change, not Reform Mirages’, Gulf News, 2 Nov. 2012.

54. Officials preferred the term ‘modernization’ to the more politically charged ‘reform’.

55. De Châtel, ‘Q&A: Nader al-Bunni’.

56. M. Ababsa, ‘Frontières de développement en Syrie: l’adaptation du projet Ba’thiste aux logiques tribales dans le front pionnier de la Jazîra’, A Contrario, Vol.3, No.2 (2005). p.11–25.

57. Hole, ‘Drivers of Unsustainable Land Use’.

58. Syrian Agricultural Database.

59. Hoff, ‘Climate Change, Impacts and Adaptation’, pp.9–10.

60. Baseline Water Sector Report, GTZ Modernization of the Syrian Water Sector, Support to Sector Planning and Coordination, State Planning Commission (2009), unpublished draft (hereafter GTZ and SPC).

61. A.J. Al-Tamimi and O. Svadovsky, ‘Demography is Destiny in Syria’, American Spectator, 2 June 2012.

62. World Population Prospects: 2008 Revision, United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia, available at http://www.escwa.un.org/popin/members/syria.pdf (accessed 19 March 2013).

63. J. Barnes, ‘Managing the Waters of Bath Country: The Politics of Water Scarcity in Syria’, Geopolitics, Vol.14, No.3 (2009), p.515.

64. Hole, ‘Drivers of Unsustainable Land Use’; Ababsa, ‘Frontières de développement en Syrie’.

65. A $2.1bn mega-project launched in March 2011 on the Tigris River in Syria's far north-east was to pump an annual 1.25bn m³ of water to irrigate 200,000 ha of land in Hassakeh Governorate (L. Ibrahim and N. Razzouk, ‘Syria Starts $2.1bn Irrigation Project on Tigris River’, Bloomberg, 7 March 2011). In addition, several new hydropower dams were being planned and built on the Euphrates and Orontes Rivers (‘Otri, Erdogan Lay Cornerstone of Friendship Dam’, SANA, 7 Feb. 2011), providing hydropower and irrigation water to new cropping areas in the north and east of the country.

66. GTZ and SPC.

67. Ibid.

68. R. Hinnebusch, ‘The Ba’th's Agrarian Revolution (1936–2000)’, in R. Hinnebusch, A. El Hindi, M.Khaddam and M. Ababsa (eds.), Agriculture and Reform in Syria (Fife, Scotland: University of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies, 2011), pp.3–14.

69. GTZ and SPC.

70. Hinnebusch, ‘The Ba’th's Agrarian Revolution’.

71. De Châtel, ‘Mining the Deep’.

72. Syrian Agricultural Database.

73. De Châtel, ‘Q&A: Nader al-Bunni’.

74. M. Hobler and R. Rajab, ‘Groundwater Vulnerability and Hazards to Groundwater in the Damascus Ghouta Plain in Syria’, Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands and Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2002).

75. Interview with Omar al-Shamali, head of Homs Water Directorate, 14 Nov. 2009.

76. De Châtel, ‘Mining the Deep’.

77. N. Marzouq, ‘The Economic Origins of Syria's Uprising’, Al Akhbar English, 28 Aug. 2011.

78. Hole, ‘Drivers of Unsustainable Land Use’.

79. Inventory of Shared Water Resources in Western Asia (Beirut: United Nations Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia and Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, 2013), Ch.24.

80. For example, on 30 March 2011, Bashar al-Assad addressed the Syrian Parliament, saying: ‘You know what happened in Lebanon in 2005, and later the war of 2006 and its repercussions, and the war against Gaza at the end of 2008. So, the whole period was that of continued pressure. What added to the problems was that we had four years of drought, which damaged our economic program. […] Of course I am not justifying. I am simply explaining these facts and separating the subjective from the objective. When I say that we had drought, this is beyond our powers’. See ‘President al-Assad Delivers Speech at People's Assembly’ SANA, 30 March 2011.