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European Security

Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens

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DOI:: 10.1080/09662839.2015.1084290

Michael E. Becker^a, Matthew S. Cohen^a, Sidita Kushi^a^* & Ian P. McManus^a

pages 112-133

Publishing models and article dates explained

Received: 21 Dec 2014
Accepted: 14 Aug 2015
Published online: 02 Nov 2015

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Abstract

Although many policy-makers and scholars maintain that international norms have altered the motivations underlying state behaviour, this article argues that states continue to pursue national self-interest, but in ways that remain understudied. While traditional realist assumptions explain a great deal of state behaviour, they have not been widely used to account for important alternative tools of state intervention, such as economic and normative strategies. Focusing on the case of Russia's 2014 intervention in Ukraine, this article offers insights into how, and under what circumstances, these tools are used to accomplish traditional state objectives. Guided by the tenets of neoclassical realism, the article argues that in the case of Russia, military force is no longer the sole, or even the primary, means used to accomplish traditional security goals. Such dynamics have significant theoretical and policy implications for contemporary international relations.

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Abstract

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

Keywords

For centuries, leaders and scholars have deemed national security interests as the guiding force behind international political behaviour (see, for example, Carr 1939, Morgenthau 1954, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). Realists argue that states pursue power in an anarchic international arena, regardless of normative considerations (Buzan 1996, Donnelly 2009, Dunne and Schmidt 2011).¹ Nevertheless, many Western leaders appear shocked when powerful states employ traditional realist strategies to achieve national objectives, as in Russia's recent intervention in Crimea. This is perhaps due to the assumption that norms and laws are gaining stronger international relevancy (Bull 1984, Finnemore 2003, Holzgrefe 2003). However, despite recent claims made by Western leaders, such as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, that Russian military interventions embody an antiquated approach to international relations, these interventions exemplify a foreign policy founded upon national interests as measured by power maximisation (Dunham 2013, Baker 2014).² Although some argue that the levels of international violence are in decline, at least among democratic nations, traditional motivations of power underlie other growing methods of international conflict and intervention (Pinker 2012; see also Goldstein 2012). In particular, while Russia's policy goals continue to reflect realist pursuits of national self-interest and regional balance of power, the tools to achieve these goals are complex, incorporating the traditional use of military force along with more indirect means of exercising state power not captured by conventional realist perspectives.

This article analyses the Russian military interventions in Ukraine in 2014, by examining military events, leadership rhetoric, and historical narratives. We argue that in light of the Russian activity in Crimea, a more multidimensional, expanded interpretation of realist theory is required to account for the strategic use of norms, economic tools, and indirect coercion strategies used by Russia to advance its geopolitical interests abroad. Realist conceptions of national interest continue to dominate national policy-making, but military force is often no longer the sole, or even the primary, tool used to accomplish those interests. Normative factors have impacted the ability of states to overtly use military force, while opening up the possibility of new tools to achieve the same goals. This perspective may prove critical to effectively respond to the current and future military crises and to properly understand the strategies of international actors.

The paper proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the theoretical literature on realism as well as alternative perspectives in international relations theory. In this section, we discuss how traditional realist approaches fail to account for the use of norms and other non-military strategies to serve traditional security objectives. We introduce the under-examined neoclassical realist perspective to account for these deficiencies. The next two sections of the paper examine Russia as a case study of contemporary military intervention through the lens of neoclassical realism. We find that Russia has made use of a wide array of tools, ranging from military to normative strategies, to pursue their security interests in the most effective manner. Further, we demonstrate that Russia's underlying motivations can be understood through neoclassical realist assumptions of foreign policy-making and grand strategy formation – offering a more comprehensive understanding of Russia's actions in Ukraine. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for both future scholarship and policy.

Review of the theoretical literature

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

The theory of realism argues that the behaviour of states is based on the recognition that, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau 1954). Traditional realist assumptions predict that states will exhibit selfish, security-maximizing behaviour internationally, including the relentless pursuit of military power to ensure their survival (Buzan 1996). A realist international system is, then, likely to suffer from frequent military or diplomatic conflicts as states seek to enhance their relative power capacities (Waltz 1979). Thus, for most realists, norms or values appear to serve little purpose. However, certain schools of realist thought move beyond this view of international relations towards a perspective that accepts the use of normative and economic strategies as part of effective foreign policy-making. In this section, we briefly outline the general realist foundations, introducing the theoretical differences between classical realism and today's dominant framework of neo-realism. This dominant perspective, however, is unable to account for many contemporary state strategies beyond hard power. Next, we introduce neoclassical realism, a framework that, although underexplored, is capable of explaining modern state behaviour in a more nuanced way than traditional realist assumptions. Lastly, we narrow the theoretical discussion to Russia's current foreign policy decisions in Ukraine.

Standard realism

Realist assumptions stemming from both classical and neo-realists culminate in a conflictual, power-driven global sphere primarily shaped by military action (Waltz 1979, p. 49). The general theory assumes the state as the central, unitary actor on the world stage, implying that other international organisations or non-governmental entities, such as networks of individuals with shared values, have little independent influence (Morgenthau 1954). This assumption removes many sources of perceived normative or indirect power internationally. Moreover, all schools of realism emphasise that states exist and interact within a context of international anarchy – a situation in which no legal authority exists capable of forcing a state to uphold an international agreement or shared norm when it sees that breaking it is in its own interest (Morgenthau 1954, Buzan 1996, pp. 50–54). Realists, however, do not suggest that the international legal order of agreements and shared practices of states has no effect at all, but rather that its effect is a function of the value placed upon it by each state (Morgenthau 1954, Buzan 1996). Each state, acting in pursuit of its own security interests, must first calculate the costs and benefits of a given normative behaviour, instead of relying on abstract principles. In other words, the theories of international morality and legitimacy are always, “the products of dominant nations of groups of nations” that stand to benefit from the imposed norms (Carr 1939, p. 111).

Another general realist assumption is that, given the conditions of inherent anarchy, states seek to maximise their power in order to ensure their security against other states (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 29, 169). Realism posits that in their pursuit of power, states craft policies in accordance with a rational framework – not moral considerations (Carr 1939, p. 7). Moreover, states must possess the ability and willingness to use force when it is perceived to be necessary (Carr 1939). In sum, these realist assumptions reflect an arena in which states often have no choice but to act aggressively to maintain their security. Consequently, realists can certainly understand why Russia intervened in Ukraine: “all nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests” (Morgenthau 1967, p. 425).

But while the earliest version of realist theory, classical realism, allowed for the influence of domestic politics, individual leadership motivations, and some ideological foundations in foreign policy-making, contemporary neo-realism limits explanations of state behaviour internationally to the structure of the international system (Morgenthau 1954, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). This system possesses an ordering principle of self-help³ (Dunne and Schmidt 2011), has no differentiated units, and only changes in its characteristics when the capabilities between state units change. The structure of anarchy socialises all states to behave in similar conflictual, self-interested ways to survive, and it generates very predictable foreign policies for states of comparable power capabilities – regardless of varying domestic politics or leadership traits.

Neo-realism predicts that states often find themselves in crisis situations, in which they must decide on how best to demonstrate their power. Anarchy leads to paranoia about state security and to distrust between states. Hence, the constantly changing balance of power between states guarantees that the international system will be dominated by opportunistic states threatened by potential and actual competitors (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001). States must always seek to strengthen themselves and their position in relation to other states, even in the absence of a direct threat. As a result, the rational calculations and behaviour of states are shaped and constantly altered only by perceptions of the relative capabilities of other states and the changing systemic distribution of power (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001).

Thus, neo-realists would simply explain Russia's interventionist patterns as the state taking advantage of opportunities to enhance regional power so as to alter systemic power standing (Mearsheimer 2001). Russia aims to be a hegemonic power within its own region and to “offshore balance” against other regional or global powers (Mearsheimer 2001). But this perspective ignores Russia's recent use of non-military, non-traditional tools of foreign policy-making, including strategies closely resembling normative appeals. A neo-realist perspective must then take a backseat to international relations theories that are more accepting of normative dimensions and more unique state characteristics.

Constructivist objections

Constructivists reject the realist worldview, instead focusing on the role of international norms and constructed identities in shaping state behaviour (Wendt 1992).⁴ Finnemore (2003) claims that the ordering principles of the international political system have evolved from a system of balance of power to the current multilateral, interdependent system. According to her argument, this shift fundamentally changes the way states perceive and pursue their security interests. Within the current multilateral system, prevailing international norms deeply shape state behaviour, discouraging and sometimes even prohibiting unilateral, illegitimate use of force (Finnemore 2003).

Perhaps the most significant point in the constructivist perspective on military interventions is that national interests, realism's focal points, are very difficult to objectively determine (Finnemore 2003). It is always easy to construct interest-based arguments for and against intervention after the fact, but it is difficult to prove the actors’ true motivations, especially if norms themselves help craft actors’ interests (Finnemore 2003). States calculate their interests based on what is considered legitimate at the time. In the current international system, for example, they may justify military interventions through the authority of international bodies, through developing norms of protecting innocents, or may attempt to deny responsibility through the indirect use of force, as Russia has attempted in its intervention in Crimea (RT 2014, U.S. Department of State: Office of the Spokesperson 2014). In contemporary politics, the illegitimate use of force is arguably more strictly limited than before (Bull 1984, Wheeler 2000, Goldstein 2012, Pinker 2012).

The existence of norms, however, does not necessarily refute the continuing relevance of power politics. Even normative state considerations may originate within a rational framework of costs and benefits and exist as functions of changing systemic and domestic forces. The recent constructivist literature has attempted to combine normative and structural aspects of the international system through the concept of “normative power” (Manners 2002, Adler et al. 2005, Laïdi 2008, Whitman 2011). According to this approach, international actors can exercise considerable influence over global politics through the diffusion of norms, rather than traditional military force (Hardwick 2011). By exercising normative power, actors are able to redefine the nature of the international system, for example, by establishing standards and prescriptions of acceptable behaviour that move away from realist notions of the centrality of state self-interest (Manners 2008). The ability to define prevailing norms and reshape the rules of the international system is a potent tool of policy-making, as it allows countries to influence other states’ behaviour without bearing the costs associated with military force or economic statecraft (Manners 2002).

But while international actors may exercise normative power to influence others, these actions do not constitute a reshaping of the international system away from power politics dynamics. In other words, behaviour, even when influenced by norms, is still severely constrained by the structural features of the international system (Hyde-Price 2006). In the case of Russia, the normative actions taken to influence the beliefs held by former Soviet states, for example, through the establishment of a regional economic bloc predicated on shared history and values, are undermined by the coercive power that the Kremlin has had to impose on these countries in order to achieve its goals (Hyde-Price 2008). This raises questions as to the supposed primacy of normative power relative to military and economic influence.

Limitations of liberalism

In brief, the theory of liberalism also disputes many realist assumptions. Liberals argue that democratic values, economic interdependence, and institutional regulations drive both states and the international system towards cooperative arrangements, focusing more on absolute power gains instead of relative gains (Keohane 1984, Buzan 1996, p. 50).⁵ Liberalism, however, fails at explaining many facets of such contemporary state behaviour (Keohane, 1984, Doyle 1997, Deudney and Ikenberry 1999). In the case of Russia's intervention in Crimea, regional interdependence and institutional actors, such as the United Nations (UN), were unable to prevent a military crisis predicated on realist tenets of power maximisation. Furthermore, from a constructivist lens, liberalism fails at explanation because non-democratic, non-free market states appear to follow many of the same norms regarding intervention (Finnemore 2003, pp. 52–56).

Neoclassical realism

Although underexplored in contemporary analysis, certain versions of realism do not outright reject the use of normative tools. Over the years, an increasing number of scholars have recognised the insufficiency of systems-only explanations in international politics and have opted to combine systemic and unit-level variables under the theoretical umbrella of “neoclassical realism”, as coined by Gideon Rose (1998) (see also Wolhforth 1993, Schweller 2004). Unlike neo-realist theories, neoclassical realism embraces individual-level determinants of foreign policy-making and moves away from traditional realist assumptions of “systemic determinacy”, which relegate domestic-level variables to the background (Sterling-Folker 1997).

These theorists seek to answer questions that traditional realist accounts can't respond to, namely, why do states acting under the same systemic constraints display different conduct internationally, and alternatively, why do states that hold to similar domestic dynamics react differently to external events? Unlike their neo-realist counterparts, neoclassical realists do not seek to craft a general theory of international politics, but rather, they aim to explain the foreign policy-making of individual states via the power analysis found in classical realism. But its neo-realist ties arise because the theory still attributes ultimate explanatory power to systemic forces, such as the socializing structure of anarchy and the distribution of power.

Neoclassical realist tenets deem foreign policy as resulting from international structure, intervening domestic influences, and the complex relations between the two (Rose 1998). Domestic-level intervening forces are the key to this endeavour, especially statesmen's perceptions of the power distribution and the restriction of national power via public opinion and domestic pressure groups (Zakaria 1998). As Schweller (2004) argues, these inclusions allow neoclassical realism to account for the unique interests and motivations of states as intervening variables – motivations ranging from power, prestige, honour, fear to self-interest – as envisioned by the classic scholars. In other words, neoclassical realists reject the assumption that the states’ sole aim is security; instead, the states attempt to use their power to direct the international system towards their own goals and preferences (Rose 1998). Due to such broad interpretations of state motivations, some neoclassical realists are eager to discuss with constructivists on matters of identity politics as a way to bridge the intervening effects of domestic politics on the independent effects of international power structures (Sterling-Folker 2009). Neoclassical realism can be seen as the midpoint between the traditions of realism, on the one hand, and liberalism, neo-institutionalism, and constructivism, on the other (Romanova 2012, Romanova and Pavlova 2012).

Aside from drawing in domestic factors and a wide range of state motivations in international relations, a central tenet of neoclassical realism is that “states use the tools at their disposal to gain control over their environment” (Rose 1998, p. 157). This tenet echoes neoclassical realism's focus on a state's grand strategy, encompassing not only military choices, but the means and ends of politics, economics, and ideology, and all aspects of power and influence at a statesman's disposal to enhance a nation's long-term interests (Kitchen 2010). As perceived via this framework, the chosen tools for state foreign policy are not consistent across state actors as most realists assume, and in addition to traditional diplomacy and military interventions, may include economic leverage and normative campaigns. Additionally, neoclassical realism acknowledges the importance of historical experience in explaining international behaviour (Rose 1998). For instance, neoclassical realists would understand Russia's interventionist behaviour as a product of its former status as a hegemon and current status as a rising power and revisionist state. As such, Russia has been reluctant to accept political institutions established by Western powers when it was weak and is now eager to overthrow the status-quo in favour of a new world order more conducive to Russia's rising international status. Overall, neoclassical realism predicts that an increase in relative material power will eventually propel a corresponding expansion in the state foreign policy ambitions and ideational foundations, as seen in Russia's recent interventions in Europe (Rose 1998).

Neoclassical realism, therefore, offers a compelling explanation of contemporary Russian behaviour that addresses the use of non-traditional tools of foreign policy-making, unaccounted for by traditional realist perspectives. Despite its growing significance as an international relations theory, neoclassical realism remains underdeveloped and scarcely applied to contemporary foreign policy decisions (Kitchen 2010). Consequently, this article seeks to apply neoclassical realism in the analysis of the case of Russia's intervention in Crimea.

A neoclassical perspective on Russian foreign policy

Over the last decade, the context in which Russia crafts its foreign policy has drastically changed – both in regards to Russia's position in the international structure and its more contested internal environment. State institutions, especially the executive branch of power, which are central for neoclassical analysis, are losing their legitimacy as civil society grows but remains divided (Romanova 2012, Romanova and Pavlova 2012). The result is that it is harder for the state to mobilise society in order to uphold its foreign policy and to extract resources needed for hard power projection. A state's potential for mobilisation increases in the case of a tangible outside threat, and that is why the exaggeration of an outside threat, such as Western hegemony via regional EU dominance, may be vital in the short term. Moreover, soft power strategies for foreign policy attainment become more common as military strategies become costlier both internationally and domestically. Such considerations of internal state dynamics coupled with overarching systemic forces allow the introduction of non-traditional strategies of foreign policy within a realist theoretical lens – including normative justifications, economic strategies, and indirect, covert military strategies.

Below, we provide qualitative evidence of Russian foreign policy that includes the use of international norms as tools of foreign policy-making, in addition to traditional hard power strategies. Russia's use of rhetoric regarding the norms of sovereignty, self-determination, and humanitarianism appears driven by national interests and traditional realist motivations of security through increased state capabilities. In other words, Russia's strategic use of norms and selective appeals to international standards are merely tools to pursue state interests in today's international arena. Indeed, in the recent cases of intervention, Russian officials persistently rejected the term “military intervention” (Allison 2009, p. 174). This differs greatly from Russia's behaviour during the bipolar Cold War international atmosphere, where Russia did not bother to hide or legitimise its military interventions by appealing to international norms. Allison argues that military interventions pose dilemmas for Russian foreign policy. Russia has been largely opposed to Western military interventions, arguing that they are generally a breach of national sovereignty. At the same time, Russia has repeatedly intervened in the affairs of its neighbours, a behaviour that has often been labelled as hypocritical by the Western world. One of Russia's fears regarding Western interventions arises from the fact that when Russia has granted approval to such missions, it has been unable to exercise meaningful control over the outcomes. The intervention in Libya against Muammar al-Qaddafi is a case in point, where Russia argues that in toppling the Gaddafi regime, the Western powers went far beyond what was approved by the UN (Allison 2013). Allison additionally argues that following the end of the Cold War, Russia remained strong enough diplomatically to have an impact on the creation of norms regarding the use of force. Russia has fluctuated between adapting to changing Western norms and outright resistance to them depending on its political needs (Allison 2013, pp. 12–14). In recent years, embedded within an international system dominated by a Western hegemon that espouses its own norms, Russia's strategic use of norms and other indirect military tools allow it to pursue its aspirations towards regional hegemony without costly Western repercussions. In the following sections, we first examine Russia's international motivations through historical analysis. We then progress to an analysis of Russia's strategic use of military versus non-military tools in Crimea in light of neoclassical realist explanations.

Russian foreign policy motivations

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

In order to understand the motivations behind Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, it is vital first to examine the role of Russia in the post-Cold War international system. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia saw its economy severely weakened and its position as a great power significantly diminished. The early transition away from the Soviet system to a market-based economy was a time of economic chaos. During this period, the Russian economy lost almost 30% of its GDP, high rates of inflation led to the collapse of the ruble, and a majority of citizens saw their savings vanish (Fischer et al. 1992). This traumatic event left a lasting mark on Russian foreign policy. President Vladimir Putin has gone so far as to refer to the 1991 collapse of the USSR as, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” (Osborn 2005).

Many in Russia, including members of the current leadership, perceive Western nations as central to Russia's decline from great power status during this period (Wilson 2010, Maitra 2014). Russians blame policies of rapid liberalisation and privatisation, recommended by Western experts and international bodies such as the IMF and World Bank, for the weakening of their global economic and political power. The result has been a sense of victimhood in Russian politics and a mistrust of the West. This suspicion extends to international institutions, such as NATO, the World Bank, and the IMF, which are seen as established by, and as favouring, the interests of the US and its European allies. This logic reflects realist assumptions about the role of international institutions in maintaining a balance of power in favour of dominant countries (Mearsheimer 1994, Waltz 2000).

By the 2000s, Russia had regained economic stability largely due to lucrative oil and natural gas exports (Maitra 2014). Political power also became more consolidated, under Putin. With this return to economic growth and strengthened political leadership, and as predicted by realist theory, Russian foreign policy has become more confrontational, with Russia seeking to reassert itself as a major international power. The objective of this more confident and combative foreign policy appears threefold. First, Russia has sought to project itself as a great power after decades of reduced influence and status (Maitra 2014). Second, Russia has sought to maintain regional dominance over former Soviet states and limit Western influence among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁶ Russian plans to develop a Eurasian Union represent such an attempt to establish a clear regional sphere of influence and provide a counterbalance to the European Union (Alpert and Kolyandr 2014). Finally, Russian foreign policy has sought openly to contest aspects of the international system it considers disadvantageous. Russia has, in varying degrees, ignored, co-opted, or undermined international rules and laws as it has seen fit. Russian adherence to international laws and norms has been used strategically to advance state interest, rather than motivated by a desire to abide by any international consensus (Allison 2009).

Each of these foreign policy objectives is exemplified by the recent actions that Russia has taken in cases such as Georgia and Ukraine. Russia views the democratization movements that took place in former Soviet states with deep suspicion. According to the Kremlin, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 were orchestrated by the US and its European allies to install pro-Western leaders within Russia's rightful sphere of influence (Wilson 2010, p. 21). In Russia's mind, the goal of these Color Revolutions has been to limit Russian influence in the region under the guise of democracy. These revolutions thus represent a direct threat to Russia's ability to project power. The recent wave of popular protest in Kiev, which led to the ousting of the former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, has been viewed by Russian leaders as yet another Western-backed infringement on Russia's sphere of influence. To achieve anti-Western foreign policy goals, Russia has employed a wide array of tools, including the use of direct and indirect military force, as well as economic and normative strategies to advance its national self-interest.

Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

Traditional military tools

In some respects, the events and actions taken by the Russian government in the buildup to the annexation of Crimea – much like the goals pursued – can be explained through a traditional realist lens. In March 2014, the Russian parliament approved Putin's request to use force in Ukraine, providing a clear signal of its willingness to employ military power to achieve state objectives. In fact, reports from the Ukrainian government indicated that there had been a significant influx of Russian troops into the peninsula and that the Russian navy had begun a blockade of Crimea (Baczynska et al. 2014). This strategy allowed Russia to claim control over the region and eventually incorporate it into its sovereign territory. In addition to using military strength to annex Crimea, Russian forces also began military exercises and a significant troop buildup along the Eastern border of Ukraine. These tactics served to both showcase the strength of the Russian military and provide an implicit threat that a more coordinated land invasion was possible. It is important to note that this direct use of military force is not an aberration, but a foreign policy strategy that Russia has pursued in other cases in the post-Cold War era. In August 2008, in response to the internal conflict in Georgia, the Russian military began to increase its military presence along the border. Following this initial troop buildup, Russian forces conducted air strikes in South Ossetia and eventually sent in an invading land force of tanks and soldiers (Japaridze 2014).

Covert military tools

However, despite the clear use of overt military force in Crimea, Russia has sought to pursue an overall strategy in Ukraine of limited engagement, emphasizing covert rather than overt use of military force. In fact, Russia has gone to great lengths to claim that the armed personnel in Crimea wearing unmarked military uniforms and supplied with Russian weaponry and support vehicles were domestic self-defense units (The Economist 2014a). At a news conference in March 2014, Putin claimed that Russian soldiers had not occupied government buildings or surrounded Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, contradicting many reports from the ground (Chappell and Memmott 2014). These denials of military involvement by the Kremlin continued despite the emergence of photographic evidence and reports from eastern Ukraine suggesting that these soldiers were Russian military and intelligence forces (Higgins et al. 2014). It was not until after the Crimean referendum and its formal incorporation into Russia that the Kremlin acknowledged that the masked men were in fact Russian troops (Reuters 2014). This reversal in the official account of events in Crimea is telling about the Russian desire to downplay its military involvement, using discourse to disguise its actions until its objectives had been achieved. Russia prudently calculated that by limiting conflict and disguising its troops, there would be a reduced risk of immediate punitive Western response to the invasion and occupation of the Crimean peninsula. Military buildup in Western Russia has also been portrayed by the Kremlin as part of a series of war games and training exercises rather than as a preparation for invasion of Ukraine (Kelley 2014). A similar strategy of disguising military actions was employed in Georgia in 2008 when Russia sent several hundred unarmed troops to Abkhazia, stating they were needed for railway repairs, in advance of formal Russian invasion (Japaridze 2014).

In addition to masking the activities of its military, Russia has also pursued a range of other covert strategies intended to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. Demonstrating the dominance of state actors and unitary nature of state influence, the rebel groups operating in Ukraine are largely an extension of Russian state interests. While the rebel groups have taken actions independent of direct Russian instructions, they would be unable to function without Russian weapons and direction. Western officials and the leadership in Kiev have accused Russia of supplying arms and fighters across Ukraine's porous border to support the rebels (Marson and Alpert 2014). The Ukrainian government also claims that many of the separatist plans have been orchestrated directly by Russia (Balmforth and Kushch 2014). According to the interviews with separatists in Kharkiv, some claimed that they had been recruited as pro-Russian fighters and were paid to attack Ukrainian nationalists (Jones 2014). These separatists also claimed that their supervisors were from the Russian military and intelligence agencies that had helped plan coordinated attacks on government buildings (Jones 2014). These tactics reveal a strategy in which Moscow provides backing and support for Ukrainian separatists while being able to maintain plausible deniability thereby allowing Russia to avoid further sanctions from the West.

While the intervention in Ukraine is clearly motivated by Russian state interest and demonstrates a willingness on behalf of the Kremlin to use military power, the government's reliance on covert actions represents a more subtle approach that is often overlooked by traditional realist accounts. In fact, much of the Russian military strategy has relied on downplaying its military involvement as a means to limit international repercussions. Although a traditional realist perspective accounts for certain aspects of Russian intervention in Ukraine, a more nuanced interpretation founded within neoclassical realism is needed to provide a comprehensive assessment of Russian motivations and actions in Ukraine – incorporating covert military actions, economic, and normative dimensions.

Economic strategies

In addition to military support, Russia has been able to deploy several economic instruments to try to force concessions from Ukraine. One of the main tools that Russia has used to achieve its national objectives is the oil and gas that it sells Ukraine and other CIS states. In June 2014, citing a dispute over gas payments, the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine (MacFarquhar 2014). This event coincided with a statement by the Ukrainian president that a cease-fire plan was being developed to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine. Russia's actions are perceived by Ukraine as part of an aggressive Russian strategy to create instability within the country. According to Ukrainian Prime Minister, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, “this is not about gas. This is a general plan for the destruction of Ukraine” (NY Times 2014). Russia has manipulated oil supplies to achieve its goals several times in the past. In 2006, and again in 2009, Russia stopped all gas supplies to Ukraine over price disagreements (Japaridze 2014). While Moscow claimed that these actions were purely motivated by economic considerations, many in Kiev insisted that they were for political reasons (NY Times 2014).

Russia has also used its trade relationship with Ukraine as an economic tool to put pressure on political leaders in Kiev, for example, when it banned the import of various Ukrainian products. This included a ban on the chocolates produced by the then Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Poroshenko's confectionary company, citing vague health concerns (NY Times 2014). These targeted trade sanctions seemed largely intended to punish the pro-Western Ukrainian leadership that had emerged, and to create instability in the Ukrainian economy at a time of political upheaval. Similar economic tools were employed by Russia in 2006 against Georgia, including a halt in the shipment of natural gas during one of the country's coldest winters, a ban on the import of Georgian products, and the closing of several transportation links between the two states (NY Times 2014). Rather than reflecting a complex interdependence between states that leads to greater cooperation and mutual benefit, Russia has used its trade relations with other CIS states to advance its own national interests and inflict economic harm on those who do not favour these objectives.

Undermining and co-opting international laws and norms

Russia has found it advantageous to challenge or co-opt international laws and norms in order to achieve its national objectives. A notable example of Moscow's willingness to disregard an international agreement is its breach of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The Memorandum, signed by the leaders of the US, the UK, Russia, and Ukraine, outlined that all parties would “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” (Council on Foreign Relations 1994). Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea represent a direct violation of this agreement and demonstrate unwillingness by Russia to uphold international agreements it finds detrimental to its own interests. In addition to ensuring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the Memorandum also indicated that all signatories would “refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty” (Council on Foreign Relations 1994). Russia's economic sanctions and strict limitations on the export of oil and natural gas represent a violation of this international agreement as they represent a strategy to force concessions from the Ukrainian government.

It is important to note, however, that Russia did not simply ignore the Budapest Memorandum. Instead, leaders in Moscow contended that a coup had toppled the rightful government of Ukraine, thus nullifying any binding agreements Russia had with the new Ukrainian government (The Economist 2014b, p. 23). This behaviour indicates that the Russian government understood that if it justified its actions in terms of the international law, it could lessen possible punishment for its actions.

Russia has additionally made strategic use of the international laws and norms to justify its foreign policy actions. The initial military intervention in Crimea was conducted under the guise of protecting the human rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speaking people within Crimea, including from genocide, this despite the lack of evidence suggesting that Crimea's majority-Russian population faced any systematic persecution (Coynash 2014, The Economist 2014c). To support these claims, the Russian foreign ministry released a report that provided almost no sources and offered starkly different accounts of the events in Crimea than those reported by the international media (Coynash 2014, The Economist 2014c).

To further reinforce its strategic control over Crimea, Russia supported a referendum on Crimean annexation purportedly based on the international principles of self-governance and the democratic will of the people. Despite these claims, the Crimean vote has largely been considered illegitimate, with the UN and members of the international community declaring the referendum illegal (BBC 2014). Evidence in fact suggests that only 15–30% of the Crimean population supported annexation, undermining claims of democratic support for the measure (Gregory 2014).

Regardless, Russia made use of the results to formally annex the territory and to issue Russian passports to Crimean citizens (Alexe 2014). By issuing Russian passports in Crimea, Moscow has attempted to bolster its territorial claims over the peninsula and legitimise its actions based on the responsibility to protect Russian peoples in the region.⁷ The Kremlin pursued a similar strategy in 2008 in Georgia, when Russia granted citizenship en masse to people living in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Telegraph 2009).

Strategic use of norms and discourse

Another related key component of the Kremlin's policy during the conflict with Ukraine has been the strategic use of norms and discourse to justify Russian actions and establish a narrative in favour of Russian interests. These normative arguments, far from discrediting the tenets of realism, constitute an integral part of how nations act self-interestedly to achieve their goals within an evolving international framework. These three types of discourse are used by Russia to several ends: first, they provide justification for Russian covert and overt intervention in Eastern Ukraine, minimizing the risk of retaliation by Western powers or Ukraine itself; second, they generate pro-Russian sentiment throughout Eastern Europe, opening a political window for Russia to intervene in other states when it suits its interests. In the context of this case study, the normative arguments may be divided into three categories: nationalistic, geopolitical, and Western/liberal.

Nationalistic discourse

Russia's primary justification for its intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has been the alleged existence of security threats against ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and other Slavic peoples (Anderson 1991). Putin, for example,

has argued that fascists threaten the safety of Russian-speakers in Ukraine; that the elite troops surrounding Ukrainian bases are not Russian, but irregulars who bought their uniforms in the shops; [and] that the Budapest memorandum, which Russia signed in 1994 and guarantees Ukraine's borders, is no longer valid because the government in Kiev has been overthrown. (The Economist 2014d)

Putin's stated ambition is to restore Russia to the position of global influence it enjoyed in the Soviet era.⁸ In this way, Russia co-opts normative, nationalistic rhetoric as a means towards standard realist aspirations of great power status (BBC 2005, Hauslohner 2014). Framing the taking of Crimea in this manner enhances Russia's stature on the world stage, portraying it as a global power that acts forcefully to achieve its goals.

Russia has additionally argued that its cultural civilisation is both independent from and incompatible with Western culture.⁹ By extension, ethnic Russians who live in multicultural states (including Ukraine) should not have to tolerate a government or national media that is consciously oriented toward the West. The cleavage between eastern Ukraine – relatively more affluent and composed largely of ethnic Russians – and Western Ukraine – poorer and more and more oriented towards Europe – represents an important manifestation of the conflict between Western and Russian values. It has also proved a key driver of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, setting off the initial protests in Kiev that led to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych and lending credence to Putin's suggestions that the Ukrainian government was incapable of insuring internal security.¹⁰

Russia's argument that it must protect its ethnic kin in Ukraine is underpinned by the idea that the latter belong under the same umbrella as citizens in Russia itself. To the extent that this imagined political community is cohesive, it creates a bloc of people – both inside and outside of Russia – sympathetic to Russia and willing to act to defend its interests. Members of this bloc in Ukraine have used force to secure territory for Russia, even without direct prompting from the Kremlin. As a result, Russia is able to play a two-level game, arguing that they have no control over the separatists while indirectly spurring them on with nationalist rhetoric. Further, in cases where clashes between separatists and unionists occur in Ukraine, the attendant deterioration in security can be cited by Russia as grounds for intervention by regular military forces. The use of an “imagined community” of Russian peoples allows Moscow the flexibility to intervene outside of Russia's formal territory under the auspices of protecting their people. This strategic use of norms provides a cover to justify intervention in any former Soviet state where ethnic Russians reside. Ultimately, Russia has made use of less costly nationalistic strategies so as to further enhance its power and security.

Geopolitical discourse

The second type of normative discourse used by Russia to support its military operations in Ukraine is geopolitical. In this regard, Russia depicts its intervention in Ukraine as justifiable because the former is surrounded by a hostile concert of economic, political, and diplomatic arrangements created and orchestrated by Western powers. In this way, Russia's actions are portrayed as defensive, last-ditch manoeuvres rather than offensive-minded incursions. The most visible manifestation of Western “encirclement” of Russia has been the military interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the expansion of NATO and Western military installations and personnel in Eastern Europe. Recent additions to NATO include several former Soviet Republics, among them Slovakia and the Baltic states. While the addition of these nations to NATO's protective cordon has come at their own behest, and while the military installations are largely defensive in nature, Russia still protests what it sees as a destabilization of the traditional balance of power in the region (Mearsheimer 2014).

The expansion of NATO aside, it is the enlargement of the European Union that has long been interpreted by Russia as a particularly egregious encroachment on its traditional “sphere of influence” in Eastern Europe. Russia has traditionally viewed itself as the final arbiter of foreign policy of the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact signatories (Kramer 2008, Baczynska and Hudson 2014). Yet as more and more of the latter adhere to the European Union, they implement policies that are not in line with Russian interests and that isolate those nations from Russia. What is more, accession to the EU requires ceding a certain amount of sovereignty to the super-national government in Brussels, further limiting Russian influence over decision-making processes in new EU member states.¹¹

Russia's geopolitical discourse benefits the nation in several ways. By couching its Crimean intervention in these terms, it transmits a warning to other states considering closer relations with the European Union, informing them that such relations will only come at a steep cost. Thus, this rhetoric pays dividends for Russia internationally, and for Putin domestically, and it is much less costly than the use of traditional military threats in signalling Russian security interests.

Western/liberal discourse

Russian leaders have also co-opted Western and liberal arguments to justify their actions in Crimea. Russia, on the world stage, has traditionally been a defender of national sovereignty and an opponent of military adventurism (Allison 2013). As such, it has opposed other states’ intervention in, for example, Syria and Iraq, and thus required a strong argument to substantiate its violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, all the more so because of the latter's growing ties to Europe.

This argument is two-pronged. On the one hand, Russia has invoked the “Responsibility to Protect”, a normative obligation to intervene when a people is being oppressed, regardless of whether doing so would violate another state's sovereignty (United Nations 2014). In the past, to take an example, this norm has been used by Western powers to justify the intervention that removed Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi from power (Bajoria 2011). Russia, besides invoking this norm in its conflict with Ukraine, also made use of this norm to buttress its invasion of Georgia in 2008, claiming that Georgia was engaging in “genocide” against South Ossetians (BBC World News 2008).

On the other hand, Russia also appeals to the right to self-determination. Under this doctrine, the people of a given territory have the right to decide how they will be governed. To this end, Russia organised an election in Crimea in which it claims that Crimea's citizens voted to join Russia; it is on this basis that Russia claims its annexation of Crimea is legal.¹²

The available evidence, however, suggests that the use of these norms by Russia is opportunistic and disingenuous: Russia's sympathy for certain people's desire for self-determination seems limited to those people who wish to be a part of Russia. Additionally, Russian appeals to Crimean self-determination are founded on a questionable interpretation of international law: they take no account of the overall sentiment in Ukraine, whose borders, as mentioned above, are sovereign and guaranteed by international agreement. Rather, Russia's invocation of Ukrainians’ desire for self-determination is based on the opinion of a conveniently carved-out geographical region already aligned with Russia.

To summarise, Russian officials have made use of a broad array of tools to justify the Crimean intervention, tools which include nationalistic appeals, geopolitical discourse, and cooptation of international, Western, and liberal norms. Such rhetoric, though perhaps expressed sincerely by some, is mainly being exploited by Russia as a means to attain its geopolitical goals while minimizing the risk of retaliation by other nations. In other words, though Russia – and states in general – no longer rely on naked, unvarnished military force to achieve their objectives, the rhetoric they use to explain and excuse their actions is often diversionary. Ultimately, Russia has strategically opted to ignore or distort international law as a tactic to reinforce the legitimacy of its actions and thereby reduce the risk of severe reprimand by the international community. As a result, scholars and policy-makers wishing to predict and explain states’ behaviour in the modern international system must take into account the ways in which rhetoric is used, and abused, by states in order to achieve their goals.

Discussion

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

As the above case study suggests, Russian behaviour is predominantly driven by its pursuit of national interests – instead of by emerging international norms. Our findings also indicate that Russia increasingly appeals to norms and international law when these tools have the potential to soften international punishments and decrease the costs of intervention. Thus, while the mainstream theory of neo-realism remains a powerful tool in predicting the pursuit of national interests, it requires more nuance so as to account for the vast array of both military and non-military strategies that contemporary states use to achieve their goals. Using the foundational assumptions of a neoclassical realist perspective, we find that these new tools do not mean that the norms have totally upended the calculus of state behaviour in today's international system. Instead, the strategic use of norms should be understood within the context of more state-specific realist objectives and the underlying systemic distribution of power. In other words, norms and values themselves hold little intrinsic influence on the international behaviour of states – countering common perceptions of a more normatively bounded international community.

Russia intervened in Ukraine in pursuit of geopolitical national objectives, as would be predicted by general realist theory. Russia's behaviour, however, often deviated from traditional realist expectations as Russia used normative appeals, economic strategies, and indirect coercion strategies alongside military tools to attain its objectives. Russia justified its geopolitical actions in terms of norms and international law when it could, but it ignored these same norms and laws when they did not provide benefits to the pursuit of national interests. Furthermore, Russia could often afford to eschew unbeneficial norms in favour of direct military strategies because its status as a regional power protected it from high levels of risk and international retaliation.

In addition to important theoretical contributions, the Ukrainian crisis provides potential lessons for international leaders and policy-makers. First, it serves as a sobering reminder to Western, liberal-minded leaders that military conflict predicated upon geopolitical interests is not a thing of the past, but a modern reality. In addition, it reveals that even non-Western authoritarian regimes can take advantage of normative appeals in pursuit of international goals. Perhaps most significantly, the Ukraine crisis casts doubt on the idea that norms, laws, and international institutions are capable of deterring states from pursuing their national interests through aggressive means.

The failure of Western efforts to limit Russian intervention is due to several factors that are not unique to Russia, but rather are endemic to the international system. States that have sought to deter and punish Russia for its actions – namely, the US and members of the European Union – have suffered from a lack of unified resolve, largely stemming from Europe's economic ties to Russia, which Russia has not hesitated to exploit. In light of the growing economic interdependence that characterises the world today, this situation is not likely to change. The effects of this interdependence, unfortunately, are neither benign nor cooperative, as liberals may predict.

A factor contributing to the inability of multilateral institutions to significantly impact state behaviour is that Russia and its allies participate in many of them, including the UN. With Russia, China (both of which hold veto power in the UN Security Council), and affiliated states opposed to Western condemnations of Russia's actions, a resolution with any capacity to create change cannot be adopted. Further, actions taken by institutions in which Russia is not a member, such as NATO, can be dismissed by Russia as Western attempts to limit Russia's influence in the international system.

Conclusions and implications

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

This article's findings demonstrate the value of applying neoclassical perspectives to explain contemporary great power behaviour and foreign policy-making. Though the structure of the modern international system has proved inadequate in deterring Russia, it has reshaped how Russia calculates the pursuit of its interests. Russia has eschewed the sole use of direct offensive military force. Instead, such force has been accompanied by diversionary normative discourse, strategic economic tools, and the use of covert military tactics. Where Russian involvement has been so obvious that it cannot be denied, Russia has created a normative discourse to justify its actions. This tactic – along with economic carrots and sticks used to deter vulnerable states from participating in an anti-Russia coalition – contribute to debate and confusion among the states trying to alter Russia's behaviour, decreasing the chances of a concerted military or economic retaliatory response by the West. In the future, similar tactics could be employed not just by other non-Western states, but by the West as well.

Yet while the scholarly literature on great power behaviour has begun to incorporate the use of non-military tactics, the prevalence and importance of these tools has yet to permeate into policy-makers’ understanding of how states behave in the modern international system. Western leaders are not ignorant of Russia's indirect use of military proxies in Crimea and Ukraine, but they have been slower to recognise how economic leverage and discursive tools are used to obfuscate and sow doubt among Russia's adversaries. In fact, this delayed recognition may also stem from the Western and particularly European perception that only they can effectively utilise normative power internationally – not authoritarian regimes such as Russia. From a policy-making standpoint, this has led to an incoherent and largely ineffectual response by Western states intent on curbing Russian aggression. Western leaders appear confident that a limited regime of economic sanctions combined with rhetorical condemnation of Russian actions will be sufficient to achieve these goals. The inconsistency with which these measures have been applied has ensured their failure to deter Russia; they have arguably aggravated relations even further. Thus, the lack of a sophisticated understanding of Russia's tactics has led to sub-optimal policy choices from the perspective of the West. In this article, we demonstrate that a research program inspired by the recent neoclassical turn in the international relations literature shows promise for explaining not just why great powers pursue certain objectives, but how they act to attain them.

But while policy-makers would certainly do well to absorb the lessons of Russia's conduct in Ukraine and Crimea, a larger question looms: how applicable are the strategies employed by Russia to other states? The findings of this article suggest promising lines of inquiry, across multiple levels of analysis, into the novel approaches modern states use to achieve their goals. In particular, scholars might consider investigating the following research questions: what is the influence of domestic politics on states’ tendency to use the non-conventional tactics discussed in this article? When are states likely to use these tactics, and when, if ever, will they rely solely on regular military force? Are there significant differences in the use of tactics between states of different power capacities? Finally, if states do rely on a mixture of obfuscation and non-traditional military force to achieve their objectives, what is the future of deterrence in the modern era?

While the international system exhibits continuity inasmuch as states continue to be the most important actors, the normative, economic, and sub-national measures employed by Russia in Ukraine invite a reassessment of the tactics used in the service of traditional realist goals, namely power maximisation and security assurance. The developing literature on neoclassical realism shows significant promise for developing an updated understanding of how states behave. It is our hope that it will be further refined and applied to other cases in an effort to understand how conflict and war are evolving in the modern world.

Acknowledgements

We would like to extend our gratitude to the reviewers for providing constructive comments on the article, as well as to those who participated and provided feedback at the Northeastern Political Science Association Conference, Boston, 13 November 2014, where an earlier version of this text was presented. The authors would also like to thank Professor Max Abrahms at Northeastern University for his extremely useful comments on previous versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

Jump to section

Review of the theoretical literature
Russian foreign policy motivations
Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies
Discussion
Conclusions and implications
Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. In this paper, anarchy refers to the lack of an overarching power in the international system that can impose order upon states. See Buzan (1996) and Donnelly (2009).

2. US Secretary of State Kerry was not the only significant political actor to express shock at Russia's military behaviour. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told President Obama by telephone that after speaking with Vladimir Putin, she was not sure he was in touch with reality; he was “in another world”. See Baker (2014).

3. The realist self-help concept holds that each state must be responsible for ensuring its own well-being and cannot rely on or expect aid from any other states or international actors. For more details, see Dunne and Brian Schmidt (2011).

4. Constructivism is an international relations theory first developed by Alexander Wendt (1992) that focuses on the development of international institutions and norms based on the interactions of structure, agency, and identities. Countering neo-realist ideas, Wendt has argued, for example, that the condition of self-help, in which states only rely on their own power capabilities, does not follow casually from the ordering principle of anarchy. As states’ identities and interests are socially constructed, anarchy too is a socially constructed international institution that can consequently be altered by other emerging norms.

5. Liberalism emphasises common interests between nations, the cooperative effects of international organisations, the interdependence imposed by free market economies, and the power of democratic governance in establishing a separate peace. Institutional liberals believe that mechanisms of free trade and international institutions will increase the benefits of cooperation through minimised transaction and information costs between nations. See Keohane (1984), Doyle (1997), and Deudney and Ikenberry (1999).

6. The Commonwealth of Independent States is a loose organisation of independent former Soviet states that was established in 1991. Ukraine was a de facto member of the group, but a bill was introduced by Parliament in response to the annexation of Crimea by Russia to withdraw from the organisation. For further information see: [http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/bill-introduced-to-withdraw-ukraine-from-cis-339433.html].

7. According to Russian constitutional law, the legal position of Russian passport holders abroad is the same those living in Russia. For further information see Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (2009).

8. See, for example, Osborn (2011) and Aron (2013).

9. For an enumeration of the cultural aspirations of Russia under Putin, see Kimmelman (2007) and Bershidsky (2014). For a discussion of the Russian state's recently instituted regulations on diffused cultural materials, see Marszal (2014).

10. For discussions of political and economic divides in Ukraine, see The Economist (1996), White et al. (2010), and Walker (2013).

11. For a discussion of the challenges EU expansion poses to Russia, see DeBardeleben (2013).

12. For more information, see Vladimir Putin's speech to the Russian Duma regarding the Crimea situation in March 2014. Available from: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889.

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European Security

Volume 25, Issue 1, 2016

Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens

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Abstract

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Keywords

Review of the theoretical literature

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Standard realism

Constructivist objections

Limitations of liberalism

Neoclassical realism

A neoclassical perspective on Russian foreign policy

Russian foreign policy motivations

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Russia's toolbox: from military to normative strategies

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Traditional military tools

Covert military tools

Economic strategies

Undermining and co-opting international laws and norms

Strategic use of norms and discourse

Nationalistic discourse

Geopolitical discourse

Western/liberal discourse

Discussion

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Conclusions and implications

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Acknowledgements

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Notes

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