The case of the missing democratic alliance: France, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and NATO's deep origins

This article is concerned with the linkage social-constructivist theory makes between threat and alliances. It constitutes a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the postulated origins of something known as the ‘democratic alliance’, that is, an ideal type security arrangement whose most concrete manifestation many constructivists say has been NATO. Although NATO's future has received a great deal of their attention, constructivists have, with some notable exceptions, been reticent about the role played by ‘threat’ in the formative stages of the democratic alliance; mostly they appear to take it as given that NATO's charter members must have needed a traditional threat (supplied by the Soviet Union) to have forged their alliance. In reality, there are two constructivist schools on the question of NATO's beginnings. The majority advances what might be branded the ‘weak’ thesis on NATO's origins, one that is nearly indistinguishable from a realist account; but a small minority, of whom Thomas Risse is the most noteworthy, dare to venture a ‘strong’ thesis, one whose implications make it a radical departure from realism. It is the strong thesis that serves as the point of departure for the critique I make in this article.