The online platform for Taylor & Francis Group content

Cookies Notification

This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Find out more.
Advanced and citation search

Security Studies

Volume 24, Issue 2, 2015

Translator disclaimer
Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace
Original Articles

Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace

DOI:
10.1080/09636412.2015.1038188
Erik Gartzke & Jon R. Lindsay

pages 316-348

Abstract

It is widely believed that cyberspace is offense dominant because of technical characteristics that undermine deterrence and defense. This argument mistakes the ease of deception on the Internet for a categorical ease of attack. As intelligence agencies have long known, deception is a double-edged sword. Covert attackers must exercise restraint against complex targets in order to avoid compromises resulting in mission failure or retaliation. More importantly, defenders can also employ deceptive concealment and ruses to confuse or ensnare aggressors. Indeed, deception can reinvigorate traditional strategies of deterrence and defense against cyber threats, as computer security practitioners have already discovered. The strategy of deception has other important implications: as deterrence became foundational in the nuclear era, deception should rise in prominence in a world that increasingly depends on technology to mediate interaction.

Related articles

View all related articles
 

Article metrics

  • Views: 630

Librarians

Taylor & Francis Group