Abstract

Although the literature is divided on the possible relationship between personality and gambling, there is some evidence that American gamblers employ decision rules different from those of nongamblers, with the former choosing on the basis of expected utility and the latter deciding on maximum regret or payoff, without considering the odds. These findings fit into the framework of Thorson (1976), who suggested that some voters may decide between candidates for public office by using an expected-utility framework, whereas others may seek to minimize their maximum possible regret. Using data from the 1972–1976 American National Election Panel Study, the results suggest that those who have gambled for money in the past are more likely to employ an expected-utility framework, whereas those who lack experience in gambling are more likely to employ a minimax-regret strategy. In both the 1972 and 1976 Presidential elections, this tendency was particularly strong among those who were predisposed by partisanship to support a candidate but who did not fully trust that candidate. These effects persisted after the introduction of multivariate controls.