It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?
a The Changing Character of War Programme , Oxford University
Author biographies
Todd Greentree is a member of the Changing Character of War Programme at Oxford University. A former US Foreign Service Officer, his political-military experience in five conflicts began in El Salvador during the early 1980’s. Most recently, he served as Director of the Initiatives Group in Regional Command-South, Kandahar, Afghanistan during 2010-11.