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# Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe

Ruud Koopmans

*On the basis of an original survey among native Christians and Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden, this paper investigates four research questions comparing native Christians to Muslim immigrants: (1) the extent of religious fundamentalism; (2) its socio-economic determinants; (3) whether it can be distinguished from other indicators of religiosity; and (4) its relationship to hostility towards out-groups (homosexuals, Jews, the West, and Muslims). The results indicate that religious fundamentalist attitudes are much more widespread among Sunnite Muslims than among native Christians, even after controlling for the different demographic and socio-economic compositions of these groups. Alevite Muslims from Turkey, by contrast, show low levels of fundamentalism, comparable to Christians. Among both Christians and Muslims, strong religiosity as such is not (among Christians) or only mildly (among Muslims) related to hostility towards out-groups. Fundamentalist believers, however, show very high levels of out-group hostility, especially among Muslims.*

**Keywords:** Religious Fundamentalism; Xenophobia; Anti-Semitism; Religiosity; Islam

## Introduction

In controversies over immigration and Islam in the early twenty-first century, Muslim immigrants have widely become associated with religious fundamentalism. Others argue that religious fundamentalism characterises only a small minority of Muslims living in the West, and that it is found similarly among other religions, including Christianity. Claims on both sides of this debate lack a sound empirical base. Little is known about the extent and determinants of religious fundamentalism among Muslims of immigrant origin, and virtually no evidence is available that allows a comparison with Christians of native stock.<sup>1</sup> Whether religious fundamentalism

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among Muslims should be considered a relatively harmless form of strong religiosity or whether it is associated with hostility towards other groups is also an open question. Research on Christian fundamentalism has demonstrated a strong connection with out-group hostility, but no solid evidence is available to determine whether this is also true for Muslims.

On the basis of a survey among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants and their offspring as well as native comparison groups in six West European countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Sweden), this paper investigates four key questions:

- (1) What is the extent of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants and their offspring and how does it compare to native Christians?
- (2) What are the socio-economic determinants of religious fundamentalism among Muslims and are they similar to those among Christians?
- (3) Can religious fundamentalism among Muslims be distinguished from other indicators of religiosity or is it an inherent component of strong Islamic religiosity?
- (4) What is the relationship between religious fundamentalism and hostility towards other groups and is it similar among Muslims and Christians?

## **Religious Fundamentalism: Definition, Determinants and Relationship to Out-group Hostility**

### *Origin, Definition and Demarcation*

Religious fundamentalism is not unique to Islam. The term originates in a Protestant revival movement in the early twentieth-century USA, which propagated a return to the 'fundaments' of the Christian faith and a literal interpretation of the rules of the Bible (see Marsden 1980; Woodberry and Smith 1998). Since, the term has been generalised to similar movements within Judaism, Islam and Hinduism (Armstrong 2000; Almond, Appleby, and Sivan 2003). According to the most widely accepted academic definition, religious fundamentalism is:

The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity. (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992, 118)

Islamic fundamentalism is often used interchangeably with 'Islamism' (see Kramer 2003). Others distinguish fundamentalism as 'an individual orientation towards the roots of a religious creed' from Islamism that is additionally characterised by 'the subordination of political decisions under the primacy of religion' (Brettfeld and

Wetzels 2007, 56, 63). In its non-academic usage and especially when referring to Islam, fundamentalism is often employed as a synonym for violent extremism. Some academic definitions, too, include the willingness to use violence as a defining characteristic of fundamentalism (e.g. Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder 1997). This usage, however, is not in line with the most common academic conceptions of fundamentalism, which define it as a set of religious attitudes, norms and ideals. As Emerson and Hartman (2006, 136) put it: 'First, not all religiously based violence is done by fundamentalists ... Second, not all fundamentalist groups are violent. In fact, most are not'. The question whether people are willing to endorse or use violent means in pursuit of fundamentalist aims should be kept analytically separate, in the same way as secular ideologies such as nationalism or socialism can be pursued in peaceful or violent ways.

In accordance with the prevalent academic usage, I define religious fundamentalism by way of three, interrelated attitudes:

- that believers should return to the eternal and unchangeable rules laid down in the past;
- that these rules allow only one interpretation that is binding for all believers;
- that religious rules should have priority over secular laws.

Because a central question of this paper is how religious fundamentalism relates to out-group hostility, I have not incorporated Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (1992) reference to the threat posed by outside 'forces of evil' in my definition. If the idea that the own religion is threatened by evil outsiders is already incorporated in the operationalisation of fundamentalism, the relationship between it and out-group hostility would become a matter of definition rather than of empirical investigation.

Fundamentalism should be distinguished from other forms of strong religiosity. Fundamentalists advocate a return to a religion's origins but they are not simply traditionalists. They often selectively emphasise certain aspects of the religious tradition and combine them with equally selective aspects of modernity. As Bruce (2008, 15) puts it, 'fundamentalism is a radical reconstruction and redeployment of a tradition for contemporary purposes'. Therefore, fundamentalism is generally distinguished from orthodoxy, which 'reflects the *content* of what is believed rather than (as is the case with fundamentalism) the way the beliefs are held' (Laythe et al. 2002, 625). Because it focuses on content, orthodoxy cannot be measured with the same instrument across religions, but is instead captured by statements such as 'Jesus was born of a virgin' (from Fullerton and Hunsberger's [1982] Christian orthodoxy scale) or 'it is important for me to meticulously follow the rules of fasting' (from Brettfeld and Wetzel's [2007] Muslim orthodoxy scale). Even within Islam and Christianity, orthodoxy is difficult to define across denominations. I therefore rely on an indicator of religiosity that can be measured similarly for Christians and Muslims, namely the strength of religious identification. If group differences in levels of fundamentalism, as well as associations of fundamentalism with out-group hostility,

disappear once we control for religious identification, we may conclude that fundamentalist attitudes are merely a correlate of strong religiosity. If they remain, we can conclude that religious fundamentalism is a separate aspect of religiosity that distinguishes some strong believers from others.

Controlling for religiosity is also important for interpreting differences between Christians and Muslims. Several studies have shown that, compared to the majority population, Muslim immigrants more often define themselves as religious and identify more strongly with their religion (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Connor 2010; Ersanilli 2010). Not controlling for religiosity could therefore lead to misattributions. What appears to be a group difference between Muslims and Christians might reflect a difference between strong believers and people for whom religion is a less central part of their identities, which is more often the case among European Christians.

### *Applicability to Islam*

The large majority of academic studies on religious fundamentalism refer to Christianity and to American Protestantism in particular. As recent as 1992, a major cross-national comparative study on religious fundamentalism ‘in East and West’ consisted entirely of chapters on Christian fundamentalism and contained only one index reference to Islam (Misztal and Shupe 1992). Since, academic interest in Islamic fundamentalism has risen, mainly in the form of studies of fundamentalist ideologies, parties, movements and terrorist groups in Islamic countries (e.g. Choueiri 2010; Davidson 2013; Roy 1996; Tibi 1998). There are, however, almost no studies of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants in the West—I will discuss a few exceptions below—and in particular there is a lack of studies that allow comparisons between Muslims and Christians.

The extension of the term fundamentalism from its original usage to Islam has not been uncontested. Some, like Edward Said, do not object against the term as such, but against the fact that it ‘has come to be associated almost automatically with Islam, although it has a flourishing, usually elided relationship with Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism. The deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as essentially the same thing’ (Said 1997, xvi). Against this, others such as Bernard Lewis have argued that, when we apply the predominant definitions of fundamentalism, Islam in its current manifestation is inherently fundamentalist:

‘Fundamentalist’ is a Christian term. It seems to have come into use in the early years of this century, and denotes certain Protestant churches and organizations, more particularly those that maintain the literal divine origin and inerrancy of the Bible. In this they oppose the liberal and modernist theologians, who tend to a more critical, historical view of Scripture. Among Muslim theologians there is as yet no such liberal or modernist approach to the Qur’an, and all Muslims, in their attitude to the text of the Qur’an, are in principle at least fundamentalists (Lewis 1988, 117)

Rather than entering into, ultimately theological, debates about whether Islam is inherently pluralistic or fundamentalist, I approach the issue empirically by investigating the attitudes of European Muslims and Christians towards their respective religions. This, rather than any theological approach, will allow us to determine whether most or only few European Muslims adhere to fundamentalist interpretations of their creed, whether such fundamentalist attitudes are more than just a correlate of strong Islamic religiosity, and whether fundamentalism is less, more, or just as widespread among European Christians.

### *Determinants of Religious Fundamentalism*

Fundamentalism is generally seen as a reaction to secularisation and modernisation:

‘Fundamentalism is the rational response of traditionally religious people to social, political and economic changes that downgrade and constrain the role of religion in the public world’ (Bruce 2008, 120).

Studies on Christian fundamentalism have found that it has its support base disproportionately among those on the losing end of modernisation processes, for example, among those with lower income, education and occupational prestige (e.g. Demerath 1965; Lienesch 1982; Coreno 2002). If these findings are transferable to Muslims, we should expect relatively high levels of fundamentalism among Muslims in Western Europe, because of their generally low socio-economic status. In comparing levels of fundamentalism between Christians and Muslims, it is therefore important to control for differences in socio-economic status between the two groups.

Theorising on immigrant acculturation provides another reason for higher levels of fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants. According to the influential ‘reactive ethnicity’ perspective (Portes and Rumbaut 2001), immigrants and their offspring may under conditions of blocked upward mobility, legal exclusion and discrimination reaffirm their ties and identification with their ethnic in-group. This may also take the form of ‘reactive religiosity’, that is, a stronger attachment to religion (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Research on first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe has mostly failed to support the reactive ethnicity and religiosity hypotheses, but none of these studies refer to religious fundamentalism (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011; Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; see Connor 2010 for a contrary finding).

To assess reactive religiosity as an explanation for Islamic fundamentalism, I will investigate first, whether on the individual level fundamentalism is associated with perceived discrimination, and second whether levels of fundamentalism are higher in countries that institutionally exclude Muslims from religious rights, for example, by restrictions on the wearing of headscarves, halal slaughtering of animals or mosque construction. Among the six countries investigated here, France and Germany have been most reluctant in granting Muslims religious rights, while the Netherlands provide the widest range of such rights, with Austria, Sweden and Belgium ranging in between (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012; Koopmans 2013). Alternatively, one may interpret Islamic fundamentalism as a reaction to more general patterns of legal

exclusion of immigrants, including, for instance, high hurdles to naturalisation or weak anti-discrimination policies. These are captured by the Migrant Integration Policy Index,<sup>2</sup> which classifies Sweden as the most inclusive of the six countries studied here, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium. Germany and France provide fewer rights to immigrants, and Austria does so the least.

### *Fundamentalism and Out-group Hostility*

Research on Christian fundamentalism has documented a strong association with hostility towards various out-groups, including homosexuals (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Laythe et al. 2002), members of other religious groups (Altemeyer 2003), Jews (Glock and Stark 1966; Eisinga, König, and Scheepers 1995) and various other ethnic and racial minorities (Altemeyer 2003; Laythe et al. 2002; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992). More generally, Christian fundamentalism correlates strongly with right-wing authoritarianism, to such an extent that it ‘can be viewed as a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism’ (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005, 391). Various studies that control for other measures of Christian religiosity, such as orthodoxy and church attendance, have found that religiosity as such, or even orthodox religiosity are not or only weakly associated with out-group hostility once fundamentalism is controlled for (e.g. Kirkpatrick, Hood, and Hartz 1991; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992).

Only a few studies have investigated fundamentalism and out-group hostility in non-Christian religious traditions. Hunsberger (1996) found for Toronto, Canada that levels of religious fundamentalism were highest among Muslims, lowest among Jews and intermediary among Christians and Hindus. Within all groups, fundamentalism correlated strongly with right-wing authoritarianism and negative attitudes towards homosexuals. These findings are, however, based on very low numbers of non-Christian respondents ( $n = 21$  for Muslims and Hindus;  $n = 32$  for Jews) and are not controlled for any background variables. Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck (1999) compared Christian and Muslim university students in Ghana. Levels of religious fundamentalism were almost identical across the two groups and strongly correlated with right-wing authoritarianism. Here too, however, controls for background variables were absent and case numbers low ( $n = 57$  for the Muslim group).

### *Previous Research on Fundamentalism and Out-group Hostility among European Muslims*

Evidence on fundamentalism and out-group hostility among Muslims of immigrant origin in Europe is fragmentary. A German study in the mid-1990s (Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder 1997) among young people of Turkish origin revealed 49% agreement that ‘reform and modernization of the faith should be rejected’. This pre-9/11 study also documented widespread feelings that Islam was under threat



from Western and Zionist enemies: 60% affirmed that 'the war in Bosnia shows that the West wants to destroy Islam' and 33% that 'Zionism threatens Islam'.

Similar results were reported a decade later (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007), showing that between one-third and half of German Muslims agree with statements such as 'those who do not follow the rules of the Quran literally, are not true Muslims' (32%); 'people who modernize Islam, destroy the true teachings' (43%) and 'following the prescriptions of my religion is more important for me than democracy' (47%).

Roex, van Stiphout, and Tillie's (2010) study among Dutch Muslims found 43% support for the statement 'the rules of God are for me more important than the Dutch laws', a very similar percentage as in the 'Muslims in Germany' study. Many Dutch Muslims also have what the authors call a 'dichotomous worldview': 71% affirm that they sometimes 'have the feeling that the world consists only of groups that are diametrically opposed'. Only 17%, however, affirmed the statement 'Western countries are out to destroy Islam'. None of these studies offer comparisons to native Christians' view on religion and out-groups.

Such comparisons were made in another study of young Muslims in Germany (Frindte et al. 2011). Unfortunately, this study only provides scale averages that are difficult to interpret, but throughout it finds higher levels of fundamentalism, prejudice against Jews and authoritarianism among young Muslims compared to non-Muslims of the same age group, which remain when controlling for socio-economic background variables.

### **Data and Operationalisation**

The data are drawn from a survey conducted in 2008 among people of Turkish origin as well as a comparison group of native stock in six West European countries. In Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium also people of Moroccan origin were interviewed; in Austria and Sweden immigration from Morocco has been very limited and targeting this small population was not practically feasible. Turkey and Morocco are the two most important countries of origin of Muslims in Western Europe. People of Turkish origin are the largest Muslim group in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, and the second- and fourth-largest group in Belgium and France, respectively. Those of Moroccan origin are the most important Muslim group in Belgium, the second-largest in the Netherlands and France, and the third-largest in Germany. Together, the groups investigated comprise roughly two-thirds of the Muslim populations of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, about 40% in Austria (where Muslims from the former Yugoslavia are important), one-third in France (where Muslims of Algerian origin are particularly important) and only about 10% of Muslims in Sweden (where the Muslim population is distributed across many origin groups).<sup>3</sup> The data are therefore not representative for the whole Muslim population in the countries of study, especially not for Austria, France and Sweden.



The focus on the two most important Muslim groups in Western Europe does, however, enable more valid cross-national comparisons. Half of the samples, moreover, are drawn from people originating in two rural origin regions in Turkey and Morocco, respectively, Central and East Anatolia, and Northern Morocco (the former Spanish protectorate). The sampling strategy thus aims to control as much as possible for compositional differences. The same sampling strategy was used in all countries: onomastic (first and family name-based) sampling from telephone directories, using a large number of typical Turkish, Moroccan and native names as search strings (see Humpert and Schneiderheinze 2000). Both landlines and mobile numbers were included. Interviews were conducted by computer-assisted telephone interviewing in the language of the country of study, or in Turkish or Moroccan-Arabic, depending on the interviewee's preference. Quota for gender, age, calling time and immigrant generation were used to ensure representativeness within and comparability across groups. In all regressions, I control for sampling variables (landline or mobile number, calling time, regional subsample) in order to ensure that sampling differences do not bias the estimates. For detailed information on sampling procedures and response rates, see Ersanilli and Koopmans (2013).

### *Dependent Variables*

#### Religious Fundamentalism

The three attitudinal aspects of religious fundamentalism mentioned above are operationalised by the following statements that were presented to native respondents who indicated that they were Christians and to respondents of Turkish and Moroccan origin who indicated they were Muslims:

Christians [Muslims] should return to the roots of Christianity [Islam]

There is only one interpretation of the Bible [the Quran] and every Christian [Muslim] must stick to that

The rules of the Bible [the Quran] are more important to me than the laws of [survey country]

The answer categories offered were agree or disagree. If respondents said they could not choose or said they neither agreed nor disagreed this was coded as 'don't know/refusal to answer'.<sup>4</sup> Agreement was coded as the fundamentalist response. Because arguably agreement to any of these items taken alone does not yet make one a fundamentalist, I also report agreement to all three items as a more adequate criterion for adherence to a fundamentalist belief system. For the regression analyses, I use a summary scale of religious fundamentalism (with disagree and don't know/refusal collapsed as the non-fundamentalist response) with a Cronbach's alpha of .76.

## Out-group Hostility

To measure out-group hostility, I use statements measuring rejection of homosexuals and Jews, as well as mirroring items for Muslims and natives that tap the degree to which the other group is seen as a hostile threat to the own group:

I don't want to have homosexuals as friends

Jews cannot be trusted

Muslims aim to destroy Western culture [for natives]

*Western countries aim to destroy Islam* [for persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin].<sup>5</sup>

Answer categories were again agree, disagree and don't know/refusal, with agreement as the out-group hostility response. Again, I additionally report agreement to all three statements. For the regression analyses an out-group hostility scale was constructed (with disagree and don't know/refusal collapsed as the non-hostile response), with a Cronbach's alpha of .66.

## Independent Variables

### Ethno-religious Groups

I exclude respondents who did not adhere to any religion (3% of the immigrant and 30% of the native sample).<sup>6</sup> Christians of Moroccan ( $n = 8$ ) or Turkish ( $n = 59$ ) origin, as well as Muslims of native stock ( $n = 3$ ) were also excluded because they are too small in number. Muslims of immigrant origin are defined as those who mention Islam as their religion, and who are themselves born abroad or have at least one parent born abroad. Christians of native stock are those who say they adhere to Christianity and who are both themselves native-born and have two native-born parents.

Among Christians, I distinguish Catholics (67% of Christians), mainline Protestants (28%) and non-mainstream Protestants from denominations such as Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals (5%). The Moroccan ethnics in our sample (40% of Muslims) all belong to Sunnite Islam, but the Turkish sample includes both Sunnites (54%) and Alevites (5%), a liberal minority current within Shia Islam, as well as a small group of other Muslims, mainly non-Alevite Shiites (1%).<sup>7</sup> Ethnically, the Moroccan group comprises Arabs (38%) and Berbers (62%), and the Turkish group ethnic Turks (87%), Kurds (8%), and other ethnicities (5%, e.g. Laz, Turkmen, Circassian). Preliminary analyses showed that these ethnic distinctions are not significantly associated with fundamentalism. I have therefore not included them in the reported analyses.

### Religious Identification

Religious identification is a scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .89, composed of three items, with answer categories 'not at all' (1), 'barely' (2), 'a bit' (3), 'largely' (4) and 'completely' (5):

To what extent do you feel Christian [Muslim]?

To what extent do you feel connected to Christians [Muslims]?

To what extent are you proud of being a Christian [Muslim]?

### Demographic and Socio-economic Control Variables

*Country of residence:* dummy variables for the six countries.

*Age:* in years.

*Immigrant generation:* Foreign-born (0) versus born in the country of immigration (1). In the multivariate analyses, only age is used because age and generation are highly collinear and age turned out to be the stronger determinant.

*Gender:* male (0) or female (1).

*Marital status:* unmarried (0) or married (1).

*Employment status:* gainfully employed (1) or not (0).

*Job status:* for those currently or formerly employed; coded using the linear International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) index (Ganzeboom, Graaf, and Treiman 1992). Those who were never employed were assigned the lowest job status;

*Home ownership:* living in owned (1) versus rental (0) housing.

*Level of education:* the highest achieved level, coded according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)<sup>8</sup> classification into: primary education or less (1; the reference category), lower secondary education or vocational training (2), upper secondary education or vocational training (3), tertiary education (4).

### Perceived Discrimination

This is a scale (Cronbach's alpha .72) composed of two indicators of perceived discrimination. The first asks generally 'Can you tell me how often you feel discriminated in [survey country] because of your origin or religion?' with answer categories 'never', 'almost never', 'sometimes', 'often' and 'always'. The second consists of the summed affirmative answers to six questions asking whether the respondent has ever felt discriminated 'when looking for a job or at work', 'when looking for housing', 'when going out in clubs and cafes', 'in school', 'by the police' or 'by a public service institution, social service or the municipality'.

### Sampling Variables

I include as controls dummies for mobile phone (1) versus landline (0) numbers; whether respondents were part of the representative sample (0) or of the oversamples for East and Central Anatolia or Northern Morocco (1); and whether respondents were interviewed during the daytime (0) or during evenings and weekends (1). To save space, I will not display the results for these sampling variables. The oversample variable had no significant relationship to fundamentalism. Christians reached on a mobile number were slightly less fundamentalist, as were Christians and Muslims interviewed during evenings or weekends.


## Results

### Religious Fundamentalism

Figure 1 shows that religious fundamentalism is not marginal among Western European Muslims. Taking together the first and second generations, almost 60% agree that Muslims should return to the roots of Islam, 75% think there is only one possible interpretation of the Quran, which is binding for every Muslim and 65% say that religious rules are more important to them than the laws of the country in which they live. Consistent fundamentalist attitudes, with agreement to all three statements, are found among 44%. Levels are somewhat lower among the second generation. Not displayed in the figure, fundamentalist attitudes are slightly less prevalent among Sunni Muslims with a Turkish (45% agreement to all three statements) compared to a Moroccan (50%) background. Turkish Alevites display much lower levels of fundamentalism (15%).

Figure 1 also shows that fundamentalism is much more prevalent among European Muslims than among Christian natives. Among Christians agreement to the single statements ranges between 13% and 21% and less than 4% agree with all three items. In line with what is known about Christian fundamentalism, levels of agreement are highest (12%) among the adherents of non-mainstream Protestant groups. However, even their support for fundamentalist attitudes remains much below the levels found among Sunni Muslims. Alevites' view on the role of religion is, however, more similar to that of native Christians than of Sunni Muslims.

These results could be due to the different demographic and socio-economic profiles of Muslims and Christians. Table 1 investigates this by way of multivariate regressions. Model 1 is the baseline model of group differences, only controlled for the sampling variables: Sunnite Muslims have by far the strongest fundamentalist



**Figure 1.** Religious fundamentalism among Christians and first- and second-generation Muslims in Western Europe (in %).

**Table 1.** Multivariate regression of religious fundamentalism among Christians and Muslims in Western Europe (unstandardised regression coefficients and significance levels; standard errors in parentheses).

	All groups Model 1	All groups Model 2	All groups Model 3	Christians Model 4	Muslims Model 5
Group reference: Catholics	–	–	–	–	–
Mainline Protestants	–.06 (.05) ns	.25 (.05)***	.20 (.05)***	.08 (.05) ns	–
Non-mainstream Protestants	.36 (.10)***	.39 (.10)***	.32 (.09)***	.40 (.08)***	–
Turkish Alevites	.44 (.08)***	.47 (.08)***	.36 (.08)***	–	–.55 (.08)***
Turkish Sunnites	1.44 (.04)***	1.42 (.04)***	.96 (.04)***	–	–.13 (.04)***
Other Turkish Muslims	1.03 (.19)***	1.01 (.18)***	.71 (.17)***	–	–.35 (.18) ns
Moroccan Sunnites	1.56 (.04)***	1.60 (.05)***	1.09 (.05)***	–	Reference
Age (*10)	–	.06 (.00)***	.02 (.00)*	.09 (.00)***	–.00 (.00) ns
Female	–	.02 (.03) ns	–.02 (.03) ns	–.06 (.03) ns	.01 (.03) ns
Married	–	–.05 (.03) ns	–.05 (.03) ns	–.08 (.04)*	–.01 (.04) ns
Education level (ISCED)	–	–.18 (.02)***	–.17 (.02)***	–.11 (.02)***	–.19 (.02)***
Employed	–	–.09 (.03)**	–.06 (.03)***	–.07 (.04) ns	–.01 (.04) ns
Professional status (*10; ISEI)	–	–.05 (.00)***	–.04 (.00)***	–.01 (.00)***	–.07 (.00)***
Home ownership	–	–.10 (.03)***	–.10 (.03)***	.05 (.04) ns	–.11 (.03)***
Country reference: Austria	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–.50 (.05)***	–.40 (.05)***	–.15 (.07)***	–.52 (.07)***
France	–	–.05 (.05) ns	.04 (.05) ns	–.01 (.06) ns	–.03 (.07) ns
Netherlands	–	–.17 (.05)***	–.12 (.05)**	–.19 (.07)**	–.15 (.07)*
Belgium	–	–.00 (.05) ns	.06 (.05) ns	–.07 (.06) ns	.04 (.07) ns
Sweden	–	–.52 (.06)***	–.37 (.06)***	–.33 (.08)***	–.35 (.08)***
Religious identification	–	–	.37 (.01)***	.22 (.02)***	.53 (.02)***
Perceived discrimination	–	–	–	–	.03 (.02) ns
Sampling controls (mobile phone, calling time, regional over-sample)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted $R^2$	.344	.413	.470	.225	.255
N	5748	5748	5748	1945	3798

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

attitudes—a full point more on the three-point scale than Alevites and non-mainstream Protestants and 1.5 points more than mainline Protestants and Catholics. As the sizes of the standard errors indicate, all pairwise group differences are statistically significant, except the ones between Catholics and mainline Protestants, and between non-mainstream Protestants and Alevites. Model 2 adds demographic and socio-economic controls, as well as country dummies. Older people tend to be more fundamentalist, though the effect size is small: .06 points on the 3-point scale for every 10 years of age. The socio-economic variables are all significant and confirm that fundamentalism is associated with socio-economic marginalisation: those who are not employed, have a lower job status, have lower levels of education and live in rented housing display significantly higher levels of fundamentalism. The effect sizes are, however, not very large. The most important of the socio-economic variables is education, for which the regression estimates imply that fundamentalism among persons with only primary school is .72 higher than among those with a university education. There are also some significant country differences: Respondents in Germany and Sweden have the lowest, those in the Netherlands intermediate, and those in France, Belgium and Austria the highest levels of fundamentalism.

However, these control variables hardly affect religious group differences, which remain virtually identical to those in Model 1. The only noteworthy change is that controlling for demography, cross-national variation and socio-economic status, mainline Protestants become significantly more fundamentalist than Catholics, but the difference is not large in size (.25). The weight of group differences compared to demographic and socio-economic variables is also illustrated by the fact that in spite of the inclusion of a large number of explanatory variables the explained variance only increases modestly in Model 2, from .35 to .41.

The difference between Sunnite Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians and Alevites, on the other, can therefore not be attributed to compositional differences. Different levels of religiosity offer an alternative explanation. Model 3 shows that religious identification is an important predictor of fundamentalism. Each point higher on the 5-point religious identification scale is associated with a .37 increase on the fundamentalism scale and inclusion of religious identification raises the explained variance to .47. Moreover, it contributes to the explanation of group differences. In particular, the effect sizes for Sunnite Muslims are reduced by one-third. Still, large and highly significant differences between Sunnites and the other groups remain that cannot be explained by different levels of religiosity.


So far, we assumed that the predictors of fundamentalism are similar for Christians and Muslims. Models 4 and 5 test this assumption by way of separate regressions for the two groups. Additionally, in order to test whether coefficients differ significantly across the two groups, I ran Model 3 with interaction terms between being Muslim and all other explanatory variables (not reported in the table but available upon request). The results show that for both Christians and Muslims, fundamentalism decreases with higher socio-economic status, but more strongly so among Muslims. Further, while among Christians fundamentalism significantly increases with age,

there is no significant relationship with age among Muslims. If we include the distinction between first and second generation instead of age in the regression for Muslims, it is also insignificant. The modest differences between the Muslim generations that we saw in Figure 1 are therefore explained by the higher socio-economic status of the second generation compared to their parents.

The most noteworthy difference is the strength of the association between religious identification and fundamentalism. Although the association is highly significant in both groups, the effect size is significantly larger among Muslims (.53) than among Christians (.22). Nevertheless, strong religiosity offers only a partial explanation for group differences in fundamentalism. Figure 2 illustrates this by comparing respondents giving consistently fundamentalist responses (agreement to all three fundamentalism items) across strongly and less religious Christians, Alevites and Sunnites. As strongly religious, I define those with an average on the 5-point religious identification scale of four or higher, that is, those who strongly or very strongly identify as Christians or Muslims, which is the case for 40% of Christians, 61% of Alevites and 92% of Sunnites.

The figure shows that levels of fundamentalism are low across the three religious groups among those with weak religious identification. Even among strongly religious Christians, one-third or less agree with each of the three fundamentalism items and only 8% agree with all three. Among strongly religious Alevites, too, religious fundamentalism is a minority position, with only 21% agreeing to all three items. Among strongly religious Sunnites, however, fundamentalist ideas are more widespread, with 50% agreeing to all three and between 60% and 80% to the separate items. Still, even among strongly religious Sunnites religious fundamentalism is by no means universal. Ten per cent of them agree with none of the statements and 15% support only one of them.

Returning to Table 1, Model 5 allows us to assess the reactive religiosity thesis. In line with earlier research, we find little support for it. Perceived discrimination is not




**Figure 2.** Religious fundamentalism among Christians, Alevites and Sunnites by level of religiosity (agreement to all three fundamentalism items; in %).



a significant predictor of religious fundamentalism. Moreover, the country differences defy interpretation in terms of reactive religiosity, as Germany, together with France the country that offers Muslims the least rights, has the lowest level of Muslim religious fundamentalism. Conversely, Belgium has a comparatively high level of fundamentalism in spite of relatively generous policies regarding Muslim and immigrant rights. Instead, the similarity of the cross-country differences among Christians and Muslims (compare Models 4 and 5) suggests that Muslims assimilate to the type of religiosity prevalent among the Christian majority. Where native Christians have comparatively low levels of religious fundamentalism, as in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, Muslim immigrants also tend to be less fundamentalist. This finding is in line with other research that shows an association between host society and immigrant religiosity (Van Tubergen 2006; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011).

### *Out-group Hostility*

We now turn to the linkage between religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility. Figure 3 shows support for the three out-group hostility items, as well as agreement with all three items. Out-group hostility is not negligible among native Christians: 9% of them are overtly anti-Semitic and believe that Jews cannot be trusted, and 11% reject homosexuals as friends. Muslims draw more hostility from Christians, with 23% believing that Muslims aim to destroy Western culture. Only few Christians display hostility against all three groups (1.6%). Muslims show much higher levels of out-group hostility: 57% reject homosexual friends, 45% do not trust Jews and 54% see the West as an enemy out to destroy Islam. Hostility towards all three out-groups is present among 26% of the Muslim respondents.



**Figure 3.** Out-group hostility among Christians and first- and second-generation Muslims in Western Europe (in %).

Again, however, there are significant differences within the Muslim group. The second generation is somewhat less hostile towards gays and Jews, but hostility towards the West is equally high in both generations. Not displayed in the figure, Alevites have lower levels of out-group hostility than Sunni Turks, especially where anti-Semitism (29% against 52% among Sunni Turks) and anti-Western attitudes (37% against 62% among Sunni Turks) are concerned. Within the Sunni group, Turks are more hostile towards all three out-groups than Moroccans, again mostly so regarding Jews (37% hostile responses among Moroccan Sunnites) and the West (44% among Moroccan Sunnites).

Again, we must adjust group differences for their different demographic and socio-economic compositions, since xenophobia is known to be higher among socio-economically deprived groups. The first model of Table 2 shows the raw group differences and indicates that among the three Christian groups, out-group hostility does not differ significantly. All Muslim groups display significantly higher levels of out-group hostility, least so the Alevites, and most so the Turkish Sunnites, who score 1.3 points higher on the 3-point out-group hostility scale than Christians. Model 2 shows that older people and males are more hostile towards out-groups and it confirms the familiar relationship with socio-economic marginalisation: the lower-educated, the unemployed and those in lower-status jobs are significantly more hostile towards out-groups. These variables add however, as in the analysis of fundamentalism above, relatively little to the explained variance. Moreover, they are of very little help in clarifying the group differences, which remain virtually the same as in Model 1.

In Model 3, we explore the relationship between out-group hostility and religious fundamentalism. In two ways, the results confirm what we know from earlier research on Christian fundamentalism. First, religious fundamentalism is powerfully related to out-group hostility. Second, religiosity as such is, if we control for fundamentalism, not significantly related to out-group hostility. Due to the strong impact of fundamentalism, the increase in explained variance is substantial, from .36 in Model 2 to .49 in Model 3. Most importantly, the higher levels of fundamentalism among Muslims explain about half of the difference in out-group hostility between the Turkish groups and Christians, and virtually all of the difference between Christians and Moroccan Sunnites, as indicated by the strongly reduced size of the group coefficients.

Models 4 and 5 show the results of separate analyses for Christians and Muslims. Again, I additionally ran Model 3 with interaction terms (not shown in Table 2 but available upon request). The basic pattern that out-group hostility is higher among the lower socio-economic strata, among males, and among religious fundamentalists holds for both groups. However, we also find some significant differences. Paralleling the results for fundamentalism, older Christians are more hostile towards out-groups than younger Christians, but among Muslims xenophobia is unrelated to age. Moreover, fundamentalism is a much stronger predictor of out-group hostility among Muslims. This is also the main reason why the explained variance is more than twice


**Table 2.** Multivariate regression of out-group hostility among Christians and Muslims in Western Europe (unstandardised regression coefficients and significance levels; standard errors in parentheses).

	All groups Model 1	All groups Model 2	All groups Model 3	Christians Model 4	Muslims Model 5
Group reference: Catholics	–	–	–	–	–
Mainline Protestants	–.07 (.05) ns	.24 (.06)***	.10 (.05)*	–.03 (.05) ns	–
Non-mainstream Protestants	.04 (.11) ns	.11 (.11) ns	–.08 (.10) ns	.05 (.08) ns	–
Turkish Alevites	.54 (.09)***	.54 (.09)***	.33 (.09)***	–	.25 (.08)**
Turkish Sunnites	1.31 (.04)***	1.28 (.05)***	.62 (.05)***	–	.44 (.04)***
Other Turkish Muslims	.96 (.18)***	.97 (.18)***	.51 (.16)***	–	.37 (.17)*
Moroccan Sunnites	.84 (.04)***	.90 (.05)***	.20 (.05)***	–	Reference
Age (*10)	–	.05 (.00)***	.02 (.00)*	.08 (.02)***	–.01 (.00) ns
Female	–	–.11 (.03)***	–.11 (.02)***	–.11 (.03)***	–.13 (.04)***
Married	–	.02 (.03) ns	.04 (.04) ns	–.03 (.04) ns	.10 (.04)*
Education level (ISCED)	–	–.16 (.02)***	–.08 (.02)***	–.10 (.02)***	–.07 (.02)***
Employed	–	–.08 (.03)**	–.04 (.03) ns	–.05 (.04) ns	–.03 (.04) ns
Professional status (*10; ISEI)	–	–.06 (.00)***	–.04 (.00)***	–.01 (.00) ns	–.05 (.00)***
Home ownership	–	.04 (.03) ns	–.02 (.03) ns	–.01 (.04) ns	–.00 (.03) ns
Country reference: Austria	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	–	–.42 (.06)***	–.17 (.05)***	–.14 (.06)*	–.16 (.07)*
France	–	–.13 (.05)*	–.10 (.05)*	–.07 (.06) ns	–.16 (.07)*
Netherlands	–	–.28 (.05)***	–.20 (.05)***	–.21 (.06)***	–.22 (.07)***
Belgium	–	.06 (.06) ns	.07 (.05) ns	–.07 (.05) ns	.09 (.07) ns
Sweden	–	–.48 (.06)***	–.23 (.06)***	–.09 (.08) ns	–.28 (.08)***
Religious fundamentalism	–	–	.43 (.01)***	.19 (.02)***	.48 (.02)***
Religious identification	–	–	.03 (.02) ns	.00 (.02) ns	.08 (.03)***
Sampling controls (mobile phone, calling time, regional over-sample)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.281	.357	.491	.176	.380
N	4804	4804	4804	1686	3118

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

as high among Muslims (.38) than among Christians (.18). Further, while among Christians religious identification is unrelated to out-group hostility once fundamentalism is controlled for, it remains a significant predictor for Muslims, although the effect size is much smaller than the one of fundamentalism.

That fundamentalism is the decisive factor behind out-group hostility is visualised in Figure 4, which plots the levels of out-group hostility separately for not very religious respondents (those with religious identification lower than four- on the five-point scale); very religious respondents without a full-fledged fundamentalist belief system (those identifying strongly or very strongly with their religion but agreeing with at most 2 of the 3 fundamentalism items); and finally strongly religious *and* fundamentalist believers (who agree with all three fundamentalism items). For both Christians and Muslims, the differences in out-group hostility between those with weak or strong non-fundamentalist religiosity are quite modest. There is a stark difference, by contrast, between strong believers with or without a consistent fundamentalist belief system. Among Christians, levels of hostility against gays and Jews are twice as high among fundamentalist strong believers, and hostility towards Muslims increases from 25% among those who are highly religious but non-fundamentalist to 57% among fundamentalists. Among Muslims, we find the same pattern, albeit on a higher base level. Hostility towards gays and the West is below 50%, and against Jews below 30% among strongly religious, but non-fundamentalist Muslims. Among fundamentalist Muslims, however, levels of hostility towards all three groups rise above 70%.



**Figure 4.** Hostility towards out-groups among Christians and Muslims as a function of religiosity and fundamentalism.

## **Conclusions and Discussion**

The first question investigated in this paper was descriptive: What is the extent of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants and their offspring and how does it compare to native Christians? The assertion that fundamentalism is a marginal phenomenon among Muslims in the West is not confirmed by this study. Up to three quarters of Muslim respondents affirmed that Muslims should return to the roots of the faith, that there is only one interpretation of the Quran that is binding for all believers, and that religious rules are more important than secular laws. Somewhat less than half of them agreed with all three statements. However, there was also a minority of almost one-third of Muslims who rejected all statements or agreed with at most one of them. Fundamentalist attitudinal structures are therefore widespread, but certainly not universal among European Muslims.

The second research question asked whether the socio-economic correlates of religious fundamentalism among European Muslims resemble those that we know from research on Christian fundamentalism. This was indeed the case, as people with Christian as well as Islamic fundamentalist attitudes were disproportionately found among socio-economically marginalised strata. Among Christians, fundamentalist attitudes were also more prevalent among older generations, but among Muslims age or membership of the second generation were not significantly related to fundamentalism. While these demographic and socio-economic variables explain variation within both religious groups, they do not reduce the large difference between Muslims and Christians. Within the Muslim group, they moreover do not explain the much lower level of fundamentalism among Alevites, a Shiite branch of Turkish Islam. The much higher level of support for fundamentalist beliefs among Sunnite Muslims does not seem to be due to immigration-related experiences of exclusion as argued by theories of reactive ethnicity and religiosity. Cross-nationally, levels of Muslim fundamentalism did not correlate with levels of legal exclusion of Islam, and were in fact lowest in Germany, the country with the strongest institutional discrimination against Islam. Moreover, on the individual level, there was no significant relationship between fundamentalism and perceived discrimination.

It would be foolish to interpret these findings as evidence of a fundamental and immutable difference between (liberal) Christianity and (fundamentalist) Islam. First of all, even in this study, some Christians display consistent fundamentalist worldviews. Second, many Muslim immigrants—most Alevites as well as a substantial number of Sunnites—do not subscribe to such views. Third, these results do not necessarily generalise to other parts of the world, both because Europe's Muslim populations were disproportionately recruited from conservative rural regions in the countries of origin, and because European Christians tend to be less religious and socially conservative than those in other parts of the world. Evidence from the USA, for instance, suggests that the difference between Muslims and Christians is much smaller there: 28% of US Christians and 37% of US Muslims affirm that 'there is only one true way to interpret the teachings of [Islam/Christianity]' (Pew Research Center

2011, 10). Among US Christians, 40% and among US Muslims 50% holds that the Bible, respectively, the Quran is 'literally, word for word' the word of God (Pew research Center 2007, 23). US Muslims thus hold more pluralist views on religion than their European counterparts, of whom 75% recognise only one, binding-for-all interpretation of the Quran. This is related to the fact that the US Muslim population is predominantly middle class and highly educated (Pew Research Center 2007).<sup>9</sup> At the same time, US Christians are more fundamentalist than their European counterparts, of whom only 17% recognise only one interpretation of the Bible. In Europe, therefore, a strongly secularised native population is confronted with a religiously conservative Muslim population, resulting in a large gap in religious attitudes between Muslims and natives. This is likely to be an important reason—next to the larger numbers and lower socio-economic status of Muslims—why Muslims and Islam have become much more politically contested in Europe than in North America.

Thirdly, this study asked to what extent religious fundamentalism among European Muslims is an inherent component of strong Islamic religiosity, or whether—as research has found for Christians—it is a distinct phenomenon. Although the strength of religious identification and fundamentalist attitudes are significantly correlated among both Christians and Muslims, there are also many strongly religious people in both groups who do not adhere to fundamentalist worldviews. This is most clearly the case among Christians and Alevites where even the most religious respondents express little support for fundamentalist beliefs (respectively 8% and 21% agree with all three statements measuring fundamentalism). But also among Sunnites, half of the most religious subgroup rejects at least some aspects of fundamentalism. To be strongly religious therefore does not necessarily imply fundamentalist belief structures in either of the religious groups, even though the association between the two is stronger among Sunnites.

The final research question asked whether the strong connection between religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility that has been demonstrated for Christian fundamentalism can also be found among European Muslims. Again, the answer was confirmatory. Among both groups, religious fundamentalism is by far the strongest predictor of hostility against gays, Jews and, respectively, Muslims (for Christians) or the West (for Muslims). Strong religiosity as such is in both groups not (among Christians) or only mildly (among Muslims) associated with out-group hostility, but when it is combined with fundamentalist religious beliefs, hostility against all three out-groups sours. Among Christians, rejection of homosexuals is very limited among strongly religious people without fundamentalist beliefs, but among fundamentalist Christians, more than 30% reject homosexuals as friends. Anti-Semitism is also twice as widespread among fundamentalist Christians, of whom almost 20% think that Jews cannot be trusted. Muslims are the main object of Christian fundamentalist hostility: almost 60% of Christian fundamentalists adhere to the Islamophobic belief that Muslims are out to destroy Western culture, against less than 25% of other Christians. Among Muslims, rejection of out-groups is generally higher, but it is a

minority position among those without fundamentalist beliefs. Among fundamentalist Muslims by contrast, more than 70% reject homosexuals as friends, think that Jews cannot be trusted and feel that Western countries are out to destroy Islam. The high percentage of Muslims (54% overall) who adhere to this enemy-image of the West indicates that there is not only a significant amount of Islamophobia among European native publics but also a widespread phenomenon of 'Occidentophobia' among European Muslims.

Similar levels of out-group hostility among the populations of countries of origin indicate that these results for Muslim immigrants in Western Europe do not spring from ethnic exclusion or the immigration experience. For instance, a recent worldwide study by the Anti-Defamation League found that 80% of Moroccans and 69% of Turks affirm anti-Semitic stereotypes such as that Jews control the global economy and media, and talk too much about the Holocaust.<sup>10</sup> Also, similarly large percentages of Muslim immigrants and of the publics of countries of origin adhere to conspiracy theories about the 9/11 attacks: 44%, 46% and 56%, respectively, of Muslims in Germany, France and the UK, and 59% and 41% of respondents in Turkey and Pakistan refuse to believe that these attacks were carried out by Arabs (Pew Research Center 2006, 4).

Hostile attitudes towards other groups should not be equated with the willingness to employ physical violence. But the combination of a fundamentalist belief in the absolute truth and righteousness of the own cause, hostility and mistrust towards other groups, and a sense of threat based in the belief that others are out to destroy one's own group may motivate a minority to act upon such beliefs. The statement that 'suicide bombing or other violence against civilians is justified to defend Islam from its enemies' is affirmed by 8% of US Muslims (Pew Research Center 2011, 65), while in France, the United Kingdom and Germany, respectively, 16%, 15% and 7% say that 'violence against civilian targets can sometimes be justified' (Pew Research Center 2006, 4). Roex, van Stiphout, and Tillie (2010) similarly find that 11% of Dutch Muslims say that 'there are situations in which it is for me from the point of view of my religion acceptable that I use violence'. Obviously, even from such hypothetical statements it is still a long way to actual violence. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism, intertwined with out-group hostility seems to be a crucial component in the brew that leads some down that path. More systematic research on the linkage between religious fundamentalism and political radicalism and violence is a clear desideratum for future research.

Widening the scope of investigation to Muslim immigrants in other countries and with different ethnic backgrounds is also necessary. Particularly studies covering the United Kingdom and other Anglo-Saxon countries would extend the scope of inquiry, because their Muslim populations are dominated by other groups than Turks and Maghrebians. While the latter are the two most important origin countries of European Muslims, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia, Algeria and Pakistan are not represented in this study. However, it is not likely that Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origin deviate strongly from the mainstream of European Muslims.



A study comparing Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan to those of ex-Yugoslav and Pakistani origin indicates that religious identification and observance are highest among Pakistanis and lowest among ex-Yugoslavs, with Turks and Moroccans in an intermediary position (Tillie et al. 2012).

## Notes

- [1] For reasons of brevity, I will sometimes use the shorthand 'Muslim immigrants' to refer to the category of 'Muslims of immigrant origin', although it includes the native-born children of immigrants. Likewise, I will sometimes refer to 'Christians of native stock' as 'native Christians', without implying that all natives are Christians, or that all Christians are native-born.
- [2] See <http://www.mipex.eu/>, accessed January 2, 2014.
- [3] See <http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/>, accessed January 7, 2014.
- [4] Depending on the item, 3–9% of the respondents chose this option. Treating these responses as missing values rather than as non-fundamentalist answers does not noticeably affect the results.
- [5] These items refer to Western rather than Christian culture and countries because 'Islam versus the West' rather than 'Islam versus Christianity' is the dominant frame within the clash of civilisations vocabulary.
- [6] The filter question for religious affiliation was 'what is your religion?' with 'none' or 'I am an atheist' as possible answer categories. This leads to a somewhat higher percentage of people who affiliate with a religion than the filter question that has been used in some other surveys: 'Do you consider yourself religious?', followed in the case of a 'yes' answer by the question to which religion the respondent belongs. The latter filter question mixes religious affiliation and identification. Persons who do not consider themselves as very religious may say 'no' to the filter question, although when asked 'what is your religion?' they may indicate a Christian or Muslim affiliation rather than classifying themselves as non-believers.
- [7] I include results for other Turkish Muslims in the regression tables for completeness sake, but I will not comment on them because this category is so small and internally heterogeneous.
- [8] See <http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx>; accessed February 13, 2014.
- [9] Note that the Pew findings that I cite are raw percentages, not controlled for any socio-economic and demographic variables.
- [10] See <http://global100.adl.org/>.

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