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Small Wars & Insurgencies

Volume 16, Issue 2, 2005

Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War

Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War

DOI:
10.1080/09592310500079874
Philippe Pottier*

pages 125-146

Available online: 25 Jan 2007

Abstract

In 1951, the French created a special unit in Indochina, the Groupement de Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés (GCMA), to deal with the unconventional side of Vietminh strategy. Its initial purpose was to destroy Vietminh subversion of the rural population and not to harass Vietminh units. The GCMA developed an efficient process of swiftly taking control of large zones in the Vietminh rear areas through the use of native contact Special Mission teams. These infiltrated the population, gathered intelligence, and established guerrilla bands. This process enabled the GCMA to increase its strength dramatically through this specialised native recruitment to 14,000 men during the latter half of 1953. An important lesson from this experience is that the isolated teams were militarily weak and thus vulnerable to any concerted Vietminh offence. Counterinsurgency thus cannot be successful without an effective coordination between conventional and unconventional forces to counter this vulnerability.

 

Details

  • Available online: 25 Jan 2007

Author affiliations

  • a Chet de Bataillon, Troupes de Marine, Armée de Terre, France

Journal news

  • Incorporating Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement

Librarians

Taylor & Francis Group