![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Considering Europe's long history of terrorist violence by separatist, leftist and rightwing groups, terrorism by militant Sunni Islamists has until recently been a marginal phenomenon. However, empirical data presented in this chronology suggests it constitutes a growing and increasingly lethal threat, and a worrisome trend in the context of increased tensions between the Muslim world and the West in the wake of 9/11 and the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which needs to be dealt with on many levels—socially, politically, and economically. The current chronology is meant to serve as a tool for conducting academic research on the scope of the threat, and for mapping incidents that might be surveyed in more depth to create a better understanding of its organizational, operational, and motivational patterns.
Notes
1. There exists no consensus on how to define “terrorism.” An excellent review of the definitional debates by Whittaker (2003) concludes that terrorism is: “—ineluctably political in aims and motives,—violent, or equally important, threatens violence,—designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target,—conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia),—and perpetrated by a sub national group or non state entity.” See David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 9.
2. The term salafi-jihadi is commonly used (by Islamists themselves and others) to refer to Islamists who pursue a purist or literalist interpretation of the Islamic faith, relying almost exclusively on the Quran and the Prophet's traditions (al-Sunnah) on the one hand, and who see violence as a legitimate means of activism to further religious and political goals on the other hand. Currents within salafi-jihadism, such as Al Qaeda, see terrorism as a legitimate and necessary means of struggle in a campaign aiming to: (1) Re-Islamize the Muslim world by toppling local regimes they accuse of having become too secular and too dependent on the West and (2) Rid Muslim lands of Western (and especially U.S. and Israeli) influences (social, political, economic, and especially military). In research on militant Islamism, the terms jihadi and jihadism are most often used about Islamist militants pursuing international or global aims and strategies (Al Qaeda and likeminded groups) and not about militants predominantly involved in local, nationalist separatist conflicts (e.g., Palestinian Hamas), despite the fact that such groups often use the concept of jihad to legitimize their struggles. For a thorough and critical review of the terminology used in studies of Islamism and jihadism, consult Thomas Hegghammer, “Islamist Violence in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism” (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2007)—doctoral thesis.
3. In 1998, another group formed on the remnants of the GIA, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which eventually became the leading force within Algerian jihadism. GSPC gradually forged closer ties with Al Qaeda and recently joined the network, adopting the name “the al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb” [Tanzim al-Qaida bi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami]. It has been widely assumed that the GSPC “replaced,” or “took over” GIA's infrastructure in Europe; see for example, Lorenzo Vidino and Steven Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe: the New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). A similar interpretation is made in Nesser, “Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations for Sunni Islamist Terrorism in Post-Millennium Europe.” Report (Kjeller: FFI, 2004). A well-informed European government official the author talked to in October 2007 said this was not exactly the case. According to the source, the GSPC focused nearly all of its capacities on the internal battle in Algeria, and maintained little or no organizational control over networks in Europe. Rather, the Algerian networks in Europe were mainly run by former GIA activists and Al Qaeda associates (who had denounced GIA under Antar Zuwabri) and ran their own networks out of Afghanistan [the author's interpretation of the source's statements]. For an overview of this period, consult Nesser, “Jihad in Europe.”
4. The chronology is part of an ongoing Ph.D./book-project within the framework of FFI's Terrorism Research Group.
5. Incidents from 1994 until 1999 have been collected from Brynjar Lia and Åshild Kj⊘k, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States: The Case of the Algerian GIA in Europe 1993–2000” (Kjeller: FFI, 2001).
6. Petter Nesser, “Jihad in Europe”; Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe,” in Clingendael Security Paper no. 2 (Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2006).
7. At the same time as there is a danger that the threat is exaggerated, there is of course also a risk that one belittles the threat poised by Islamist militancy. The following chronology contains a substantial number of incidents. Some of them are well-documented, but in other instances, it is dubious if they qualify as terrorism at all. At the same time, the chronology only presents incidents covered in open sources. Public statements by senior European security officials, such as former head of the MI5, Eliza Manningham Buller, suggest there might be quite substantial, dark figures, concerning terrorism by Islamist militants in Western Europe.
8. However, in many cases, suspected terrorists were involved in a range of activities, some of which might be characterized as support activities for militant groups and networks inside Europe and abroad, and some of which were related to concrete attack planning inside European countries.
9. However, in some instances incidents have been defined as substantially documented even though verdicts have not yet been reached, for example, when information from several independent and seemingly reliable sources substantiate that terrorism was in the making and that jihadis were involved.
10. The network consisted of a combination of hardened GIA veterans coming from Algeria, or training camps in Afghanistan. Key figures in the network as portrayed in the press and literature were: Ali Touchent aka Tarek (leader of GIA's European network), Boualem Bensaid (GIA recruiter and coordinator), Smaïn Aït Ali Belkacem (facilitator and bombmaker) Khaled Kelkal (operational leader and “muscle” in the attacks in Paris), Rachid Ramda (financer). The network was subdivided into three branches: the Vaulx-en-Velin (Rhone department) network, the Lille (Nord) network, and the Chasse-sur-Rhone (Isere) network. Khaled Kelkal headed the Vaulx-en-Velin network, Boualem Bensaid headed the Lille network, and a man called Safe Bourada headed the Chasse-sur-Rhone network (he was later suspected of heading a GSPC cell planning attacks in France in 2005; see later). For more details on the GIA networks in France, consult for example, Lia and Kj⊘k, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States”; Vidino and Emerson, Al Qaeda in Europe; Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad; My Life with Al Qaeda a Spy's Story (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
11. The operation unit was headed by the 25-year-old Algerian Abdul Abdullah Yahia. Kamil Tawil's excellent study of the FIS and the GIA sheds light on and supports the hypothesis of Lia and Kj⊘k (2001) that the operation was a top-down initiative from the GIA leadership and a strategic escalation of the jihad in Algeria “taking the battle to France”; consult Kamil al-Tawil, The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria: From “The Salvation” To “The Group” (in Arabic) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998).
12. “Hardline Algerian Group Threatens Belgian P.M.,” Reuters, 18 January 1995.
13. Gilles Kepel, Jihad, The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 309.
14. Lia and Kj⊘k, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States,” pp. 35–37.
15. Ibid., p. 38.
16. Ibid., p. 35.
17. Ibid., p. 38.
18. Ibid.
19. “Bomb Conspirators in France Linked to U.K., Other Islamic Groups—GIA Leader Allegedly Operated from London,” Agence-France-Presse, 3 November 1995.
20. Lia and Kj⊘k, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States.”
21. Ibid.
22. Consult, for example, Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath, and James Neff, “The Terrorist Within; the Story Behind One Man's Holy War Against America,” The Seattle Times, 23 June–7 July 2002.
23. Lia and Kj⊘k, “Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support Networks, and Their Host States,” pp. 41–42.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. The Khalden training camp in Khowst was a facility mainly for Algerians. Several of the operatives involved in GIA's bombings in France trained at this camp. Activities at Khalden were coordinated by the Al Qaeda affiliate Abu Zubaydah, whereas Algerian jihadi veterans Abu Jaffar, aka Omar Chabaani, and Abu Doha acted as leaders and instructors. Khalden continued to act as a base for Algerians after the fall of the GIA, and trained known terrorists, such as Ahmed Ressam and his accomplices, who planned bombings in Los Angeles to coincide with the Millennium celebrations, and the group headed by Salim Boukhari that planned bombings in Strasbourg in 2000.
27. Verdict in the Criminal Case against Mr Djilali Benali (“Aeurobui Beandali”) et al. (in German) (2003).
28. The High Court of Paris against Daoudi, Beghal, Bounour et al., Verdict of 15 Mars 2005 (in French—with Author) (2005).
29. Peter Finn and Sarah Delaney, “Al Qaeda's Tracks Deepen in Europe, Surveillance Reveals More Plots, Links,” Washington Post, 22 October 2001.
30. Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorists in Europe.”
31. “United States of America Vs. Richard Colvin Reid, a/K/a Abdul-Raheem, Abu Ibrahim, Indictment and Detention Order” (January 2001).
32. Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess Et Al (in German) (2003), Translated Excerpts of Interrogations of Shadi Abdullah (Translated by Steven Arons), Courtesy Peter Bergen, May through October 2002.
33. Sebastian Rotella, “6 Alleged Members of Milan Cell Held,” Los Angeles Times, 12 October 2002; Finn and Delaney, “Al Qaeda's Tracks Deepen in Europe, Surveillance Reveals More Plots, Links.”
34. “Arrests Trigger Italy Terror Alert,” BBC News, 24 January 2003.
35. Elisabetta Povoledo, “Man Wrongly Held in ‘02 Italy Terror Raid Wins Damages,” New York Times, 17 March 2007.
36. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006).
37. Nick Hopkins and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Huge Hunt for Missile Smugglers,” Guardian, 13 February 2003; Hugh Muir, “British Muslim Convert Jailed for Terrorism Offences,” Guardian, 24 September 2005.
38. “Terrorism Alert Heightened in Belgium,” Agence-France-Presse, 12 November 2002.
39. Joanna Walters, Gaby Hinsliff, and Robin McKie, “Three Held over ‘Poison Gas’ Bomb Plot on Tube,” Guardian, 17 November 2002.
40. Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris Contre Marbah, Lebik, Benahmed Et Autres, Jugement Du: 14 Juin 2006; Mohamed Sifaoui, Inside Al-Qaeda, How I Infiltrated the World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization (London: Granta Books, 2003).
41. Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque (London: Harper Perennial, 2006).
42. Friederike Truemper, “German Court Convicts Couple in Heidelberg,” Bloomberg Media, 6 May 2003.
43. “London Map Found in Terror Raid,” Washington Post, 24 January 2003.
44. “Italy Releases 28 Pakistanis Accused of Terrorism,” Agence-France-Presse (via FBIS), 12 February 2003. For the Italian judge's explanation of the verdict consult “Italy Frees 28 Terror Suspects,” CNN, 12 February 2003.
45. Jason Burke, “Terror Cell's U.K. Poison Plot,” Guardian, 25 May 2003; Indictment of the Jordanian Citizen of Palestinian Origin Mohamed Ghassan Ali Saud Abu Dhess et al. (in German) (2003).
46. Nur al-Din Al-Farid, “The U.S. Arrests an Arab Doctor Working at Guantanamo, and the Prison for Trablusi and His Group in Belgium,” al-Hayat (in Arabic), 1 October 2003.
47. “German–French Cooperation Leads to Arrest of Terror Suspects,” Der Spiegel (via FBIS), 16 June 2003.
48. Sebastian Rotella, “Fears Persist of Terrorism Links at Scuba School,” Los Angeles Times, 31 July 2003.
49. Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler, “Calls to Jihad Are Said to Lure Hundreds of Militants into Iraq,” New York Times, 1 November 2003.
50. “Terror Suspect Admits Plane Plot,” BBC News, 28 February 2005.
51. Richard Bernstein, “German Police Seal Off Hospital in Hamburg in Terror Alert,” New York Times, 31 December 2003.
52. Jon Henley, “Al-Qaida Terror Plot Foiled, Say French Police,” Guardian, 12 January 2004; Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris Contre Marbah, Lebik, Benahmed Et Autres, Jugement Du: 14 Juin 2006.
53. John Hooper, “Al-Qaida Man Planned Italy Bomb,” Guardian, 26 March 2004.
54. Regina Vs. Omar Khyam et al.—Opening Note (2006). The leader of the cell, Omar Khyam, trained with the Kashmiri separatist group Laskhar-e-Toiba, from January to March 2000. During 2003, he organized a cell and set up a provisional training camp (which in fact was the backyard of a house) in Malakand, Pakistan. During May and June 2003, members of the cell learned to use weapons and explosives, and staged test explosions of two small fertilizer bombs. Back in the United Kingdom, members of the group assembled and stored 600 kgs of fertilizer meant for the attacks. Khyam told his comrades that he took orders from a high-level Al Qaeda commander, going by the name of Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi. Consult, for example, “U.K. Seven ‘Were Ready to Start Bombing’,” Guardian, 21 March 2006.
55. “Berlin Was Target for Terror Attack,” Verdens Gang (in Norwegian), 21 March 2004.
56. Proceedings 20/2004, Indictment of April 10 2006, Court of First Instance Number 6 of the Audencia National (Translation of the Indictment of the Madrid Bombers) (2006). According to the indictment the Madrid bombers planned and prepared several follow-up attacks inside Spain in case the Spanish government did not respond adequately to the terrorists’ claims. The video statement that was pieced together from the rubble of the hideout apartment in which seven terrorists blew themselves up in Leganes on 11 March, contained threats of new attacks unless the Spanish troops were pulled out of Iraq fast. On 2 April there was an actual attempt by the terrorists to strike again. Railroad workers detected a bomb device on the tracks of the high-speed railway between Madrid and Seville. The device was made of the same explosive and constructed in the same way as those used on 11 March. According to the indictment the terrorists also planned to strike targets such as Jewish centers, and U.K. and Japanese tourists.
57. “Turncoat on ‘Panorama’ Attack on Rome in Preparation,” Agenzia Giornalistica Italia, (via FBIS) 15 April 2004.
58. “Al Qaeda Eyed Chemical Hit on U.S. Base in Spain,” Reuters, 5 March 2005.
59. Craig Whitlock, “How a Town Became a Terror Hub,” Washington Post, 24 November 2005.
60. Sebastian Rotella, “Dutch Raids Net 7 Suspected of Assassination Plots,” Los Angeles Times, 15 October 2005.
61. Consult, for example, “Barot Operation Posed Complex Challenge,” Guardian, 7 November 2006. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan was released from a Pakistani prison in August 2007. Consult Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Pakistan's ‘Extraordinary Prisoner’,” BBC, 21 August 2007.
62. “Terror Suspects ‘Had Video of Spain's Twin Towers’,” Expatica, 20 September 2004.
63. “Spanish Judge Orders Remanding of Islamists Involved in Bomb Plot,” Madrid ABC Times, (via Nexis Lexis) 24 October 2005.
64. Consult Albert Benschop, “Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold: Jihad in the Netherlands” (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 2005).
65. “Four Suspects Arrested in Berlin,” Der Spiegel (in German), 4 December 2004.
66. Consult Benschop, “Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold.”
67. U.K. Government, “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005” (London: U.K. Government, 11 May 2006); “Revealed: Bomber Transcript,” BBC News, 1 May 2007.
68. Paul Tumelty, “Reassessing the July 21 London Bombings,” Terrorism Monitor (2005).
69. “Islamist Detainee Confirms Planned Attacks in Paris,” Agence-France-Presse, 29 September 2005. Among those being held was Safe Bourada, who headed the Chasse-sur-Rhone GIA network, and who was convicted in 1995 and released from prison in 2003.
70. Indictment against Mirsad Bectasevic and Abdulkadir Cesur (2006); Stuart Bell, “Probe Had Global Dimension,” National Post, 5 June 2006.
71. Gian Marco Chiocci, “Attack on Italy Foiled, Three Suicide Terrorists Arrested,” Il Giornale, 18 November 2005; Kathryn Haar, “GSPC in Italy: The Forward Base of Jihad in Europe,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 3 (2006); Tom Bakkeli, “Planned Terrorist Attack in Oslo, Algerians Charged with Terror Were on Their Way to Oslo,” VG (in Norwegian), 2005.
72. “Italy Says Thwarted Terror Attack,” Washington Post, 6 April 2006.
73. “Plot to Down Israeli Plane Foiled,” CNN, 8 June 2006.
74. One of the bombers claimed that the attack was a spontaneous act motivated by the Mohammed cartoons published by a Danish newspaper, and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to the German press, investigators now believe that the operation was ordered by a “man with links to al-Qaida” as an initiation test before joining the ranks of the mujahidin in Iraq. The press coverage of the investigations suggests that the terrorists had several accomplices in Lebanon and Germany helping them with the logistics, and downloading bomb recipes on the Internet. The brother of one of them was a leading figure of the Fatah al-Islam group, which fought fiercely against the Lebanese forces out of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in 2007. It is alleged that Fatah al-Islam is inspired and supported by Al Qaeda, and that it has recruited some of its fighters from the Iraqi theater of war. The bombers also mixed with a community of militant Islamist activists inside Germany, and were in touch with a member of the al-Tawhid group (a group formerly headed by al-Zarqawi). Consult, for example, Andreas Ulrich, “Failed Bomb Plot Seen as Al-Qaida Initiation Test,” Spiegel Online International, 9 April 2007; “3rd Suspect in Failed German Train Plot a Syrian,” Associated Press, 26 August 2006; Gunther Latsch, Guido Kleinhubbert, Cordula Meyer, Holger Stark, Daniel Steinvorth, and Marc Widman, “Every Investigator's Nightmare [Translated by Christopher Sultan],” Spiegel, 28 August 2007; Hans Leyendecker, “Suspicious Men with Unclear Motives—Background of Suitcase Bombing Plans Continues to Be Disputed; Motives of Main Perpetrator Youssef Mohamad Al-Hajdib from Lebanon, Accomplices Subject of Speculation,” Sueddeutsche Zeitung (via FBIS), 13 September 2006.
75. Don Van Natta Jr., Elaine Sciolino, and Stephen Grey, “Details Emerge in British Terror Case,” New York Times, 28 August 2006.
76. “Seven Held in Danish Terror Raids,” BBC News, 5 September 2006.
77. “The Whole Terror Conversation,” Dagbladet (in Norwegian), 30 September 2006.
78. Matthias Gebauer, “Terror Plans in Frankfurt—Islamists Wanted to Blow up Airplane,” Spiegel (in German), 20 November 2006.
79. Ian Cobain and Steven Morris, “A British Beheading on the Net—Police Claim to Foil Plot,” Guardian, 1 February 2007.
80. David Leppard, “Al-Qaeda Plot to Bring Down U.K. Internet,” Times, 11 March 2007.
81. Evan Thomas and Mark Hosenball, “Doctor of Death,” Newsweek, 16 July 2007.
82. “Italy Police Raid ‘Terror School’,” BBC News, 21 July 2007.
83. Nicholas Kulish, “New Terrorism Case Confirms That Denmark Is a Target,” New York Times, 17 September 2007.
84. Nicholas Kulish and Souad Mekhennet, “In Plot Suspect, Germany Sees Familiar Face” New York Times, 7 September 2007. For an excellent review of the case consult Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, “Operation Alberich, How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot,” Der Spiegel (in English), 10 September 2007.
85. Sebastian Rotella, “14 Arrested in Belgian Jailbreak Case,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 2007.
86. Engene, Jan Oskar. Terrorism in Western Europe, Explaining the Trends since 1950. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004.
87. “Final Verdict against Jerome Courtallier (Courtallier Was First Sentenced by Rotterdam District Court on 18 December 2002).” The Hague Appeal Court, 2004.