
According to mainstream economic theory the contractual relationship between borrower and lender is characterized by asymmetry of information regarding the project to be financed. It is assumed that trust among credit participants is constructed individually as they collect and assess requisite information. In contrast, this paper argues that trust and information among credit participants have compelling social constituents that depend on economic function and social context. More specifically, the paper shows that financial institutions transform trust into a social and objective relationship. The capitalist credit system comprises a set of institutions that construct trust socially by using increasingly general information. Nonetheless, the foundation of credit-related trust is the ability to repay money. Hence the moral content of credit is thin, giving rise to fraud and deception.
Costas Lapavitsas is Reader in Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His research interests and publications include political economy of money and finance, history of political economy and the evolution of the contemporary financial system.