Russian reliance on its non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been an ongoing concern for security experts. What is the Russian de facto employment doctrine for this arsenal? This article argues that Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) have no defined mission and no deterrence framework has been elaborated for them. This study disentangles Russian thoughts and deeds about regional nuclear deterrence and the role of NSNW in it. Situating the Russian case in the comparative context, the article argues that establishing a coherent theater nuclear posture and streamlining it with the national level deterrence strategy is a demanding and frequently unfulfilled task. It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.
a Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, The Institute of Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel
Author biographies
Dr Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky is Associate Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy and a fellow at the Institute of Policy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya. His research interests include international security, cultural approach to IR, modern military thought, nuclear strategy and history. He has published on these topics in academic journals and edited volumes. His first book Operation Kavkaz (Hebrew) earned the prize for the best academic work on Israeli security in 2006. His second book The Culture of Military Innovation (Stanford UP 2010) earned the same prize in 2012. He is a winner of the 2012 annual Amos Perlmutter Prize.