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What Are Beall and Restall Pluralists About?Thanks to the attendees at the Western Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings of 2001 for a helpful discussion of this paper, and also to two anonymous referees for the AJP for their useful comments.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Beall and Restall's claim that there is one true logic of metaphysical modality is incompatible with the formulation of logical pluralism that they give. I investigate various ways of reconciling their pluralism with this claim, but conclude that none of the options can be made to work.
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- Available online: 08 Apr 2010
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