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Abstract
Far reaching decentralisation reform has been launched in Rwanda, intended to contribute to socioeconomic development as well as to reconstruction and reconciliation. While the reform is well in line with the international trend of a ‘local turn’, the Rwandan government makes a point of not letting donors or other external actors set the agenda. Determined to formulate its own policies, thus claiming ‘national ownership’, it has, within the frame of decentralisation, launched several development programmes to be locally implemented and to promote local participation and downward accountability. However, the reform and programmes are designed and decided upon in a top-down manner by the central national leadership. This article analyses local experiences and perceptions of decentralisation and related programmes, and investigates whether and how such reform provides for local participation and downward accountability. It concludes that nationally owned reform is not necessarily an alternative to externally initiated and driven reform; neither local participation nor downward accountability was enhanced. The study builds on official policy documents and semi-structured interviews with Rwandan residents and local officials.
Notes
1. Brinkerhoff and Johnson, “Decentralized Local Governance”; Conyers, “Decentralisation”; Crawford and Hartmann, Decentralisation in Africa.
2. Long, Development Sociology; and Hasselskog, “Development Intervention on the Ground.”
3. Grimm, “Aid Dependency”; and Hayman, “Rwanda.”
4. Straus and Waldorf, “Introduction,” 10ff; and Desrosiers and Thomson, “Rhetorical Legacies,” 436.
5. Ansoms, “Re-engineering Rural Society,” 299; Ansoms, “Large-scale Land Deals”; Desrosiers and Thomson, “Rhetorical Legacies”; Pritchard, “Land, Power and Peace”; Purdeková, “‘Even if I am not here’”; Hintjens, “Land Reform”; and Hasselskog, “Rwandan developmental ‘Social Engineering’.”
6. National ownership refers to a government’s authority over development policies and activities (that rely on external resources). This includes articulating the national development agenda and establishing authoritative policies and strategies. See OECD, Guidelines and Reference Series.
7. RoR, National Decentralization Policy, 8.
8. For example, Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression.
9. Chemouni, “Explaining the Design,” 248.
10. Ibid; Gaynor, Decentralisation, Conflict and Peacebuilding; and Powley, Engendering Rwanda’s Decentralization. For a description of different administrative entities mandates and responsibilities, see, for example, Purdeková, “‘Even if I am not here’.” Local elections in Rwanda have been widely criticised for, among other things, lack of secrecy, lack of political competition, and outcomes being predetermined, seriously undermining their legitimacy and not providing for downward accountability. Further, the most influential local state officials, the Executive Secretaries at various levels, are not elected but are centrally appointed. See Uvin, “Difficult Choices”; Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On”; Burnet, “Gender Balance”; Powley , Engendering Rwanda’s Decentralization; and Chemouni, “Explaining the Design.”
11. Chemouni, “Explaining the Design,” 248; Kauzya, “Political Decentralization in Africa,” 10; and Tilburg, “Decentralisation as a Stabilising Factor,” 222.
12. Kauzya, “Political Decentralization in Africa,” 9–10.
13. RoR, Rwanda Decentralization Strategic Framework, 3; Ansoms and Rostagno, “Rwanda’s Vision 2020,” 428–430; Chemouni, “Explaining the Design,” 246–247; Zorbas, “Aid Dependence”; Hayman, “Rwanda”; and Hasselskog, “Rwandan developmental ‘Social Engineering’.”
14. RoR, Economic Development & Poverty Reduction.
15. Ibid.
16. Purdeková, “‘Even if I am not Here’,” 490–491.
17. ‘Umurenge’ is Kinyarwanda for ‘sector’.
18. RLDSF, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, 4; and VUP, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme.
19. RLDSF, Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme, 37.
20. RoR, Mechanisms for Participation, 24, 55.
21. RoR, Economic Development & Poverty Reduction.
22. RoR, Mechanisms for Participation. It is worth noting that the term ‘umuganda’ was also used to call upon people to participate in the genocide. See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 138; and Thompson, The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, 110.
23. RoR, Mechanisms for Participation, 61–62.
24. Rwandapedia, “Umuganda.”
25. Yin, Case Study Research, 46–47.
26. RoR, National Decentralization Policy, 8–9.
27. George and McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories,” 35–36; and King et al., Designing Social Inquiry, 227–228. See also George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development.
28. For example, Cornwall, The Participation Reader; and Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation.”
29. Gaventa, “Towards Participatory Local Governance”; Ribot, “Participation without Representation”; and Blair, “Participation and Accountability.”
30. That it is not always the poorest who benefit, as a result of corrupt practices, is confirmed by RoR, Mechanisms for Participation, 61.
31. This is confirmed by ibid., 61.
32. This is confirmed by ibid., 39.
33. This is confirmed by ibid., 45ff.
34. The imihigo programme aims for all government entities, and now also all households, to commit within a specific timeframe to achieving specific targets; their performance on these targets is closely monitored. See, for example, RoR, National Decentralization Policy (Revised).
35. This is confirmed by RoR, Mechanisms for Participation, 62.
36. Mansuri and Rao, Localizing Development, 17.
37. Uvin, “Difficult Choices”; Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On”; Burnet, “Gender Balance”; Powley, Engendering Rwanda’s Decentralization; and Chemouni, “Explaining the Design.”
38. See also Chemouni, “Explaining the Design,” 253.
39. For example, Melvin, “Reconstructing Rwanda”; and Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth.”