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Research Note

What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC's National Strategy

Pages 54-72
Published online: 19 Mar 2012
 

Abstract

Debates about China's national strategy have surprisingly overlooked an important source: the national strategy as formulated by China's leaders themselves. This article explains how the ruling Communist Party of China formulates its equivalent of a national strategy – defined as the nation's desired end state and guidance on supporting objectives, ways, and means. It explores the current national strategy as published in widely available official documents such as the Communist Party Constitution and Party Congress Work Report, the most recent version of which dates from the 17th Party Congress in 2007. The article considers some implications for observers and policymakers.

Acknowledgments

This article represents the author's personal views. It does not represent the US Pacific Command, Department of Defense, or government and does not necessarily reflect the policies or estimates of these or any other organizations.

The author would like to thank Chad Sbragia, Michael Coullahan, Daniel Tobin, and the individuals in the United States Pacific Command China Strategic Focus Group for their help with this manuscript.

Notes

1. Richard McGregor, The Party (New York: Harper-Collins Books 2010), p. 21. David Finkelstein, “China's National Military Strategy,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1999), pp. 99–145.

2. The Communist Party has lately called its version of Marxist theory, also called “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” the “party's theory” as part of a longstanding trend to downplay Marxism and emphasize the collective authority of the party over individual leaders. This article will follow the CPC's practice in employing the term “party's theory.”

3. Xi Jinping, “On Several Experiences and Understandings in Studying the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Qiushi, April 1, 2008.

4. “Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th Party Congress,” Xinhua, October 24, 2007.

5. Alice Lyman Miller, “The Road to the 17th Party Congress,” China Leadership Monitor No. 18 (Spring 2006). Available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm18_lm.pdf

6. Joseph Fewsmith, “Promoting the Scientific Development Concept,” China Leadership Monitor No. 11 (Summer 2011). Available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/6226

7. Throughout this article, “Constitution” refers to the Constitution of the CPC.

8. Miller, “The Road to the 17th Party Congress.”

9. “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 25, 2007. http://www.xinhuanet.com

10. These comprise the “four basic principles” (si xiang jiben yuanze) mentioned in the basic line.

11. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.” “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development,” December 6, 2010. Available at Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC Web site, http://www.mfa.gov.cn

12. “The 11th Meeting of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Convenes in Beijing: Hu Jintao Makes an Important Speech,” Xinhua, July 20, 2009. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com

13. Chen Xiangyang, “The Direction of China's Great Diplomacy in the New Period,” Liaowang, July 27, 2009, p. 58. Chen Xiangyang, “Deal with the Six Plates of the ‘Grand Periphery,’” Liaowang, August 23, 2010, p. 59.

14. “Speech by His Excellence Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China at Opening Plenary of Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2011,” April 14, 2011. Available at Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn

15. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”

16. State Council Information Office, “PRC Peaceful Development White Paper,” December 22, 2005. Available at http://www.china.org.cn

17. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”

18. State Council Information Office, “PRC Peaceful Development White Paper,” 2005.

19. Feng Liang, “Strategic Consideration on Stabilizing China's Maritime Security Environment,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue No. 5 (2009).

20. “Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report to 16th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2002. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com

21. Wen Xian, “A Year of Peace and Development Achieved,” Renmin Ribao, December 24, 2007.

22. The 2008 PRC Defense White Paper State Council Information Office, “China's National Defense in 2008,” January 20, 2009. Available at http://www.china.org.cn. Also identified this as an objective for 2020.

23. “Full Text of Jian Zemin's Report to 16th Party Congress” and “Full Text of Hu Jintao's Report at the 17th Party Congress.” Alan Romberg, “Cross Straits Peace,” China Leadership Monitor No. 23 (Winter 2008). Available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5803

24. Wang Shumei et al., “Carry out the Historic Mission of the Army and Establish the Scientific Concept of the Seas,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue No. 2 (2007). Andrew Batson, “China Takes Aim at the Dollar,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2009.

25. Edward Wong, “China Expands Naval Power to Waters US Dominates,” New York Times, April 23, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html Although PRC officials deny that China “is a core interest,” they do concur that the South China Sea “is related to core interests.” This subtle but important difference is likely the source of much confusion in Western press on this issue.

26. Willy Lam, “Hawks vs. Doves: Beijing Debates ‘Core Interests’ and Sino–U.S. Relations,” Jamestown Foundation, August 19, 2010. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36769&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=4462bfb6da

27. Michael Swaine, “China's Assertive Behavior: Core Interests,” China Leadership Monitor No. 34 (Winter 2011). Available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM34MS.pdf

28. The 17th Party Congress Work Report discussed the core interests in guidance on foreign relations and in military guidance as part of the “historic missions” concept. The concept also appears in PRC Defense and Peaceful Development (foreign policy) white papers.

29. State Council Information Office, “PRC Peaceful Development White Paper,” 2011. State Council Information Office, “China's National Defense White Paper,” December 29, 2006.

30. State Council Information Office, “China's National Defense White Paper,” December 29, 2006.

31. State Council Information Office, “China's National Defense White Paper,” January 20, 2009.

32. Da Wei, “A Clear Signal of ‘Core Interests’ to the World,” China Daily, August 2, 2008. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-08/02/content_11083124.htm

33. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”

34. Chen Zhou, “An Analysis of Defensive National Defense Policy of China for Safeguarding Peace and Development,” Zhonggou Junshi Kexue No. 6 (2007). See also Su Changhe, “On China's Overseas Interests,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], August 14, 2009.

35. Wei, “A Clear Signal of ‘Core Interests’ to the World.”

36. Full Text of Jiang Zemin's Report to “16th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2002. 15th Party Congress Work Report, Xinhua, September 21, 1997. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com

37. Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”

38. Hui Liangyu, “Improving Policies for Strengthening Agriculture, Benefiting Peasants,” Qiushi, March 1, 2011.

39. “The Outline of the 12th Five-Year Program,” Xinhua, March 16, 2011. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com

40. “China Tries to Ease Tensions in South China Sea,” Financial Times, July 22, 2011.

41. Swaine, “China's Assertive Behavior: Core Interests.”

42. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesman's News Conference,” September 21, 2010. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn

43. “Interview with Greg Sheridan,” November 8, 2010. Available at US Department of State Web site, http://www.state.gov

44. “China to Build Surveillance Ships to Protect Maritime Rights,” Xinhua, February 21, 2008. Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com

45. Carlyle Thayer, “The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” Security Challenges Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 2010). Available at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol6no2Thayer.pdf

46. Michael Swaine and Taylor Fravel, “China's Assertive Behavior: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor No. 35 (2011).

47. Valdine England, “Why Are South China Sea Tensions Rising?” BBC, September 2, 2010. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11152948

48. Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, Chinese Decision Making Under Stress (Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2005). Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub623.pdf

49. The author would like to thank Chad Sbragia for this observation.

50. Xi Jinping, “On Several Experiences and Understandings in Studying the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” Qiushi, April 1, 2008.

51. “Innovative Development of the Party's Guiding Theory on Air Force Building,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue No. 5 (2007).